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Abstract  
 
 
In this thesis, I critically analyse power relations between donors and the government 
of Malawi (GoM) under the new aid architecture and argue that this new configuration 
represents a shift away from domination, with donors attempting to impose policies, 
and towards more subtle interactions, through which donors seek to transform the 
GoM into a self-disciplined, entrepreneurial, neoliberal subject by shaping its 
aspirations and promoting specific norms of conduct, ‘truths’ and policy-related 
techniques.  
 
The research focuses on funding for AIDS and draws on forty interviews with 
representatives from the GoM, donors and civil society, conducted in Malawi 2008, as 
well as discursive analysis of secondary sources. I use Foucault’s concept of 
governmentality, a form of productive power focused on the care of the population and 
working through individuals’ subjectivities, and extend it to the relation between 
donors and the GoM. I show that the agency of the GoM is both elicited by the 
principle of country ownership, and re-worked through the increased involvement of 
donors in the policy sphere. I explore how these interactions are legitimised by a 
discourse that presents donors and the GoM as equals, while casting the GoM as 
technically deficient and requiring donors’ intervention. I analyse how donors 
instrumentalise dialogue with the GoM to instil an ethos of self-responsibility.   
 
I also investigate how AIDS funding has been made reliant on public financial 
management reforms, which re-code social domains according to an economic logic, by 
subordinating government activities to macroeconomic imperatives and creating new 
undemocratic accountabilities based on market rationalities. I argue that by 
 3 
restructuring the GoM according to this neoliberal rationality, the new aid architecture 
has programmatic effects, allowing donors to rule at a distance. I also examine avenues 
for resistance, particularly the potential residing in the intrinsic contradictions of this 
rationality.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
 
‘It is not power, but the subject, which is the general theme of my research1’ 
(Foucault, 2001: 1042)  
 
 
1.1. Introduction  
 
The aid architecture has undergone significant transformations in the past decade or so, 
with aid recipient governments repositioned at the centre of development policy 
elaboration and implementation by the Post-Washington Consensus (PWC) and the aid 
effectiveness agenda. The role of traditional donors has also changed as many pledged 
in 2005 to follow the principles established by the Paris Declaration of Aid 
Effectiveness, requiring them to align their priorities on those developed by aid 
recipients. In this thesis, I analyse how this new aid architecture has altered power 
relations between donors and the government of Malawi (GoM) by focusing on the area 
of AIDS. International funding for the AIDS response has expanded considerably 
throughout the first decade of the new millennium and makes these changes 
particularly visible, especially in Malawi where donors’ response has largely espoused 
the Paris principles. In order to analyse these changes, I draw on Foucault’s concept of 
governmentality to show that this new configuration can be seen as a shift away from a 
relation based on domination, with donors attempting to impose policies, and towards 
more subtle interactions through which donors seek to transform the GoM into a self-
disciplined, entrepreneurial neoliberal subject by shaping its aspirations and promoting 
specific norms of conduct. The research is based on forty interviews with 
representatives from the government of Malawi, donor agencies and civil society, 
                                                 
1 Author’s translation : ‘Ce n’est donc pas le pouvoir, mais le sujet, qui constitue le thème général de mes 
recherches’, 
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conducted in Malawi in 2008, as well as document analysis. This chapter introduces the 
thesis in greater detail, locating it in its academic context, providing details of its scope 
and presenting the theoretical perspective underpinning the research. The aims and 
significance of the study are then addressed, before introducing the research questions 
and considering epistemological and methodological issues. Finally, I explain the 
choices I made in relation to the use of potentially contentious terminology and outline 
the structure of the thesis.  
 
 
1.2. Context of the study 
  
The critique of international development is a vast and flourishing field, to which this 
thesis seeks to contribute. The power dimension of foreign aid in particular has been 
the focus of attention of many scholars. In that regard, aid, in the form of grants, loans, 
lines of credit, technical and humanitarian assistance and so on, has been seen as a 
means through which more powerful nations have sought to secure their ‘political and 
strategic interests’ (Rowlands, 2008). ‘Soft policies’, such as foreign aid, were 
instrumentalised as tools used to sustain alliances during the Cold War. However, the 
end of the bipolar world and new security concerns have also contributed to give 
international development a geopolitical importance (Dixneuf and Rey, 2004; Duffield, 
2001). In this light, Western aid has been analysed as political containment (Li, 2007), a 
means of diffusing social mobilisation in the Global South (Li, 2007; Escobar, 2005) and 
securing the geopolitical domination of the West (Slater and Bell, 2002). As Power 
states:  
‘Development has to be considered therefore in large part as related to a 
“geopolitics” of race where “developed” countries take an interest in and 
consider the needs of poor countries in ways that often issue directly from their 
own preoccupations and strategic political, cultural and economic objectives and 
perspectives.’  
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(Power, 2003: 12) 
 
Postcolonial approaches (Mercer et al., 2003; Slater and Bell, 2002) and 
‘postdevelopment’ theories (Escobar, 1995; Ferguson, 1990) have notably focused on the 
discursive constructions involved in reproducing, legitimising and depoliticising 
unequal relations between countries through international development. For example, 
Kapoor (2006) states that foreign aid portrays donor countries as generous, caring and 
humanitarian, while recipient countries are marked as weak and helpless. In that 
regard, international development can be seen as both post- and neo-colonialism, a 
‘continuation of tutelage under a globalizing gaze’ (Slater and Bell, 2002: 351).  
 
From that perspective, global health and AIDS, which have taken an increasingly 
important place in the international development agenda in the past two decades, can 
be seen as incarnating ‘an exaggerated version of the existing aid and policy 
mechanisms with some peculiar features of [their] own’ (de Waal: 2006: 60). The 
scaling up of financing for AIDS prevention, treatment and care spearheaded by the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), the establishment of the Global Fund for TB, 
Malaria and HIV/AIDS and the U.S. President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief 
(PEPFAR) which have disbursed respectively about US$ 17bn and US$ 46bn so far, has 
magnified many traditional features decried by critics of international development. 
Thus, the creation of an ‘international AIDS governance’ has been seen as both 
reflecting and bolstering donors’ power over recipient countries, at both discursive 
(Seckinelgin, 2004; Jones, 2004) and material levels (Poku, 2002). For example, 
O’Shaughnessy (2007: 3) argues that ‘African governments, organisations and 
communities were constructed as takers of knowledge’, rather than sources of 
innovation. As a result, the response to the epidemics in Sub-Saharan Africa has been 
critiqued for drawing heavily on Western experiences and context and focusing on 
biomedical issues and behaviour change (Seckinelgin, 2008; O’Manique, 2004). Thus, 
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donors have been perceived as failing to address the socio-economic dimension of the 
epidemics and their link with global structural inequalities (Nauta, 2010; Youde, 2005).  
 
In addition, this increase in funding has been analysed as reflecting security concerns of 
donors linked to the fight against terrorism, uncontrolled migration and spread of 
diseases (Ingram, 2005; Duffield, 2001). Hence, these developments have been seen as 
creating a ‘nexus between questions of disease, space and power’ (Ingram, 2005: 524). In 
this light, global AIDS interventions can be analysed as a way of exercising greater 
social, economic and political control rather than ‘a means of genuine emancipation or 
empowerment’ (Ingram, 2005: 525-6). Moreover, the international AIDS response has 
been viewed as a means to protect or further donors’ economic interests. For example, 
the 1995 Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement has 
been impeding the use of generic drugs in poor countries (Sandusky, 2006; Shadlen, 
2004). The scaling up of treatment has also been seen as benefiting the Western 
pharmaceutical industry (Nauta, 2010). As Ingram (2005: 524) argues: ‘The inability to 
transcend neoliberal ideology suggests that containment of the diseases of the poor 
rather than genuine global transformation may be a dominant mode for the new 
geopolitics of disease’.  
 
However, the scale of the international response, and especially the aspiration for 
universal treatment, has been seen as altering recipient countries’ global position and 
locating them as the executive arm of a network of global governance. As de Waal 
(2006) explains:  
 
‘Sub-Saharan Africa’s biggest-ever service delivery operation is being 
implemented with a multiplicity of new actors, with massive infusion of foreign 
funds and expertise, and in governing systems that are often neopatrimonies. 
We are on the brink of an unparalleled life-controlling intrusion into African 
societies, and we just don’t know what it will look like. […] Achieving the 
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necessary compliance rates and monitoring systems will require an unparalleled 
level of intrusiveness and discipline.’ 
(de Waal, 2006: 115)  
 
As Power (2003: 16) elucidates, development can be seen as ‘disciplining’ in a 
Foucauldian sense, in that it seeks to make ‘people become good, docile, governable 
citizens in the course of their society’s modernisation’, by instilling surveillance and 
compliance through the use of discourses, policies and statistics. Thus, the international 
AIDS response has been raising issues such as power, democracy and sovereignty in 
unprecedented ways.  
 
Moreover, the development of a ‘global governance’ of AIDS (Seckinelgin, 2008: 1) has 
been concomitant to a major paradigm shift in international aid. By the late 1990s, the 
International Financial Institutions (IFIs) comprising the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF)2 faced a severe legitimacy crisis. Confronted with 
swelling popular disapproval, critiques from the Bank’s own former Chief Economist, 
Joseph Stiglitz, and an increasing number of internal and external evaluations showing 
that the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) and the accompanying neoliberal 
policies they had forced onto indebted countries had failed to bring expected benefits, 
the IFIs had to reinvent themselves (Bergamashi, 2011). They adopted a new approach, 
coined the ‘Post-Washington Consensus’, centred on poverty reduction. In contrast 
with the modus operandi of development in the SAP period, which favoured service-
delivery through a web of NGOs and CSOs, this new paradigm shifted the emphasis 
back to the state and country-ownership of development policies became a new 
buzzword. This stemmed, in part, from concerns that previous reforms imposed on poor 
countries had failed to be adequately implemented due to a lack of political will (Dollar 
                                                 
2 They are sometimes referred to in the literature as the Bretton Woods Institutions (BWI) though the 
term also includes the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade which became the World Trade 
Organisation in 1995.  
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and Pritchett, 1998). Thus, while macroeconomic policies formulated under the PWC 
have remained remarkably unchanged, promoting macroeconomic stability, 
privatisation, trade liberalisation and fiscal discipline (Ruckert, 2006), there has been a 
noticeable shift from the SAPs’ rhetoric of ‘competition, confrontation and ideological 
contestation’ to ‘a language of convergence and mutual complicity’ (Gould: 2005b: 61). 
This is underpinned by a departure from the ‘carrot and stick approach’ to North-South 
relations to a subtler dynamic (Gould, 2005b: 63).  
 
The paradigm shift represented by the PWC, together with the substantial increase in 
funding for international development stimulated by the Millennium Development 
Goals, paved the way for concerns regarding aid effectiveness. Indeed, the pressure 
towards meeting the millennium targets, the need for Western governments to account 
for aid funding to their voters, and concerns regarding poor countries’ ability to absorb 
increased aid flows (de Renzio, 2006) have brought long-standing issues such as lack of 
donor coordination and transaction costs (the cost of disbursing and managing aid 
funding) to the fore (Steinle and Correll, 2008). Under the aegis of the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), a new ‘aid architecture’ was 
conceptualised. The Paris Declaration, which was signed in 2005 by 35 donor countries, 
26 multilateral donors and 56 aid-recipient countries with 14 civil society organisations 
acting as observers, outlines the main principles presiding over this reconfiguration. 
The new aid effectiveness agenda is based on the principle of country ownership, 
which engages donors to support recipient countries’ leadership over their development 
policies. Donors are also urged to align their funding on recipient countries’ priorities 
and procedures (e.g. procurement, auditing, accounting etc.) and harmonize with other 
donors through the use of common systems (such as direct budget support or pool-
funding mechanisms) and/or comparative advantage (finding a ‘niche’ in countries’ 
development agenda). Meanwhile recipient countries are expected to reform their 
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national systems to make them compatible with ‘international standards’. In addition, 
the Declaration commits signatories to a results-oriented development approach and 
increased mutual accountability and transparency.  
 
While the Paris Declaration has been viewed by some (e.g. Steinle and Correll, 2008) as 
attempting to shift the balance of power between donor and recipient countries, by 
putting the latter ‘in the driver’s seat’, others have been critical of it. It has been seen as 
an overly technocratic instrument (Kees van Donge, 2007; Fritz and Rocha Menocal 
2007), developed from donors’ perspective (Unwin, 2004; Rocha Menocal and 
Rogerson, 2006) and failing to address issues crucial to aid effectiveness such as debt, 
conditionalities, gender equality, human rights, or environmental sustainability 
(Wallace, 2009; Steinle and Correll, 2008). The Paris Declaration has also been 
perceived as artificially separating aid from any consideration about structural issues 
that contribute to poverty such as world trade agreements, primary commodity pricing, 
the undemocratic nature of IFIs, or the unbalanced aid allocations across countries 
(Wallace, 2009; Sen, 2007; Rogerson, 2005). A few of these shortcomings have been 
addressed recently at the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, that took 
place in Busan in 2011. The conference shifted the emphasis towards development 
effectiveness, a framework that sought to include donor countries from the Global 
South and widen the scope of the Paris Declaration. Indeed, the increasing importance 
of donors such as China, India, Brazil and South Africa in the past few years is 
contributing to significantly altering aid relations. However, it is likely that some of the 
critiques targeted at the aid effectiveness agenda, and indeed the findings of the present 
study, will remain relevant in the near future.  
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Indeed, the Paris Declaration has been seen as further embedding the spirit of the 
PWC, viewed by some as a new incarnation of neoliberalism, rather than a radical shift 
(Murray and Overton, 2011; Ruckert, 2006). As David Mosse asks: 
 
‘Does the “moral resurrection of aid” with its emphasis on ownership, 
participation and good governance in fact conceal an era of greater intervention 
by international agencies in the internal affairs of developing countries?’ 
(Mosse, 2005: 1-2) 
 
However, while the PWC and its Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) have 
generated a vast literature, there is still surprisingly little research into the effects of the 
new aid architecture on power relations between donors and recipient countries. The 
present thesis seeks to address this gap, as outlined in the next section. 
 
 
1.3. Scope of the study 
 
In this study, I seek to understand the changes brought about by the new aid 
architecture to the power dynamic between donors and recipient countries. It takes 
funding for AIDS (and health to the extent that these sectors overlap) as its focus. As 
outlined above, because of the considerable increase in interest and funding for AIDS 
from donors, this area magnifies new trends in international development. In 
particular, while indebted countries’ economic sovereignty has been largely transferred 
to supra-national institutions and international corporations (Ferguson and Gupta, 
2002: 992), until recently, the area of social policies had been, to a greater degree, the 
prerogative of poor countries (to the extent that they complied with SAPs’ demands for 
cutting public service spending through privatisation, downsizing, fee levies etc.). Yet, 
under the PWC and the new aid architecture, many donors have agreed to fund social 
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areas through the state rather than through parallel structures, leading to their greater 
involvement with aid-dependent countries in these sectors.  
 
The research was carried out in Malawi. This country was identified as a valuable 
location for this study for several reasons. Despite occasionally stormy relations 
between the government and donors (Booth et al., 2006), the country has historically 
been the recipient of high levels of donor funding (Morfit, 2011). It is highly aid-
dependent, with overseas development assistance representing 40% of national 
revenues in 2006/2007 (DFID, 2007b). Malawi suffers from high HIV prevalence rates 
at about 11.2% (UNAIDS, 2012), combined with extreme levels of poverty, with 40% of 
the population living below the poverty line in 20083 (CABS Development Partners, 
2010, in Loquai and Klavert, 2011).  
 
Development assistance targeted at AIDS interventions has been highly harmonised in 
Malawi since the beginning of the Millennium. The National AIDS Commission (NAC), 
created in 2001, has a pool-funding mechanism through which donors such as the 
Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), the British Department for 
International Development (DFID), the Norwegian Agency for Development (NORAD, 
also managing funds on behalf of the Swedish International Development Agency 
SIDA), the World Bank and the Global Fund for TB, HIV/AIDS and Malaria operate. 
Pool or basket funding mechanisms enable the joint funding by a number of donors of a 
set of activities through a common account (Government of Malawi, 2007). Other 
donors such as the U.S. Centers for Disease Control (CDC) and the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP), though not part of the pool, have aligned their 
activities on the strategies and workplan formulated by the National AIDS Commission.  
                                                 
3 The poverty line was defined as Malawi Kwacha (MK ) 47 per person per day in 2005 prices, equivalent 
to US$ 0.3 (Chissinga, 2009) 
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In addition, in 2004 the Malawian Ministry of Health (MoH) and a number of donors 
agreed to a Sector-Wide Approach (SWAp) which is a form of sectoral budget support. 
The Health SWAp has been successful in attracting donor support and, in 2008, was 
channelling an average of 95% of total donor funding for the sector (Carlson et al., 
2008: viii). At the time of my fieldwork, SWAp signatories included DFID, the largest 
donor in the health sector, NORAD (with SIDA), the United Nations Population Fund 
(UNFPA - formerly United Nations Fund for Population Activities), the World Bank 
and the Global Fund (DFID, 2007b). In 2009/2010 sectoral support provided through 
the Health SWAp and NAC’s pool funding mechanism accounted for 15% of total aid to 
the country (Loquai and Klavert, 2011).  
 
There is also a direct, or general, budget support mechanism through which donors 
contributing directly to the government budget coordinate their action. In 2008, this 
included DFID, NORAD (with SIDA), the European Commission (EC), the World Bank 
and the African Development Bank. Budget support accounted for 30% of all overseas 
development assistance (ODA) to the country in 2009/2010 (Loquai and Klavert, 2011). 
It is worth noting that these mechanisms all predate the Paris Declaration, pointing to 
the fact that the document institutionalised and reinforced practices that had already 
been in existence, particularly since the shift promoted by the PWC.  
 
Because of the specificity of each recipient country and the major donors operating in 
these locations, I am reluctant to call this research a case study as findings may or may 
not be indicative of the power dynamics taking place in other settings. However, this 
research seeks to offer lines of inquiry and analytical tools that could be useful to study 
aid relations under the new aid architecture in other locations.  
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1.4. Theoretical framework  
 
This research draws on Foucault’s concept of governmentality to analyse the changes in 
power relations between donors and the government of Malawi (GoM). 
Governmentality can be defined as an economy of power which works alongside other 
forms such as sovereignty and discipline and whose primary target is to ensure the 
welfare of a population in order to maximize the wealth of a nation, or economy 
(Foucault, 2007a). One characteristic of this art of government is that it employs a series 
of tactics, including but not being limited to the law, in order to reach its goals 
(Foucault, 2007a: 99). While Foucault traces its origin back to some early Christian 
cultures, he also shows how governmentality has been reworked overtime, as different 
ways of rationalizing the exercise of government have emerged. For example, he 
elucidates how, in the eighteenth century, liberalism, under the impetus of the 
Physiocrats, subordinated the existence of the state to its use to society and the 
economy.  
 
However, Foucault shows that liberalism, or the question of ‘too much government’, 
has been transformed since. In particular, he analyses how, while post-war German 
liberals viewed the state as a key element ensuring the correction and protection of a 
market-based economy, the partisans of the Chicago School reversed this logic and 
advocated instead an organisation of the state by market-based principles (Foucault, 
2008). They also extended market-based logic to human behaviour, conceptualising the 
individual as a ‘homo economicus’, whose choices are based on self-interest and a 
rational calculus aiming at maximising value. This encoding of the social as economic 
thus entailed a redefinition of neo-liberal subjects as entrepreneurs of themselves 
(Foucault, 2008; Lemke, 2001). The theorization of this ‘homo economicus’ leads to a 
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second marked difference with the classical version of liberalism. While, for the latter, 
freedom of individuals is foundational, the neoliberals view liberty as an artifice, as 
choices can be manipulated through incentives and disincentives (Foucault, 2008: 268). 
Thus Foucault shows that, contrary to the roll back of the state rhetoric, this neoliberal 
perspective opens up new domains of state intervention necessary to (re)produce 
suitably responsible self-entrepreneurial individuals. Hence, Foucault highlights the 
ways in which the American neoliberal incarnation of governmentality relies on a link 
between political formation, economic exploitation, and the production of subjects 
made responsible for themselves through a series of techniques deployed by the state 
and other agents (Lemke, 2001: 103).  
 
Foucault’s conceptualisation of governmentality has spawned a vast array of studies. Of 
chief interest here, are those examining the various techniques and mechanisms 
employed to, on the one hand, create ‘free’ subjects that are able to make calculative 
and rational choices (homo economicus), and on the other, devise incentives to help 
them make appropriate decisions (Hamann, 2009). Rose (1999), for example, has 
explored how governmental techniques and rationalities have sought to construct 
freedom as the compulsion to make choices and to create subjects abiding by norms of 
responsibility, autonomy and self-determination. The programmatic quality of 
governmentality, which works through ‘the more or less explicit, purposive attempts to 
organize and reorganize institutional space, their routines, rituals and procedures, and 
the conduct of actors in specific ways’ (Dean, 1999: 43) is also key, here, to understand 
processes of neoliberal subjectification.  
 
Governmentality has inspired a number of studies analysing aid through its lens. Li 
(2007) for example, contends that decolonisation and the loss of control over territories 
has given some impetus to the pre-eminence of government as a technology of power, 
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where focus on the welfare of the population has been key to securing influence over 
newly independent countries. For instance, Ansell et al. (2012) have analysed how 
youth policy in Malawi can be seen as a form of transnational governmentality seeking 
to produce suitable neoliberal subjects. Of course, with its focus on population welfare, 
the concept of governmentality has been seen as particularly relevant to the studies of 
AIDS interventions, in both Western countries and the Global South. For instance, 
Vander Schee and Baez (2009: 33) have analysed AIDS education in the U.S. as ‘a 
method of neoliberal governmentality concerned with regulating the categories of 
health, risk, and disease in relation to youthful identities’. In relation to development 
assistance, Leach (2006) has declared that HIV/AIDS interventions constitute biopower4 
on a global scale. Because AIDS programmes often seek to regulate intimate areas of 
people’s lives, they constitute an unprecedented expansion of surveillance of, and 
intervention targeted at the population (de Waal, 2006). Ingram (2010), for example, 
has analysed the deployment of PEPFAR through the prism of governmentality, 
showing how interventions ‘designed to shape the conduct of people living with or at 
risk of infection by HIV […] by marking out a series of populations in need or at risk, 
and [seeking] to manage their exposure to HIV’ operate through seeking to alter ‘their 
relationships with things like customs, habits, ways of acting and thinking’ (Foucault, 
2007a: 96). 
 
A number of analyses have extended the concept of governmentality to international 
relations, particularly in the context of foreign aid. As Joseph (2010), Fougner (2008), 
Best (2007) and Abrahamsen (2004) have observed, under the PWC, the increasing use 
of non-juridical tools (benchmarking, metric indicators, monitoring systems, etc.) to 
produce compliance from poor countries with international norms through the 
                                                 
4 Biopower was used by Foucault to characterise a form of centralised power focused on influencing 
patterns of seemingly random and individual characterising ‘man as species’ (e.g. sexuality, diseases, birth 
rates, etc.), through which governmentality operates.  
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promotion of an ethos of self-responsibility have drawn on the repertoire of 
governmentality. As Joseph (2010: 46) elucidates, this international governmentality 
targets states but is sustained through ‘the claim to be concerned with the health, 
wealth and well-being of the local population’. The present study draws on this 
definition of international governmentality and extends the concept to interactions 
between donor agencies and the government of Malawi in order to explore the ways in 
which the new aid architecture has contributed to reconfiguring aid relations.  
 
 
1.5. Aims and significance of the study 
 
This research seeks to contribute to the body of scholarship outlined above, by drawing 
on governmentality to provide a deeper understanding of the changing dynamic of 
power relations between donors and aid recipients under the new aid architecture. In 
doing so, it also fills several gaps in the literature. While the PWC and PRSPs have been 
a focus of academic interest, the new aid architecture has not been the object of 
attention to the same extent. Yet, although it can be seen as further promoting similar 
discourses and practices, the Paris Declaration has entrenched these to a much greater 
extent, and produced specific effects worthy of exploration. By institutionalising 
arrangements such as budget support mechanisms, the aid effectiveness agenda has, to 
some degree, embedded donors within the State. The creation of these new spaces 
where donors and aid-dependent governments interact on a regular basis has created a 
much more intricate and routine relation and allowed donors to affect practices and 
systems pertaining to policy-making. Yet, much of the literature on the new aid 
architecture focuses on the flaws of the arrangements promoted by the Paris 
Declaration and the subsequent documents emanating from High-Level Fora on Aid 
Effectiveness, rather than on its effects. Indeed, a large portion of critical analyses of the 
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aid effectiveness agenda emanates from NGOs. While these contributions are valuable, 
this thesis takes a step back from the practicalities involved in these schemes, and views 
these developments from a medium-term perspective. It endeavours to understand the 
distinctiveness of power relations between donors and recipient governments under the 
new aid architecture, in contrast with the SAP period, as well as, to some extent, with 
the early days of the PWC.  
 
In addition, many critical analyses of the PWC and PRSPs have focused on their 
continuities with policies in the SAP era. Mosse (2005: 3) for example, explains that the 
poverty reduction agenda ‘helps to re-legitimise continuing donor emphasis on policies 
of trade liberalisation, macro-economic stability and fiscal discipline overseen by the 
IMF, while mobilising new aid resources’. Crawford and Abdulai (2009: 110) consider 
the rolling out of PRSPs as an ‘effort to embed and consolidate neoliberal hegemony’. 
Ruckert (2006) sees the PWC as an attempt to resolve contradictions that neoliberal 
policies face, notably in poor countries that should be read as a first step towards 
‘inclusive neoliberalism’ (Ruckert, 2006: 37). While there are undeniably many 
similarities between the policies pursued under the SAPs and the PWC, I argue here 
that there are also significant differences in the modalities of power operationalised 
under the new aid architecture. The analytical tool provided by governmentality allows 
changes such as the emphasis on aid-recipient agency and self-responsibilisation to gain 
visibility. Yet, the literature viewing foreign aid through this Foucauldian lens, while 
usefully extending the concept of governmentality, has been largely focused on 
document analysis. By drawing on this theoretical tool to make sense of interviews 
with staff members from the government of Malawi, as well as various donor and civil 
society organisations, I endeavour to enrich both our understanding of the effects of the 
new aid architecture, and the benefits and challenges of using governmentality in this 
field of study. Moreover, by focusing on AIDS interventions, rather than 
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macroeconomic policies as many studies with an emphasis on the neoliberal character 
of the PWC have done, this study reveals the more subtle ways through which 
neoliberalism, both as a political idea and as a mode of government, operates in 
practice.  
 
 
1.6. Research questions 
 
In this research, I seek to understand how power relations between donors and the 
government of Malawi (GoM) have been reconfigured under the new aid architecture. 
While in the previous period, marked by SAPs, donors can be seen as drawing on the 
grammar of domination, working through the imposition of policies and threats of 
funding withdrawal, the aid effectiveness agenda requires greater cooperation between 
donors and the GoM. Its emphasis on country ownership of development policies has 
also redefined the roles of both donors and aid-recipients. Thus, this study asks: what 
are the ethos, episteme (field of knowledge) and techniques (Dean, 1992) governing the 
new aid relations?  
 
More specifically, taking its cue from governmentality and its emphasis on processes of 
subjectification, the research analyses the ways in which new norms regarding the 
conduct of the GoM, and to some extent, donors, have been promoted under the new 
aid architecture. It examines the new responsibilities assigned to the GoM and the 
degree to which these participate in its construction as an entrepreneurial, ‘free’ 
subject. It explores the discourses and regimes of truth through which donors’ new 
roles are legitimised and rationalised. The study also analyses practices that have been 
promoted by the aid effectiveness agenda, for example the increased coordination and 
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dialogue between donors and the GoM, and considers their normative and productive 
effects on shaping particular subjectivities.  
  
The research also seeks to attend to the programmatic aspect of the changes stemming 
from the new aid architecture. It explores the transformations pertaining to the domain 
of policy-making that have been spurred by the reorganisation of aid delivery. It asks: 
what are the new discursive constructions and rationalities underlying these changes? 
What is the role assigned to the government through these reforms? How does this 
legitimise a certain idea of the state and its functions? By focusing on the technologies 
of/for government being deployed, the research also questions the symbiosis between 
neoliberalism as governmentality and neoliberalism as policy (two of the three 
definitions of neoliberalism identified by Larner, 2000). Finally, this study examines 
possible avenues for resistance to neoliberal governmentality. It explores the extent to 
which political will can be considered a possible form of opposition. However, it also 
analyses the potentially contradictory features of neoliberal governmentality as an 
inadvertent source of resistance.  
 
 
1.7. Methodology 
 
This qualitative research is based on a post-structural approach, and thus relies on the 
assumption that there is no pre-existing social world existing outside our knowledge of 
or discourse about it (Butler, 1990). Knowledge is thus seen as a situated set of 
discourses produced by social constructions and representations competing with others 
to impose its ‘truth’ (Smith, 2001). The analytics5 of government in particular has been 
                                                 
5 Defined as a systematic analysis. 
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seen as offering a subjective perspective on power and authority (Dean, 1999). 
However, as Dean states:  
 
This does not mean that it is a subjectivist, ‘anything goes’ enterprise. Rather, it 
seeks to formulate and consistently employ a specific set of questions that follow 
from this concern with how regimes of practices of government operate. To 
admit its perspectival nature is to say that there is no absolute standard of truth 
by which this analytics can be judged. To evaluate it, we might simply compare 
the intelligibility and understanding it yields with alternative accounts.  
(Dean, 1999: 33) 
 
Indeed, as Rose (1999: 13) states: ‘Foucault once described his works as fictions, which 
did not thereby weaken the force of the truths that they could make, remake and 
unmake’. Thus, following Gibson-Graham (1994), this thesis is based on a view of 
knowledge production as constitutive rather than reflexive (Gibson-Graham, 1994). 
Nevertheless, it locates its validity in the rigour of the research and analysis processes 
from which it has been developed, as well as in the explanatory power of the analysis it 
provides.  
 
This research is based on both primary and secondary data analysis. It draws on official 
reports and documents both as a source of material for a discursive reading of the 
technologies and processes of subjectification, and as a way of filling information gaps. 
Primary data was gathered during 3.5 months fieldwork in Malawi from June to 
October 2008. The study is largely based on 40 semi-structured interviews with staff 
members at various Ministries and Offices within the Government of Malawi, as well as 
representatives from both bilateral and multilateral donor agencies and civil society, 
including international and national NGOs and trusts (see appendix A for a list of 
research participants’ job title and organisation). I also benefited from an internship 
with ActionAid International Malawi which enabled me to gain access to meetings 
involving the government. The person in charge of managing my internship was also 
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invaluable in providing me with contacts for interviews. Limited ethnographic 
observations were also made. The data was analysed using a Foucauldian analytics 
focusing on identifying discourses, practices and techniques pertaining to the new aid 
relations between donors and the GoM.  
 
This study is also grounded in ethical considerations. These have been largely informed 
by principles promoted by the Royal Geographical Society’s Developing Areas Research 
Group (DARG) which include: ‘honesty, integrity, sensitivity, equality, reciprocity, 
reflectivity, morality, contextuality, non-discriminatory, fairness, awareness, openness, 
altruism, justice, trust, respect, commitment’ (DARG, 2003). However, ethical 
guidelines are often implicitly written for projects involving marginalised groups. 
Studying elites has led me to consider some issues, such as whether the work will 
benefit research participants, in a new light. I have strived, however, to stay as close to 
the spirit of these ethical guidelines as possible.  
 
The research also gained ethical approval from Brunel University and has abided by the 
procedures and requirements in place in Malawi at the time of my fieldwork. This 
involved seeking and receiving ethical approval from the National Health Sciences 
Research Committee as well as affiliating with the Centre for Social Research at the 
University of Malawi. Research participants were provided with a leaflet outlining the 
study’s objectives, methods, ethical approval and plans for dissemination, prior to being 
interviewed (available in appendix B). However, it is worth noting that the focus of the 
research has been altered somewhat as a result of the fieldwork. Written informed 
consent to participate in the research and be quoted in this thesis and subsequent 
publications was gained before starting interviews. Consent was also sought to audio 
record interviews and the opportunity to make ‘off-the-record’ comments was offered 
and, on many occasions, seized. Requests by interviewees to see and amend the 
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transcript of our conversation were accommodated. Confidentiality was guaranteed 
and, in writing this thesis, direct quotation was attributed to groups such as 
‘Government of Malawi’, ‘donor’ or ‘NGO/CSO’ in order to provide anonymity. Where 
relevant, I have included more information on respondents (for example, the Ministry 
they were affiliated with) but ensured that the number of interviewees fitting this 
category corresponded to more than one person in order to maintain anonymity. A 
research report reflecting the more practically oriented interests of participants was 
developed and sent to all those interviewed in Malawi, in order to ensure that they 
benefited from the process (the report is available in appendix E).  
 
 
1.8. Some considerations on terminology 
 
This thesis uses a number of terms that are potentially contentious and this section 
explains the choices that I have made in this regard. First of all, I generally use AIDS as 
a shorthand for HIV and AIDS or HIV/AIDS. This largely reflects international norms: 
for example UNAIDS often mentions AIDS to designate the pandemic (as in its ‘AIDS 
Epidemic Updates’) and HIV when referring specifically to the infection by the virus. 
However other agencies and governments use HIV/AIDS (Malawi for example) while 
others prefer HIV and AIDS (such as DFID). Yet, the use of AIDS, in addition to being 
slightly shorter, makes sense in the context of my research. The acquired 
immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS) is defined in terms of either the occurrence of 
specific diseases in association with an HIV infection, or a CD4+ count below 200 cells 
per µL of blood6. However, in many poor countries, people cannot afford to be tested on 
a regular basis and thus are unable to make this distinction (Barnett and Whiteside , 
                                                 
6 CD4 stands for cluster of differentiation 4 and is a glycoprotein found on the surface of immune cells. 
The HIV virus infects cells of the human immune system (mainly CD4 positive T cells and 
macrophages—key components of the cellular immune system) (UNAIDS, 2012a).  
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2002: 34). I have nevertheless used HIV/AIDS when quoting directly or to reflect the 
language used by specific agencies or authors.  
 
Another loaded terminology is the one employed to designate various groups of 
countries. In this thesis, I often refer to aid-dependent countries as this issue represents 
the crux of the dynamics I am examining here. However, in places, I also use the term 
‘poor countries’ (and rich countries), often for the simple aesthetic reason that it flows 
better and avoids repetitions. Nonetheless, this term has also been used by organisations 
campaigning for global justice (such as the World Development Movement) and 
adequately places emphasis on inequalities. On occasion, I use the terms Global South 
and Southern countries when denoting a larger group of countries including global 
powers and emerging economies such as China, Brazil and India. I have generally 
employed ‘West’ and ‘Western’ when referring to North American and European 
bilateral donor agencies, as well as Western-dominated international institutions such 
as the IFIs and the OECD.  
 
I have also used the terms ‘(aid) recipient’ and ‘donors’ rather than ‘development 
partners’ or ‘partner countries’ which is the terminology promoted by the new aid 
architecture. I concur with Collins (2011: 4) who remarks that these labels make more 
sense as they reflect ‘the real dichotomy despite the partnership rhetoric’. In the 
context of this research, they are also key to the clarity of the argument.  
 
 
1.9. Structure 
 
Chapter 2 focuses on the emergence of the new aid architecture. It situates this 
development as the coalescence and extension of a number of discourses and practices 
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that have been surfacing in the area of foreign aid since the late 1980s. The chapter also 
provides a detailed analysis of the Paris Declaration and the subsequent Accra Agenda 
for Action and Busan Partnership agreement, and reviews some of the critiques which 
have been raised with regards to the aid effectiveness agenda.  
 
Chapter 3 examines the context of AIDS interventions in Malawi. It outlines the 
development of a global AIDS governance and examines some of its critiques, 
particularly in relation to Sub-Saharan Africa. The chapter also provides a short 
political history of Malawi, as well as details on the country’s economy and society. 
Finally, it gives an overview of donors’ interventions in the country before detailing the 
current arrangements pertaining to the AIDS response.  
 
In chapter 4, I explore the theoretical ‘tool kit’ underpinning my analysis. First, I 
interrogate the meaning and usefulness of the term neoliberalism, before moving on to 
examining the perspectives offered by governmentality. This involves going back to its 
roots and surveying the work of Foucault before exploring more recent theorisations. 
Finally, this chapter considers some of the ways neoliberal governmentality has been 
used in the field of international development. I conclude by explaining how I intend 
to extend governmentality to the relationship between international agencies and the 
Government of Malawi in the field of AIDS interventions.  
 
Chapter 5 provides further discussion on the methodological considerations outlined 
above. It presents the epistemological perspective on which this thesis is based, before 
exploring issues relating to research ethics, the study of elites and describing the 
methods used in this research. The chapter then gives details about data collection and 
the analysis process.  
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Chapters 6 and 7 present the research findings. Chapter 6 focuses on the ‘technologies 
of subjectivity’ (Miller and Rose, 1990: 7) that have been deployed by donors under the 
new aid architecture, in an attempt to govern through freedom (Rose, 1999). I show 
how this involves eliciting the agentic qualities of the recipient country, by engaging 
with its desire for sovereignty and autonomy, in order to foster an entrepreneurial state. 
However, I also explore how the new aid architecture has created or reinforced spaces 
where dialogue as a technology of government can be deployed by donors in order to 
shape the GoM’s agency. I examine how this is supported by discourses representing 
the GoM both as an equal partner and as technically deficient and in need of donors’ 
support and expertise. Finally, the chapter analyses the various ways donors have used 
dialogue in order to foster the GoM as a ‘suitable’ subject, shaping its agency by 
promoting various norms of civility, encouraging policies that are consistent with 
specific regimes of truth, facilitating the acquisition of techniques and inculcating 
practices of self-improvement. These processes of subjectification can be seen as 
instilling an ethos of self-responsibility, consistent with neoliberal governmentality, 
allowing donors to govern through freedom. 
 
In chapter 7, I attend to the programmatic dimension of this neoliberal 
governmentality, enabling donors to eventually ‘conduct at a distance’ (Miller and 
Rose, 1990). I show how donors have been pressuring the GoM to adopt a series of 
techniques pertaining to policy-making and implementation. In particular, I argue that 
the new aid architecture has made funding for Health and AIDS dependent on a series 
of reforms in the area of public finance management. A notable effect of these changes 
is the economic rationality they promote with regards to all aspects of government. I 
explain how these reforms seek to produce the subordination of all its activities to 
macroeconomic and budgetary imperatives, by reigning in public spending, and using 
calculative technologies recoding government programmes and processes in economic 
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terms. I show that the imposition of this technical grammar of policy-making and 
implementation constructs the state as a service-delivery mechanism, pointing to a 
depoliticisation also consistent with some forms of neoliberalism. Finally, the chapter 
examines some possible avenues for resistance to neoliberal governmentality, notably 
political will, as well as more inadvertent forms resulting from the internal 
contradictions of this rationality of power.  
 
Finally, in chapter 8, I conclude by summarising my findings. I also consider the 
contributions made by this thesis to scholarship on aid, governmentality and 
neoliberalism before highlighting some of its limitations and suggesting issues worthy 
of further research. An afterword provides a brief update on aid relations in Malawi and 
the future of aid effectiveness.  
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Chapter 2:  
Improving effectiveness?  
The new aid architecture and its critiques 
 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
This chapter presents the historical and ideological background to the emergence of the 
aid effectiveness agenda. By showing how its principles and instruments, especially the 
Paris Declaration, can be situated at the intersections of specific discourses deployed by 
actors within the arena of international development since the 1980s, the first section 
highlights the contingent and historically situated nature of this agenda. The second 
section examines in detail the content of the Paris Declaration, the Accra Agenda for 
Action and the outcome of the Fourth High Level Summit on Aid Effectiveness held in 
Busan in 2011. The third section provides a thorough review of critiques that have been 
raised with regards to the aid effectiveness agenda.  
 
 
2.2. A genealogy of the aid effectiveness agenda: the mutations of neo-liberalism 
 
The Paris Declaration is rooted in a number of ideas such as aid as poverty reduction, a 
renewed appreciation for the role of the state in development with its associated focus 
on governance, and the ownership of aid strategies by recipient countries (with donors 
harmonised and aligning themselves on these policies). Here I explore how these 
themes have emerged since the 1980s as part of mutations in the discourses of Western 
donors, primarily the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) made up of the World 
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Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF)1, largely in response to increasingly 
vocal critiques. I also examine how these themes have coalesced into a new aid 
paradigm, coined the Post-Washington Consensus by Joseph Stiglitz (1998), which 
comes with new aims and tools (such as Poverty Reduction Strategies). I also show how 
the new millennium with its fresh goals, targets and promises of increased aid funding 
brought issues of aid effectiveness to the fore. This section situates the so-called ‘Paris’ 
agenda as part of the latest incarnation of an ever changing set of aid discourses, and as 
the reflection of contested power relations between donors and recipient countries.  
 
2.2.1. The emergence of the poverty agenda 
 
In the late 1970s, the combined effects of the oil crisis, recession, drop in the price of 
primary commodities, and falling exchange rates exacerbated by high interest rates 
linked to monetarist policies in the US and the UK, left many Latin American countries 
facing a debt crisis. These countries had accumulated sizeable foreign debt in the 1960s 
and 1970s in order to finance their developing economies. Large scale infrastructure 
projects in particular had attracted the 1970s oil wealth then seeking investment 
opportunities. With overall economic conditions deteriorating, these countries were 
now unable to pay back their loans or even service their debt, as announced by Mexico 
in August 1982 (Coats, 1989). As private investors became unwilling to provide new 
loans, Latin American countries had to turn to the IMF. The Fund’s loans came with a 
number of stringent policy conditions aimed at improving domestic financial situations 
and avoiding the collapse of the large American banks involved in the original lending 
(Dezalay and Garth, 1998). These policy prescriptions, which were in essence 
                                                 
1 These organisations were born out of the Bretton Woods agreement. The original agreement also 
included plans for an International Trade Organisation (ITO) but it was not before the early 1990s that 
the World Trade Organisation (WTO) was created, replacing the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT) created in 1948 (Bretton Woods Project, 2011). 
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conservative responses to a specific crisis, were then extended to the IMF’s dealings 
with African and Asian countries through its Structural Adjustment Programmes 
(SAPs) and dominated their economies during the 1980s and much of the 1990s. They 
were based on three main principles: macroeconomic discipline, market economy and 
trade openness (Unwin, 2004) and constituted what became known as the Washington 
Consensus. These conditions were first presented by the World Bank in its ‘Berg 
Report’ in 1981 but a more detailed and exhaustive compilation carried out by John 
Williamson, an economist at the World Bank, was published in 1989 (see box 1).  
 
Box 1: The ‘Washington Consensus’ adapted from Williamson (1989): 
1. Fiscal policy discipline, with avoidance of large fiscal deficits relative to GDP; 
2. Redirection of public spending from subsidies ("especially indiscriminate subsidies") 
toward broad-based provision of key pro-growth, pro-poor services like primary 
education, primary health care and infrastructure investment; 
3. Tax reform – broadening the tax base and adopting moderate marginal tax rates; 
4. Financial liberalisation: Interest rates that are market determined and positive (but 
moderate) in real terms; 
5. Competitive exchange rates; 
6. Trade liberalization – liberalization of imports, with particular emphasis on 
elimination of quantitative restrictions (licensing, etc.); any trade protection to be 
provided by low and relatively uniform tariffs; 
7. Liberalization of inward foreign direct investment; 
8. Privatization of state enterprises; 
9. Deregulation – abolition of regulations that impede market entry or restrict 
competition, except for those justified on safety, environmental and consumer 
protection grounds, and prudent oversight of financial institutions; 
10. Legal security for property rights. 
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Confronted with swelling popular disapproval singling them out as the source of many 
global problems, as well as an increasing number of internal and external evaluations 
showing that the SAPs had failed to bring expected benefits, the IFIs faced a severe 
legitimacy crisis. In a bid to ensure their survival, they embraced the anti-poverty 
rhetoric of their critiques. In 1998, the World Bank reinvented itself as the champion of 
the poor, launching a new slogan: ‘Our Dream: A World Free of Poverty’ (Bergamaschi, 
2011). In 1999, the IMF established the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) 
to ‘make the objectives of poverty reduction and growth more central to lending 
operations in its poorest member countries’ (IMF, 2009). The new centrality of the 
poverty rhetoric signals changes that have then been reinforced through strategies such 
as the Highly Indebted Country Process, as I show in section 2.2.3. However the next 
section first examines another paradigm shift crucial to understanding the aid 
effectiveness agenda: the ‘return’ of the state.  
  
2.2.2. The return of the state: good governance as effectiveness 
 
A marked characteristic of the Washington Consensus is its advocacy of a minimal role 
for the state and the reliance on the market to allocate resources effectively and 
stimulate growth (Fritz and Rocha Menocal, 2007). However by the late 1980s, factors 
determining aid allocation had evolved: considerations regarding geopolitical alliances 
had been supplanted by issues that had not been seen as of primary importance in the 
era of the Cold War; human rights and democracy in particular became ‘benchmarks’ 
for the support of Western donors in sub-Saharan Africa (Anders, 2005). With the 
rising importance of these issues, the IFIs widened their focus on the (minimal) size of 
the state to its ‘quality’ of government or governance (Crawford and Abdulai, 2009). 
This was epitomised in a 1989 World Bank report entitled Long-Term Perspective 
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Study on Sub-Saharan Africa, in which it is suggested that ‘what Africa needs is not just 
less government, but better government’ (World Bank, 1989: 5).  
 
From 1990, Good Governance officially became part of the World Bank’s mandate 
(Anders, 2005). The Bank focuses on new areas, namely public sector management, 
accountability, legal framework and transparency and information (World Bank, 1992). 
However, the Institution’s definition voluntarily shunned its political dimension and 
suggested instead a technocratic understanding compatible with its economic principles 
and the idea of small government (Crawford and Abdulai, 2009). 
 
Yet, Governance has become an increasingly important theme as the Bank has been 
seeking to improve its image. This time however, the critiques come from its 
stakeholders i.e. creditor governments whose contributions started to dwindle from the 
early 1990s as a response in part to the lack of success of the IFIs’ policies. For example 
the contribution of donors from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development’s Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC), which represent all 
major Western donor countries, went from an average of 0.33% of their Gross National 
Income2 in 1990 to 0.22% in 1997, the year when it picked up again (OECD, 2010). 
Indeed from 1995 onwards, under the impetus of its new president, James Wolfensohn, 
the Bank reinvented itself as an organisation fighting corruption in an attempt to divert 
some of the critiques towards ‘corrupt and inefficient civil servants’ in Africa (Anders, 
2005: 57). As Hayman (2009: 582-3) argues, this concern for governance fits in nicely 
with the new interest in poverty: ‘a great deal of responsibility for the poor 
performance of aid in the past [was placed] on the shoulders of recipient governments, 
blaming poor governance, weak financial management systems and very limited 
                                                 
2 Gross National Income represents the total value produced within a country (i.e. its gross domestic 
product), together with its income received from other countries (notably interest and dividends), less 
similar payments made to other countries. 
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involvement of the local population in determining development strategies to address 
poverty’. Thus, good governance became a precondition to the anti-poverty agenda and 
the 1990s saw an ever expanding catalogue of reforms being pushed on to poor 
countries (de Haan and Everest-Phillips, 2007). 
 
Assumptions on the size and roles of the state were also challenged throughout the 
1990s by the failures of SAPs, as well as by the achievements of the Asian Tiger 
countries relying on interventionist states. In this context the international community 
also appeared to come around to the idea that states have a role in delivering essential 
public services (Fritz and Rocha Menocal, 2007). As a result, the World Bank’s views 
began to shift. In a 1997 report, The State in a Changing World, the Bank took a 
noticeably more pro-state position: it was no longer conceptualised as essentially 
enabling the market, but seen as complementary to it (World Bank, 1997 in Crawford 
and Abdulai, 2009:88). Interestingly, the report also mentioned ‘state effectiveness’, 
which can be read as a prelude to the notion of aid effectiveness.  
 
But the state also gained a new theoretical role under the intellectual impulse of Joseph 
Stiglitz. Chief Economist at the World Bank from 1996 to 2000, Stiglitz became 
nonetheless increasingly vocal about what he saw as the failings of the IFIs. In 2001, he 
and two colleagues received the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics for their work on 
information asymmetry. They demonstrated that, contrary to neoclassical assumptions, 
markets are almost always imperfect. As a consequence, they argued that in order to 
maximise economic efficiency, states and other institutions should have a role in 
creating incentives to reshape individual behaviours and other social interactions that 
cause information asymmetries and transaction costs that distort markets (Ostrom et al., 
2002; Mosse, 2005). This new theory was given further impetus by the publication of 
Stiglitz best-seller book a year later. In Globalization and its discontents (2002), he 
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criticised the IFIs, especially the IMF, for putting the interest of its principal 
stakeholder, namely the United States, before that of poor countries, often worsening 
their economy as a consequence and creating a social calamity. He also criticised the 
IMF methods, in particular the ways in which policies are imposed from Washington 
by agents having little knowledge of the countries in question (Bergamaschi, 2011: 65).  
 
Thus, under Stiglitz’s influence, ideas that had been emerging in the past two decades 
found a theoretical grounding and coherence, reinforced by the new label of ‘Post-
Washington Consensus’ (PWC). However, despite his critical stance, Stiglitz’s model 
was still rooted in neoliberal ideas and neoclassical theories of rational choice (Mosse, 
2005). If some see the PWC as a positive step (Driscoll and Evans, 2005; Booth, 2003) 
others view it as a ‘newly emerging orthodoxy’ (Fine et al., 2003) enabling a deeper 
kind of neoliberalism (e.g. Cammack, 2007; Soederberg, 2005). This latter view also 
reflects anxiety with regards to another key concept of the PWC: ‘country ownership’.  
 
2.2.3. The rise of country ownership: Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers and their 
critiques 
 
Another area where practices of donors in general and the IFIs more particularly have 
been criticised is the imposition of inflexible conditions dictated by the Washington 
Consensus on aid-receiving countries, otherwise called conditionalities. As the 
effectiveness of SAPs was being questioned, civil society organisations also became 
increasingly vocal with regards to what were perceived as misguided policies robbing 
countries of their economic sovereignty (Bergamaschi, 2011). Maybe more influential 
are the many studies showing that conditionalities do not guarantee that reforms are 
sustained or even implemented (see for example Dollar and Pritchett, 1998).  
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Thus the concept of ownership arose as a way of addressing these issues. It aimed to 
create a ‘genuine commitment’ on the part of recipient countries to implement the 
policies advocated by the IFIs (World Bank, 2000; Ruckert, 2006). As an IMF report 
summarised:  
‘When the program is owned by the country, decisions on such actions 
are likely to be made quickly and in support of the program, which 
makes it more likely that the program will succeed. Furthermore, 
ownership will make it easier to generate domestic political support for 
the program, since it is likely to be seen at least in part, as an indigenous 
product, rather than a foreign imposition.’  
(IMF, 2001: 14, in Ruckert, 2006: 46) 
 
The rise of the concept of ownership is also symptomatic of a shift in rhetoric from 
‘competition, confrontation and ideological contestation’ (SAPs) to ‘a language of 
convergence and mutual complicity’ (Gould: 2005b: 61), underpinned by a departure 
from the carrot and stick approach to North-South relations to a subtler dynamic 
(Gould, 2005b: 63). Ownership can also in part be seen as stemming from concerns 
about new donors, such as China, Venezuela and Saudi Arabia, significantly increasing 
their aid programmes in the new millennium, with ‘few or no string attached’ (Rosser 
and Simpson, 2009). Partnership has thus become the latest buzzword and innovative 
policy tools, chiefly incarnated by Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs), have 
been developed to facilitate this new dynamic.  
 
In 1996, as a result of pressure from civil society organisations described in section 
2.2.1, the IMF and the World Bank launched the Highly Indebted Poor Countries 
Initiative. This programme provided qualifying countries with debt relief and cheap 
loans in order to reduce their debt burden to sustainable levels, or cancel it altogether. 
From 1999 the Initiative also linked debt relief to poverty reduction and social policies 
(IMF, 2011). In order to achieve this, qualifying countries were asked to develop a 
Poverty-Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) setting out their development priorities. 
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PRSPs signalled a new approach to development, based on the principles outlined in 
the Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF) launched by the World Bank in 
1998. In essence, the CDF highlighted the importance of long-term and holistic 
strategies for development, guided by the principle of ownership, broad-based 
consultation, and performance-based approach (see box 2). Soon, PRSPs were rolled out 
and replaced SAPs in all the countries receiving loans from the IFIs (CARE and 
ActionAid International, 2006).  
 
Box 2. The Comprehensive Development Framework, presented to the World Bank 
Board of Governors in 1998, governs the development of Poverty Reduction Strategies. 
It is based on four principles:  
• Development strategies should be comprehensive and shaped by a long-term vision. 
In the past, development strategies emphasized short-term macroeconomic 
stabilization and balance-of-payment corrections. The CDF stresses longer-term 
structural and social considerations, such as expanding and improving education 
and health facilities, maintaining infrastructure, and training a new generation of 
public officials. 
• Each country should devise and direct its own development agenda based on citizen 
participation. The CDF holds that when countries ‘own’ reforms, governments and 
their citizens are more committed to seeing them through. 
• Governments, donors, civil society, the private sector and other stakeholders should 
work together in partnership led by recipient countries to carry out development 
strategies. Partnerships built on transparency, mutual trust and consultation can 
increase the efficiency and effectiveness of aid, and help countries increase their 
capacity to develop and carry out a wide variety of programs. 
• Development performance should be evaluated on the basis of measurable results. 
Traditionally, the Bank tended to concentrate on disbursement levels and project 
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inputs in evaluating development efforts, an approach that measured only resource 
allocation and consumption. The CDF emphasizes that evaluation should focus on 
the impact of aid on people and their needs 
      (Adapted from World Bank, 2011a)  
 
While some see in PRSPs a new departure and an opportunity for aid-dependent 
countries to reclaim some of their sovereignty (Cheru, 2006), others have been more 
dubious about their benefits. Many critiques point to the fact that the ‘ownership’ of 
PRSPs by governments and their ‘consulted’ populations is very limited. As Hayman 
(2009: 583) puts it, ownership here has to be understood as ‘country leadership of 
development strategy which meets donor approval’. PRSPs contents have been clearly 
framed by the World Bank Sourceboook for Poverty Reduction Strategies (World Bank 
and Klugman, 2002) which identifies what is deemed to constitute good structural and 
macroeconomic development policies, a precondition to the PRSP process itself 
(Ruckert, 2006). In addition, aid dependent countries are often very aware of donors’ 
policy expectations and the necessity to comply with them – or at least to appear to - in 
order to secure foreign assistance (Unwin, 2004; Rocha Menocal and Rogerson, 2006). 
Donors are also often heavily involved in shaping PRSPs nationally either directly 
through negotiations or through the involvement of western consultants (Unwin, 
2004). In essence critics point out that under these conditions, recipient countries 
would be hard pressed to come up with a strategy reflecting home-grown aspirations 
(Fraser and Whitfield, 2009).  
 
Unsurprisingly perhaps, the content of the policies formulated under the PRSPs does 
not constitute a break from the orthodoxy of the 1980s: macro economic stability, 
privatisation, trade liberalisation and fiscal discipline remain firmly on the agenda. As 
Ruckert (2006: 54) points out, some of the advocated policies actually go against the 
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stated poverty reduction goals. He notes that the tax regimes advocated have been 
criticised by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) for 
being largely regressive because they are based on consumption and that this alone 
could wipe out pro-poor budget allocations. He also highlights how these measures are 
presented as neutral, based on internationally agreed knowledge, standards and norms, 
while this is far from always the case. For example, the IFIs impose very strict inflation 
targets which limits the ability of governments to invest in poverty-related spending. 
However, the negative effect of moderate inflation on growth has been challenged by 
the World Bank’s very own former Chief Economist (Stiglitz, 1998). 
 
Gould (2005b) thus argues that the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative3 
and PRSPs have enabled the IFIs to improve their public image without changing the 
thrust of their policies. He shows, for example, that organisations that had been critical 
of the IFIs’ policies, especially large INGOs such as Oxfam or CARE, have become the 
gatekeepers of the PRSP process through their involvement in explaining the document 
to the poor and consulting them on essentially pre-defined strategies (Gould, 2005b: 
62). Indeed, popular consultations tend to focus on relatively uncontroversial issues 
related to social welfare while other more controversial poverty-related issues such as 
taxation, land reforms, access to natural resources, trade agreements, privatisation, or 
macro-economic policies are often left out of discussions (Dijkstra, 2005; CARE and 
ActionAid International, 2006).  
 
PRSPs are thus seen as having a strong depoliticising effect, favouring a technocratic, 
consensual approach to planning (which co-opts critiques) while largely bypassing 
democratic institutions such as parliaments (Bergamaschi, 2011; Fraser, 2007; de Haan 
                                                 
3 The HIPC initiative aims to provide debt relief and low-interest loans to cancel or reduce external debt 
repayments to sustainable levels. 
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and Everest-Phillips, 2007; Dijkstra, 2005). In another vein, Mosse (2005: 8) argues that 
the shift from SAPs to PRSPs is translated by a move from external controls to an 
internal discipline involving ‘increased powers of surveillance and control over 
sovereign states, and more invasive monitoring of liberalisation by IFIs’. However, 
Mosse also highlights the limits of policy imperatives imposed by IFIs and donors and 
the relative autonomy of practice from policy (Mosse, 2005). In addition to all this and 
maybe somewhat ironically, PRSPs have led to an increase in conditionalities with a 
rise in target-setting as well as the emergence of new requirements with regard to 
policy processes (Dijkstra, 2005; Gould, 2005a). While I have traced some of the 
discursive origins of the aid effectiveness agenda, the renewed interest in development 
that emerged around the turn of the millennium is also key in understanding the 
impetus behind the emergence of the Paris Declaration.  
 
2.2.4. The new millennium: increased aid flow calls for more effectiveness 
 
Concerns about aid effectiveness are not new. For instance, in 1986 the results of a 
study commissioned by the IFIs entitled ‘Does Aid Work?’ (Cassen, 1986) generated a 
heated debate on the subject (Bergamaschi, 2011). However, since the new millennium, 
aid effectiveness has become ever more central. The year 2000 was seized by the UN as 
a symbolic opportunity to create a momentum towards a series of new commitments in 
the area of international development. The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) 
consist of 8 goals, broken down in quantifiable targets, to be achieved by 2015, agreed 
by 23 international organisations and 189 countries in September 2000. These 
include halving extreme poverty and hunger, reducing child mortality rates, fighting 
disease epidemics such as HIV and AIDS, promoting gender equality and building a 
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global partnership for development4 (United Nations, 2011a). The impetus created by 
this new global partnership managed to reverse the decline of overseas development 
assistance which had been decreasing during much of the 1990s (Unwin, 2004). Though 
international aid flows remain significantly short of UN targets, official development 
assistance increased from US$ 54bn in 2000 to US$ 129bn in 2010 (Eurodad, 2008b). 
However, by 2005, progress on the MDGs was patchy and both the Commission for 
Africa chaired by Tony Blair and the UN Millennium Project Report called for a 
doubling of aid flows5 (Rocha Menocal and Rogerson, 2006; de Renzio, 2006).  
 
The pressure towards meeting the millennium targets and the concomitant increase in 
official development assistance (ODA) has brought the aid effectiveness imperative to 
the fore. In addition to the necessity not to appear to squander vast amounts of tax 
payers’ money, new issues have arisen such as the ability of poor countries to absorb 
such an increase in aid (de Renzio, 2006). Addressing older problems such as the lack of 
donor coordination has also become more pressing. There have been concerns with 
regards to the massive ‘transaction costs’ born by aid receiving countries (Steinle and 
Correll, 2008). These costs refer to the heavy burden of managing the different 
reporting requirements of each donor. A 2003 OECD report showed that a typical 
African country was submitting 10,000 quarterly reports to donors a year and hosting 
more than 10,000 different missions (cited in CARE and ActionAid International, 
2006). Project duplication, institutional fragmentation and the bypassing of the state 
have also been seen as impeding aid effectiveness (Dijkstra, 2005: 445). For example, 
Burall, Maxwell and Rocha Menocal, (2006: 1) report a 2006 UNDP calculation 
estimating that there are over 1,000 financing mechanisms globally. Thus, the need to 
                                                 
4 These targets find their origins from various sources including targets set up at the 1995 Copenhagen 
Social Summit and goals set up by the OECD in its 1996 strategy paper Shaping the 21st Century.  
5 They call to double the average 1990s ODA for the 2005-2010 period.  
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deal with these issues and promote aid effectiveness has been made more pressing by 
the necessity to meet the MDG targets.  
 
 
2.3. Financing development: the new aid architecture 
 
The aid effectiveness agenda has been seized upon by a number of institutions. The 
World Bank which was crucial in laying out its discursive and institutional foundations 
demonstrated its interest in the issue as early as 1998 in a study entitled Assessing Aid. 
In the new millennium, it became the co-sponsor of a series of international 
roundtables on results-based management for development6. The UN has also been 
keen to play a role, especially given the anxiety around meeting the MDGs. It hosted 
the first significant international conference dealing with donor harmonisation and 
alignment in 2002. Since the 2005 Millennium Review Summit, the UN Economic and 
Social Council (ECOSOC) has also been in charge of organising biennial High-Level 
Development Co-operation Fora which aim to ‘review trends and progress in 
international development cooperation and promote greater coherence among the 
development activities of different development partners’ (ECOSOC, 2010).  
 
However, it is the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 
an organisation no more democratically representative than the IFIs, which emerged as 
the main orchestrator of the aid effectiveness paradigm. Born in 1961 as a successor to 
the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), established after the 
Second World War in order to manage the US-financed Marshall Plan for 
                                                 
6 More specifically the International Roundtable on Measuring, Monitoring, and Managing for Results 
(Washington, 2002), the Second International Roundtable on Managing for Development Results 
(Marrakech, 2004), the third Roundtable on Managing for Development Results (Hanoi, 2007), co-
sponsored with multilateral development banks, DAC-OECD, and UNDP (the latter was only involved in 
the Hanoi conference).  
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reconstruction, the OECD now spans several continents and counts 34 member 
countries (OECD, 2011, see list in appendix F). Firmly rooted in ideals of free-market 
capitalism and liberal democracy, the organisation prides itself for offering quality 
research and analysis as well as a forum where policy issues faced by member countries 
can be discussed (OECD, 2011). The organisation’s Development Assistance 
Committee (DAC) provides a dedicated space where most of the traditional donor 
countries such as European and Northern American countries as well as Japan, are 
represented7. Maybe unsurprisingly, OECD-DAC (and the Development Co-operation 
Directorate supporting DAC’s activities through research and analysis) has been the 
most significant driver of the institutionalisation of the aid effectiveness agenda. It is 
worth noting with Bergamaschi (2011) that little academic work has been carried out 
on the OECD8. The following section examines some of the key moments marking the 
institutionalisation of the aid effectiveness agenda within this multiplicity of initiatives.  
 
2.3.1. The first steps to effectiveness  
 
Donors’ concerns regarding aid effectiveness and the burden of transaction costs were 
articulated in 2002 by an OECD report entitled Harmonizing donor practices for 
effective aid delivery. Interestingly the report also highlighted recipient countries’ 
points of view on donor practices that could improve aid effectiveness. Three key issues 
emerged: the simplification of procedures and systems, the harmonisation of procedures 
                                                 
7 For example during 1993-2003, DAC donors accounted for approximately 95% of all international aid 
(Burall et al., 2006: 4). 
8 In one of the most relevant books on the organisation, Richard Woodward (2009, in Bergamaschi, 2011) 
explains that the OECD is a little-known organisation, whose mandate is excessively large and vague: 
both a think tank and an international forum, it also acts as a facilitator in negotiations taking place in 
other fora such as the G20 or the UN. OECD membership is conditioned by countries’ level of 
development and it has been critiqued for being a ‘rich countries’ club’. 
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(so that all donors’ requirements, for example, are similar) and the alignment of 
procedures on systems used by recipient countries (Unwin, 2004).  
 
In 2002, the United Nations hosted the first International Conference on Financing for 
Development in Monterrey, Mexico. The conference was particularly concerned with 
the shortfall in aid deemed necessary to achieve the MDGs. It called for donors to 
increase their ODA so as to reach the 0.7% of donors’ Gross Domestic Product9 (GDP), 
but also, in line with the spirit of the UN Global Compact (2000)10 highlighted the role 
of the private sector in development. As many commentators have noted, the consensus 
also committed recipient countries to take steps to improve governance, identify 
development strategies and ‘sound’ economic policies, in exchange for additional aid 
funding (see for example, Rocha Menocal and Rogerson, 2006; Saith, 2006). However, 
the conference also highlighted issues often raised by poor countries such as trade and 
debt. In this context, the Monterrey consensus (2002) sketched some of the aid 
effectiveness principles: it urged donors to harmonise their procedures and to align 
with recipient countries’ ‘own’ development frameworks, particularly PRSPs 
(International Conference on Financing for Development, 2003). 
 
Following the Monterrey conference, the OECD set up a Working Party on Aid 
Effectiveness in 2003. It aimed to be somewhat representative and comprised 46 senior 
policy advisors, half of them from the OECD-DAC, representing donors, the other half 
from poor countries, as well as 11 advisors from multilateral organisations 
(Zimmermann, 2008). The working party has been driving much of the subsequent 
                                                 
9 GDP refers to the market value of all goods and services produced in a country in a given year  
10 “a strategic policy initiative for businesses that are committed to aligning their operations and 
strategies with ten universally accepted principles in the areas of human rights, labour, environment and 
anti-corruption.” (United Nations Global Compact, 2011) 
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international discussions on aid effectiveness, particularly through its role in organising 
a series of High Level Discussion Fora on Aid Effectiveness.  
 
The first of these held in 2003 led to the Rome Declaration on Harmonisation (see 
appendix G), in which 40 donors and 28 recipient countries committed to taking steps 
to improve aid effectiveness. Most of these concern the standardisation of donors’ 
procedures and the alignment of their agenda with the development priorities of 
partner countries. Compared to the UN-led Monterrey Consensus however, the 
Declaration’s focus is narrower, principally centred on the need to reduce transaction 
costs (Bergamaschi, 2011). Issues such as tied aid are not acknowledged. In this context, 
the much acclaimed Paris Declaration can be read both as a breakthrough and as a next 
logical step.  
 
2.3.2. The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness 
 
The Paris Declaration was signed in 2005 by 35 donor countries, 26 multilateral donors 
and 56 aid-recipient countries with 14 civil society organisations acting as observers 
(see appendix H for the full Declaration and list of signatories), at the Second High 
Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness hosted under the aegis of OECD-DAC. The 
declaration was distinctive from earlier instruments in several respects. It was based on 
a relatively wide participation: indeed the document was inspired by a consultative 
process which included regional workshops as well as a meeting dedicated to obtaining 
NGOs’ views (OECD, 2006) and the summit was marked by high levels of participation. 
But some also argue that the Paris Declaration represents a real paradigm shift. For 
example Steinle and Correll (2008) state that previous instruments aiming at enhancing 
aid effectiveness essentially sought to increase ‘oversight by international aid 
institutions and forcing rigid guidelines, stipulations and conditions for receipt of aid’ or 
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set unenforceable goals. (Steinle and Correll: 2008: 3). Instead, the Paris Declaration 
attempted to shift the balance of power between donor and recipient countries (Steinle 
and Correll, 2008). It also committed its signatories to practical, action-oriented 
measures, set out specific targets and indicators and established a monitoring 
mechanism to assess progress and ensure that donors are accountable for their 
commitments (OECD, 2011).  
 
The Paris Declaration is based on five main principles seeking to address development’s 
‘accountability gap’ and to promote ‘a model of partnership that improves transparency 
and accountability on the use of development resources’ (OECD, 2006: 5). These five 
principles are: country ownership, harmonisation, alignment, managing for results and 
mutual accountability.  
 
Ownership implies that recipient countries should have leadership over their 
development policies and strategies and co-ordinate development efforts. Donors 
should support country ownership by respecting their policies and helping strengthen 
their capacity to implement them (para. 14 and 15). It is worth noting that ownership is 
measured through one indicator based on whether recipient countries have a national 
development strategy outlining ‘priorities linked to a medium-term expenditure 
framework and reflected in annual budgets’ (indicator 1), a requirement that can be 
perceived as rather prescriptive.  
 
Alignment, the second principle buttressing the Paris Declaration recommends that 
donors should base their overall support on partner countries’ national development 
strategies, including drawing conditions ‘whenever possible, from a partner’s national 
development strategy or its annual review of progress in implementing this strategy’ 
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(para. 16)11. Donors should also align with partner countries’ institutions and 
procedures (e.g. for public financial management, accounting, auditing, procurement, 
result frameworks and monitoring) ‘to the maximum extent possible’ (para. 21). Donors’ 
alignment is measured by indicators 3 (on national priorities), 5a (on public financial 
management systems) and 5b (on country procurement systems). Interestingly, the use 
of country systems is conditioned by recipient countries undertaking diagnostic 
reviews, the setting up of a performance assessment framework (PAF) integrated within 
country-led strategies, and implementing reforms (para. 19 and 20). Tellingly, the 
second monitoring indicator is based on the number of countries that ‘have 
procurement and public financial management systems that either (a) adhere to broadly 
accepted good practices or (b) have a reform programme in place to achieve this’ 
(indicator 2). Recipient countries, with the support of donors, are also enjoined to 
develop a capacity development strategy in order to improve their ability to ‘plan, 
manage, implement and account for results of policies and programmes’ (para. 22). 
Indicators 4 and 6 measure donors’ commitment to support capacity development 
through better programme coordination and the reduction in the number of parallel 
implementation structures. Donors have also pledged to make aid more predictable 
(indicator 7) and show signs of progress on untying aid (para. 31; indicator 8).  
The Paris Declaration also commits donors to be more harmonized and collectively 
effective, for example by establishing common arrangements at country level for 
planning, funding and implementing development programmes (indicator 9). They are 
also urged to work to reduce separate, duplicative missions to the field and reviews 
(para. 32). In addition, donor and recipient countries pledge to make use of donors’ 
comparative advantage at sector or country level (para. 33-35) by letting the most 
suited donors take the lead in various sectors. Indicator 10 measures the proportion of 
field missions and/or country analytic work such as diagnostic reviews that are joint.  
                                                 
11 If not, imposed conditions should have a ‘sound justification’ (para. 16). 
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The fourth principle, managing for results, means that both donors and recipient 
countries should improve decision-making processes so that they are more likely to lead 
to successful outcomes. In order to achieve this, donors should support developing 
countries’ efforts in implementing transparent and monitorable performance 
assessment frameworks (PAF) that measure progress against key elements of national 
development strategies and sector programmes (para. 43-46; indicator 11). 
 
The last principle, mutual accountability, means that donors and poor countries should 
hold each other mutually accountable for development results. Recipient countries 
commit to increase the role of Parliaments in developing national strategies and 
ensuring budgetary overview, and to reinforce participatory approaches (para. 48). 
Donors for their part pledge to provide better information on aid flows. Recipient 
countries pledge to ‘undertake mutual assessments of progress in implementing agreed 
commitments on aid effectiveness including those in the Declaration’ (indicator 12). As 
Steinle and Correll (2008) highlight, result-based management and mutual 
accountability ‘echo the MDGs’ focus on results and a system of accountability’. Mutual 
accountability can also be seen as a recognition of power imbalances pertaining to aid 
relations (Droop et al., 2008). The overarching nature of the last two principles is 
clearly conceptualised in the Paris Declaration pyramid, reproduced below, which 
graphically expresses the intertwinement of the five Paris principles.  
 
  
59 
 
Figure 1. The Paris Declaration Pyramid (OECD, 2006) 
 
It is worth noting however, that despite the far-reaching consequences of the Paris 
Declaration (for example in the way aid is structured and organised), support for the aid 
effectiveness agenda varies widely. While Northern European countries and the UK 
have embraced the agenda, other donors, such as the US, have been arguing that 
specific situations require various levels of ownership while supporting the spirit of the 
declaration by aligning and harmonizing where possible (Droop et al., 2008: 14). 
 
2.3.3. The Accra Agenda for Action  
 
The Third High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness took place in Accra, Ghana in 2008. 
It is widely acknowledged that the ensuing Accra Agenda for Action (AAA, available in 
appendix I) failed to bring concrete improvements to the Paris Declaration (Eurodad, 
2008a; Steinle and Correll, 2008, Wallace, 2009). The Agenda for Action was based on 
an appraisal of progress so far which included the 2006 and 2008 Monitoring Surveys of 
the Paris Declaration, as well as reviews such as the World Bank Aid Effectiveness 
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Review and an independent evaluation (Zimmermann, 2008). It recognised that the 
international community was unlikely to meet many of the Paris targets, notably those 
pertaining to ownership (OECD, 2008b) and also acknowledged new challenges such as 
the rise of non-Western donors and global funds which operate more or less outside the 
aid effectiveness agenda (para. 9; see also Hayman, 2009). It proposed measures to 
increase ownership (Rosser and Simpson, 2009) such as enhancing participation from 
parliaments, local authorities and CSOs in developing national development strategies, 
encouraging donors to promote country ownership, including by investing in 
recipients’ human resources and institutions (para. 8) and urging donors to intensify 
their use of country systems (para. 15).  
 
The AAA uses strong language in places. For example, it states that ‘even when there 
are good-quality country systems, donors often do not use them’ (para. 15) and urges: 
 
‘Donors will immediately start working on and sharing transparent plans for 
undertaking their Paris commitments on using country systems in all forms of 
development assistance […] They will finalise these plans as a matter of 
urgency.’  
(OECD, 2008a: para. 15d) 
 
There are also mentions of gender, human rights and environmental sustainability 
which are described as ‘cornerstones for achieving enduring impact’ (para. 3). However, 
some feel that donors backtracked on areas such as reducing aid conditionalities, 
improving aid predictability, reforming technical assistance or increasing mutual 
accountability (e.g. Eurodad 2008b). The AAA also fails to explicitly acknowledge CSOs 
as more than aid funding sources and recipients (Steinle and Correll, 2008). The politics 
behind the drafting of the AAA appears to have prevented any significant advances. 
Civil Society Voices for Better Aid (2008) reports that US influence at the World Bank 
sought to ensure that any stronger commitment would be watered down. Wallace 
(2009) in her description of a multi-stakeholders workshop in the process leading to the 
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Third High Level Forum recalls how participants were told that ‘there was no chance of 
challenging the Paris Declaration at Accra; politically there was very little room for 
manoeuvre’ (Wallace 2009: 762).  
 
2.3.4. From aid effectiveness to new aid architecture 
 
The aid effectiveness agenda with its focus on country ownership, and the alignment 
and harmonisation of donors, has been accompanied by a new organisation of aid, or 
aid architecture. While many donors’ overseas development assistance (ODA) used to 
be channelled through a number of development projects, often implemented through 
international NGOs (INGOs) or CSOs, this strategy has increasingly been seen as too 
fragmented and unsustainable (Kees van Donge, 2007) and not consistent with the aid 
effectiveness agenda. Instead, donors have turned their focus to state systems, opting to 
finance large governmental programmes, or contributing directly to national budgets 
(through direct or general budget support) or specific sectors (in the case of sectoral 
budget support and its many variations such as Sector-Wide Approach and pool- or 
basket-funding mechanisms). Although budget support is not a new modality (Unwin, 
2004) it has gained prominence thanks to the Paris agenda and has become one of the 
preferred tools for administering foreign aid in the past decade (Kees van Donge, 2007). 
There are however important variations between donor countries: some have favoured 
this aid modality for a number of years (Nordic countries, the Netherlands, the UK), 
while others have come to it more recently (Finland, Germany, the EC, Ireland, 
Canada) or are still reluctant to use it such as Japan and the US (Dijkstra, 2005).  
 
Budget support has a number of advantages: by allowing greater predictability, stability 
and flexibility for country recipients and providing a mechanism for donor 
coordination, it reduces duplication, budget fragmentation, and transaction costs and 
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thus in theory increases aid effectiveness (de Haan and Everest-Phillips, 2007). It is also 
a cost-effective way for donors to disburse the increased aid promised since 2000 
without having to foot ballooning management costs (Woll 2008; de Renzio, 2006). One 
drawback of this aid modality however, and a major cause for concern for donors, is 
that it makes it impossible to track down the money and show what precisely has been 
achieved with it. Performance management has thus become a central issue (Rocha 
Menocal and Rogerson, 2006). There is also a perception that budget support might 
increase corruption; for this reason, many donors insist that conditions of good 
governance be met before budget support can be put in place (Dijkstra, 2005). ‘Sound’ 
public financial systems, including accounting and auditing, and procurement 
procedures, have thus become the cornerstone of budget support, enabling donors to 
ensure that funds are properly used (Rocha Menocal and Rogerson, 2006). Indeed, 
Public Financial Management (PMF) often constitutes a pre-condition to budget 
support (for example for DFID, Unwin, 2004).  
 
Thus budget support is seen by donors as a way to engage with recipient countries at 
policy level and to encourage reforms (Mosse, 2005; Unwin, 2004), while sustaining 
country ownership. Indeed this approach appears to favour donor-recipient 
relationships based on cooperation and flexibility (Kees van Donge, 2007: 475). It 
enables donors to move away from conditionalities that have proved rather ineffective 
while gaining support for their preferred policy environment (de Haan and Everest-
Phillips, 2007). However, this approach has also been perceived to lead to donor micro-
management, loss of sovereignty and the bypassing of democratic institutions. (Rocha 
Menocal and Rogerson, 2006). These critiques and others are developed in more detail 
in section 2.4. in relation to the aid effectiveness agenda.  
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2.3.5. The Busan Summit: from aid effectiveness to development effectiveness 
 
The research presented in this thesis was carried out prior to the Fourth High Level 
Forum in Aid Effectiveness which took place in Busan, South Korea between 29 
November and 1 December 2011. However, by analysing recent developments, this 
section aims to provide some perspective on its likely evolution.   
 
While the 2008 Accra Agenda for Action (AAA) could be seen as a continuation and 
reaffirmation of the Paris principles, with a few adjustments, the Partnership for 
Effective Development Cooperation (Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, 
2011, in appendix J) adopted by participants at Busan has been viewed as sanctioning 
‘the end of aid effectiveness as we know it’ (Hayman, 2012: 1). In many respect, the 
summit was indicative of the rapid changes that had taken place since 2008: the impact 
of the global financial crisis on traditional donors and the pressure they have been 
facing justifying aid budgets in this context, the increased importance of (re)emerging 
donors, particularly China, as well as a more confident and vocal presence from aid 
recipients (Mawdsley et al., 2013). These changes are encapsulated in the shift from a 
language of ‘aid effectiveness’ to ‘development effectiveness’. This can be seen as a 
consequence of the summit’s attempt to be inclusive of Southern donors as a large part 
of their development assistance lies outside the strictly defined scope of overseas 
development assistance. However, Hayman (2012: 9) also argues that this change is 
suggestive of a new vision of aid as a ‘catalyst’ with other kinds of resource mobilisation 
for development such as ‘taxation and domestic resource mobilisation, private 
investment, aid for trade, philanthropy, non-concessional public funding and climate 
change finance’ (High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, 2011: para. 10, see also para. 
9) called to play a greater role. Mawdsley et al. (2013) note that the development 
agenda appears to be moving away from poverty-reduction and increasingly 
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(re)focusing on economic growth. The inclusion of (often high-level) private sector 
representatives at Busan suggests that private companies are likely to play an 
increasingly important role in development in the years to come.  
 
However, the new aid landscape that emerged at Busan is still unclear. On paper, the 
Partnership document outlines a two-tier system where DAC donors reiterate their 
commitments to follow the principles established at Paris and Accra (para. 16), as well 
as those developed at the Busan summit while ‘the principles, commitments and actions 
agreed in the outcome document in Busan shall be the reference for South-South 
partners on a voluntary basis’ (para. 2). The language of development effectiveness is 
perceptible in two of the four principles promoted by the Busan Partnership, 
advocating a renewed focus on development results and a vision of inclusive 
partnerships. Transparency and mutual accountability has somehow replaced alignment 
and harmonisation. However, country ownership remains central and the indicator-
based model on which this is measured seems unchanged: the Partnership endorses the 
use of country-led result frameworks to allow ‘all concerned actors to assess 
performance based on a manageable number of output and outcome indicators’ (para. 
18(b)). Overall, the document offered few firm commitments (Hayman, 2012) and 
many of the recently published proposed indicators lack numerical targets. The Busan 
summit can thus be seen as outlining the basis of a weaker but ‘broader and more 
inclusive’ partnership (para. 1), leaving the future of aid ‘extremely unclear’ (Hayman, 
2012: 12).  The next section examines some of the critiques that have been directed at 
the aid effectiveness agenda.  
 
 
 
 
  
65 
2.4. Critiques of the aid effectiveness agenda: a technocratic and biased strategy 
 
Critiques of the Paris agenda have come from a variety of points of view. Some of them 
focus on technical aspects of the new aid architecture, seeking to assess some of its 
advantages and drawbacks (for example with regards to reducing transaction costs, see 
USAID, 2005). Another group of critics deals with the broader processes involved in the 
interactions between various actors (e.g. donors, NGOs, recipient countries’ 
institutions, etc.) within the aid effectiveness agenda. This section concentrates mainly 
on the latter set of critiques, which appears to be the most relevant to the argument 
developed in this thesis. These critiques centre principally on three key issues: the 
limited scope and excessively technical nature of the aid effectiveness agenda, the 
apparent paradox of its broad political bias and effects and finally the need to extend 
the concept of ownership of the Paris Declaration to make it both political and 
democratic. 
 
2.4.1. A technical solution to a political problem 
 
With its ‘excessively narrow agenda of management’ (Droop et al., 2008: 16) concerned 
with transaction costs, auditing, administrative procedures and efficiency, some feel 
that the Paris declaration has replaced the end with the means (Sen, 2007; Wallace, 
2009). As such the emphasis seems to be on efficiency rather than effectiveness (Sen, 
2007: 7). Critics also see the Paris agenda as a missed opportunity to grapple with real 
issues hindering to aid effectiveness: ‘political struggle is an intrinsic component of the 
aid process and not an alien element compromising the purity of plans made.’ (Kees van 
Donge, 2007: 492; see also Fritz and Rocha Menocal 2007). While the new aid 
architecture and instruments such as budget support could be seen as an opportunity to 
better understand and engage in political dialogues at the level of recipient countries 
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(Kees van Donge, 2007), the aid effectiveness agenda remains firmly removed from 
issues pertaining to power, politics and institutional dynamics (Sen, 2007; Fritz and 
Rocha Menocal, 2007).  
 
Yet, political issues are crucial to the goals of the Paris Declaration. Limitations to this 
technocratic approach are visible in the contradictions surrounding one of its central 
concepts: country ownership. The aid effectiveness agenda fails to acknowledge that 
both donors and recipient governments are political players (de Haan and Everest-
Phillips, 2007). The former are accountable domestically through elections, audit 
institutions, legislative committees and civil society (Droop et al., 2008). As a result, aid 
might be shaped by a variety of political and social forces and, for example, can be seen 
as a way of using economic surplus (e.g. Diven, 2001, on the role of food producers in 
shaping the US aid policy ; see also Rosser, 2008) or furthering political and economic 
agendas (Rocha Menocal, 2007). Aid is not neutral and as a consequence, donors cannot 
‘let go’ (Rosser and Simpson, 2009): their commitments to the aid effectiveness agenda 
and country ownership in particular, are always to some extent subordinated to 
domestic pressures (Droop et al., 2008). Donors tend to be risk averse and so reluctant 
for recipient governments to take full ownership of development (Booth, 2008).  
 
In recipient countries, leaders are often dependent on aid to maintain their grip on 
power by generating political support through the delivery of goods and services, 
(Fraser and Whitfield, 2009; de Renzio et al., 2008). As a result, they often find 
themselves in a subservient position to donors, with the fear of losing aid constituting a 
strong feature of many governments (de Renzio et al., 2008). Yet, conditions imposed 
by donors in exchange for aid can be unpopular. Fraser and Whitfield (2009: 13) 
explain that some leaders have been invoking pressure from donors to justify policy 
decisions to domestic constituents, some of which have been advantageous to the ruling 
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elite (see also Anders, 2005). But such tactics can also be politically dangerous. As a 
result many recipient governments tread a fine line and will sometimes approve 
conditions on paper to please donors but with little intention to change current 
practices (see for example Woll, 2008, about Ghana in the early 2000s; de Renzio, 
2006). Often, as Bergamaschi (2011) shows, the gap between donors’ expectations and 
the actual reforms carried out is the result of the interplay between actors, interests, 
norms, and resources. She argues that each new measure produces specific trajectories 
of assimilation as the various persons involved deploy strategies in order to deal with 
the new opportunities and constraints that they represent.  
 
Domestic accountability both for donors and recipient countries thus produce complex 
relationships of dependency that the aid effectiveness agenda fails to address. On the 
one hand, donors are constrained by the need to sell development success stories to 
their electorate (Harrison, 2010; de Renzio, 2006). As a consequence, although the 
balance of power may be skewed in their favour, donors may not always be in a 
position to challenge the behaviour of recipient partners due to the need to protect 
their relationship with country leadership, especially in the absence of realistic political 
alternatives (Fraser and Whitfield, 2009). They may thus lack incentives to raise issues 
such as corruption and funds misuse (see for example Wallace, 2009 on Mali). By failing 
to address these issues, the aid effectiveness agenda may not bring about the expected 
results. In addition, harmonization and alignment may actually contradict country 
ownership as recipient countries find themselves reluctant to challenge a more unified 
front of donors (Droop et al., 2008). As Woll (2008: 85) explains ‘harmonising agendas 
reduces the plurality of opinions and leaves the recipient with no choice but to pick the 
most suitable development partner. The result is an externally defined agenda and, 
consequentially reduced government ownership’. The pressures that donors are under 
to make the new aid effectiveness agenda ‘work’, may also contradict the principle of 
  
68 
country ownership. This is illustrated for example by Hayman (2009: 593) who shows 
this with regards to Rwanda, where donors, pushed by time and in the absence of 
policy directions from the government, ‘forge[d] ahead with establishing harmonisation 
frameworks and Sector Wide Strategies’, with the World Bank writing most of the 
Health Strategy.  
 
In addition, by not addressing issues of power, the Paris Declaration might lead to 
limited results. The above mentioned pressures mean that donors ‘in spite of their 
support for greater accountability […] can find frank assessment of their performance 
uncomfortable’ (Droop, 2008: 14). At the same time, as Cammack explains (2007: 607) 
while donors might ‘gain a “seat at the table” through their provision of budget support, 
they are not privy to those meetings where high-level decisions are really made’. In this 
context, they may find alignment and harmonisation particularly challenging (Droop, 
2008). Maybe as a result of its technocratic approach, the Paris agenda has had limited 
success in some areas. For example, Lawson et al. (2005), in their evaluation of general 
budget support in Tanzania, show that there were few signs that it could be linked to 
improve efficiency of public spending or better domestic accountability. The Paris 
Declaration has also been unable to reverse the proliferation of aid mechanisms for 
example in health (Whyms and Buse, 2008) and many important bilateral donors such 
as the US, France and Japan have not wholly subscribed to it. 
 
Although engaging with these issues is difficult and complex, the literature offers a few 
suggestions of measures that would help in that regard. While some countries such as 
the UK with its Drivers of Change studies and the Swedes with their power analysis 
have taken steps to develop a better understanding of networks of power in recipient 
countries, human resource practices have been perceived to undermine these efforts (de 
Haan and Everest-Phillips, 2007). A number of studies have highlighted the importance 
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of personal relationships in making projects such as the Paris agenda work. Hayman 
(2009) for example shows that the commitment of specific individuals is often key. 
Indeed, the Paris Declaration works principally on a collaborative accountability model 
in which sanctions for non-compliance ‘tend to be social, political, reputational and 
relational’ and where norms emerge from ‘shared ideas, values, beliefs or evidence and 
become embedded over time’ (Droop, 2008: 17). Pomerantz (2004), Eyben (2009), and 
Whitfield and Fraser (2009) have all underlined the centrality of building trust between 
staff from donor agencies and government. Drawing on the work of Rosser (2009) in 
Timor-Leste, Rosser and Simpson (2009) argue that it is ‘political and social 
relationships rather than aid management structures and aid modalities that matter in 
shaping the degree of recipient country ownership’. However, building these 
relationships takes time and energy. Although the Paris Declaration recognises this, for 
example by committing signatory members to address ‘insufficient delegation of 
authority to donors’ field staff, and inadequate attention to incentives for effective 
development partnerships between donors and partner countries’ (para. 4iii), it is seen 
as not going far enough. It failed to significantly address practices such as the reduction 
of personnel ratio (Eyben, 2009), the high staff turnover in country, lack of local 
language knowledge and the ‘pressure on staff to demonstrate short-term visible results’ 
(Wathne and Hedger, 2009: 3), preventing staff from donor agencies to engage in 
meaningful ways with the power dynamics in recipient countries. The Paris agenda also 
missed the opportunity to recognise the need for a more serious understanding of 
country contexts by donors (Booth, 2005) and the need to wean donors from their 
reliance on ‘blueprint approaches’ (de Haan and Everest-Phillips, 2007: 17). As Rocha 
Menocal and Rogerson (2006) argue, international experts are still too often favoured at 
the expense of local ones, even when they have very little understanding of local issues 
(Rocha Menocal and Rogerson, 2006). Another set of suggestions to address power and 
accountability issues and meaningfully improve aid effectiveness entail measures to 
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enable donors to make long-commitments including reforming parliamentary 
procedures so as to allow multi-year pledges in ODA, or educating public opinion about 
the need for a long-term strategy (see for example, Wathne and Hedger, 2009). 
 
2.4.2. Biases in aid effectiveness: an agenda led by donors  
 
Although the aid effectiveness agenda is presented as technocratic and ‘missing out’ on 
power and politics, some argue that it is not apolitical as it is skewed in favour of 
maintaining the current power status-quo between rich and poor countries. Despite the 
fact that aid effectiveness is supposed to benefit recipient countries by putting them in 
the driver’s seat, reducing transaction costs and increasing the level of aid, many 
commentators acknowledge that the argument for the Paris agenda was developed from 
a donors’ perspective (see for example, Unwin, 2004; Rocha Menocal and Rogerson, 
2006). Indeed most discussion fora on the aid systems such as OECD’s DAC or the EU 
are dominated by donors’ views and northern perspectives (Rocha Menocal and 
Rogerson, 2006). A number of other factors such as lack of financial resources, the fear 
of criticising donors, scepticism at being able to make changes as well as the technical 
and complex nature of the issue, have been curtailing the inclusion of Southern 
perspectives in the debate (Rocha Menocal and Rogerson, 2006). The fact that the Paris 
Declaration was developed chiefly by the OECD rather than the UN, a more 
representative forum, is symptomatic of this imbalance and some Northern CSOs have 
questioned the legitimacy of DAC as the home of the aid efficiency and accountability 
mechanisms (Droop et al., 2008). The creation of the Global Partnership for Effective 
Development Co-operation as an outcome of the 2011 Busan Summit may provide a 
more inclusive forum. However, it is worth noting that the OECD secretariat will 
continue to coordinate the data analysis of the global monitoring of the Busan 
commitments (OECD, 2013). 
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The focus of the aid effectiveness agenda on technocratic issues and the avoidance of 
politically-loaded ones have also been read as reflecting donors’ considerations and 
interests instead of the priorities of recipient countries. Issues such as human rights, 
gender equality, indigenous rights, inequalities, environmental sustainability or even 
poverty reduction were entirely overlooked in the Paris Declaration (Steinle and 
Correll, 2008, Civil Society Voices for Better Aid, 2008) and paid lip service in the 
Accra Agenda for Action (OECD, 2008a)12. Rogerson (2005) argues that the Paris 
Declaration should have included indicators showing its impact on these issues. In 
addition, ‘the Paris Declaration objectives, commitments and assessment indicators 
have also been artificially separated from any consideration about how aid actually 
affects the conditions that sustain poverty and inequality’ (ISG, 2007: 3).  
 
The aid effectiveness agenda fails to properly address issues pertaining to the quality of 
aid. Although policy conditionalities and tied aid are mentioned in the Paris 
Declaration, the mechanisms to enforce improvements in these areas are weak or non-
existent; for example the target for untying aid is excessively vague13 (Wallace, 2009; 
Steinle and Correll, 2008; Sen, 2007). Debt, while it constitutes an important part of 
ODA in the form of loans and an immense strain on recipient countries’ development is 
not even mentioned (ISG, 2007; Wallace, 2009). Indeed, the aid effectiveness agenda 
fails to address structural issues that contribute to poverty such as world trade 
agreements, primary commodity pricing, the undemocratic nature of IFIs, or the 
unbalanced aid allocations across countries (Wallace, 2009; Sen, 2007; Rogerson, 2005). 
                                                 
12 The Busan Partnership Agreement however highlights international commitments on ‘human rights, 
decent work, gender equality, environmental sustainability and disability’ (para. 11) and gender equality 
and women’s empowerment are discussed in greater length in para. 20.  
 
13 The OECD has estimated that as much of half of all aid is in the form of technical assistance (ISG 2007: 
7) most of which is not demand-driven.  
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In addition, the aid effectiveness agenda shows little regard for the impact and outcome 
of aid on the ground, focusing instead of the modalities of dispersion up to the level of 
recipient governments (Rajani, 2008; Wanyeki, 2006). The Reality of Aid Global 
Network (in Sen, 2007: 5) thus feels that Paris Declaration may not change the fact that 
aid does not reach the most vulnerable.  
 
Moreover, the current monitoring process for the Paris Declaration and the Accra 
Agenda for Action fails to involve recipient countries substantially but focuses 
primarily on their performance, while donors in effect monitor themselves (Droop et 
al., 2008; Sen, 2007; ISG, 2007). Northern CSOs have also voiced concerns with regards 
to the independence and data quality of the Monitoring Survey, which assesses 
countries’ performance against the indicators set out in the Paris Declaration (Droop et 
al., 2008: 16). Wallace (2009) commented:  
 
‘… [N]o serious account is being taken of the criticisms, analysis and 
alternatives proposed in response to questions such as who is monitoring 
the Paris Declaration, and the need for independent monitors; who sets the 
results and are they the important or valid ones for the long-term 
development and poverty reduction; or to issues such as the lack of any 
real accountability or responsibility for success or failure in the PD; and 
the stories of negative impact.’ 
(Wallace, 2009: 762) 
 
While there has been a rapid growth of mechanisms available to donors to monitor the 
performance of, and sanction and reward, partners14 (Droop et al., 2008: 12), there are 
as yet ‘no means for recipient governments to take action against donors except through 
peer pressure’ (Hayman, 2009: 594). As such, donors are still relatively unaccountable 
for pledges and aid performance (Rocha Menocal and Rogerson, 2006). To some extent, 
                                                 
14 These include the World Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessments (CPIA), IMF economic 
assessments, the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index, the Performance Reports of 
the Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) programme and the World Bank Institute’s 
Kaufmann-Kraay-Zoibo-Lobaton (KKZ) indicators (Droop et al, 2008: 12). 
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this reflects the ‘implicit assumption that the ideal of consensus and stability is not 
achieved because of shortcomings on the government’s side’ (Kees van Donge, 2007: 
475). Therefore, the Paris Declaration is seen as largely imposed by donors on aid 
dependent countries (Unwin, 2004). 
 
2.4.3. Critiquing ownership 
 
Another critique, linked to the one detailed in the previous section, deals with how 
country ownership, the central tenet of the Paris Declaration is conceptualised. Hickey 
(2009: 478) for example states: ‘…the language of ownership is highly normative, 
implying that international development agencies have the answers to poverty 
reduction and that national governments simply need to adopt this agenda and 
implement it’. As Hayman (2009:584) puts it: ‘provided donors are satisfied with the 
strategy, they will allow the government to ‘own’ it’. Otherwise, negotiations will 
ensue. Ownership is thus narrowly defined and operating within a specific framework 
of upward accountability (Sen, 2007). For instance, the ‘ownership’ assessment of the 
Paris Declaration is based on whether or not recipient countries have drawn an 
‘operational development strategy’ prioritising result-oriented programmes and 
presenting medium term expenditures and annual budgets, as specified by the aid 
effectiveness agenda (Rosser and Simpson, 2009).  
 
Some feel that despite its rhetoric, the Paris agenda has actually caused country 
ownership to regress. For example, there is evidence that conditionalities have 
expanded under the new aid architecture (Booth and Fritz, 2008), both in numbers and 
scope. As Hayman (2009: 591) explains: ‘the use of programme-based instruments has 
led to greater and broader donor oversight over budgetary processes and hence 
priorities. This is no longer just the domain of the World Bank and the IMF but a 
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primary concern of all bilateral and multilateral donors providing general or sectoral 
budget support’. In addition, the Paris agenda has led to a concerning change in the 
nature or scope of some of these conditionalities. The rise in soft conditionalities (also 
called process conditionalities) which determine how policy processes should take place 
has been analysed as institutional micro-management on the part of donors. As Dijkstra 
shows (2005: 457), these policy conditions are often handpicked from the PRSPs (for 
ownership’s sake) but clearly show prioritisation by donors. Mosse (2005: 5) argues that 
these new conditionalities have far reaching effects: ‘Indeed as its ends have narrowed 
to the achievement of quantified targets on poverty or ill-health, the means of 
international aid have expanded from the management of economic growth and 
technology transfer to the reorganisation of state and society needed to deliver on 
targets’. Policy conditionalities are seen as severely undermining democracy, especially 
as these are often the outcome of ‘secret policy dialogues’ (ISG, 2007). 
 
Indeed, the Paris agenda seems to favour a form of technocratic ownership. Aid 
negotiations and policy discussions between donors and recipient governments have 
become increasingly technical (CARE and ActionAid, 2006), with the use of 
instruments such as Performance Assessment Frameworks (PAF) or Public Financial 
Management (PFM) reforms becoming ubiquitous. The involvement of civil society has 
also been made more difficult under new aid architecture by the increased lack of 
transparency surrounding aid negotiations, which tend to be a private bureaucrat-to-
bureaucrat (B-2-B) process that often bypasses the scrutiny of democratic institutions 
and civil society (Rocha Menocal and Rogerson, 2006). As CARE (2008: 5) remarks, 
‘negotiations on budget support and decisions over budget allocations are often carried 
out by a small group of donors and finance ministry staff, without broader consultation 
and debate’ (see also Sen, 2007). Crucial issues such as conditionalities, budget 
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allocations and spending limits thus escape parliamentary control and supreme audit 
institutions (de Renzio, 2006). 
 
This is compounded by the lack of publicly available information and documents on aid 
flows, conditionalities, spending priorities, donor disbursements, and debt which seems 
to have been worsened by the new aid architecture (Wathne and Hedger, 2009; CARE, 
2008; ISG 2007; CARE and ActionAid, 2006). It is worth noting that both the Paris 
Declaration and Accra Agenda for Action include commitments for donors to increase 
information on aid flow. However, there are no specifications as to how detailed the 
provided information should be. The secretive nature of aid negotiations is thus seen as 
making monitoring of recipient governments and donors more difficult for NGOs, 
increasing the risk of corruption (Fritz and Rocha Menocal, 2007). Eurodad (2008a) also 
argues that the Paris Declaration itself is difficult for civil society to monitor as some 
indicators are constructed in a way that makes it hard to measure performance. It also 
reports ‘strong indications that some donors and governments have provided inaccurate 
data’ (Eurodad, 2008a: 14). According to critiques, the aid effectiveness agenda is thus 
conducive to a lack of transparency, accountability and participation (Wallace, 2009), 
undermining democratic processes and marginalising the poorest (CARE and 
ActionAid, 2006). This is all the more so when used in countries known for the 
undemocratic nature of their government such as Bangladesh (Wallace, 2009).  
 
Another hindrance to democratic ownership is the absence of civil society and non-
governmental organisations in the way the new aid architecture has been 
conceptualised. Rocha Menocal and Rogerson (2006) argue that this is due to the pro-
government bias present in organisations such as the OECD or the EU, leading them to 
overlook the contribution of civil society organisations. Others are more critical of this 
shortcoming. Sen (2007: 7) for example states: ‘the absence of civil society inclusion and 
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engagement indicates a lack of political will and commitment to social participation 
from donors.’ Many NGOs have been feeling sidelined by the new relationship between 
recipient governments and donors (Sen, 2007). CARE and ActionAid (2006) for 
example, believe that the new aid architecture has put strain on their access to and 
ability to lobby donors, an issue reinforced by the pervasive staff cuts in many agencies 
(e.g. DFID’s ‘Doing more with less’). In addition, they report that ‘experiences in both 
Tanzania and Malawi suggest that the more effective and influential NGOs become in 
advocacy, the less willing governments are to engage with them’ (CARE and ActionAid 
International, 2006: 22). As Sen (2007) highlights, there is a risk for CSOs to become 
marginalised in decision-making processes. Organisations that manage to be involved in 
the process tend to be large, international NGOs who talk the ‘aid speak’ and use tools, 
language and aesthetics which are congruent with that of donors (Wallace, 2009). As a 
report by CARE and Action Aid (2006) also remarks, under the new architecture, 
consultative policy meetings and documents are more often in English than local 
languages, reflecting the fact that they are primarily aimed at donors rather than 
citizens. Small grassroots organisations which are often the closest to the poor and 
vulnerable are thus often marginalised under the Paris agenda (Wallace, 2009). The 
need for the aid effectiveness agenda to be based upon democratic ownership where 
parliaments, civil society and citizens drive the policy process and outcomes is 
advocated by many critiques (e.g. Eurodad, 2008a; CARE, 2008; Booth, 2008; Steinle 
and Correll, 2008; ISG, 2007). In other words, political ownership should replace 
technocratic ownership (Booth, 2008).  
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2.5. Conclusion  
 
This chapter has examined the discursive roots of the aid effectiveness agenda, showing 
how concepts such as country ownership and poverty reduction have evolved out of 
mutations of international institutions in response to internal and external pressures. It 
also highlighted the importance of the new commitments to increase aid and reach the 
MDGs that have been made since the new millennium, in making aid effectiveness a 
pressing concern. The chapter then related the recent history of aid effectiveness and 
analysed the content of some of its most relevant documents, particularly the Paris 
Declaration (2005) detailing the meaning of the main commitments made by donors 
and recipient countries, and showing how this has affected the way ODA is disbursed 
and used. Finally this chapter presented some of the critiques of the aid effectiveness 
agenda. More specifically, it showed that it was perceived as too technocratic, failing to 
grasp the importance of power relations and personal rapport in increasing aid 
effectiveness. At the same time, the Paris agenda could be seen as having broad political 
effects through its lack of engagement with important aid-related issues such as debt or 
conditionalities and its implicit role in maintaining a status quo between donors and 
poor countries. However, some analysis found that the Paris Declaration participated in 
undermining the sovereignty (or ownership) of recipient countries to a far greater 
extent than was previously the case. It was felt that process conditionalities in 
particular, ‘increased powers of surveillance and control over sovereign states’ through 
more invasive monitoring procedures (Mosse, 2005: 8). Many thus call for a more 
democratic understanding of country ownership and the need for donors to seriously 
commit to improve the quality of aid (Civil Society Voices for Better Aid, 2008).  
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Chapter 3 :  
Global AIDS governance and Malawi 
 
 
3.1. Introduction  
 
Few studies have critically examined the impact of the new aid architecture on global 
AIDS policies. Yet, as this chapter explains, the pandemic has been the target of 
considerable funding from international donors in the past decade or so. In addition, 
the global AIDS response has long been critiqued for being largely donor-driven, 
making the analysis of the effects of the implementation of the new aid architecture 
and its principle of country ownership in the area of AIDS particularly significant. This 
chapter examines the context of AIDS interventions in Malawi. It starts, in section 3.2., 
by outlining the development of a global AIDS governance and examining some of its 
critiques, particularly those pertinent to Sub-Saharan Africa. Section 3.3 provides a 
short political history of Malawi, as well as some information on the country’s economy 
and society. Section 3.4. focuses more specifically on aid in Malawi, providing 
background to the intervention of donors, before detailing the current arrangements 
pertaining to the AIDS response.  
 
 
3.2. The global AIDS governance in Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
This section presents contextual information on the development of international AIDS 
interventions. It first provides a brief overview of the discursive changes that have 
taken place in the past 25 years or so and introduces some of the major international 
actors in the field. It then moves on to some of the critiques that have been formulated 
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with regards to the deployment of the current global AIDS governance, notably the 
imposition of specific types of interventions by donors, their excessive focus on 
behaviour-change and biomedical perspectives at the expense of broader socio-
economic dynamics, as well as the collusion of AIDS-related assistance with 
neoliberalism.  
 
3.2.1 Global AIDS narratives: a short historical perspective 
 
The international response to the AIDS pandemic has gone through many 
transformations and paradigm shifts in the past 25 years. Arguably, AIDS has grown to 
receive more global attention than any other disease (Whiteside and de Waal, 2004), 
spearheading a change in the place occupied by Health in international development 
and politics.  
 
One of the fist milestones of the rise of a global AIDS governance can be identified as 
the establishment of a Global Program on AIDS (GPA) within the World Health 
Organisation (WHO) in 1986. Under the aegis of Jonathan Mann, the Program began to 
‘establish an international discourse around HIV/AIDS which emphasised the language 
of empowerment and participation’ (Poku, 2002: 287) and garnered support from donor 
countries for a multilateral response integrating the non-governmental sector (Poku, 
2002). In 1996, the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) was set 
up and replaced the GPA. However, UNAIDS is not an implementing agency. Its role is 
to provide support and coordination to originally six UN agencies, in relation to the 
AIDS pandemic (Poku, 2002). It has been playing a central role in defining the global 
response through its compilation and dissemination of ‘best practices’ (Seckinelgin, 
2007).  
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The late 1990s saw the arrival of a new global player in the guise of the World Bank. 
The Bank had started to focus on Health in the early 1990s, spending more in the sector 
than both the WHO and the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) combined 
(Sandusky, 2006). As its 1993 report ‘Investing in Health’ indicates, the Bank has been 
an advocate for the role of the private sector beyond a small package of essential health 
services delivered through the state (Sandusky, 2006). This focus on the role of the 
private sector and local communities is also perceptible in the Bank’s approach to AIDS. 
Although it had been involved in the AIDS response since 1986, by the late 1990s the 
pandemic became a new area of focus. In 1999, it developed a new strategy for 
‘Intensifying Action Against HIV/AIDS in Africa: Responding to a Development Crisis’ 
(World Bank, 1999), in which it declared its intention to scale up its commitment to 
fight HIV/AIDS, by promoting a ‘multi-sectoral response by focusing on HIV/AIDS as a 
development issue and by engaging both local communities and the private sector’ 
(World Bank, 2011b). In 2001, it launched its Multi-Country AIDS Program which was 
until 2003 the only major global source of funds for AIDS response (World Bank, 2007) 
and up to April 2010 provided over US$ 2bn for HIV/AIDS programmes in 35 countries 
(World Bank, 2011b).  
 
The new millennium can be seen as representing a turning point in the global response 
to AIDS. The Millennium Development Goals identified AIDS as one of the key issues 
to be addressed to improve social and economic conditions in poor countries. Two out 
of the three targets of Goal 6 relate to the fight against AIDS with target 6A aiming to 
‘have halted and begun to reverse the spread of HIV’ by 2015 and target 6B focusing on 
providing ‘universal access to treatment for HIV for all those who need it’ by 2010. A 
year later, the United Nations General Assembly held a Special Session (UNGASS) on 
HIV/AIDS and made a Declaration of Commitment (UNGASS, 2001). Seckinelgin 
argues that this resolution, together with the UNAIDS Report on the State of the 
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Epidemics (2002) set up a roadmap for global initiative, focused largely on scaling up 
prevention, treatment and care. He wrote: ‘since its release this document has been 
adopted as the reference point by many countries in their funding arrangements as well 
as in the creation of many national AIDS councils in Sub-Saharan Africa’ (Seckinelgin, 
2004: 291).  
 
The UNGASS also created a momentum for scaling up AIDS-related interventions. It 
called for an increase in ‘annual expenditure on the epidemic of between US$ 7 billion 
and US$ 10 billion in low and middle-income countries (UNGASS, 2001: art 80). Ten 
years, later, the UN General Assembly High Level meeting on HIV and AIDS noted that 
the decade had seen ‘an over eight-fold increase in funding from US$ 1.8 billion in 2001 
to 16 billion in 2010, the largest amount dedicated to combating a single disease in 
history’ (United Nations High Level meeting, 2011: art 13).  
 
Indeed, the new millennium saw the establishment of large funds dedicated to AIDS. 
The Global Fund to fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria was created in 2001, as an 
outcome on the UNGASS meeting. The Global Fund is public-private partnership 
between governments, civil society, the private sector and affected communities and 
acts as an ‘international financing institution dedicated to attracting and disbursing 
additional resources to prevent and treat HIV and AIDS, TB and malaria’ (Global Fund, 
2012a). It has become one of the largest sources of funds for AIDS-related activities, 
having disbursed to date (August 2012) over US$ 17bn (Global Fund, 2012b). Another 
heavy-weight of AIDS financing was also born early in the new Millennium: the U.S. 
President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), launched in 2003 by US 
President George W. Bush. The establishment of PEPFAR as a distinct and dedicated 
structure reflects the unique status accorded internationally to AIDS. With funding to 
date just under US$ 46bn (PEPFAR, 2012), PEPFAR has played a major role in shaping 
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the response to the epidemics, notably through its Christian-right influenced 
promotion of abstinence and faithfulness and the funding of faith groups (Nauta, 2010).  
 
Perhaps part of the rationale of this increased funding is to be found in the framing of 
AIDS as a security issue (Elbe, 2009; Ingram, 2005). In 2000, the UN Security Council 
devoted two sessions to the pandemic and adopted Resolution 1308 (United Nations 
Security Council, 2000) highlighting the potential impact of AIDS on social instability 
as well as in relation to the health of international peace keeping personnel. As Ingram 
argues, the resolution 
 
‘marked a major change in the way global health issues were framed at the 
highest political level: they constituted a declaration that what was previously a 
matter of domestic public health and international development was now an 
imminent threat to international peace and security.’  
(Ingram, 2005: 531) 
 
This rationale is clearly visible in the launch of the PEPFAR which was heavily 
influenced by the findings from the 2002 report of the U.S. National Intelligence 
Council The Next Wave of HIV/AIDS: Nigeria, Ethiopia, Russia, India, and China, 
viewing the spread of AIDS as a threat to US security and interests (Barnett and 
Whiteside, 2002: 314). However as Ingram (2005) and de Waal (2006) note, evidence to 
link health and security remains weak.  
 
Since the 2001 Declaration of Commitment, the 3 by 5 initiative (3 million people on 
treatment by 2005), launched initially by WHO and UNAIDS in 2003, has ‘helped to 
mobilize and support governments and their partners to scale up access to treatment’ 
(UNAIDS and WHO, 2006). The 2005 Gleneagles G8 Summit, the United Nations 
General Assembly 2005 World Summit Outcome, and the United Nations General 
Assembly resolution on the implementation of the Declaration of Commitment on 
HIV/AIDS (UNGASS, 2006) have contributed to keeping AIDS and particularly access 
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to treatment, at the top of the development agenda. The global economic downturn 
that has taken place since the research fieldwork was conducted has however impacted 
on donors’ ability and willingness to fund the global AIDS agenda. In 2011, the Global 
Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria had to cancel its next funding round 
totalling some £930m (Commons Select Committee, 2012) due to severe underfunding 
caused by constraints on aid budgets and corruption scandals (Boateng and Oxley, 2011; 
Boseley, 2011). While the Gates foundation has since pledged US$ 750 million to help 
support the Fund (UNAIDS, 2012c), the financial pressure on many western countries’ 
budgets may be signalling the decline of ‘AIDS exceptionalism’.  
 
At the time of my fieldwork in 2008, 60 million people had been infected by HIV and 
25 million had died of HIV-related causes (UNAIDS and WHO, 2009). Sub-Saharan 
Africa was and is still bearing the brunt of the pandemic, with 67% of all people living 
with HIV worldwide living in the region in 2008 (UNAIDS and WHO, 2009). Whilst 
the international response to AIDS has shown some success, for example by slowing 
down the incidence of infection worldwide from 3.3 million in 2001 to 2.5 million in 
2011, it has also been the object of critiques, some of which are outlined in the next 
section.  
 
3.2.2. Critiques of international AIDS interventions 
 
The Global AIDS governance has been the subject of many critical appraisals. One set 
of analyses focuses on how the international donor community has imposed a set of 
‘global’ solutions to the variety of contexts in which the pandemic has unfolded. As 
Barnett and Whiteside (2002) argue this trend was visible from the early international 
response to the epidemic where the Global Programme for AIDS (GPA) set up 
medically and epidemiologically-driven programme packages that were ‘all more or less 
the same’ and ‘were manufactured and exported from Geneva to the countries of Africa, 
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Asia and Latin America’ (Barnett and Whiteside, 2002: 74). Ever since, the top-down, 
prescriptive nature of AIDS interventions in the Global South has been decried (Kelly 
and Birdsall, 2010). As Seckinelgin (2009) argues, donors have often focused on seeking 
to transform poor countries’ understanding of their national interest.  
 
The large number of externally-funded interventions is key to understanding this 
characteristic. As de Waal (2006: 114) noted half a decade ago, ‘at present about 80 per 
cent of Africa’s HIV/AIDS programmes are financed from international sources, and 
that proportion is certain to rise as pledged monies come on-stream’. As a consequence, 
in poor countries, policy frameworks have been ‘by and large, developed by 
international actors’ (Seckinelgin, 2007: 1219). In addition, although a large proportion 
of work is carried out by grassroots NGOs and CSOs, their dependence on international 
funding has created a tendency for ‘donorism’, the ‘overriding sensitivity to the 
concerns of funders’ (de Waal, 2006: 55), thus making them more inclined to reflect 
global priorities than to challenge them. As a result, the global AIDS governance has 
been seen as constructing affected countries as ‘passive recipients to be managed and 
monitored, and in need of having (Western) technology and knowledge (read 
“globalisation”) bestowed upon them’ (Jones, 2004: 394).  
 
As a consequence, O’Manique (2004) explains, the global response to the pandemic has 
been largely rooted in the Western experience of AIDS and approaches focused on 
behavioural change and biomedical perspectives were exported to Africa. As 
O’Shaughnessy (2007) states, knowledge production about the AIDS epidemic in Africa 
was rooted in Western medical science, rather than in the experience of local people 
living with HIV and AIDS (PLWA): ‘African governments, organisations and 
communities were constructed as takers of knowledge in this system, not as a source of 
information and innovation’ (O’Shaughnessy, 2007: 3). Thus, international AIDS 
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funding often fails to take into consideration community interests (Edström and 
MacGregor, 2010). Furthermore, because of the lack of cure, and the expensiveness of 
treatment in the context of poor countries, interventions in the first two decades of the 
pandemic have focused on behaviour change as well as self-help and empowerment, 
which, Nauta (2010) argues, has tended to display a misplaced emphasis on African 
culture, sexuality and ignorance (Nauta, 2010). Campbell (2003) also notes that the 
international AIDS response has allowed the framing of the problem as a local, African 
one rather than a global one.  
 
In addition, Whiteside and de Waal contend that the field of AIDS is characterised by 
many ‘“factoids” – claims that have acquired the status of indisputable fact through 
frequent repetition, even though their basis may actually be extremely shaky’ 
(Whiteside and de Waal, 2004: 585). They cite the supposedly high HIV prevalence 
amongst the military as such factoid, based on unreliable evidence. As Seckinelgin 
(2008) notes, many interventions that have entered the AIDS intervention repertoire, 
such as condom distribution and voluntary testing and counselling (VTC) are believed 
to be working. Barriers to an effective response are typically perceived by the Global 
AIDS community to be revolving around funding gap and the need to scale up the 
implementation of these tools. Thus, change is ‘measured by increased quantities of 
interventions and funding similar to those of the past, without taking stock of whether 
what was done produced overall positive outcomes’ (Seckinelgin, 2004: 284). Moreover, 
international funding often emphasises short-term programmes, with numerical targets 
attached to them, at the expense of long-term investments in local infrastructures 
(Campbell et al., 2012). Thus Campbell (2003) argues that money tends to be wasted on 
short term, unsuitable projects. 
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More recently, with the PWC and the return to a state-centred approach to 
government, the imposition of models from donors has extended from interventions 
and policies to para-statal and government institutions and systems. As Swidler (2006: 
273) notes, the global AIDS governance has created a form of ‘institutional 
isomorphism’, a ‘homogenisation of organizational forms across the AIDS terrain’. For 
example, the imposition of the creation of a National AIDS Commission (NAC) as a 
precondition to receiving funds from the World Bank has remodelled the institutional 
landscape of many African countries. However, Rau (2006) argues that small-scale 
grassroots CSOs often find large scale bureaucracy engendered by the NAC system at 
odds with their capacity. Both Putzel (2004) and Swidler (2006) also contend that this 
new organisation template shows bias for action outside of government structures, with 
the creation of NACs often marginalising Ministries of Health, whilst decentralisation, 
also promoted by the World Bank and donors such as UNAIDS, has led to the creation 
new regional and local governing bodies such as DACCs (District AIDS Coordinating 
Committees) and VACs (Village AIDS Committees) (Swidler, 2006). Public-private 
partnerships have been largely prescribed by international donors as well (Putzel, 
2004). The new aid architecture has also contributed to the shaping of in-country 
systems of AIDS governance. For example, Swidler (2006) explains how, in Malawi, the 
establishment of a NAC monitoring and evaluation framework was a prerequisite for 
grants from the Global Fund and from an international donor pool supporting access to 
antiretrovirals (ARVs). The framework was then developed by consultants funded by 
the World Bank. She concludes that ‘to get resources from global donors, Malawi has to 
mobilize local actors to enact organizational forms and procedures required by global 
actors’ (Swidler, 2006: 271).  
 
As a result of this unidirectional flow of knowledge, policy and tools for tackling the 
AIDS pandemic, Seckinelgin (2004: 297) states that global AIDS governance is 
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characterised by a ‘mismatch between the psychosocial context of the disease and the 
mechanisms of intervention’ which has been detrimental to an effective response. In 
particular, the biomedical framing of AIDS programmes and focus on behaviour change 
has been seen as ignoring ‘the wider context of sexual behaviour, the ways it is shaped 
by political, socioeconomic and cultural forces, and the possibility of other factors 
contributing to vulnerability in southern Africa’ (O’Shaughnessy, 2007: 4). A 
compelling account of the failures of the programmes promoted by the international 
AIDS community was provided by Campbell in her study of a mining community in 
South Africa. In it, she highlights how interconnected factors such as poverty, lack of 
opportunities and gender inequalities can undermine the behaviour-change model of 
intervention. She writes:  
 
‘Sexual behaviour, and the possibility of sexual behaviour change, are 
determined by an interlocking series of multi-level processes, which are often 
not under the control of an individual person’s rational conscious choice. […] 
Thus, for example, one’s innermost needs for trust and intimacy are often 
symbolized by the closeness of flesh-to-flesh sex. This may become a 
particularly compelling option in life situations that offer scant opportunities for 
the development of secure and stable relationships. […] Many people use the 
psychological defences of denial or fatalism in the face of overwhelmingly 
frightening threats, of the kind represented by HIV/AIDS. Such defences may be 
particularly common among people who are persistently faced with difficult life 
situations over which they have little control, or who have had few experiences 
of situations in which they have succeeded in meeting their hopes or achieving 
their aspirations. In strongly patriarchal societies, where socialization often 
encourages men to be macho risk-takers and to crave social power, frequent and 
unprotected sex with multiple partners may often be one of the few ways in 
which men can act out their masculinity. This might be the case particularly in 
situations where men, at best, work in difficult conditions over which they have 
little control or, at worst, have little access to jobs or money.’ 
(Campbell, 2003: 183-184) 
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Programmes driven by the Global AIDS industry appear to be based on an exaggeration 
of personal agency (Cunha, 2007: 212) whilst structural causes of socio-economic 
inequalities remain inadequately addressed. As Barnett and Whiteside argue:  
 
‘Neither public health nor clinical medicine pays sufficient attention to what 
does improve health – escaping from poverty, access to good food, clean water, 
sanitation, shelter, education and preventative care. Clinical medicine has only 
marginal effects on people’s long-term health.’  
(Barnett and Whiteside, 2002: 27)  
 
In addition, the ‘catastrophe narrative’ (Whiteside and de Waal, 2004: 586) and ‘AIDS 
exceptionalism’, the idea that AIDS has attracted disproportionate attention compared 
to other similarly important development problems, have been criticised for 
reconfiguring development in Sub-Saharan Africa around the pandemic (England, 
2008) and diverting focus from other important issues, including international policies 
and agreements sustaining global inequalities (Youde, 2005). The disjuncture between 
the international AIDS control regime’s messages and the history and identity of 
recipient countries can lead to a resistance to these messages. This has led to some 
backlash, most notably the ‘counter-epistemic’ reaction (Youde, 2005) of Thabo Mbeki, 
the President of South Africa between 1999 and 2008, who questioned the link 
between HIV and AIDS and banned the use of antiretroviral treatment (ART) in public 
hospitals.  
 
Some of these backlashes can also be read as a reaction to what Nauta (2010) sees as the 
depoliticisation of AIDS by global interventions. For example, international donors 
have failed to acknowledge the effects of the implementation of Structural Adjustment 
Programmes (SAPs) on the spread of HIV in Africa. Yet, by introducing cutbacks in 
public service provision such as health and education, as well as introducing the levy of 
fees, they have contributed to undermining national health systems (Nauta, 2010). In 
addition, some of the policies advocated by the IFIs have been seen as creating 
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increased poverty and inequalities (Nauta, 2010; Poku 2005) as well as unemployment 
with the shrinking of public sector workforce (O’Shaughnessy, 2007). As Sandusky 
states:  
‘Specific policies such as reorienting agriculture for food crops to exports, 
reducing education spending and relaxing labour regulations undermined access 
to good nutrition, education and stable income, all essential requirements for 
maintaining good health and utilising health care services.’  
(Sandusky, 2006: 5) 
 
Indeed, poverty has been associated with higher risks of contracting HIV, through both 
its socio-economic and biological effects. For example, Hunter (2007) explains how 
rising unemployment have left some groups, especially poor women, more vulnerable. 
In South Africa, the implementation of neoliberal policies have been concomitant to 
reduced marital rates, an increase in women-headed households, women’s migration, 
all factors that make women more prone to contracting HIV (Hunter, 2007). Poverty is 
also associated with increases in sex work (O’Shaughnessy, 2007). Mtika (2007) has also 
shown as well how the lack of human capital development in rural Malawi has been 
pushing young people into circular migration that increases AIDS risks. In addition, 
Nauta (2010) highlights how malnutrition weakens the skin and mucous membranes, 
increasing susceptibility to sexually transmitted diseases (STDs), which also makes HIV 
infection more likely. With the scaling up of treatment, malnutrition can also be an 
issue as antiretroviral treatments (ARTs) require increased calorie consumption. As a 
result, the very poorest might stop taking treatment because it makes them too hungry.  
 
The framing of AIDS as a development problem by many of the global actors such as 
the World Bank, UNAIDS, the Global Fund and the Gates Foundation has recognised 
the AIDS-poverty nexus, where poverty is seen as a factor increasing vulnerability to 
HIV whilst the pandemic also causes impoverishment at household, community and 
national levels. However, whilst such an understanding is valuable, it has also tended to 
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obscure the fact that in some countries such as Ethiopia, Kenya and Tanzania, HIV 
prevalence is highest amongst the middle-class and more educated people (England, 
2008). Access to money and positions of power can also lead to an increase in 
concurrent partnerships and constitutes a risk factor (Lwanda, 2004), a dynamic that 
can be masked by a focus on AIDS as a development issue. In addition, policies focused 
on poverty can fail to take into account the complexity of people’s lives. For example, 
Tawfik and Cotts Watkins (2007) found that while donors in Geneva and Lilongwe saw 
rural women’s engagement in marital relations outside marriage as linked to poverty 
and their survival needs, women’s motivations were far more varied including a desire 
for consumer goods, passion and revenge on husbands’ infidelity.  
 
Moreover, the understanding of AIDS as a development issue has been framed by 
neoliberalism and focused on growth (O’Shaughnessy, 2007) with little attention paid 
to the role that redistribution of political and economic resources would need to play in 
tackling inequalities. The Global AIDS governance thus appears to favour programmes 
which are not only in line with their experience of the pandemic but also compatible 
with their values and interests. As Barnett and Whiteside state:  
 
‘The development of the human rights discourse has been important for the 
protection of some. But its placement at centre stage has much to do with the 
agendas of US politics and what is acceptable in the US policy discourse where 
social inequality and the distribution of income and wealth are by and large 
excluded from the political agenda.’  
(Barnett and Whiteside, 2002: 73)  
 
Neoliberal rationales were also seen as having prevented access to affordable treatment 
in poor countries for the first two decades of the epidemics. As Poku (2002) explains, 
pharmaceutical companies were able to set their own prices for medications in various 
countries which produced the perverse effect of making ART more expensive in poor 
countries where competition was less. For example, a Médecins Sans Frontières report 
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found that Ciprofloxacin (an antibiotic anti-retroviral) was twice as expensive in 
Uganda as in Norway (MSF, 2000, in Poku, 2002). Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS) agreements have also made it more difficult for countries to 
access generic ARTs (see box 3 for more details) and the insistence of PEPFAR, at least 
in its early days, on the use of non-generic ARTs has been seen as a way of boosting 
national pharmaceutical companies (Nauta, 2010). The lack of market incentives has 
also been linked with the failure to develop a vaccine (Nauta, 2010) and the neglect of 
the development of microbicides that would give more control to women, especially 
poor ones (Barnett and Whiteside, 2002). 
 
Box 3: Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agreements and 
ARTs 
(after Sandusky, 2006)  
 
The Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement came 
into force in 1995, during the Uruguay Round of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) 
negotiations. It established standards for the protection of intellectual property rights. 
Before the full implementation of the TRIPS agreement in 2005, countries such as 
Brazil, Thailand, and India did not grant patents and were major producers of low price 
generics; India was the primary exporter of affordable antiretroviral medicines.  
 
The 2001 Doha Declaration on the TRIPS agreements and Public Health acknowledged 
concerns about the cost of patented medicines for poor countries. It reasserted that 
developing countries should make use of all the flexibilities in the TRIPS agreement to 
promote public health and extended the transition period for least developed members 
to enforce patent protection for pharmaceutical products until January 2016. 
Flexibilities include allowing a government to import a product sold at lower prices in 
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another country. The TRIPS agreement also authorises member countries to issue 
mandatory or compulsory licenses, allowing companies to produce generic versions of 
patented products without the consent of the patent holder, in situations of national 
emergency or for public non-commercial use. In 2002 the government of Zimbabwe 
declared the AIDS epidemics a national emergency and issued compulsory licenses to 
local companies to import or produce antiretroviral drugs (ARVs), leading to treatment 
price reduction. For instance, the price of one ARV drug (Zerit) went from US$ 400 in 
2001 to US$ 30 in 2002. These licenses, however, were only to be used domestically and 
many poor countries, especially small ones like Malawi, do not have the production 
capacity to manufacture complex medicines and are reliant on imported ones.  
 
In 2003, the WTO’s ‘August 30th decision’ allowed members to issue compulsory 
licenses for patented medicines for export to eligible importing members. However 
these compulsory licenses are granted on a country-by-country, drug-by-drug and case-
by-case basis and their scope and lifespan is limited. As a result, it divides the market in 
a way that is unattractive to potential generic pharmaceutical producers. In addition, 
the US has used technical assistance and bilateral trade agreements to pressure poor 
countries to adopt ‘TRIPS Plus’ which provides stronger patent protection.  
 
However, the literature also highlights examples of subversion of and resistance to 
donors’ pressure. As Cornish et al. (2012) and Morfit (2011) argue, local actors have 
demonstrated creativity in negotiating global norms and appearing to comply with 
donors’ prescriptions while adapting them to the context they work in. Some countries 
have also transgressed global standards. For example, Botswana, which struggled getting 
patients to come forward for treatment, made AIDS testing ‘routine’ – though the 
option of opting-out was offered - rather than voluntary, which appeared to have 
helped to alleviate the stigma attached to ARVs (Swidler, 2006). This initiative was 
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validated by the World Health Organization in 2007 and adopted by the Malawian 
government (Meldrum, 2007). As O’Shaughnessy (2007: 4) notes, the few African 
countries that successfully mounted early campaigns did so from an African 
perspective. In that context, the country-led approach promoted by the new aid 
architecture appears particularly worthy of examination. The next section presents an 
overview of Malawi’s recent political, economic and social history and situation at the 
time of my fieldwork. 
 
 
3.3. A short overview of Malawi 
 
Malawi is a small but densely populated landlocked country bordering with 
Mozambique, Zambia and Tanzania. As many other African countries, its borders are a 
product of colonisation and were established in 1907, when the British Central African 
Protectorate was divided into two separate entities: Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia) 
and Nyasaland, the colonial name for Malawi. Its capital is Lilongwe but Blantyre, in 
the South, is the largest city. The country is divided into 28 districts within three 
regions: Northern, Central and Southern (see map in figure 2). This section provides a 
brief introduction to the recent political history of Malawi, and gives some perspectives 
on the country’s economy and civil society. It is worth noting however that whilst 
there is a rich literature on aid and development in Malawi, there is a relative dearth of 
accessible material analysing the country’s political and economic development outside 
donor-funded reports. Thus this section is based on a relatively small pool of literature, 
a large proportion of which was developed by Western academics with the support of 
donor agencies. This may thus reflect an ‘outsider’s view’ of the country.  
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Figure 2. Map of Malawi (Source: United Nations) 
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3.3.1. A young democracy 
 
Malawi gained independence from Britain in 1964, having been a protectorate since 
1891. Its first President, Hastings Kamuzu Banda from the Malawi Congress Party 
(MCP) instituted a one-party state and authoritarian rule (Jubilee Debt Campaign, 
2012). Under increased popular pressure and demand for democratic change in the late 
1990s, Banda organised a referendum in 1993 which he lost, ending the one-party state 
and allowing multi-party elections to take place in 1994 (Loquai and Klavert, 2011). 
Malawi is thus often characterised as a ‘young democracy’. The 1995 constitution 
guarantees basic human rights and freedom and sets up a presidential system with the 
legislature and the judiciary providing, on paper, a check on executive power (Rakner 
et al., 2004).  
 
The 1994 election was won by Bakili Muluzi and his United Democratic Front (UDF). 
However, the UDF did not secure a parliamentary majority. As Rakner et al. (2004) 
note, the electoral geography of Malawi shows strong regional affinities. In 1994, three 
parties emerged in Parliament: the Alliance for Democracy (AFORD) won seats in the 
less populated Northern region, the Malawi Congress Party (MCP) in the central 
region, and the UDF in the densely populated southern region. AFORD initially formed 
an alliance with the MCP before being persuaded to join the UDF in a coalition 
allowing Muluzi to benefit from a majority in Parliament (Rakner et al., 2004).  
 
The UDF won re-election in the 1999 presidential and parliamentary elections (the 
latter thanks to an alliance with independent candidates). However, some UDF MPs left 
the party to create the National Democratic Alliance, forcing the UDF to form 
coalitions to secure legislation. As Rakner et al. (2004) note, the peaceful 
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accommodation of a ‘divided’ government, with the Presidency and Parliament being 
controlled by two (or more) different parties is a striking characteristic of Malawi. 
Towards the end of his second term in office, Muluzi attempted to change the 
constitution in order to run for a third mandate but this move was met with strong 
protests and demonstrations organised by civil society organisations, and was rebuked 
by parliament (Loquai and Klavert, 2011).  
 
The 2004 elections were won by Bingu Wa Mutharika on a UDF ticket. Mutharika had 
been groomed by Muluzi as his replacement but soon showed signs of independence, 
refusing to nominate some of Mulizi’s protégés for key posts and committing to fighting 
corruption. After months of internal strife, Mutharika resigned and founded the 
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) (Booth et al., 2006). A number of MPs followed 
him which caused a major crisis as their legitimacy in Parliament was challenged under 
section 65 of the Malawian Constitution, which prohibits defections by MPs without 
seeking a fresh electoral mandate. Thus Mutharika operated with a minority 
government with Parliaments blocking reforms as well as protesting against the lack of 
application of section 65 by threatening, for example, not to approve budgets.  
 
In 2009, Mutharika won a landslide election, providing the Presidency with a stable 
Parliamentary majority for the first time in the country’s democratic history (Loquai 
and Klavert, 2011). However, the increasingly autocratic attitude of Mutharika as well 
as his economic policies leading to fuel and foreign exchange shortages as well as high 
inflation, sparked protests in 2011 (Mapondera and Smith, 2011). In April 2012, 
Mutharika’s sudden death brought the Vice-President, Joyce Banda, to power, 
becoming the first female President in Southern Africa (Smith, 2012a).  
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As a consequence of the Local Government Act (1998) and its decentralisation policy, 
local councils were elected in 2000. The 40 local governments1 (which include non-
elected members without voting rights such as MPs, traditional authority and CSO 
representatives) had some political authority devolved to them (for example the ability 
to raise local taxes) and were set to play an important democratic role by planning and 
implementing various activities and public services (Simwaka, 2004). However, their 
mandates ran out in 2005 and new elections have been continually delayed, mainly for 
fear of political defeat from the ruling party. They are now set to take place in 2014 
(Loquai and Klavert, 2011). As a result, there has been a ‘de facto recentralisation’ 
(Cammack et al., 2007) as devolution has been reversed. However, local councils still 
fulfil some planning and policy implementation functions.  
 
The experience of democracy in Malawi has so far been marked by a number of 
characteristics that have undermined the depth of changes. One of them is the weak 
institutionalisation of parties. As Booth et al. (2006: viii) remark, there are still ‘very 
little signs of a more issue-based, performance-oriented politics’. Parties are often based 
on particular personalities, and indeed there has been a personalisation of power in the 
hands of the President ever since Banda (Rakner et al., 2004) with Muluzi, and 
Mutharika in his second term, emulating Banda’s style to some extent. The lack of 
issue-based politics can be seen as reflecting the control of the political sphere by a very 
small, privileged, elite which controls large parts of the country’s economy. As Rakner 
et al. (2004) remark, both ruling party and opposition MPs have economic interests in 
large-scale farming, transport, tobacco, fertilizer, and construction. Thus their interests 
are ultimately convergent beyond party divisions. As a result, there is a lack of 
                                                 
1 Twenty-Eight district assemblies, eight town assemblies, one municipality (Zomba) and three 
municipal councils (Blantyre, Lilongwe and Mzuzu). 
 98 
articulation of alternative political vision, notably one that would reflect poor people’s 
voices (Rakner et al., 2004).  
 
Moreover, according to Booth et al. (2006: viii) Malawi incarnates a hybrid 
‘neopatrimonial’ state, in that ‘there is a framework of formal law and administration 
but the state is informally captured by patronage networks’ where ‘the distribution of 
spoils from office takes precedence over the formal functions of the state, severely 
limiting the ability of public officials to make policies in the general interest’. More 
particularly, Malawi is seen as a case of ‘big man syndrome’, with ‘a systematic failure to 
distinguish between private sector resources, state resources and the resources of the 
ruling party’ (Booth 2006: viii). As Rakner et al. (2004) argue, this may explain the 
existence of peaceful ‘divided’ governments: shifting alliances and coalitions ensure that 
power and spoils are regularly shared by all political actors.  
 
Another related issue has been the actual lack of checks and balances to executive 
dominance. Both Parliament and the National Audit Office are dependent on funds 
made available by the executive branch of government which have often been kept 
purposefully insufficient thus considerably hampering their capacity. As a result, the 
effectiveness of the legislature has suffered from low frequency of session and 
committee meetings, lack of parliamentary administration and research service, 
inexperienced MPs and until 2010, the absence of a building (Loquai and Klavert, 
2011). Although parliamentary work has received some support from donors, it has 
been sporadic and has failed to lead to the development of a Malawi-owned programme 
(Loquai and Klavert, 2011; Rakner et al., 2004). As Rakner et al. (2004: 9) note: 
‘committees do not have their own staff to assist them in their work, but instead rely on 
donor-provided researchers, with unclear lines of authority as to who they really are 
answerable to.’ However, since 2009, there has been an increase in the frequency of 
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committee sessions and a new building financed by the Chinese government was made 
available in 2010. The judiciary, while relatively independent and competent suffers 
from capacity constraints (Loquai and Klavert, 2011).  
 
A notable impact of the features of the Malawian democracy has been the country’s 
inability to design and implement coherent policies (Booth et al., 2006). This contrasts 
with the years of Banda’s rule where a long-term (if self-serving) development vision 
was consistently articulated and implemented by a competent civil service (Booth et al., 
2006). The Muluzi administration, on the other hand, was marked by the multiplication 
of policy documents and a lack of consistent implementation (Booth et al., 2006; Loquai 
and Klavert, 2011). High-level corruption, the sidelining of senior public servants by 
Muluzi’s cronies, resource constraints and a lack of incentive for performance also led 
to a loss of ethic and professionalism in public service (Booth et al., 2006). Civil service 
salaries were also negatively affected with average pay in 2001/2002 less than half the 
1980 level in real terms (DFID, 2007a), thus encouraging qualified personnel to leave 
for jobs in NGOs and donor offices. Under Muluzi, corruption also spread to the lowest 
echelons of public service (Booth et al., 2006).  
 
Civil society is relatively recent in Malawi. Before 1994, civil society associations were 
banned, with the exception of faith-based ones (Rakner et al., 2004). In addition, after 
the end of the one-party system, large funding by donor organisations channelled 
through NGOs with low capacity led to the creation of a number of ‘briefcase NGOs’ 
and undermined the sector’s claims of representativeness (Booth et al., 2006). As 
Rakner et al. (2004) note, NGOs have often been perceived to be anti-government and 
relations between civil society organisations and politicians have sometimes been 
strained. Since 2003, organisations have had to receive official approval (Morfit, 2011). 
However, given the recent history of the NGO sector, it is relatively buoyant and has 
 100 
proved its ability to mobilise the population, as the organisation of demonstrations 
protesting against Muluzi’s attempt to reform the constitution and run for a third 
mandate, showed. Funding for HIV and AIDS has provided a considerable boost with 
Morfit (2011) noting that close to half of all NGOs’ employment opportunities from 
2000 to 2005 were AIDS-related. Some national organizations seeking to represent 
PWLA have emerged, such as the National Association of People Living with HIV and 
AIDS in Malawi (NAPHAM) or the Malawi Network of People Living with HIV/AIDS 
(MANET+). In addition, the Lighthouse Trust or Banja la Mtsogolo has been key in 
providing AIDS-related services and care. Malawi benefits from freedom of press and a 
number of independent printed media and radio (Loquai and Klavert, 2011) though 
they came under increased pressure from the government in 2011.  
 
3.3.2. A vulnerable economy marked by social inequalities and widespread poverty 
 
Malawi is one of the poorest countries in the world. In 2011, it ranked 171 out of 184 in 
UNDP’s Human Development Index, which captures levels of economic and social 
development by combining indicators of life expectancy, years of schooling and income 
per capita. The economy is dominated by agriculture which in 2009 represented 36% of 
the GDP (Loquai and Klavert, 2011). Three quarters of total agricultural production 
comes from smallholders (Rakner et al., 2004). About 90% of households are engaged in 
agriculture with 81% of the active rural population classified as subsistence farmers 
(DFID, 2007b). The sector is also the main source of foreign exchange, making up for 
about 80% of exports (MEPD, 2006). This reliance on agriculture makes the country 
and its population particularly vulnerable to shocks due to low rainfall. Government-
delivered services also dominate the economy (Loquai and Klavert, 2011) and 
manufacturing and mining account for about 17% of the GDP (Rakner et al., 2004).  
 
 101 
The fast growth in population, which rose from 4 million in 1964 to about 12 million in 
2008, has been leading to high population density, especially in the Central and 
Southern regions where it reaches 206-207 inhabitants per sq km (Booth et al., 2006). 
This has also created pressure on the land and impacted negatively on soil fertility. In 
addition to the lack of access to land, the lack of employment opportunities, access to 
credit, as well as low levels of health and education are seen as the main factors of 
poverty (Rakner et al., 2004).  
 
The first fifteen years after independence were characterised by a period of rapid 
growth based on agriculture, and policies benefiting large estates, often acquired by the 
ruling elite (Booth et al., 2006). The economy was also boosted by trade with South 
Africa, as Banda was the only African ruler to establish diplomatic relations with the 
apartheid government (Jubilee Debt Campaign, 2012). However, the lack of 
restructuring of the agricultural sector, as well as international shocks and rapid 
population growth made progress unsustainable. The creation of large estates also put 
further pressure on the land available to smallholders. In addition, whilst the period 
brought some social improvements, it fuelled rising inequalities, with 10% of the 
population earning over half of national income in the late 1960s (Booth et al., 2006: 5).  
 
The 1980-1998 period was marked by economic liberalisation, poor growth rates and 
inconsistent policies that failed to address the major structural issues the country faced 
such as population growth, soil erosion and unequal land distribution (Booth et al., 
2006). Exogenous shocks such as the rise of oil prices, the deterioration of terms of trade 
and the 1980s civil war in Mozambique which led to an influx of over 1 million 
refugees and reduced access to key ports and trading opportunities, also had a negative 
impact on the economy (Jubilee Debt Campaign, 2012). In addition, Malawi had 
accumulated large debts in the 1970s and the rise of interest rates from 1.9% in 1976 to 
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over 9% in 1981 put strain on the country’s finances: debt repayments through the 
1980s and 1990s averaged US$100 million (Jubilee Debt Campaign, 2012). Income per 
capita fell to one of the lowest in Africa (Booth et al., 2006). In the 1990s, public 
expenditure was reoriented towards social sectors but barriers such as low growth, ‘one 
of the most severe HIV/AIDS outbreaks’ and environmental degradation impeded 
progress (Booth et al., 2006: 5). 
 
The 1998-2004 period corresponds to Muluzi’s second term and showed even greater 
deterioration of the economy with growth averaging 1.6% per year in the period 
(Booth et al., 2006: 6). By 2000, Malawi’s international debt burden had reached 150% 
of its national income (Jubilee Debt Campaign, 2012). High population growth, 
widespread corruption, macroeconomic instability, high inflation rates, the collapse of 
public service provision as well as bad weather all contributed to a significant 
worsening of living conditions for most Malawians. In addition economic slow down in 
neighbouring countries which had traditionally been a destination of migration for 
Malawians affected the level of remittances (Booth et al., 2006). The bleakness of the 
period culminated in 2002-2003, with an extremely severe famine (due in part to poor 
weather conditions as well as structural and policy-related issues). The United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID) estimates that in February 2003, nearly 
a third of the country was dependent of food aid (USAID/Malawi, 2004).  
 
At the time of my fieldwork in 2008, though the situation was bleak, there had been 
some progress. Economic management had improved under Mutharika and the country 
was experiencing strong growth (as high as 9.7% in 2008) (Loquai and Klavert, 2011). 
Malawi had finally been granted a US$ 2.3 billion debt cancellation in 2006 by the IMF, 
the World Bank as well as some rich governments, freeing up finance from the national 
budget for public services. As the Jubilee Debt Campaign (2012) notes, in 2005, Malawi 
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was spending 9.6% of national income on debt servicing and 4.6% on public health 
care. Poverty had somewhat been alleviated: in 2004, over half (52%) of Malawi’s 
population lived below the poverty line (Integrated Household Survey, 2004 in DFID, 
2007b), while in 2008, this had been reduced to 40% (CABS development partners, 
2010). However, prospects for further amelioration are hampered by continuous 
population growth and increasing density, the AIDS epidemic, weak infrastructure, 
lack of qualified human resources, dependence on agriculture and energy constraints 
(Loquai and Klavert, 2011). Social and economic inequalities are still considerable with 
the wealthiest 10% being 8 times richer than the 10% poorest segment of the 
population (DFID, 2007b). In this context, foreign aid has often been seen as key to the 
provision of basic services.  
 
 
3.4. Overseas assistance for AIDS in Malawi 
 
This section provides an overview of donors’ involvement in the AIDS sector in 
Malawi. It starts by giving a brief historical perspective on the development of the 
pandemic in Malawi, before turning to the establishment of the current funding 
architecture governing the AIDS response.  
 
3.4.1. AIDS in Malawi: from silencing the threat to scaling to up treatment 
 
The first case of AIDS in Malawi was confirmed in 1985 (Lwanda, 2004). The same year 
a USAID-funded survey found a 2% HIV prevalence amongst a sample of 200 pregnant 
women (Lwanda, 2004). A committee to ensure the safety of blood transfusion was set 
up but it was not until 1987 that the first national AIDS campaign was launched and 
Malawi’s first AIDS policy was issued in 1988 as a basis for donor funding (Lwanda, 
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2004). However, until the demise of Banda, the epidemic was deliberately silenced. As 
Booth et al. (2006: 23) explain, until 1994 ‘medical staff and the Ministry of Health 
were forbidden from keeping records, and journalists were warned against reporting on 
the advance of the infection or the illness, which would be treated as an act of treason’. 
The National AIDS Control Programme was set up but Banda nominated his personal 
physician Hetherwick Ntaba to head it, which allowed him to control and politicise 
decision-making (Lwanda, 2004). Indeed, the HIV virus sat awkwardly with Banda’s 
institutionalised sexism mixing prudery and sexual exploitation. Under this rule, strict 
gender-based dress codes were enforced and family planning services were banned 
until 1982 (with limited access thereafter). At the same time, a culture of sexual 
exploitation was rife within the MCP, using women to perform songs and dances for 
leaders’ personality enhancement, as well as expecting sexual favours as part of the 
service to the elite and/or in order to secure business and positions for male family 
members (Booth et al., 2005; Lwanda, 2004). The culture of sexual exploitation in 
politics persisted under Muluzi.  
 
The AIDS epidemic in Malawi was fuelled by the war in Mozambique, during which 
Malawi had 500 men, rotated every 6 months between 1985 and 1993, posted in the 
neighbouring country to defend the Nacala rail line. Many of them frequented brothels 
both in Mozambique and Malawi (Lwanda, 2004). In addition, practices amongst the 
male elite, whose power and money enabled them to have mistresses, also fuelled the 
pandemic. The spread of AIDS has, more generally, been driven by social and cultural 
attitudes such as gender inequalities and sexual violence, trans-generational sex, stigma, 
discrimination and denial, some cultural practices and inhibitions to talk openly about 
sex, as well as by structural issues including high mobility (inter- and intra-national), 
economic inequalities, illiteracy and low levels of education (NAC, 2008b). According 
to estimates from the 2004 demographic and health survey (in NAC, 2008b), the main 
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mode of transmission of the virus is heterosexual (88%), whilst mother to child 
transmission is estimated at 10%. ‘Other’ modes are deemed to be at 2% but it is worth 
noting that homosexuality, like prostitution, is illegal in Malawi and represents a 
tremendous taboo.  
 
By 1994, Lwanda (2004) notes, AIDS had become a prominent issue and the issue was 
included in the UDF’s election manifesto. By 1995, AIDS-related illnesses accounted for 
a third of hospital admissions. Yet, the government did very little until 1999, when a 
sentinel survey indicated a prevalence of 8.8% in the population. By then, the UDF had 
lost over 20 of its MPs and senior activists, many allegedly to AIDS (Lwanda, 2004). By 
2000, life expectancy had declined from 48 to 41, largely due to the pandemic (DFID, 
2007b) and it was estimated that Malawi had about one million orphans, half of them as 
a result of AIDS (DFID, 2007b). In 2003, the government issued a national HIV/AIDS 
policy which was supplemented in 2005 by the National Action Framework (2005-
2009), guiding a multi-sectoral response based on public health, community 
empowerment and human rights approaches and seeking to involve PLWA (NAC 
2008b). HIV has been relatively stable in the late 2000s, with a prevalence of 11.2% by 
2008. Since the mid-2000s, treatment has been considerably scaled up, with the number 
of people on ARVs increasing from less than 4,000 in 2004 to 85,000 in 2007 (DFID, 
2007b) and over 165,000 (68% of those in needs) by June 2008 (NAC, 2008b).  
 
However, the biomedical response is severely constrained by inadequate health 
infrastructures and human resources. Malawi has one of the worst health worker to 
population ratio in the world, with 2 doctors and 59 nurses for every 100,000 people 
and a vacancy rate of 60%. This is attributed to the pandemic itself as well as low 
investments leading to high attrition rates due to heavy workload, poor pay and 
working conditions (for example medicine and equipment shortages) as well as the 
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more attractive employment opportunities within the NGO sector and abroad (DFID, 
2007b). A 2002 study showed that less than 10% of all health facilities satisfied the 
requirements for the delivery of the Essential Health Package (EHP), promoted by the 
government and donors through the Health SWAp (MoH/JICA, 2002). In addition, 
access to health services is an issue with only 54% of people living in rural areas having 
access to a health care facility within a 5 km radius. Moreover, not all health centres are 
public. In 2003, it was estimated that the MoH only operated about 60% of the 617 
available health facilities (Republic of Malawi, 2004b: 7), with a quarter of all health 
centres being managed by the Christian Health Association of Malawi (CHAM), which 
levies fees at point of service delivery, hence ‘posing a serious threat to equity amongst 
the rural poor’ (Republic of Malawi, 2004b: 7). The poorest households are estimated to 
spend between 7 and 10% of their income on health care consumption (Republic of 
Malawi, 2004b) and the National Health Account exercise showed that 20% of all 
health care costs are covered by out-of-pocket expenditures (Republic of Malawi, 
2004b).  
 
3.4.2. Aid relations in Malawi 
 
Malawi is a highly aid-dependent country. In 2009/2010, overseas development 
assistance represented 35% of national revenues (Loquai and Klavert, 2011), a decrease 
from 40% in 2006/2007 (DFID, 2007b). The country is often considered as a ‘donor 
darling’ and has been the recipient of high levels of donor funding historically (Morfit, 
2011). It was one of the first African countries to introduce structural adjustment loans 
in 1980/1981 (Clapham, 1996) and during the first part of the 1980s was seen as one of 
the ‘most compliant structurally-adjusted countries in the region, implementing many 
of the reforms advocated by the IMF and World Bank (Booth et al., 2006: 31). 
However, Malawi’s relations with international donors has also been marked by non-
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compliance, mistrust on both sides, and on-off patterns of funding (Booth et al., 2006). 
For example, in 1986, the government violated donor conditionality and reintroduced 
fertiliser subsidies. However, neither USAID not the World Bank withdrew their 
funding. As Booth et al. (2006: 31) put it: ‘having touted Malawi as the shining star of 
adjustment in Africa, the Bank would have found it very difficult to pull out’. The Bank 
subsequently reviewed its agricultural policy. Even under Muluzi, where donor 
conditionalities were agreed to but often not implemented consistently, many donors 
continued to disburse funding (Booth et al., 2006). However, in 2001, the IMF, the 
World Bank and donor countries involved in budget support suspended their 
disbursements, following the failure by the government to abide by the conditions 
specified in its Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) programme as well as 
concerns regarding governance (Tan, 2010; Unwin, 2004). Aid and loans were resumed 
in 2003, motivated not so much as a result of improvement on the part of the 
government but rather by the deterioration of the situation (Rakner et al., 2004).  
 
Although the Muluzi era was characterised by tremendous issues of mismanagement, 
donors’ attitudes are also critiqued in the study by Booth et al. (2006). In particular, 
donors have tended to use conditionalities to make up for the lack of governmental 
policy process. In addition, these interferences lacked consistency as divergences 
amongst various donors emerged and some of the decisions they pushed, such as the 
privatisation of the Agricultural Development and Marketing Corporation (ADMARC), 
the national grain marketer, were seen by the government of Malawi and other 
commentators, as inadequate in the context of Malawi. Moreover, the frequent use of 
technical assistance by donors was resented by the government and civil service. As a 
result, relations between the government and donors were marked by a ‘high level of 
mistrust’ and lack of mutual respect (Booth et al., 2006: xi). However, in 2000, Malawi 
was identified as a potential candidate for debt relief. In 2000, the Malawian 
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government put into place an interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), with 
the view of fulfilling the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) conditions. A full 
PRSP was issued in 2002, though debt relief was not granted before 2006 due to 
Malawi’s failure to meet the conditions detailed in its HIPC completion point.  
 
Relations between donors and the government of Malawi appear to have improved 
during Mutharika’s first term. In addition, the 2005 Paris Declaration and the new aid 
architecture it supports strengthened dialogue and coordination mechanisms between 
donors and the government. Malawi’s Development Assistance Strategy (2006-2011) 
has provided a plan outlining various ways through which donors can contribute to 
implement the aid effectiveness agenda. It also set up the High-Level Forum on Aid 
Coordination through which the government and heads of donor organisations can 
address policy issues and ensure good coordination. The government also issued a 
second PRSP called the Malawian Growth and Development Strategy (2006-2011) 
which focused on economic growth as well as social issues, and also addresses a number 
of cross-cutting issues such as AIDS. In 2008, Malawi’s main donors were the European 
Commission, the UK, The World Bank, Norway, the Global Fund, the United States, 
Japan, Germany and Ireland, as well as the UN institutions (notably UNDP, UNICEF, 
WHO, and WFP) (OECD, 2012c).  
 
It is worth noting that the aid landscape in Malawi has undergone some tremendous 
changes since 2008, when the fieldwork informing this thesis was conducted. China 
established diplomatic ties with Malawi in 2007 and its role as a donor has been rapidly 
growing ever since. This may partly explain Mutharika’s increasingly autocratic rule 
and hostile attitude to Western donors during his second term. These issues, as well as  
concerns about economic mismanagement led many of Malawi’s donors, including the 
World Bank, the European Union, the African Development Bank, Germany, Norway 
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and the UK, to end or suspend their contribution to direct budget support in 2011 
(Tran, 2011). Since Mutharika’s sudden passing in 2012, his successor Joyce Banda has 
taken a number of measures to win back donors’ sympathy and funding – with some 
success so far. These issues are developed in greater detail in the afterword of this 
thesis.  
 
3.4.3. Donors and the AIDS response in Malawi: incarnating the new aid architecture 
 
Since the beginning of the Millennium, many donors working in Malawi have 
displayed attempts to follow the principles outlined by the aid effectiveness agenda. 
The PRSP process in particular contributed to galvanise some donors into creating joint 
working arrangements such as the pool funding mechanisms within the National AIDS 
Commission, the SWAp at the Ministry of Health as well as a coordinating framework 
for direct budget support (Claussen et al., 2006). All these mechanisms have made 
substantial contributions to AIDS funding and are examined, in turn, in this section.  
 
The National AIDS Commission was created in 2001, as a condition for becoming a 
World Bank MAP recipient. The government restructured the then National AIDS 
Control Programme (NACP) located in the Ministry of Health and set up the National 
AIDS Commission (NAC) as a semi-autonomous trust. Although the creation of NAC 
was also seen as a means to acknowledge the multi-sectoral aspect of HIV and AIDS, 
Putzel (2004: 1136) argues that it was established at the expense of the Ministry of 
Health: ‘personnel, vehicles and even buildings were reallocated to the new 
Commission, leaving the Ministry of Health in a shambles’. Although donors wanted 
the trust to be independent, in August 2002 it was moved from under the authority of 
the Ministry of Health to the Office of the President and Cabinet, demonstrating the 
political will to tackle the epidemics. The role of the NAC is to coordinate the National 
 110 
AIDS response. It has research, policy, monitoring and evaluation functions, and was at 
the time of my fieldwork in the process of updating Malawi’s chief AIDS strategy, the 
National Action Framework (2005-2009) in order to integrate new developments such 
as the Universal Access targets as well as objectives included in the Malawi Growth and 
Development Strategy.  
 
In 2002, several donors entered a basket-funding agreement with the government of 
Malawi. Basket, or pool funding, is defined by ‘the joint funding by a number of donors 
of a set of activities through a common account, which keeps the basket resources 
separate from all other resources intended for the same purpose’ (Government of 
Malawi, 2007: v). In contrast to sector budget support (as we will see in the Ministry of 
Health for example with the Sector Wide Approach), the planning and other 
procedures and rules used to govern this type of funding mechanism do not necessarily 
need to be in line with those of the recipient government. In addition funds can be 
earmarked to a specific set of activities, rather than fund a sector at large (Government 
of Malawi, 2007). At the time of my fieldwork, pool donors included the Canadian 
International Development Agency (CIDA), the UK Department for International 
Development (DFID), the Norwegian Agency for Development (NORAD)2 and the 
World Bank (though it cannot co-mingle funds, the MAP mechanism is flexible enough 
to fund any areas required in the NAC work plan). The Global Fund had recently joined 
the pool funding mechanism at the time of my fieldwork and had created some tensions 
with the government and other pool donors by adding conditions to funds 
disbursement and requiring amendments to key documents pre-dating their entry to 
the pool (for example, spelling out that funds should not be used to support terrorism).  
 
                                                 
2 NORAD also managed funding from the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA) by virtue 
of delegated funding arrangements. 
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The NAC’s activities are planned through an integrated annual work plan (IAPW) 
which is based on the National Action Framework (2005-2009), the guiding policy 
document for all national AIDS programmes at the time of my fieldwork. The ‘IAWP 
contains activities and milestones to be achieved in a specified time period’ (NAC, 
2008a: 4), hence facilitating coordination. Indeed, the workplan is formulated in such a 
way that even discrete donors are able to find ‘a niche in the implementation of the 
various interventions’ (NAC, 2008a: 4), in effect funding specific activities detailed in 
the IAWP. Donors such as the UNDP, the US Centers for Disease Control (CDC), and 
the African Development Bank, although not pooled were thus able to align their 
activities on NAC’s plans. Other major discrete AIDS donors included the US Agency 
for International Development (USAID), the Japanese International Co-operation 
Agency (JICA) and the German Technical Cooperation (GTZ). 
 
The NAC finances the AIDS response in several ways. A large proportion of funds (45% 
in 2008/2009) is channelled through the district assemblies and used to finance District 
Implementation Plans and grants to CSOs (NAC, 2008a). However the application and 
reporting format used by NAC has been found to be quite complex and directive for 
grassroots organisations (Edström and MacGregor, 2010). In addition, the 
decentralisation policy and the devolution of powers and responsibilities to local 
assemblies (such as the formulation of District Implementation Plans) has faced many 
hurdles, not least the lack of capacity at district level. Thus, the government had to use 
‘umbrella NGOs’ (Canadian Physicians for Aid and Relief, PLAN and Save the Children 
(USA) as well as ActionAid International, which was later dropped) as a mean of  
implementing the ‘complex new reporting system at district level and training trainers 
required to teach local organisations the forms of reporting required’ (Swidler, 2006: 
279). The NAC also channels funds through the Ministry of Health to support some of 
the biomedical aspects of the response.  
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Indeed, whilst the NAC coordinates the response, the Ministry of Health is in charge of 
implementing the biomedical facet of the AIDS response, for example by managing 
infrastructures or the distribution of medicines. While the Ministry interacts with a 
number of donors financing health-related expenses, it has also set up a group of donors 
who agreed to operate within the Sector-Wide Approach (SWAp). The idea of a Health 
Sector-Wide Approach initiative was initially adopted by the Government of Malawi in 
1999. However, the process of formulating its Programme of Work and other 
governance documents, proceeding to a costing exercise, mobilising funding and 
finalising agreements with donors was time-consuming and the SWAp’s Memorandum 
of Understanding between the GoM and donors was only signed in October 2004 
(Republic of Malawi, 2004b). The Health SWAp has been successful in attracting donor 
support and in 2008, had been channelling an average of 95% of total donor funding for 
the sector (Carlson et al., 2008: viii). SWAp signatories include DFID, which is the 
largest donor in the health sector, the Norwegian Embassy (with SIDA), the UNFPA, 
the World Bank and the Global Fund (DFID, 2007b). The GoM is a SWAp member and 
contributes about half of the health sector budget. The SWAp has also led to a 
significant increase in ODA for the Health sector with funding increasing eight-fold 
between 2004/2005 and 2006/2007 (Carlson et al., 2008: 12). In 2009/2010 sectoral 
support provided through the Health SWAp and NAC’s pool funding mechanism 
accounted for 15% of total aid (Loquai and Klavert, 2011). 
 
Direct, or general, budget support (DBS) has also been a source of support to social 
expenditures including Health and AIDS. DBS means that aid is ‘channelled into a 
general treasury account […] where, as an integral part of the resources therein, it co-
funds the national budget. The support is thus not earmarked, and it is used according 
to the national public expenditure management, rules and procedures’ (Government of 
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Malawi, 2007: v). Donors involved in DBS, called the Common Approach to Budget 
Support (CABS) group, originally included Britain, Norway, and Denmark. Denmark 
withdrew in 2002 but the European Commission (EC), the World Bank and the African 
Development Bank had joined by 2008. Germany (GTZ) had also become a CABS 
member by 2010 and Ireland and UNDP have participated as observers. The rationale 
for such an approach was to create better harmonisation amongst donors and improve 
dialogue amongst donors and with the government, as well as to reduce transaction 
costs (Clausen et al., 2006). The CABS group and the government have developed a 
Performance Assessment Framework (PAF) which contains a ‘jointly agreed set of 
indicators for measuring progress’ (World Bank, 2012b). Despite the 2001-2003 hiatus, 
budget support has been successful in attracting donors and accounted for 22% of all 
ODA in 2008/2009 and 30% in 2009/2010 (World Bank, 2012b). However, as explained 
above, in 2011, DBS was suspended following concerns with Malawi’s economic 
governance and failure to meet IMF conditions (World Bank, 2012b).  
 
The AIDS response in Malawi can thus be seen as displaying a good example of the 
implementation of the Paris principles, with a large number of donors either 
contributing funds to the government budget through direct budget support, or 
through sectoral support or pool funding mechanisms within the NAC and the Ministry 
of Health.  
 
 
3.5. Conclusion 
 
This chapter has examined the deployment of a global AIDS governance and the 
increased importance granted to the pandemic by the international community. It has 
traced how international financing for AIDS prevention, mitigation and treatment in 
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Sub-Saharan Africa has been accompanied by a number of biases in favour of a 
biomedical model and behaviour-change, at the expense of an understanding framed by 
socio-economic considerations. The chapter has then provided a brief outline of the 
political, economic and social context to AIDS interventions in Malawi, a young 
democracy suffering from substantial levels of poverty and an unstable economy. The 
last section has focused on the international financing of the AIDS response in Malawi, 
first providing a brief summary of the spread of the HIV virus in Malawi before 
sketching the fluctuating relationship between donors and the government in the 
recent past. Finally, this chapter has presented the various mechanisms through which 
donors fund the AIDS response in the country and highlighted how the principles from 
the Paris Declaration have been largely built upon in that regard.  
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Chapter 4:  
Neoliberalism, governmentality and development 
 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
Many critical analyses seeking to make sense of the deployment of the Post-Washington 
Consensus (PWC) have viewed this new paradigm as an extension of neoliberalism. This 
chapter briefly reviews some of these contributions before interrogating the meaning 
and usefulness of the term neoliberalism. It then moves on to examine the perspectives 
offered by neoliberal governmentality, a concept based on the idea of power as working 
through freedom. This involves going back to its roots and examining the work of 
Michel Foucault (1926-1984), before exploring more recent theorisations and 
investigating the main critiques that have been directed at the concept. Finally, this 
chapter considers some of the ways governmentality has been used in the field of 
international development. I conclude by sketching how I intend to extend 
governmentality to the relationship between international agencies and the 
Government of Malawi in the area of HIV and AIDS to show how the deployment of a 
new technology of power working through recipient countries’ greater autonomy and 
self-regulation has been supported by the implementation of the ‘Paris principles’.  
 
 
4.2. The Post-Washington Consensus: a new era of neoliberalism? 
 
While the Post-Washington Consensus (PCW) appears to break with some of the 
previous diktats imposed by international agencies on poor countries, many critiques 
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have regarded this new paradigm, with its state-centred and participatory approach, as a 
new incarnation of neoliberalism, rather than a radical shift. Ruckert (2006: 37), for 
example, argues that the PWC is an attempt to resolve contradictions that neoliberal 
policies face, notably in poor countries, and should be read as a first step towards 
‘inclusive neoliberalism’, which involves subsidizing the poorest segments of society. In 
a similar vein, Murray and Overton (2011) see the shift away from Structural 
Adjustment Programmes (SAPs), the return of the state, participatory approaches, the 
primacy of consensus-based policies and a more holistic style of development thinking, 
as reflections of the extension of a reworked version of neoliberalism rather than a new 
departure.  
 
The new instruments promoted by the PWC are thus seen as supporting a more 
palatable and functional version of the same ideology. Harrison (2004) sees the emphasis 
on governance as a construction of what he calls ‘governance states’, which attempts to 
further embed neoliberalism by promoting a more intricate relationship between state 
and global actors. Similarly, Gould (2005b: 65) analyses the ‘partnership mentality’ 
developed as part of the PWC as a mode of governing, which ensures the complicity of 
key actors in a policy regime that reflects the aims of external creditors. Anders (2005: 
55) also views ownership as ‘legitimising strategy for a particular political ideology’ 
while Crawford and Abdulai (2009: 110) consider the rolling out of Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Paper (PRSPs) as an ‘effort to embed and consolidate neoliberal hegemony’. 
They ague:  
 
‘Governance measures do clearly demonstrate an ongoing project of state 
transformation […]: [o]ne is the continued downsizing of the state and of the 
public sector generally, the other is the transformation of the notion of public 
service through its reorientation to serve business.’  
(Crawford and Abdulai, 2009: 109) 
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Mosse (2005: 3) concurs and explains that the poverty reduction agenda ‘helps to re-
legitimise continuing donor emphasis on policies of trade liberalisation, macro-
economic stability and fiscal discipline overseen by the IMF, while mobilising new aid 
resources’.  
 
While these studies usefully highlight the continuities between the PWC and its more 
orthodox predecessor, they also raise questions around the use of the term neoliberalism. 
Indeed, as Peck and Tickell (2002) and Clarke (2008) note, neoliberalism has become 
near-ubiquitous in academic writing in the past two decades. It has been used to account 
for such a wide array of practices, policies, and phenomenon that it is at risk of 
becoming meaningless (Clarke, 2008; Ferguson, 2010). As Peck articulates:  
 
‘In effect, neoliberalism seems often to be used as a sort of stand-in term for the 
political-economic zeitgeist, as a no-more-than approximate proxy for a specific 
analysis of mechanisms or relations of social power, domination, exploitation, or 
alienation.’ 
(Peck, 2010: 14) 
 
Yet, as Ferguson (2010) argues, there are huge variations in the way the word is used 
and understood. Hence, neoliberalism has be seen as a macroeconomic doctrine 
favouring private enterprise (Ferguson, 2010), a class project, aimed at restoring profits 
after the accumulation crises of the 1970s (Harvey, 2005: 31), a new form of statecraft 
(Peck, 2003), or even a mobile assemblage of practices and technologies (Ong, 2007). 
Another definition given by Clarke (2008: 136) describes neoliberalism as involving 
‘both the direct expansion of the scope and reach of corporate capital, and the indirect 
“economization” of areas of social and political life (public functions to be either 
privatized or “run like a business”, for example)’. In addition, while some (critical) 
understandings of neoliberalism take their roots in different theoretical perspectives, 
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notably the Marxist and Foucauldian traditions of thought, a number of scholars have 
been using a mix of these perspectives (see for example, Li, 2007).  
 
However, it is not surprising that neoliberalism eschews a clear definition and works 
across theoretical boundaries. While, as we will see later in this chapter, Foucault traces 
the roots of neoliberalism back to the 16th century, most accounts (see for example, 
Leitner et al., 2007) situate the origin of neoliberalism as a reaction to 1930s 
totalitarianism. As Peck (2004: 400) argues, it is a combination of disparate intellectual 
currents such as Hayekian economic rationalism, Chicago School monetarism and Ayn 
Rand’s individualism, ‘many of which seem to have been held together by little more 
than their shared ostracism during the Keynesian-developmentalist period of the 1950s 
and 1960s’. With neoliberalism being implemented in a variety of geographical settings 
from the 1970s onwards, its meaning has become increasingly muddled (Leitner et al., 
2007). From the 1972 CIA-backed military coup in Chile which offered the first 
‘opportunity’ to translate these ideas into policies, to their implementation by Reagan 
and Thatcher in the 1980s, and the SAPs imposed on poor countries from the early 
1980s as well as the shock therapy of the Eastern block in the 1990s, practices of 
neoliberalism have become diverse and paradoxical (Leitner et al., 2007). Indeed, one of 
the strengths of neoliberalism appears to be its immense adaptability. As Peck explains:  
 
‘The “neoliberal state” […] has demonstrated a capacity to morph into a variety 
of institutional forms, to insinuate itself into, and graft itself onto, a range of 
different institutional settlements, and to absorb parallel and even contending 
narratives of restructuring and intervention, in response both to internal 
contradictions and external pressure.’  
(Peck, 2003: 226) 
 
For example, it is widely acknowledged that while neoliberalism is generally seen as 
promoting the rolling back of the state, ‘projects like privatization, devolution, de-
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unionization, and deregulation involved significant extensions of state power, together 
with the construction of new bureaucracies and modalities of government’ (Peck and 
Tickell, 2007: 33). Thus the doctrine of ‘less government’ does not necessarily entail less 
state intervention or cheaper running costs. However claims of the mobile, adaptable, 
flexible, variegated, fluid, multidimensional and hybridized nature of neoliberalism (see, 
for example, Peck, 2004) have given rise to further questions with regards to the term’s 
vagueness and continued relevance as well as the risk of exaggerating its power (Larner, 
2000; Ferguson, 2010; Clarke, 2008).  
 
Yet, neoliberalism remains a powerful term which is difficult to replace (Clarke, 2008). 
It is particularly relevant – though not necessarily the only enlightening perspective - in 
analyzing policies adopted by African governments, under the influence and pressure of 
international agencies. Harrison (2010: 19) even argues that Africa displays ‘cutting 
edge’ neoliberalism-in-practice, as countries are often compelled to implement 
neoliberal reforms in their purest unadulterated form. Hence, in order to retain 
neoliberalism as a useful tool and avoid the pitfalls of a vague and all-powerful concept, 
I will strive to follow Ferguson’s suggestion as he contends that an ‘insistence on 
specificity and precision would undoubtedly improve the analytical clarity of many of 
our discussions’ (Ferguson, 2010: 172). Larner (2000) provides a useful distinction in this 
respect. She differentiates between neoliberalism as a policy (derived from principles of 
the individual, freedom of choice, market security, laissez faire and minimal 
government), an ideology (often linked with critical work using a Marxism-inspired 
framework) and a governmentality (after Foucault). Although not always a perfect fit, 
studies on the PWC cited earlier tend to draw on the second definition. They seek to 
attend to the rationale behind the deployment of new tools and discourses, and focus on 
uncovering the ideological continuities of the PWC with previous policies and their 
effects. The present study however sees the PWC as introducing new technologies of 
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power fostering processes of neoliberal subjectification of recipient countries. In that 
regard, the third definition, namely neoliberalism as governmentality appears to be 
particularly useful.  
 
 
4.3. Michel Foucault and governmentality 
 
Michel Foucault introduced the concept of governmentality in his 1978 series of lectures 
at the College de France entitled ‘Security, Territory and Population’. Governmentality, 
a neologism created from the words ‘government’ and ‘mentality’, seeks to illuminate 
the development of a certain governmental rationality in the Western world since the 
sixteenth century. One lecture ‘On Governmentality’ was published in English in 1979 
in the journal ‘Ideology and Consciousness’ (see Gordon, 1991 or Huxley, 2007, for more 
details), and influenced a number of publications in fields as diverse as psychology, 
economy, political science or accountancy (Rose, 1985, 1988; Miller and Rose, 1990). A 
new publication of the lecture in ‘The Foucault Effect’ (Burchell et al., 1991) gave 
further impetus to the use of the concept in an increasing number of areas. However, 
the rest of the series was for long only available as recordings in the Foucault archive at 
the Bibliothèque du Saulchoir in Paris and later commercialised in cassette tape format1. 
It was not before 2004 that the whole series was transcribed and published in French. 
The full translated series of lectures from 1978 entitled ‘Security, Territory and 
Population’ was finally published in English in 2007, while the following series ‘The 
Birth of Biopolitics’ which elaborates on the concept of governmentality was made 
available in 2008. Thus, despite the flourishing of publications using and extending the 
concept of governmentality to various fields, its full potential and limitations are still 
                                                 
1 The recording of the Birth of Biopolitics lecture series is now available online at http://michel-foucault-
archives.org/?Naissance-de-la-biopolitique. 
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being explored. Before briefly summarising these lectures and exploring some of the 
ways they feed into some of the work on neoliberalism and international development, 
it is useful to contextualise it in Foucault’s work.  
 
4.3.1. Towards governmentality 
 
Michel Foucault (1926-1984) is well known for his work on power, which evolved 
throughout his life. In the so-called ‘archaeological’ period (1961-1969) Foucault focused 
on investigating the historically contingent rules and other discursive practices that 
define, delineate and shape specific fields of knowledge (Legg, 2005). For example, in his 
work on madness (Madness and Civilisation, 1973, published in French in 1964), 
Foucault examined how the articulation of normative and discursive mechanisms on the 
one hand and systematic institutional rules and practices on the other are involved in 
the construction of categories of subjects such as ‘the insane’. By detailing how scientific 
discourses were made historically possible, Foucault exposed the artificiality of the idea 
of Science as a progressive and stable ‘truth’ (see The Order of Things, 1970, published 
in French in 1966; Archaeology of Knowledge, 1972, published in French in 1969). By 
historicising and highlighting the contingent and discursive nature of the process of 
subjectification, Foucault also argued that there are no pre-discursive subjects (McNay, 
1994: 11). But, although in this archaeological phase Foucault drew attention to the 
ways in which power relations have shaped discursive formations, knowledge and 
‘truths’, thus developing the formulation of a power-knowledge nexus, the concept of 
power he deployed there remains principally repressive and under-theorised from his 
own admission (McNay, 1994 :111)  
 
In what is known as his ‘genealogical’ period (1970-1984), Foucault embarked on further 
investigating power relations and the processes of subjectification through which we 
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govern others (political arts) and through which individuals internalise governance 
(ethical practices). This period is marked by Foucault’s attempt to reformulate power as 
positive and productive and ‘circulating’ in all social relations (e.g. The History of 
Sexuality volume 1, 1978, published in French in 1976). As McNay (1994: 2) articulates: 
‘[Foucault] was concerned to examine how power relations of inequality and oppression 
are created and maintained in more subtle and diffuse ways through ostensibly human 
and freely adopted social practices’. As a consequence, Foucault dismissed approaches 
focusing on top-down, centralised forms of power (McNay, 1994: 3). Instead he 
advocated an exploration of its ‘microphysics’, its mundane, localised and dispersed 
manifestations (e.g. in his lecture series Society Must Be Defended 1975–1976, published 
in English in 2003).  
 
Critiques highlighting the limits of this approach to address what were seen as large or 
‘global’ issues such as state power and institutions (Gordon, 1991: 4) led Foucault to 
refine the classification and clarify the definition of the various technologies of power 
that had emerged through his work, namely sovereignty, discipline and 
biopower/government. Sovereign power can be conceptualised as a foundationally 
violent power which once pacified operates to protect itself against outside acts of 
aggression. In this economy of power, the only distinction within the population is the 
one operated between the royal power and the masses (Foucault, 2003b). Disciplinary 
power, however, attempts to individualise, identify and classify its subjects according to 
various discourses and criteria in order to govern them through a process of 
normalisation. Indeed, as Rose (1999: 22) notes, disciplinary power is not only repressive 
but endeavours to produce individuals through normalising exhortation for in-depth 
examination within global systems of knowledge/power (for example through 
psychiatry or school exams). Disciplinary power works though various technologies by 
investing the body and time of subjects through the institutionalisation of particular sets 
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of rules and discourses and the supervision/surveillance of individuals (for example as in 
a professional army, a school, a prison, etc.) until they become normalised as social 
functioning. Foucault’s concept of ‘disciplinary power’ was criticised on a number of 
points. It was seen as bleak and paralysing, conceptualising subjects as produced by and 
embedded in this economy of power to an extent that left no room for freedom, agency 
or possibilities for resistance (McNay, 1994). This formulation also failed to adequately 
theorise and explain the possibility for (and history of) social change. 
 
The conceptualisation of biopower is seen as Foucault’s attempt to address these 
critiques (though this is developed in more depth through his lectures on 
governmentality). He first developed this notion in his 1975 series of lectures, ‘The 
Abnormals’, in which he describes the psychiatrisation of ‘social danger’, showing how 
psychiatry evolved from a focus on curing patients to a concern about detecting and 
preventing disorders linked to heredity or ‘race’. The concept is also mentioned towards 
the end of ‘History of Sexuality’ volume 1 (1978, 1976 French publication) and in his 
1975-1976 series of lectures entitled ‘Society Must Be Defended’ (Foucault, 2003b). 
Biopower is characterised by its focus on ‘man as species’ (Foucault, 2003b: 242) where 
discipline sees ‘man as body’. While discipline is concerned with producing certain 
bodies and behaviours in practical terms, biopower is a regulatory mechanism whose 
purpose is ‘not to modify a given individual insofar as he is an individual, but, 
essentially, to intervene at the level at which these general phenomena are determined, 
to intervene at the level of their generality’ (Foucault, 2003b: 246). It seeks to influence 
patterns of seemingly random and individual events such as sexuality, diseases or birth 
rates, which are only perceptible at a macro level and through instruments such as 
statistics (Gordon, 1991: 5). Because of this scalar dimension, biopower requires large 
institutions such as the state in order to operate. Foucault thus asserts that the same 
structures of enquiry of microphysics of power that he uses to analyse practices and 
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technologies at the local institution level such as prisons and asylums could be used to 
analyse practices and technologies of state power; he argued that the local and the global 
levels should not be seen as separate but rather as interdependent: 
 
‘No “local centre”, no “pattern of transformation” could function if, through a 
series of sequences, it did not eventually enter into an over-all strategy. And 
inversely, no strategy could achieve comprehensive effects if it did not gain 
support from precise and tenuous relations serving, not as its point of application 
or final outcome, but as its prop and anchor point. There is no discontinuity 
between them, as if one were dealing with two different levels (one microscopic 
and the other macroscopic); but neither is there homogeneity (as if the one were 
only the enlarged projection or the miniaturization of the other); rather, one 
must conceive of the double conditioning of a strategy by the specificity of 
possible tactics, and of tactics by the strategic envelope that makes then work.’  
(Foucault, 1978: 99-100) 
 
He thus argued that the study of microphysics of power enabled an understanding of 
how ‘diverse power relations come to be colonized and articulated into more general 
mechanisms that sustain more encompassing forms of domination’ (Jessop, 2007: 36). It 
is following this idea, and before focusing the forms and modalities pertaining to self-
conduct and subjectification (his ‘ethical period’, 1980-1984), that Foucault undertook a 
genealogy of the modern state leading him to elaborate on the notion of biopolitics and 
formulate the concept of governmentality.  
 
4.3.2. Governmentality: the emergence of a new art of government  
 
In 1970 Foucault obtained a Chair in the History of Systems of Thought, especially 
created for him, at the College de France in Paris and delivered 13 series of lectures until 
1984. Every year, Foucault was not to teach a set syllabus but to report on his research 
findings. The lectures from 1978 and 1979 respectively entitled ‘Security, Territory and 
Population’ and ‘The Birth of Biopolitics’ are particularly interesting as Foucault seeks to 
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address critiques of his previous work and develops the concept of governmentality. 
However, as Gane (2008: 357) notes, the work of Michel Foucault can be difficult and 
confusing as he does not offer a definitive and coherent theoretical framework and 
instead re-worked, refined and adjusted his ideas throughout his life. This is particularly 
the case for the concepts of biopower and governmentality, as they are largely based on 
a series of lectures that was influenced by the progression of his research, questions from 
the audience, etc.  
 
In his first series: ‘Security, Territory and Population’, Foucault explores various forms 
of government and their rationalisation, from the early Christians and the Ancient 
Greeks to 18th century liberalism. In particular, Foucault describes the evolution of an 
economy of power distinguishable from (though concurrent to) discipline and 
sovereignty which he calls government. The term however refers to an older meaning of 
the word which could be applied to the conduct of others but also to the running of 
families and self-conduct (Foucault, 2007a: 121).  
 
Foucault finds the origin of the idea of this rationality of government amongst the early 
Christian cultures also called pastoral cultures. This ‘mentality’ is encapsulated by the 
image of a shepherd caring for its herd. In contrast to the forms of power having 
currency in Ancient Greece, pastoral power is not static: it is exercised over a 
population, rather than over a territory. Pastoral power is also a power of care (Foucault, 
2007a: 128). It is based on thoughtfulness and justice, and aims to ensure the salvation of 
the population (or its souls) and to protect against enemies both from inside (dissidents) 
and outside. However, its mission requires the individualisation of those in its care, the 
knowledge of ‘each and one’ (omnes et singulatim) of its members (Foucault, 2007a: 
128), as salvation can only be achieved through the confession and scrutiny of souls 
(Foucault, 2007a: 126). Pastoral power is thus an individualising power, which infiltrates 
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and produces one’s conduct. As Foucault explained later: ‘Governing in this sense is to 
structure the possible field of action of others2’ (Foucault, 2001: 1056). Thus pastoral 
power can be seen as the origin of government as ‘the conducting of conduct’ (Miller 
and Rose, 2008: 16).  
 
However, Foucault argues that the institutionalisation of this rationality of power or 
governmentality was contained until the sixteenth century where various historical 
factors, state centralisation and religious dissidence in particular, enabled it to develop 
and evolve (Foucault, 2007a: 100). He describes how a series of scientific discoveries 
introduced the idea that God did not directly rule the world but rather governed it 
through principles that had to be deciphered. With the waning of its theological 
foundations, the state required new justification to its existence, a raison d’Etat, which it 
found in the idea of the care of its population. In contrast with pastoral societies 
however, the care was now focused on the preservation of human life rather than on the 
salvation of souls.  
 
These changes find a reflection in a shift taking place in the area of the education of 
rulers, which moved from an emphasis on the savoir faire of government illustrated by 
Machiavelli’s ‘The Prince’ (1532) which was concerned with conserving a delimited 
power, to an art of government. The latter is exemplified by a 1555 text by Guillaume de 
la Perrière, entitled ‘Le Miroir politique’ (‘The Political Mirror’). As Foucault explains in 
his lecture delivered on 1st February 1978 (subsequently published under the title of ‘On 
Governmentality’), this text displays a more global approach to government as 
encompassing both how the Prince governs himself and his patrimony (pedagogy) but 
also the ways in which the family, the church and the society at large operate, which 
                                                 
2 Author’s translation: ‘Gouverner, en ce sens, c’est structurer le champ d’action éventuel des autres’ 
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Foucault calls police3. ‘One must try to identify both an upwards and downwards 
direction’ explains Foucault (2007a: 94) because this approach is based on the rationale 
that: ‘when a state is governed well, fathers will know how to govern their families, 
their wealth, their goods, and their property well, and individuals will also conduct 
themselves properly’ (Foucault, 2007a: 94). The goal of this new form of government, La 
Perrière explains, is ‘the right disposition of things, arranged so as to lead to a 
convenient end’ through a focus on the ‘relations between men and things’ (Foucault, 
2007a: 96). To this end ‘wisdom … as the knowledge of things, of the objectives that can 
and should be attained and the disposition one must employ in order to attain them’ 
(Foucault, 2007a: 100) becomes more important qualities for a ruler than force. One 
characteristic of this art of government is that it employs a series of tactics, including but 
not being limited to the law in order to reach its goal (Foucault, 2007a: 99).  
 
Historically, the development of this economy of power was stifled throughout the late 
sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries by war (the Thirty Year War) and lack of 
resources (Foucault, 2007a: 101). The unfolding of the eighteenth century, with Europe 
enjoying wealth and population growth enabled the development of a state apparatus 
and the use of new tools, such as statistics, that revealed aggregated phenomena in the 
population. Indeed, Foucault highlights the importance of these technologies to the 
emergence of political economy as a form of knowledge and the deployment of 
government as an technology of power: ‘the constitution of a knowledge (savoir) of 
government is absolutely inseparable from the constitution of a knowledge of all the 
processes revolving around population in the wider sense of what we now call the 
economy’ (Foucault, 2007a: 106).  
 
                                                 
3 After the Polizeiwissenschaft which developed in Germany in the second part of the seventeenth 
century. 
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This art of government however did not reach its full potential before the second half of 
the eighteenth century as liberalism progressively replaced the raison d’Etat and its 
appending police as a rationality, re-inventing governmentality around the idea of 
freedom (Foucault, 2007a: 101). Since the schism between religion and state in the 
sixteenth century, the sovereign had attempted to legitimise its existence through the 
circular and self-referring logic of the raison d’Etat in which the finality of the state was 
linked to its continued existence and expansion: the end of sovereignty was sovereignty 
itself (Foucault, 2007a: 99). In order to preserve itself, the state used two main 
apparatuses of security, namely a militaro-diplomatic apparatus to deal with outside 
threats and the police, which regulated all levels of social life within the state in order to 
maximise internal growth. However, the Physiocrats (a disparate group of economists) 
viewed the state’s regulatory and coercive system as a hindrance to what they saw as the 
natural phenomena of economic and biological processes (see Collier, 2009 for further 
analysis). They argued, against the raison d’Etat, that state interventions and regulations 
should be reduced so as to maximise growth and the welfare of the population; they 
explained that ‘the ends of government cannot be effectively achieved by means of the 
law’ (Foucault, 2007a: 99).  
 
4.3.3. Liberal and neoliberal governmentalities 
 
Foucault’s 1978-1979 series of lectures, ‘The Birth of Biopolitics’ is largely devoted to 
liberalism and neoliberalism. However, Foucault explained that what should have only 
been the series’ introduction had progressively expanded into the whole set of lectures 
(Foucault, 2008: 217). As Gane (2008) and Collier (2009) highlight, Foucault appears to 
have been undergoing an intellectual crisis at the time. Gane (2008) argues that he had 
lost interest in biopolitics but was unsure as to what his new problematic was. Collier 
(2009) however, contends that the shifts were linked to a methodological break 
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implying the gradual move from the power/knowledge nexus and an ‘epochal’ reading of 
various technologies of power (from sovereignty to discipline to government) towards a 
more ‘topological analysis’ exploring how various heterogeneous elements (such as 
techniques, technologies of power, institutional structures, etc…) are configured and re-
worked by new deployments, in this case, different liberal rationalities.  
 
While the police is based on the idea that ‘not enough attention is given to things, too 
much escapes control, too many domains lack rules and regulations, order and 
administering are lacking’ (Foucault, 2008: 318), liberal rationalisation relies on the 
suspicion that there is too much government. Instead of assuming an inherent need for 
the state, liberalism presupposes that its existence is subordinated to its use to society. It 
is worth noting that Foucault does not analyse liberalism as a theory or an unrealised 
utopia; instead he views it as a critique of other forms of government rationality and as a 
‘principle and method of the rationalization of the exercise of government’ (Foucault, 
2008: 338), which is guided by political economy. Yet, Foucault shows that liberalism or 
the question of ‘too much government’ has been reworked and transformed since the 
eighteenth century. In particular he contrasts German liberalism in the years 1948-1962 
and American neoliberalism of the Chicago School in order to illustrate more recent 
mutations. Post-war German liberals’ thinking (also called Ordo after a journal they 
published) is anchored in an anti-naturalist conception of the market where capitalism 
is not seen as singular or natural, but as a product of history and society necessitating 
political intervention for creating and sustaining the conditions of existence of market 
competition. This includes corrective mechanisms such as welfare provisions and social 
interventions. The Ordo aimed to find ways in which the state could be rationalised by 
using the principle of economic freedom as a way to both legitimize it and to delimit its 
activity (Lemke: 2001 196). Thus the Ordo liberals saw the state as a key element 
ensuring the correction and protection of a market-based economy.  
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Partisans of the Chicago School however reversed the logic of classical liberals where 
the state regulated the market and advocated instead an organisation of the state by 
market-based principles (Lemke, 2001). They sought to: 
 
‘extend the rationality of the market, the schemas of analysis it offers and the 
decision-making criteria it suggests, to domains which are not exclusively or not 
primarily economic: the family and birth rate, for example, or delinquency and 
penal policy’ . 
(Foucault, 2008: 322) 
 
This encoding of the social as economic also entails a redefinition of the neoliberal 
subject as an entrepreneur of him/herself, in charge of optimizing the use of their 
‘human capital’ so as to maximize their value (Foucault, 2008; Lemke, 2001). This 
theorization of the homo economicus leads to a second marked difference with the 
classical version of liberalism: while for the latter freedom of individuals is a foundation 
of the rational state, the neoliberals view liberty as artificially arranged: the behaviour of 
the rational homo economicus can be manipulated through incentives and disincentives 
(Foucault, 2008: 268). The following quote by one of the ‘founding’ members of this 
advanced/neoliberal rationality, Friedrich von Hayek is telling in this regard:  
 
‘Man has not developed in freedom ….Freedom is an artefact of civilization… 
Freedom was made possible by the gradual evolution of the discipline of 
civilization which is at the same time the discipline of freedom.’  
(Hayek 1979: 163, original emphasis, cited in Rose, 1999) 
 
Thus Foucault shows that, contrary to the roll back of the state rhetoric, this thinking 
opens up new domains of state intervention necessary to (re)produce suitably 
responsible self-entrepreneurial individuals. Hence, Foucault’s ‘The Birth of Biopolitics’ 
highlights the ways in which the American neoliberal incarnation of government relies 
on a link between political formation, economic exploitation, and the production of a 
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subject made responsible for him/herself through a series of techniques (Lemke, 2001: 
103).  
 
 
4.4. Neoliberal governmentalities and their critiques  
 
Foucault’s concept of governmentality, particularly his discussion of its later, 
(neo)liberal incarnations, has spawned a vast array of studies. This section examines 
some of the more notable contributions with regards to this research. It is worth noting 
however that governmentality is used to denote both as a technology of power and as an 
analytical lens, though this distinction is often blurred by the fact that the latter is often 
employed to analyse the former. The section then turns to explore and assess some of 
the critiques that have been directed at the concept and its use.  
 
4.4.1. Studies in governmentality  
 
Foucault’s insights have inspired such a vast amount of work that it has gained the label 
of studies of governmentality (Rose, 1999). While inspired by Foucault, this body of 
work builds on and extends various elements of governmentality. As Rose explains, 
studies of governmentality are: 
 
‘…studies of a particular “Stratum” of knowing and acting. Of the emergence of 
“regimes of truth” concerning the conduct of conduct, ways of speaking truth, 
persons authorized to speak truths, ways of enacting truths and the costs of so 
doing. Of the invention and assemblage of particular apparatus and devices for 
exercising power and intervening upon particular problems. They are concerned, 
that is to say, with the conditions of possibility and intelligibility for certain ways 
of seeking to act upon the conduct of others, or oneself, to achieve certain ends.’  
(Rose, 1999: 19) 
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Foucault’s work into American neoliberal governmentality was particularly significant 
and chimes with many contemporary concerns. In February 2009, the journal ‘Foucault 
Studies’ dedicated a special issue to the topic of neoliberal governmentalities.  
 
One of the most relevant elements to this field of study is concerned with the idea of 
governing through freedom (in particular work by Nikolas Rose, 1999, but see also in 
Cruickshank, 1999 for example). However the term freedom can be confusing, as it 
evokes the idea of the absence of constraints, of not being subjected to power - in its 
‘negative’ understanding. Rather, freedom in this sense has to be understood, not as 
boundless liberty, but as a governmental technique built around the compulsion to make 
choices. As Rose explains:  
 
‘Modern individuals are not merely “free to choose”, but obliged to be free, to 
understand and enact their lives in terms of choice. They must interpret their 
past and dream their future as outcome of choices made or choices still to make. 
Their choices are, in their turn, seen as realizations of the attributes of the 
choosing person – expressions of personality – and reflect back upon the person 
who has made them’.  
(Rose, 1999: 87) 
 
Studies in governmentalities have pointed out the vast array of techniques and social 
mechanisms employed to, on the one hand, create ‘free’ subjects that are able to make 
calculative and rational choices (homo economicus), and on the other, devise incentives 
to help them make appropriate choices (Hamann, 2009). Indeed, this is the irony of 
neoliberal governmentality: the ‘freer’ subjects become, the more trained they become 
to ‘navigat[e] the social realm using rational choice and cost-benefit calculations 
grounded on market-based principles’ (Hamann, 2009: 37), the more easily they can be 
manipulated into making the ‘right’ choices. Indeed, the homo economicus is ‘sensitive 
to modifications in the variables of the environment and […] responds to this in a non-
random way, in a systematic way’ (Foucault, 2008: 269). Thus, Harrison articulates 
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(2010: 24), ‘neoliberalism discursively produces subjectivities of individualised 
entrepreneurialism, which, whilst not necessarily being subject to large amounts of state 
authority, are subjects of market governmentality within all social realms.’  
 
But neoliberal governmentality works both on and through subjects’ agencies (Shore, 
2008). Techniques involved in this process of subjectification include the inculcation of 
an ethos of moral responsibility, autonomy, self-determination, ‘encouraging [subjects] 
to see themselves as active subjects responsible for improving their own conduct’ (Shore 
2008: 284). This ethos instilled by equipping subjects with ‘languages and techniques of 
self-understanding and self-mastery’ at the level of the individual but also in terms of 
political organisation (Rose, 1999: 69; see also Hamann, 2009). It takes the form of 
psychology, organizational and (self-)management skills, the pre-eminence of planning 
and auditing, but also more localized and participative decision-making processes (see 
Rose, 1999 for more details). Rose (1999: 87) highlights the role of independent experts 
in articulating the new norms of conduct. However, governing through freedom is not 
prescriptive; instead it works through people’s own interest, agency, desires and 
motivations. It ‘operates by educating desires and configurating habits, aspirations and 
beliefs’ (Li, 2007: 5)4.  
 
As a consequence of these new subjectivities, responsibility for failures or risk 
previously socialized by the welfare state is shifted from the state to individuals or 
communities and re-coded as faulty decision-making processes or problems of self-care. 
As Lemke (2001: 201) puts it the neoliberal state ‘characteristically develop[ed] indirect 
techniques for leading and controlling individuals without at the same time being 
                                                 
4 According to Hamann (2009: 38) Foucault distinguishes between the government of others 
(subjectification) and the government of one’s self (subjectivation), which is the work that individuals 
perform upon themselves in order to become certain kinds of subjects.  
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responsible for them’. Hamann (2009) also highlights how the marketisation of all areas 
of life at the exclusion all other ethical values and social interests contributes to 
increased competition and social insecurity, thus reinforcing the inclination to behave as 
self-responsible subjects.  
 
4.4.2. Critiques and limits of governmentality 
 
Despite the insights it offers, the concept of governmentality is not without issues. An 
important one revolves around questions of freedom, agency and resistance. 
Interestingly, critiques fall in two opposite camps: those who feel governmentality is 
bleak and paralyzing on the one hand, and those, on the other, who view this rationality 
of government as ‘weak’ and open to contestation. Illustrating the first camp, McKee 
(2009) argues that Foucault’s governmentality reduces politics to a coherent and 
programmatic rationality which, as a consequence, appears to be omnipresent and all-
powerful. The definition of freedom as a technology of government is also seen as 
problematic (Rose et al., 2006), paralyzing any politics of resistance without offering any 
convincing alternatives. Thus McKee (2009: 471) views governmentality as signalling 
Foucault’s ‘scepticism, and indeed rejection, of emancipatory projects’.  
 
On the other hand, both Li (2007) and Rose (1999) insist on the contingent nature of 
various governmental rationalities, and view them as emerging from available language, 
strategies and practical observations of past failures. Li (2007: 270) also argues that the 
dynamic nature of the target of governmentality i.e. the relation between population 
and things, means that there are no guarantees specific goals will be reached. As she 
explains (Li, 2007: 18): ‘rather than exercise total control, the objective of government is 
to sustain and optimize the processes upon which life depends. But beneficial outcomes 
cannot be guaranteed’. In addition, by operating through freedom, liberal 
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governmentality leaves itself open to resistance, counter conducts and the emergence of 
new discourses (Mc Nay, 1994: 130).  
 
These divergent interpretations are likely to be due, in part, to some of the difficulties 
and potential contradictions in using the concept of governmentality (Fraser, 2003), as 
well as to the possible methodological changes pointed out by Collier (2009) and 
outlined in the previous section. In his two lecture series: ‘Security, Territory, 
Population’ and ‘The Birth of Biopolitics’, Foucault showed how (neo)liberal 
governmentality emerged as a critique of a previous rationality, namely the raison d’Etat 
(Foucault, 2008: 312). Foucault is careful about analysing the contingent mix of 
historical, political, economic and scientific circumstances that led to the emergence of 
this new rationality and its appending apparatuses of security5. However, in his 
accounts, attempts for greater autonomy, such as the delinking of politics and religion, 
or the endeavour to free civil society from the state have contributed to alter the 
rationality of government – and to extend its reach – rather than fundamentally 
challenged it. In this sense, governmentality does raise the question of the possibility of 
social change, especially as Foucault is known in his later work (his ethical period) to 
have located it in the invention and performance of new subjectivities (McNay, 1994). 
This is critiqued by some as leading to a politically sterile form of dandyism (Barnett, 
2011). Others, such as Fraser (2003: 165) argue that Foucault became entangled in a 
contradiction where the creation of these new subjectivities depends for ‘its critical 
power on the very humanist norms, above all autonomy, that it wants simultaneously to 
unmask’. McNay (1994: 132) concurs highlighting that the idea of new subjectivities 
falls back on an opposition between structures and agency. 
 
                                                 
5 Apparatus (dispositif) of security is defined as: ‘a thoroughly heterogeneous ensemble consisting of 
discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific 
statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions’ (Foucault, 1988: 194) 
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However, it seems that Foucault’s conception of freedom and power is perhaps less bleak 
and paralyzing than often assumed. In ‘The Subject and the Power’ (originally published 
in 1982, cited in 2001: 1055), Foucault explains that he defines power relations, not as a 
way of acting directly and immediately on others, but rather a way of acting on their 
own actions (as opposed to a relationship based on violence – or the threat of violence - 
where individuals are physically constrained into acting in certain ways). He thus 
conceives freedom and power not as an exclusionary relationship (where there is power, 
freedom disappears) but as an interdependence, an ‘agonism’: ‘a relationship which is at 
the same time reciprocal incitation and struggle; less of a face-to-face confrontation 
which paralyzes both sides than a permanent provocation6’ (Foucault, 2001: 1057). 
While government as a technology of power, works through freedom, it appears to be 
more tentative and incompletely realised than is perhaps sometimes understood. As 
Foucault explains:  
 
‘Governing people is not a way to force people to do what the governor wants; it 
is always a versatile equilibrium, with complementarity and conflicts between 
techniques which assure coercion and processes through which the self is 
constructed or modified by himself.’  
(Foucault , 1993: 203-204) 
 
Thus, although Foucault’s governmentality might have its limits, I argue that it can be a 
much more flexible analytical perspective than sometimes conceived of.  
 
However, such a perspective raises a number of epistemological and methodological 
issues. One set of critiques has been directed to governmentality’s ‘functionalism’, 
defined as ‘the neo-Foucauldian tendency to over-emphasise the coherence and 
effectiveness of political projects’ (MacKinnon, 2000: 309; see also McKee, 2009; 
                                                 
6 ‘Un rapport qui est à la fois d’incitation réciproque et de lutte; moins d’une opposition terme à terme qui 
les bloque l’un en face de l’autre que d’une provocation permanente’. Translation from Foucault, 1982. 
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Weidner; 2009). As a consequence, these studies are seen as unable to attend to the issue 
of successes and failures of specific governmentalities to create the desired subjectivities 
(Weidner, 2009: 391). However, as Miller and Rose (2008: 84) argue that ‘whilst 
“governmentality” is eternally optimistic, “government” is a congenitally failing 
operation’. Indeed, it could be stated that the failures of governmentality to shape 
suitable subjects justify the perpetuation or expansion of its programmes (Li, 2007; 
Ferguson, 1990). Yet, this critique points to the need to be alert to the risk of totalizing 
the power of governmentality.  
 
Other critiques of governmentality include gender blindness (McNay, 1994) and a lack 
of attention to social differences (McKee, 2009). As Weidner explains:  
 
‘Governmentality scholars tend to view neoliberalism as a heterogeneous set of 
governmental practices which formulate different responses to the problem of 
rule – “who can govern; who is to be governed; what is to be governed, and how” 
- that are not ultimately functional to the interests of any social group or class’  
(Weidner, 2009: 390 
 
Hence, Weidner (2009) argues that governmentality studies have failed to address the 
link between capitalism and forms of neoliberal governmentality. Critiques have also 
suggested that his history of governmentality as the progression towards a more 
sophisticated form of power originating in the West constitutes ‘an ethnocentrist replay 
of modernisation theory’ (Li, 2007: 12). Geographers have argued that Foucault has 
overlooked the ways in which the ordering and the production of knowledge about 
spaces have been central to governmentality (O’Tuathail, 1996 in Rose-Redwood, 2006). 
For example Rose-Redwood (2006: 470) states that ‘geocoding’ has been a prerequisite to 
most of biopolitics.  
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Finally, other critiques have claimed that Foucault underestimated the importance of 
sovereignty in governing (e.g. Hardt and Negri, 2000; 2004). Agamben for example 
argues that sovereignty - defined as the ability to declare a ‘state of exception’ – and 
biopolitics are always implied in one another; he states: ‘the production of a biopolitical 
body is the original activity of sovereign power’ (1998: 6, in Rose-Redwood, 2006). Yet 
it can be said that governmentality extends beyond the analysis of sovereignty by 
introducing discipline and government as distinct technologies of power (Rose-
Redwood, 2006). Thus, while some of these critiques are worth keeping in mind, 
governmentality still appears as a useful analytical perspective. The next section 
examines some of the ways the concept has been used in the field of international 
development.  
 
 
4.5. Governmentality and international development  
 
Many governmentality studies are concerned with current issues unfolding in the West. 
It might be, as Ferguson (2010) argues, that the concept is not as relevant in other 
geographical locations such as Africa. He contends that the policy measures that were 
forced on African states in the 1980s by international agencies (in particular, the SAPs), 
reflect ‘an old-style laissez-faire liberalism in the service of imperial capital’ (Ferguson, 
2010: 173) rather than a display of sophisticated technologies of government aiming to 
foster self-regulated subjects. However, in the past few years, a number of studies have 
applied the concept of governmentality to international development.  
 
For instance, Ansell et al. (2012) have analysed how youth policy in Malawi can be seen 
as a form of transnational governmentality seeking to produce suitable neoliberal 
  
139 
subjects. Li (2007), in one of the most comprehensive studies using governmentality7 to 
analyse international development, shows how, despite the conceptual disconnects 
between imperialism and technologies of government, manifestations of a certain 
governmentality can be found in colonial times under the guise of ‘the will to improve’ 
(Li, 2007: 15). As colonisation unfolded, Li (2007) notes that the importance of 
sustaining population and the economy became more central, leading to an increasingly 
governmentalised form of power (though coexistent with sovereignty and discipline). 
The formulation of a ‘civilising mission’ of the West, in particular, encapsulated this 
trend but also gave rise to a paradox of colonisation: if the colonized were seen as 
radically different, as ‘others’, then the hope to reform them was elusive; but if they 
were seen as equals, then the idea of trusteeship could not be supported. One of the 
ways the colonial rule attempted to solve this contradiction was the rhetorical device of 
‘permanent deferral’ through which the colonised were ‘rationalized and racialised’, 
‘destined to become rights-bearing individuals, but always too immature to exercise 
those rights’ (Wilder 1999: 47, in Li, 2007). As Li (2007) notes, this tactic is still largely 
present within current international development agendas, where poor countries are 
often seen as being ‘behind’ rich nations on a modernist time-development continuum. 
In this framework, the promise of development seen as a process of ‘catching up’ is 
constantly postponed. Following Ludden (1992: 252), Li argues that late colonial state 
and development donors share an ‘institutionalised configuration of power’ with 
progress as their goal; a population in need as their target; a system of scientific and 
technical knowledge to plan and measure improvements; and ‘progressive’ leaders using 
their ability to achieve progress as political capital.  
 
Yet, Li (2007) contends that the process of decolonisation and the deployment of an 
international development regime have given further impetus to the pre-eminence of 
                                                 
7 In connection with a Gramscian framework (see Li’s ‘The Will to Improve’, 2007 for more details).  
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government as a technology of power. The lack of formal control over territories and 
the stigma attached to the recourse to violence has led to a greater focus on populations 
and the importance of securing their support. She notes (Li, 2007: 16): ‘acquiescence is 
crucial. Lacking access to the means of violence, they [the development apparatus] can 
operate only by educating the desires and reforming the practices of their target 
population’. Although Li seems to underestimate the ways in which the trade and aid 
systems can be used as punishing and coercive regimes, her exploration of the use of the 
‘will to improve’ is insightful. She explores how by defining and delimiting the issue to 
be ‘corrected’ and making solutions to these problems technical, this governmental 
rationality has a de-politicising effect, not dissimilar to the one analysed by Ferguson in 
‘The Anti-politics Machine’ (1990). She goes beyond his conclusions however and 
conceives improvement as a ‘deliberate measure to contain a challenge to the status quo’ 
(Li, 2007: 8): assistance as (political) containment. In this light, the tactic of constant 
deferral used by the development industry also operates as a diversion whereby many 
critiques concentrate on the flaws of the scheme and how to address them rather than 
questioning the larger system. However, she argues that reducing development to a 
power tool obscures important features and the sometimes contradictory finalities of the 
process: she stresses that processes of depoliticisation and technicalisation should be seen 
as ‘project[s] open to contestations rather than a secure accomplishment’ (Li, 2007: 10).  
 
Another noteworthy study using governmentality to explore development issues comes 
from Ferguson and Gupta (2002). While, as noted at the beginning of this section, 
Ferguson is critical of the relevance of governmentality to analyse the relations between 
state and population in Africa, in this (earlier) paper, Foucault’s concept is extended by 
un-tying it from the sovereign nation-state and conceptualising a ‘transnational 
governmentality’ which encompasses the ‘modes of government that are being set up on 
a global scale’ (Ferguson and Gupta, 2002: 990). Many African states, they argue, are no 
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longer able to exercise many of the prerogatives associated with sovereignty; they note 
that to a large extent, a ‘transfer of economic sovereignty’ (Ferguson and Gupta, 2002: 
992) has been operated, allowing international corporations and international agencies 
such as the IMF to impose their undemocratic policies. However, they remark that this 
transnational governmentality operates at multiple scales, highlighting how NGOs and 
other non-state agencies have also been used to outsource state functions. This coincides 
to a large extent with what Fraser calls ‘globalizing governmentality’ (2003: 169) which 
works through increasingly dispersed, flexible and autonomous networks.  
 
AIDS programmes have also been seen as constituting an unprecedented expansion of 
surveillance of, and intervention targeted at the population (de Waal, 2006). Ingram 
(2010), for example, has analysed the deployment of PEPFAR through the prism of 
governmentality, showing how interventions ‘designed to shape the conduct of people 
living with or at risk of infection by HIV […] by marking out a series of populations in 
need or at risk, and [seeking] to manage their exposure to HIV’ operate through seeking 
to alter ‘their relationships with things like customs, habits, ways of acting and thinking’ 
(Foucault, 2007a: 96). 
 
A number of analyses have extended the concept of governmentality to international 
relations, particularly in the context of foreign aid. As Joseph (2010), Fougner (2008), 
Best (2007) and Abrahamsen (2004) have observed, under the Post-Washington 
Consensus, the increasing use of non-juridical tools (benchmarking, metric indicators, 
monitoring systems, etc.) to produce compliance from poor countries with international 
norms through the promotion of an ethos of self-responsibility has drawn on the 
repertoire of governmentality. As Joseph (2010: 46) has elucidated, this international 
governmentality targets states but is sustained through ‘the claim to be concerned with 
the health, wealth and well-being of the local population’. Joseph reformulated 
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Foucault’s concept and defined global governmentality as ‘a complex ensemble of 
institutions, procedures, analysis and tactics that has the state as its target, and a political 
economy of poor populations as its main form of knowledge’ (Joseph, 2010: 48). The 
present study draws on this definition of international governmentality and extends the 
concept to interactions between donor agencies and the government of Malawi in order 
to explore the ways in which the new aid architecture has contributed to reconfiguring 
aid relations.  
 
 
4.6. Conclusion: the new aid architecture and the governmentalisation of aid  
 
This chapter has taken a winding journey through the ideas of neoliberalism, 
governmentality, and international development. It has shown that while neoliberalism 
still imposes itself as a powerful lens to critically analyse aid relations, it can be 
imprecise and, to some extent, ineffective. Foucault’s theorisation of neoliberal 
governmentality offers a perspective providing new insights. It can however also be 
confusing as its use varies in the different accounts Foucault makes, as well as in its 
application by ‘governmentality scholars’. Foucault appears to use governmentality as a 
general and polysemic concept which designates in turn the historical tendency towards 
the pre-eminence of government over other forms of power such as discipline and 
sovereignty; the result of a process of mutations where the state has progressively been 
governmentalised (in contrast with the state of justice of the Middle Ages and the 
administrative state of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries which focused on 
regulations and discipline) (Foucault, 2007a); the ‘rationalization of governmental 
practice in the exercise of political sovereignty’ (Foucault, 2008: 2); and also: 
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‘… the ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, analysis and reflections, 
the calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific albeit 
complex form of power that has the population as its target, political economy as 
its major form of knowledge, and apparatuses of security as its essential technical 
instrument’  
(Foucault, 2007a: 108)  
 
Foucault has also defined governmentality as a triangle of sovereignty-discipline-
government (in Elden, 2007: 30). As this last definition shows, there are often overlaps 
between the use of the terms governmentality and government, the technology of 
power that is characteristic of liberal and neoliberal rationalities of government. 
However this lack of clarity reflects the dynamism of Foucault’s thinking and should not 
necessarily be seen as an issue. As Foucault (2003a: 246) explains:  
 
‘What I say ought to be taken as ‘propositions’, ‘game openings’ where those 
who may be interested are invited to join in; they are not meant as dogmatic 
assertions that have to be taken or left en bloc. My books aren’t treatises in 
philosophy or studies of history: at most, they are philosophical fragments put to 
work in a historical field of problems.’  
 
Here, I have been particularly inspired by the ideas of power working through freedom 
and the processes of subjectification this involves. However, the present study extends 
the concept in a new direction to examine power relations between institutions. It 
intends to show that, to some extent, Ferguson (2010: 273) is mistaken to think that 
‘neo-liberalism-as-rationality’ does not apply to Africa. On the contrary, I argue that the 
post-Washington consensus, and particularly the new aid architecture set up by the 
Paris Declaration, marks the deployment of an array of governmental technologies. Yet, 
rather than being directed at the population, these technologies aimed to produce 
African states as compliant and self-regulating neoliberal subjects. This is not to say that 
repressive forms of power, incarnated by SAPs, have entirely disappeared. However, I 
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show that we have been witnessing the deployment of a specific type of neoliberal 
rationality, working through African governments’ increased autonomy.  
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Chapter 5: Methodology 
 
 
5.1. Introduction 
 
This qualitative research is largely based on 40 semi-structured interviews carried out 
in Malawi in a three-and-a-half month period in 2008. The study also draws on 
discursive readings of official documents and limited ethnographic observations. In this 
chapter, I discuss the epistemological and methodological underpinning of this study. 
In the first section, I clarify the philosophy of knowledge on which this thesis is based 
and consider its implication on the value and validity of research. I also describe the 
implications of using the analytics of governmentality and discuss the potential of 
extending it to the study of relations between donors agencies and aid recipient 
governments. In the second section, I reflect on these epistemological issues in the 
context of my own study, seeking to unpack the various discourses and power relations 
influencing the research outcome by telling the ‘story’ of this thesis and discussing my 
positionality during this process. In the last section, I provide information about the 
methods used to gather and analyse data and conclude by highlighting ethical 
considerations informing this research.  
 
 
5.2. Epistemology: truth(s), power and the challenges of using a governmentality 
analytics  
 
In this section, I explain the epistemological underpinning of this research and provide 
details on what constitutes a governmentality analytics. I then move on to discuss issues 
of positionality/ies and their implications for the research process. I also consider the 
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insights offered by the literature on studying ‘elites’ and carrying out oppositional 
research. Finally, I interrogate the radical potential of governmentality studies.  
 
5.2.1. Post-structuralism and governmentality analytics 
 
This study is based on a post-structural approach, and thus relies on the assumption that 
there is no ‘pre-existing world that can be known or measured’ (Dwyer and Limb, 2001: 
6). Post-structuralism refutes the premise of the neutrality and objectivity of the 
research process. Indeed, many scholars have shown that research is always situated 
within power relations. Every stage of a study, from the kind of topic it investigates, the 
questions it proposes to answer, the selection of research methods, the dynamics 
established with research participants, to the analysis of data, is mediated, in part, by 
the researcher’s subjectivity and positionality (Rose, 1997; Stanley and Wise, 1993; 
McDowell, 1992). Research is also inscribed in power relations dominating academia, 
which determines what is valued as knowledge (sometimes in economic terms if the 
work is supported by external funding). As McDowell (1992) highlights the choice of 
possible and acceptable research topics has long been influenced by the dominance of 
the interests of male, white and bourgeois academics.  
 
From a post-structural perspective, knowledge is thus seen as a situated set of discourses 
produced by social constructions and representations competing with others to impose 
their ‘truth’ (Smith, 2001). Hence, knowledge production is viewed as constitutive 
rather than reflexive (Gibson-Graham, 1994; Rose 1997). The analytics of 
governmentality is rooted in such an approach and thus ‘admits to being a perspective 
on questions of power and authority’ (Dean, 1999: 33).  
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However, such a perspective raises the question of what constitutes good research. If 
any study should be considered a discourse about the world, how not to fall into a 
situation whereby research becomes a ‘subjectivist, “anything goes” enterprise’ (Dean 
1999: 33)? Arguably, (good) research should distinguish itself by the rigour of its 
processes. This includes, for example, detailed consideration of the issues it chooses to 
examine, the methods used and its ethical implications, thorough data collection, 
careful reflection on data analysis, etc. Another yardstick to evaluate research is its 
explanatory power. As Rose (1999: 33) wrote: ‘Foucault once described his works as 
fictions, which did not thereby weaken the force of the truths that they could make, 
remake and unmake’. Indeed, Dean argues with regards to governmentality:  
 
‘To admit its perspectival nature is to say that there is no absolute standard of 
truth by which this analytics can be judged. To evaluate it, we might simply 
compare the intelligibility and understanding it yields with alternative 
accounts.’  
(Dean, 1999: 33) 
 
In this context, Dean (1999) argues that the strength of governmentality studies lie in 
that they seek to ‘formulate and consistently employ a specific set of questions that 
follow from this concern with how regimes of practices of government operate’ (Dean, 
1999: 33). Dean proposes four insightful axes of analysis that can be used to analyse 
governmental regimes of practices:  
 
1. The ‘fields of visibility of government’ (Dean, 1999: 41) which focuses on the 
objects, processes and actors made visible by the regimes of practices under 
study, as well as on those that are obscured. 
2. The techne of government: by what ‘means, mechanisms, procedures, 
instruments, tactics, techniques, technologies and vocabularies is authority 
constituted and rule accomplished?’ (Dean, 1999: 42). 
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3. The episteme of government: the forms of knowledge, or episteme, that ‘arise 
from and inform the activity of governing’ (Dean, 1999: 42). This includes 
investigating the ‘forms of thought, knowledge, expertise, strategies, means of 
calculation, or rationality […] employed in practices of governing’ as well as the 
ways in which these practices ‘give rise to specific forms of truth’ (Dean, 1999: 
42). It also analyzes the means through which knowledge/thought seeks to 
‘render particular issues, domains and problems governable’ (Dean, 1999: 42). 
These include programmes of conduct, defined as ‘all the attempts to regulate, 
reform, organize and improve what occurs within regimes of practices’ (Dean, 
1999: 43) 
4. The formation of identities. Some of the questions raised by Dean (1999) which 
are particularly relevant to this study are:  
 
‘What statuses, capacities, attributes and orientations are assumed of those who 
exercise authority […] and those who are to be governed […]? What forms of 
conduct are expected of them? What duties and rights do they have? […] How are 
certain aspects of conduct problematized? How are they then to be reformed?’  
(Dean, 1999: 43) 
 
In this research, I have extended the governmentality analytics to relations between 
donors agencies (both bilateral and multilateral) and the government of Malawi, which 
raises a number of issues. The concept of governmentality developed by Foucault 
focused on the relation between the state and its population. Given the prominence of 
processes of subjectification (or shaping suitable subjects) in Foucault’s theorisation, 
using governmentality to analyse relations between agencies and a state relies on 
conceptualising the government of Malawi as an individual-like entity. As MacLeavy 
and Harrison (2010) have argued, viewing the state as a unified actor is problematic in 
that it undermines a relational and socially constituted view of space. However, 
following Wendt (1999) and Hattori (2003), I contend that viewing states as a ‘real 
agent, whose identities, interests, and power capabilities are constituted in relation to 
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other states’ (Hattori, 2003: 231) can offer unique insights, without necessarily 
essentialising their existence. In the area of international development, it is particularly 
useful in shedding light on how the demands from donors shape aid-dependent 
countries. However, this (partial) perspective also obscures many dynamics such as the 
complex relations between (democratic) governments and the population they are 
supposed to represent or the importance of internal cultures at various levels of the 
state apparatus. Thus, the use of governmentality in such a context can be seen as 
offering a partial yet productive perspective on power.  
 
But how to account for the power dynamics that are at the heart of the research 
process? As Stanley and Wise (1993) warn, researchers have the power to impose their 
own truth on people they study and to interpret the reality of the researched material 
in order to make it suitable for their own theory. This is particularly relevant in the 
case of governmentality studies which have been critiqued for their ‘functionalism’, 
defined as ‘the neo-Foucauldian tendency to over-emphasise the coherence and 
effectiveness of political projects’ (MacKinnon, 2000: 309; see also McKee, 2009; 
Weidner; 2009). Although qualitative studies drawing on governmentality are 
potentially more conducive to a nuanced account of the deployment of rationalities of 
government than research focused solely on document analysis, they bring the question 
of the positionality of the researcher to the fore.  
 
5.5.2. Power and positionality/ies 
 
The rejection of the researcher as a neutral, disembodied and objective outsider in post-
structuralist research has led to a reflection on how researchers’ own bias and their 
multiple positions in society (for example linked to gender, age, race, nationality, social 
and economic status, sexuality etc.) is constitutive of research outcomes and their 
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interpretation as knowledge (Maynard, 1994). In addition, power relations between the 
researcher and the researched have been under scrutiny. In particular, it has been 
thought that the relative position of the researcher and the researched influences to a 
large extent how the research is conducted, what the participants will reveal, what the 
researcher will see or hear and how the data will be interpreted. The exploration of 
collaborative and non-exploitative methods attempting to shift the balance of power 
between the researcher and the researcher so as to enable some form of ‘connectivity’ 
has been seen as a way to reduce the effects of their differentiated power positions 
(Kobayashi, 1994). It has also been suggested that the effects of these various positions 
and relations on the constitution of knowledge could be minimised by reflecting on 
one’s position within the different constitutive power structures and how this might 
have affected the research. For example, McDowell (1992: 409) states that, as 
researchers, we should ‘recognise and take account of our own position, as well as that 
of our research participants, and write this into our research practice’. Moser (2008) has 
argued that personality, particularly in terms of social skills and emotional abilities, 
should also be considered as influencing the research process and outcomes.  
 
However, Rose (1997) has critiqued the trick of making one’s position more 
‘transparent’ by accounting for it and argues that it has been seen as a way of increasing 
the objectivity and the validity of the research. Yet, if there is no pre-existing social 
world existing outside our knowledge of or discourse about it (Butler, 1990), then 
objectivity has to be abandoned altogether. Drawing on Butler, Rose (1997: 316) affirms 
that ‘our identities do not pre-exist our performances of them’ and that there is no 
stable identity that can be made transparent through reflexivity. She argues that the 
researcher and the research subjects construct themselves in particular ways through 
the research process, ways that are then re-worked and re-presented in the process of 
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analysing and writing up. This makes it impossible for the researcher to define their 
positionalities through a reflexive process, leading to tensions and uncertainties:  
 
‘we are made through our research as much as we make our own 
knowledge, and that process is complex, uncertain and incomplete. 
Complex, because our position is a very particular mediation of class 
and gender and race and sexuality and so on; uncertain, because our 
performance of them always carries the risk of misperforming an 
assigned identity (Butler, 1990); and incomplete because it is only in 
their repetition that identities are sustained.’  
(Rose, 1997: 316) 
 
Taking a Foucauldian view of power as saturating the social world, some have argued 
that power relations thus cannot be escaped (Gibson Graham, 1994; Rose, 1997). 
Instead, Rose (1997) has concluded that these uncertainties and tensions linked to 
power differences and positionalities should be seen as spaces of reflection and 
negotiation rather than as problems. Others (e.g. Smith, 2001: 25) have claimed that the 
aim of research should be to put power to radical use in order to ‘recover and centralise 
marginal voices and the issue is therefore which strategy to adopt to place non-
dominant, neglected knowledges at the heart of the research agenda’. While this 
research seeks to build on these two points, the latter assertion raises a number of issues 
in the context of this thesis: namely, the implications of studying ‘elites’ and the 
question of the radical potential of governmentality studies.  
 
5.2.3. Studying ‘up’ and ‘against’: some implications  
 
This research focuses largely on donors and the government of Malawi. As a result, it is 
at odds with a large proportion of the literature discussing issues pertaining to 
epistemology, methodology and ethics which is based on the assumption that research 
participants are in a lower power position relative to the researcher (for exceptions, see 
Desmond, 2004; Duke, 2002; Cormode and Hughes, 1999; Hughes and Cormode, 1998; 
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Neal, 1995; McDowell 1992; Schoenberger, 1991). As Duke (2002) notes, contrary to 
other disciplines such as History or Political Science, Geography research, and 
particularly qualitative projects, has often focused on marginal groups, as a way to bring 
‘subjugated knowledges’ (Foucault, 1988: 82 in Duke, 2002: 40) to the fore. However, as 
a result, studies focusing on those in positions of power have been, to some extent, 
neglected. Yet, as Neal argues, ‘the paucity of inquiry into the ruling classes, the 
wealthy, the privileged and the powerful is in itself a simple testimony of the reality of 
a political research agenda’ (Neal, 1995: 518). The lack of scrutiny into elites can be 
seen as leaving them ‘unmarked’ and naturalised while the disadvantaged groups are re-
presented and made knowable. However, researching ‘elites’ or studying ‘up’ as it is 
sometimes coined (e.g. Desmond, 2004) presents a number of fresh challenges. One of 
the first dilemmas is perhaps about terminology: how to describe this unequal power 
relation without conveying and naturalising a contestable hierarchical imaginary? I 
have chosen reluctantly to use the word elite, here, defined by Desmond (2004: 264) as 
a status stemming from ‘the control of human, capital, decision-making and knowledge 
resources’.  
 
Although issues encountered are often thematically similar to the challenges met when 
conducting research with participants from marginalised groups, they often manifest 
themselves in different ways. For example, whereas most of the discussions around 
methodology and ethics deal with the need to ensure that a non-exploitative 
relationship is established with participants and a rapport is created to put them at ease, 
in the case of elite research, the asymmetry of power often favours those researched, 
leaving researchers little ability to establish relationships based on care and reciprocity. 
In addition, many studies focused on ‘elites’ stem from a critical position towards how 
power is exercised, thus making studying ‘up’ often also studying ‘against’, or ‘behind 
enemy lines’ as a Geoforum issue (2010, issue 41) devoted to the topic phrased it.  
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Access can be an issue as elite members often have little personal gains to make from 
being involved in the research or the research findings. However this is not always the 
case. As Desmond (2004) experienced during her research on legislation pertaining to 
genetically modified organisms (GMOs) in Ireland, a politically sensitive and topical 
research can lead elite participants to use their participation as a way of diffusing 
critiques and seeking to co-opt the researcher. In other cases, participants will open up 
to the researcher as s/he is seen as ‘unthreatening’ or ‘unofficial’. However, the research 
can also be seen as a threat (Desmond, 2004) or a waste of time. It is worth noting that 
many pieces of research on elites have been carried out by researchers in relatively well 
established positions, sometimes having had previous connections with the institution 
researched or even benefiting from the status of ‘insider’ (for example, David Mosse’s 
ethnography of the World Bank, Mosse, 2004). However, for PhD students who lack 
academic credentials and are often in a vulnerable and isolated position, access to elites 
can be difficult (Duke, 2002; Neal, 1995).  
 
Thus, the relative positions of the researcher and the researched often make fieldwork 
challenging, though in a rather different way from those outlined by academics 
working with marginalised (or sympathetic activist) groups. In the context of 
interviews, research participants’ attitudes to being studied can be problematic in a 
variety of ways: from the patronizing behaviours experienced by Duke (2002), the 
‘hostility and resistance’ felt by Neal (1995: 526) whose interviewees questioned the 
validity of her questions, to unexpected openness bordering on cooption. For example 
Desmond (2004) explained how while doing interviews within a company dealing with 
GMOs, her taxi ride from the train station to the interview site was always paid for by 
the interviewee. Another common issue in interviewing elites is the existence of an 
‘official line’ (Duke, 2002: 46) and the reluctance of some interviewees to speak openly 
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about their views. Dissemination can also present new dilemmas, forcing researchers to 
tread a fine line between critique and continued access to participants (Oglesby, 2010). 
 
Thus, the differentiated positionalities of the researcher and the researched in elite 
studies require a different kind of performativity by the researcher during fieldwork. 
While research with marginal groups often entails creating a compassionate rapport, 
studying elites often requires researchers to try to conform to the expectations and 
values of the researched in order to bolster their status in their eyes of the respondents. 
Neal (1995) for example describes how she countered her socially lower position by 
making claims of intellectual authority, presenting herself as ‘neutral, rational and 
objective’ (1995: 524), and attempting to ‘fit in’ through the adoption of dress code and 
presentation that could be perceived as professional and non-threatening. Researchers 
studying elites are thus more likely to consider how positionalities are enacted and 
performed in various ways according to the position of respondents, in line with Rose’s 
argument about the need not to essentialise positionality (Rose, 1997). As McDowell 
(1998) explains in an account of her research with elites in the city of London, 
interviews with this category of participants often entail a process of performing 
identities likely to lead interviewees to open up (to the extent of the limitations of one’s 
gender, race, age, class, etc.). She explained:  
 
‘In some interviews I seemed to fall into the classic male-female pattern, for 
example with an older charming but rather patriarchal figure I found myself to 
some extent “playing dumb”; with an older and extremely fierce senior woman I 
was brusquely efficient, with other women I was “sisterly” in the sense of same 
age-same position, with some of the younger men I was super-fast, well 
informed, and definitely not to be patronised.’ 
 (McDowell, 1998: 2138)  
 
As this quote suggests, this process is often barely conscious at the time of the interview 
and depends largely on the inter-personal skills of the researcher. As a result of the 
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acknowledgment of the performative element of positionality, Hanson Thiem and 
Robertson (2010: 5) asserted that we should differentiate between ‘political difference 
(which may be irreconcilable in a given research project), and positionality (which can 
be constructed strategically within certain bounds)’. However, the process of presenting 
oneself or a research project in a light that will be more agreeable to participants raises 
ethical issues which I will examine in section 5.4.3. I now turn to exploring the ways in 
which governmentality studies can (re)claim some radical potential.  
 
5.2.4. Radical governmentality studies? 
 
Studies drawing on Foucault in general, and governmentality in particular, have been 
seen as lacking potential for radical use because of their lack of normative framework. 
As Dean (1999: 49) states: ‘there is no single standard for deciding whether a form of 
power or state of domination is contingent or necessary’. Indeed, Foucault has been 
seen as turning away from projects that claim to be emancipatory or radical (Foucault, 
1986, in Dean, 1999) and his intellectual project has been described as paralyzing or 
anaesthetising (Foucault, 2003a). However, Foucault himself refuted this assertion, 
claiming that, in his view, his work appeared to have an ‘irritant’ effect (Foucault, 
2003a: 257). In a 1978 Roundtable (later published under the title ‘Questions of 
method’), Foucault clarified the role of his research with regards to bringing social 
change. He stated1:  
 
‘It seems to me that “what is to be done” ought not to be determined from above 
by reformers, be they prophetic or legislative, but by a long work of comings 
and goings, of exchanges, reflections, trials, different analyses. […] The necessity 
of reforms mustn’t be allowed to become a form of blackmail serving to limit, 
reduce, or halt the exercise of criticism […] Critique doesn’t have to be the 
                                                 
1 Foucault, here, discusses specifically the role of his work on prisons. However, these ideas are applicable 
to the rest of his work. It is worth noting that the Roundtable took place at the time where Foucault was 
giving his lectures on governmentality at the College de France.  
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premise of a deduction that concludes, “this, then, is what needs to be done”. It 
should be an instrument for those who fight, those who resist and refuse what 
is. Its use should be in processes of conflict and confrontation, essays in refusal. 
It doesn’t have to lay down the law for the law. It isn’t a stage in a programming. 
It is a challenge directed to what is.[…] The problem [of what should be done], 
you see, is one for the subject who acts – the subject of action through which the 
real is transformed. […] [change] will be when those who have a stake in that 
reality, all those people, have come into collision with each other and with 
themselves, run into dead ends, problems, and impossibilities, been through 
conflicts and confrontations – when critique has been played out in the real, not 
when reformers have realized their ideas’  
(Foucault, 2003a: 256-257) 
 
Thus, for Foucault, the power of critique lies in its ability to ‘remove the taken-for-
granted character of […] practices’ (Dean, 1999: 47), to allow transformation by making 
‘clear what is at stake and what are the consequences of thinking and acting in such 
ways’ and thus ‘how it might be possible to do things differently’ (Dean, 1999: 48-49). 
The radical potential of governmentality studies lies in the ways they  
‘expand the terms of political debate’ (Rose, 1999: 277). They offer tools to think things 
differently, which can then be seized upon by ‘those who act’ to operate political 
transformations. While I am not of the view that the dichotomy between the 
researcher – or critique – and the activist is always necessary, Foucault’s 
conceptualisation of their relationship points to the radical potential of body of works 
that do not provide immediate and practical solutions to the questions they examine. In 
the next section, I seek to reflect on the issues discussed here, particularly with regards 
to power and positionality, in the context of the present research.  
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5.3. The ‘story’ of this PhD: reflections on research, positionalities, power and 
contingency 
 
This section seeks to situate this work by unpacking issues relating to my 
positionalities, notably in relation to research participants. But it also attempts to locate 
this work in relation to dominant discourses within and outside of academia, making 
this thesis both very personal and decidedly a product of a specific time and place. I also 
highlight the contingent nature of the research process, showing how its outcomes are 
often shaped by elements that are outside of the control of the researcher. I examine 
these issues by telling ‘the story’ of this PhD, beginning by examining the emergence 
and evolution of the topic, before focusing on the UK-based part of the fieldwork and 
then moving on to data-collection in Malawi. More factual information about the 
methods used is provided in section 5.4.  
 
5.3.1. Situating the research topic: positionalities and academia 
 
The factors influencing the identification of a suitable research topic are seldom 
discussed in methodological accounts. Yet, as McDowell (1992) has observed, the 
definition of research topics ought to be problematised as they can reflect, and 
reinforce, the interests of dominant groups, both within and outside academia. As a 
result, I find it useful to situate my thesis as the intersection of my own positionality 
and interests, and dominant (or emergent) discourses within academia.  
 
I started my PhD in 2004, while working as a researcher at Brunel University. I enjoyed 
my job carrying out London-based socially-oriented projects but was also keen to 
return to a more explicitly political/policy-based project (my first degree was in 
Political Science), particularly in the area of international development. After my 
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masters, I had done an internship with the International Organisation for Migration 
(IOM) in Geneva, and was subsequently given a contract as a researcher, in charge of a 
project aimed at studying programmes targeting internally displaced persons and 
developing guidelines to promote greater gender equality. I travelled to Colombia to 
carry out interviews and focus groups with civil society organisations and project 
beneficiaries. While I thoroughly enjoyed the job content, I was uncomfortable with 
many aspects of working in this organisation – including the ways funders influenced 
the agenda - and left after my research contract came to end. Doing a PhD on a 
development-related topic was a way to both revisit and analyse my experience 
working there, and further my interest in this field.  
 
Noxolo et al. (2011), Jazeel and McFarlane (2010), Power (2009) and Massey (2004) to 
cite a few, have shown how the concept of responsibility can be fraught, legitimising 
the portrayal of those in lower power positions as lacking specific attributes, conferring 
authority to the privileged to dictate decontextualised ‘top-down’ solutions while 
failing to problematise the mutual constitutions of places and people. However, taking 
responsibility has also been seen as ‘an ethical disposition that offers a way of taking 
account of inequalities and confronting power in a profoundly unequal postcolonial 
world’ (Noxolo et al., 2011: 419). As someone from a relatively privileged background 
my interest in development stems, in part, from a sense of responsibility for my position 
to contribute to tackle the injustices on which my advantages are built.  
 
However, both through my education and experience working in development, I had 
been alerted to some of the pitfalls associated with ‘helping the Other’. In that light, I 
found it both less problematic and more productive (as a citizen and thus, in some way, 
as a stakeholder in these organisations) to focus on how the attitudes of Western-
dominated institutions contributed to maintain global inequalities. Yet, as much as my 
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position is rooted in a critical perspective on donors, based on my education and life 
experience, this is also combined with a sense of belonging (or having belonged) to the 
same community as the donor representatives I interviewed. In many ways such as 
class, race, culture and educational background, my positionality is closer to theirs than 
to the ones embodied by Malawian civil servants. Thus, although this research can be 
qualified as oppositional, it is also built on an ambiguity which may have helped me 
cultivate a greater understanding of and empathy with the international donor 
community. In a sense, this research could be qualified as studying the ‘enemy’ within.  
 
The idea of researching global AIDS policies was suggested by one of my supervisors 
after a few failed attempts at trying to find a suitably ‘new’ topic. Of course, identifying 
a subject offering an opportunity for original findings is often the first step of a PhD. I 
first turned my attention to the political and bureaucratic aspects of the international 
AIDS response, in particular DFID’s policies, and how its corporate statements of intent 
where translated to, or interacted with, the national contexts in which they were 
deployed. I became interested in the linkages and disconnects between policy text and 
implementation, and the various discourses that operated at different scales. The rising 
importance of the Three Ones in AIDS2 and, subsequently, the Paris Declaration made 
this aspect of AIDS policy implementation particularly interesting. But studying the 
working of an aid bureaucracy also appealed to me. Though it might be understandable 
given my interest in politics and power, I also felt that the process of the PhD allowed 
me to discover myself as a researcher and to better define areas that attracted my 
intellectual curiosity, though the reasons behind this interest still remain partly 
unclear. This echoes Rose’s assertion that ‘we are made through our research as much as 
we make our own knowledge’ (Rose, 1997: 316). In that regard, the research process 
                                                 
2 One agreed HIV/AIDS Action Framework providing the basis for coordinating the work of all partners; 
one National AIDS Coordinating Authority; one agreed country level Monitoring and Evaluation System. 
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could be conceptualized as a dialogue (and sometimes a confrontation) between myself 
and my evolving PhD project, leading to reflection and mutual constitution.  
 
However, this research can also be seen as situated in and by time and place. I had been 
searching for a theoretical framework, and had examined various possibilities including 
ontology/theory of scale, actor-network-theory, critical policy analysis and postcolonial 
theories. I had come across governmentality but it was not before I attended a two-day 
seminar organised by the Geography Department at University of Bristol that I was able 
to understand the possibilities this concept offered. Thus, in some ways, this thesis also 
reflects the growing interest in governmentality within academia, as the many recent 
publications I draw on in this research also indicate. Hence, the present work is also a 
manifestation of the ways in which specific theoretical formulations were dominant (or 
emergent) at the time of the research, in the English-speaking academic world.  
 
5.3.2. The convoluted process of conducting research: ‘failures’ and readjustments  
 
This section reflects on a first ‘failed’ interview which contributed to reorient my 
research to some degree. It does so by analysing the various factors such as 
positionalities and contingency that led to this problematic encounter and by 
considering the specificities of ‘elite’ research.  
 
The first interview I conducted for this research was what could be considered a failure. 
Yet it provided a rich ground for reflection and was key in reorienting my research. I 
had decided to focus on DFID’s policies both because it had been one of the leading 
donors in the implementation of the new aid architecture as well as for practical 
reasons, as I am a UK resident. I had emailed a network of friends working in the area 
of development and obtained a few contacts within the organization. I arranged an 
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interview with two DFID staff members involved in AIDS policy. However, on the day, 
one of them was called into a meeting and unable to attend. The person left (I have 
chosen not to provide the individual’s name in this thesis in order to feel comfortable 
providing a frank account of our encounter) had a focus on psycho-social aspects of 
AIDS and was unable to answer most of my questions with regards to funding 
allocation and programme implementation (something her colleague would apparently 
have been better suited for). The interviewee also became irritated and uncomfortable 
when I started probing about the relationship between DFID and its US counterparts 
(despite having been guaranteed anonymity in any writing developed from the 
research). At the end of the meeting, the person inferred the interview had been a 
waste of time.  
 
There are a few considerations stemming from this ‘failed’ interview. Although I had 
experience conducting qualitative research, participants had been either less powerful 
than (mothers from deprived neighbourhood, children, etc.), or on a relatively equal 
footing (such as council staff members) with, myself in my capacity of researcher. 
Though this is not without its challenges, interviewing a member of the ‘elite’ made for 
a very different experience, for which I was perhaps unprepared. In hindsight, I should 
probably have carried out interviews with staff members at DFID Headquarters after 
my fieldwork in order to bolster my intellectual authority and counter my lower 
position as a research student. In addition, although I had sent them both a short 
summary of my interests prior to the interview, this meeting made me realise that 
sending a more detailed outline or an interview schedule may have been of benefit. 
However, this experience also made me reflect on the contingent nature of the research 
process. The second person who was supposed to attend the interview would probably 
have been more appropriate to my area of investigation and may have found my 
questions more relevant. Finally, and this was later confirmed during my Malawi-based 
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fieldwork, DFID personnel appeared to be more wary of straying away from the ‘official 
line’ (Duke, 2002) than staff members from many other donor agencies. After this 
interview, the few other contacts I had at DFID Headquarters and who had agreed to 
meet me stopped replying to my emails. As Fitz and Halpin (1994) explain, elite 
research is often dependent on establishing good contacts with initial participants as 
they often constitute a close network and will exchange their views on your research 
and performance. This ‘failure’ to establish a first good contact within this ‘elite’ group 
led me to alter the framing of my research. I decided to focus largely on donors in 
Malawi, though initially retained an emphasis on DFID, which had a prominent role in 
the implementation of the new aid architecture in the country and was the lead donor 
in the health sector.  
 
5.3.3. Data-gathering: positionalities and influences  
 
Access to staff members at aid agencies and governmental ministries in Malawi was 
thankfully much easier. The new aid architecture was still fairly recent at the time of 
my fieldwork in 2008, and the lack of research material on its implementation in 
Malawi helped to stir interest about my study. I also got a sense that representatives of 
the GoM used interviews as a way to voice their concerns with regards to donors’ 
attitudes, knowing that the findings would be disseminated to all participants. My 
international status (perhaps bolstered by my whiteness as a marker of power) 
combined with a relatively relaxed corporate culture, and a bold, no-nonsense style of 
expression which was common to most of the Malawians I interviewed, made these 
meetings fairly straightforward and productive. The ‘official line’ was more strongly 
enforced amongst donors though this varied tremendously. However, by focusing on 
technical aspects of the new aid architecture first and only then probing for more 
politically-loaded aspects of the research, the ‘official line’ was more easily crossed (or 
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blurred). In addition, donors appeared to instrumentalise the interview to air their 
opinion, particularly with regards to the behaviour of the Global Fund, which had 
recently joined the donor pool-funding basket at the National AIDS Commission but 
was seen as failing to embrace the principles behind it.  
 
While most donor representatives were white, and many of them were from Western 
countries, a number were either from Malawi or other African countries. On the 
whole, their views were in line with those of white donor representatives. However, 
especially in the case of Malawians, they had a refreshing tendency to speak more 
frankly than other donors, which chimes with my experience talking to Malawian civil 
servants. In addition, African donor representatives often displayed a more holistic 
outlook, linking issues raised by the Paris agenda to macroeconomic questions or civil 
service reforms, thus providing a broader picture. Malawians also made use of ‘we’ to 
designate in turn both the donor agency they represented and the people of Malawi. 
Though it was usually clear which type of affiliation they were referring to, it was an 
interesting testimony to their dual sense of belonging. Access to civil society 
respondents was relatively unproblematic, hampered only by their busy schedule. Thus, 
power dynamics between interviewees and myself in Malawi were varied but, on the 
whole, marked by a greater sense of equality and reciprocity, as my research was of 
interest to many participants.  
 
An important factor influencing the outcome of this research was my supervisor during 
my internship at Action Aid International Malawi, who provided me with contacts for 
interviews that few others suggested, notably orienting me towards questions 
pertaining to conditionalities, macro-economy and public financial management. I 
suspect these contacts were aimed at influencing the direction of the research, in line 
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with this person’s own interest. This was immensely useful as this allowed me to 
investigate new grounds and articulate original findings.  
 
In addition to the formal fieldwork however, I collected information in a more 
informal manner. I exchanged ideas with fellow residents at the Lodges I stayed in, the 
majority of whom were involved in development. A guest even transferred to my 
computer a vast number of official documents related to health in Malawi. Reading 
Malawian newspapers daily and watching the official television channel also allowed 
me to gain a deeper understanding of the political issues at the time and the 
representations of the AIDS response in the country. For example, the large number of 
official procurement notices in newspapers confirmed the points made by interviewees 
regarding the cumbersomeness of the procedures involved.  
 
This section has attempted to locate this research in terms of the relative positionalities 
of interviewees and myself, showing how these have shaped the direction of this 
project. It has also situated this work in relation to the value accorded to specific 
theoretical perspectives within academia at the time of my research, influencing both 
access to greater knowledge and my readiness to adopt a generally well-regarded 
(though not unchallenged) framework. Finally, this section also sought to highlight the 
contingent nature of the research process, showing how elements beyond the power of 
the researcher can contribute to shape the final result significantly. I find it useful to 
acknowledge this contingent element, to decentre the (perhaps masculinist) 
construction of research as a plan that unfolds seamlessly. In many ways, this research 
has been shaped by the people I interacted with (as well as those who declined to be 
involved).  
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5.4. Research methods and ethical considerations 
 
While the section above reflected on the complex and unpredictable nature of the 
research process, I now seek to provide more comprehensive information about the 
methods used to carry out this study, and to consider how the research is grounded in a 
reflection on ethical issues.  
 
5.4.1. Research methods 
 
As explained in section 5.2., this research is qualitative in nature and rooted in a post-
structural approach and more particularly, in a governmentality analytics. It thus relies 
on identifying discourses and practices that construct and sustain specific identities, 
forms of authority, knowledges and techniques (Dean, 1999) and draws largely on 
interviews carried out with individuals involved in the area of AIDS in Malawi, 
particularly representatives from donor agencies, the government and civil society. This 
research is also based on secondary data analysis and on some limited ethnographic 
observations.  
 
The first stage of the research consisted of literature reviews in order to familiarise 
myself with the available material on global AIDS interventions, the new aid 
architecture, as well as relations between donors and aid recipients and Malawi. As 
described above, I also read widely on the theorisation of these issues, particularly 
governmentality. This phase provided empirical and theoretical context to the study 
and allowed me to narrow its scope.  
 
The second stage involved an attempt at UK-based fieldwork. As described above, this 
resulted in a ‘failed’ interview which spelled the end of further access to potential 
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research participants from DFID Headquarters. However, I also carried out a telephone 
interview with Action Aid UK’s HIV/AIDS policy officer in September 2007, which 
was useful in identifying key issues to include in my interview schedules.  
 
The third, and more intense, phase of this research consisted of fieldwork, conducted in 
Malawi (mostly in Lilongwe) between June and October 2008. This country was 
identified as a valuable location for this study for several reasons. The country has 
historically been the recipient of high levels of donor funding (Morfit, 2011) and is 
highly aid-dependent. Malawi suffers from high HIV prevalence rates at about 11.2% 
(UNAIDS, 2012a), combined with extreme levels of poverty, with 40% of the 
population living below the poverty line in 20083 (CABS Development Partners, 2010, 
in Loquai and Klavert, 2011). In addition development assistance targeted at AIDS has 
been highly harmonised since the beginning of the Millennium, with the National 
AIDS Commission (NAC) hosting a pool-funding mechanism through which donors 
operate. The Ministry of Health channels about 95% of total donor funding through a 
harmonised Sector-Wide approach (Carlson et al., 2008: viii). There is also a direct 
budget support mechanism through which donors contributing directly to the 
government budget coordinate their actions. In addition, one of my supervisors had 
recently conducted research in Malawi and was able to provide me with initial contacts 
amongst donors, ministries and civil society.  
 
I used these names to carry out a first wave of interviews and asked respondents for 
further contacts of people they recommended I talked to, a method often coined as 
‘snowball sampling’. While in Malawi, I carried out 39 interviews with 42 persons. I 
also did a repeat telephone interview with one donor representative after my return to 
                                                 
3 The poverty line was defined as Malawi Kwacha (MK) 47 per person per day in 2005 prices, equivalent 
to US$ 0.3 (Chissinga, 2009). 
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the UK. Interviews were carried out with representatives of three broad groups (a list of 
the individuals and organisations can be found in appendix A):  
 
- The Government of Malawi: including the National AIDS Commission, 
the Department of HIV/AIDS and Nutrition, the Ministry of Health, the 
Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Economic Development and 
Planning, and Lilongwe District Assembly. 
- Donors: both bilateral and multilateral agencies. Interviews were 
conducted with staff members from organisations that were part of 
‘aligned’ structures such as the NAC pool-funding mechanism, the Health 
SWAp, and direct budget support group, as well as those operating 
outside these arrangements. Unfortunately, I was unable to meet with 
representatives of the Global Fund as they are based in Washington DC 
with PricewaterhouseCoopers acting as their agent in the country (and 
they did not give interviews, I was told).  
- Civil society organisations, including international as well as national 
NGOs and associations, CSOs, a trust and a professional association.  
 
Interviews were semi-structured, allowing issues raised during the course of the 
meeting to be probed further. An interview schedule, or topic guide, was formulated 
initially (see appendix C), but it was amended for each meeting according to the type of 
interviewee. However, this schedule was also altered as the fieldwork progressed and 
new issues arose. In some cases, where the tasks of the respondent were very specific 
(as in the case of the Ministry of Finance’s Deputy National Authorising Officer), only a 
few key questions from the original schedule were asked, while the discussion focused 
more specifically on the complexity of their role and its challenges. Overall, a 
significant portion of many interviews were devoted to understanding the intricacy of 
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the institutional arrangements between donors and the GoM, reflecting the paucity of 
accessible secondary sources. But while questions around the relations between donors 
and the government of Malawi remained central to most interviews, their content 
varied quite widely, in line the variety of respondents and the information and opinions 
they volunteered. This flexibility allowed issues that were not initially envisaged to 
emerge, such as the importance of procurements and public finance management. 
Unfortunately however, these questions appeared rather late in the course of my 
fieldwork and this resulted in information gaps as well as a relatively narrow set of data 
to draw on in my analysis.  
 
During most of this time, I was also an intern with Action Aid International Malawi 
(AAIM). This enabled me to get an ‘insider’s perspective’, gain access to various 
meetings, carry out participant observations as well as gain further contacts for 
interviews. For example, I attended the Action Aid Programme Forum, which allowed 
me to learn more about the organisation and the way in which it its objectives are 
translated into strategies and programmes. I also participated in a report launch on 
education and Bretton Wood Institutions which enabled me to network and later 
conduct interviews with some of the participants. I took part in a consultative 
workshop on community and home-based care (CHBC), organised by WHO and VSO, 
and attended a meeting on the launch of a new website followed by a press conference 
on the treatment literacy project recently launched by AAIM. Maybe the most two 
important activities in terms of research outcomes were the participation in a one-day 
workshop in Blantyre on the HIV/AIDS legislation currently being drafted, during 
which I was able to make further useful contacts and get a sense of the legislative 
process in Malawi, and attendance at a task-force meeting on the National AIDS 
Spending Assessment (NASA) that Malawi was about to undertake. This gave me 
insights into the NASA process itself as well the as the relationships between the 
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various ministries and government bodies. However, at the time of my fieldwork, the 
AAIM office was suffering from cash flow problems and many activities had been put 
on hold, limiting the insights the internship could have provided.  
 
Some informal ethnographic observations were made both through the internship and 
during the interview process. As Crang (2002: 650) argues, ethnography allows one to 
address the non-discursive and more performative aspects of policy delivery, by 
focusing on what people do and not only what they say. I made detailed observations of 
interview settings and interactions between individuals, for example amongst 
employees at Action Aid International Malawi, or between research participants when 
conducting a paired interview, and wrote these down later in the day. I also took notes 
on the dynamics between individuals or various groups of people at events and 
conferences I attended. However, in the end, I have used relatively little of this data in 
this thesis as interviews and document analysis often provided stronger and more 
detailed material. A number of observations also fell outside the focus of this thesis and 
would have distracted from its main points. Yet, these notes were illuminating in a few 
instances, for example in order to ascertain the variations in the material conditions 
under which some interviewees were working. In the Ministry of Health in particular, 
staff, even those in relatively senior positions, were crammed in small rooms. Files were 
piled against the walls showing a lack of office resources as basic as filing cabinets. In 
comparison, the NAC and the Ministry of Finance appeared to be better resourced.  
 
A fourth, overlapping stage of this research was the analysis of secondary data. I first 
collated Malawi’s official policy documents dealing with development (for example, the 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper and the subsequent Malawi Growth and 
Development Strategy) and Health/AIDS (e.g. Malawi’s National AIDS Policy). Internet 
searches then allowed me to identify reports from donors as well as international, 
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national and local NGOs/CSOs on these themes. I also made a number of more specific 
searches pertaining, for instance, to public finance management  or to policy conditions 
attached by the International Financial Institutions to Malawi’s debt relief. Finally, a 
number of key documents, particularly those pertaining to the Health SWAp, the NAC 
and the Common Approach to Budget Support Group were provided to me by research 
participants. These documents were studied for discourses and practices, sustaining a 
governmentalisation of aid, using the axis of questioning proposed by Dean (1999) and 
outlined in section 5.2.1. The selection of documents comprised main policy especially 
those pertaining to My analysis was inspired by the Critical Discourse Analysis 
approach which views texts as ‘social spaces’ which ‘constitute systems of knowledge 
and belief […] [as well as] social subjects (or in different terminologies, identities, forms 
of self) and social relations between (categories of) subjects’ (Fairclough, 1995: 6). 
Policy documents were particularly useful in providing greater insights into what Dean 
(1999: 43) calls the ‘formation of identities’. Texts were analysed with particular 
attention paid to questions such as: how are various subjects or groups of subjects 
constructed in the text? What are the roles and attributes ascribed to them? Which 
types of conduct are promoted by the documents, and which are either absent or 
presented as unsuitable? Document analysis was also useful in highlighting discourses 
pertaining to the relationships between the various groups of actors. For example, I was 
attentive to the ways in which the description of specific arrangements (such as 
mechanisms for dispute resolution) drew on particular semantic fields (in this case, 
openness and friendliness) and how this could be seen as part of the 
governmentalisation of aid relations. In addition, by providing specific information on 
more technical modalities relating to the new aid architecture (for example with 
regards to procurement or the use of indicators), policy documents allowed me to 
analyse the technologies and fields of knowledge governing aid relations. 
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Document analysis has a number of weaknesses however. Such texts are often the result 
of negotiation processes that are obscured in the official version (Gottweis, 2003). These 
documents thus reflect the outcome of a bargain between different discourses or 
‘truths’. Texts are also ‘ideational’ (Fairclough, 1995: 6) in the sense that they constitute 
‘systems of knowledge and belief’. As such, they construct a normative description of 
reality – what ought to happen – which is not always reflected in the ways in which 
policies unfold and are implemented.  However, using document analysis in 
combination with interviews and ethnographic observations allows us to reduce these 
drawbacks by providing greater nuances. In this thesis, I have drawn primarily on 
interviews as they offered a source of rich and detailed material. Document analysis was 
nevertheless useful in giving further insights into the articulation of particular 
discourses, as well as in presenting more detailed information on the current 
arrangements.  
 
5.4.2. Analysis: making sense, creating meanings 
 
As Schiellerup (2008) states, while epistemology has received increased attention in the 
past twenty years, the process of analysing data and writing it up in a coherent form has 
often remained a ‘black box’ of qualitative research. This section aims to provide details 
on this process.  
 
Data from interviews was transcribed and coded using Nvivo, a qualitative data analysis 
software which enables users, amongst other things, to code parts of an interview 
transcript according to various nodes, or themes. Coding was done according to pre-
defined themes stemming from a preliminary analysis of the data. A few ‘free nodes’ 
with material not fitting in any of the categories were also added as the coding 
progressed. It is worth noting, however, that coding sought to cover both material for 
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the research report, a more practical assessment summarising the views of research 
participants on the successes and challenges of the implementation of the new aid 
architecture in the area of AIDS in Malawi, and the thesis itself, with its more 
theoretically-grounded perspective. The themes used were the following:  
 
- HIV and AIDS policies in Malawi (report): successes and challenges (including 
implementation; lack of capacity; late disbursements; decentralisation; corruption; 
others).  
- The new aid architecture in Malawi (report); positive aspects; negative aspects; 
challenges; changes in relations between donors and the GoM; suggestions to 
make funding more effective.  
- The organisation of AIDS implementation in Malawi (PhD + for reference): roles 
of the NAC; the MoH, donors, districts; changes in recent years.  
- The Governmentalisation of donor-GoM relations (PhD): power relations between 
donors and the GoM; greater autonomy of the GoM; the new role of donors.  
- The means of governmentalisation (PhD): discursive truths (increased embedding 
of donors, creation of pool funding agreements, donor-defined procedures, 
technical assistance); ethical practices of the GoM; conditionalities.  
- The neo-liberal ‘mentality’ of the new aid architecture (PhD): indicators (link 
between AIDS and indicators; the Malawi Growth and Development Strategy) 
variations amongst donors; resistance from the GoM; lack of capacity and failure.  
 
However, the categories used were rather general and generated hundreds of pages of 
quotes. While the coding was useful in narrowing down the amount of material and 
operating an initial selection, the data needed to be further refined in order to become 
usable for the thesis (the report selection was narrower and more straightforward to 
structure in finer details from the content of the themes). In that respect, I found it 
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useful to take some time to familiarise myself again with my theoretical framework, re-
reading through Foucault’s lectures, as well as key books extending the concept of 
governmentality (Miller and Rose, 2008; Rose, 1999; Dean 1999) with my data in mind. 
The axes of analysis proposed by Dean (1999) which I had overlooked the first time 
were particularly useful. I took notes and drew diagrams in order to clarify how various 
elements of governmentality interacted with one another. Going back to my pre-
selected data, I used coloured stickers to refine the themes, and rearranged the quotes 
on my electronic document accordingly, deleting quotes that seemed redundant. This 
provided me with a template to structure my chapters. However, the process of writing 
itself led to more restructuring and re-shuffling as the arguments unfolded. I found that 
having been through the process of transcribing, coding and re-coding provided me 
with a thorough knowledge of my data that allowed me to call upon specific quotes as I 
was writing, Thus, the analysis process mixed formal analysing strategies such as 
thematic coding and more intuitive connections enabled by a good knowledge of my 
data. 
 
5.4.3. Ethical considerations 
 
This study is informed by ethical principles. These have been largely drawn from those 
promoted by the Royal Geographical Society’s Developing Areas Research Group 
(DARG) which include: ‘honesty, integrity, sensitivity, equality, reciprocity, 
reflectivity, morality, contextuality, non-discriminatory, fairness, awareness, openness, 
altruism, justice, trust, respect, commitment’ (DARG, 2003). However, in the context of 
this research, some of these principles have raised questions. Indeed, like much of the 
literature on the research process, these guidelines implicitly assume the coincidence of 
an ‘ethic of care’ based on interpersonal emotional relations with the researched and an 
‘ethic of justice’ relying on the idea of fairness (Ansell and van Blerk, 2005). However, 
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the problems pertaining to the application of ethical guidelines to real-life research 
contexts has been recognized by geographers (Valentine, 2003; Ansell and van Blerk, 
2005). This is particularly the case in oppositional research. As Han (2010: 11) asked: ‘is 
it possible to engage in ethical and critical research when the subject is deemed the 
“enemy” from the outset?’ 
 
Research that stems from a critical perspective on the participants involved has thus 
entailed the reappraisal of some of these principles. For example, oppositional research 
raises a dilemma between obtaining, and maintaining, access to interviewees and 
honest and full disclosure of the research goals (Hanson Thiem and Robertson, 2010). 
In her study of Korean/American evangelical groups, Han (2010) makes the distinction 
between not volunteering her opinions (which were thus assumed to be in line with 
those of her research participants) and lying, which would be considered as unethical. 
Similarly, trust and respect can be problematic values in the case where research 
subjects hold views that are at odds with those of the researcher (such as the case of 
Blee’s (2007) study of former, but unrepentant, members of the Ku Klux Klan). It has 
also been acknowledged that these guidelines ‘offer topics for consideration rather than 
“blue-prints” for good practice’ (Cree et al, 2002: 48). Oppositional research notably 
requires a balancing act and a thoughtful revisiting of commonly upheld ethical 
guidelines.  
 
In my research, I have striven to stay as close as possible to the spirit of the DARG 
ethical guidelines. I have complied with all formal ethical requirements. The research 
gained ethical approval from Brunel University and has abided by the procedures and 
requirements in place in Malawi at the time of my fieldwork. This involved seeking and 
receiving ethical approval from the National Health Sciences Research Committee (see 
appendix D) as well as affiliating with the Centre for Social Research at University of 
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Malawi, to which I paid a visit, allowing me to discuss my research with some of its 
staff.  
 
Research participants were provided with a leaflet outlining the study’s objectives, 
methods, ethical approval and plans for dissemination, prior to being interviewed 
(available in appendix B). However, it is worth noting that the focus of the research has 
been altered somewhat as a result of the fieldwork. In addition, the leaflet was framed 
in neutral terms and focused to a great extent on technical issues. In that regard, it does 
fall short of DARG’s expectations of constant ‘open, truthful and full disclosure of the 
objectives and expected outcomes of the research’ (DARG, 2003) since the research 
stemmed from a critical perspective vis-à-vis the organisations represented by some of 
the participants. Yet, as Han (2010) inferred, in the context of oppositional research, the 
silencing of one’s critical standpoint may be necessary to the continuation of the 
research. In addition, the complexity of the theoretical framework used in this study 
would make a truly full disclosure of the research objective a probably mystifying 
experience for most research participants.  
 
Written consent to participate in the research and be quoted in this thesis and 
subsequent publications was gained before starting interviews. Consent was also sought 
to record interviews (and was denied in one instance) and the opportunity to make ‘off-
the-record’ comments was offered and, in many occasions, seized. Requests by 
interviewees to see and amend the transcript of our conversation were accommodated. 
Confidentiality was guaranteed and, in writing this thesis, direct quotation was 
attributed to groups such as ‘Government of Malawi’, ‘donor’ or ‘NGO/CSO’ in order to 
provide anonymity. In a few places, I have provided further information about 
respondents quoted, identifying them as members of staff of a particular Ministry or a 
specific group of donors. However, I made sure that the numbers of respondents 
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corresponding to these categories was large enough (usually at least three) to ensure 
that anonymity would be maintained. At a more inter-personal level, I have striven to 
keep an open mind and sought to understand the viewpoint of participants (Duke, 
2002). A research report reflecting the more practically oriented interests of 
participants was developed and sent to all those interviewed in Malawi, in order to 
ensure that they benefited from the process (the report is available in appendix E). In 
the thesis, quotes were contextualised as much as possible and care was taken not to 
distort their meaning. Thus, although elite and oppositional research may require some 
adjustments to the ethical principles usually promoted, this thesis has sought to abide 
by the values they uphold; any variations were motivated by an ‘ethic of justice’ (Ansell 
and van Blerk, 2005).  
 
5.5. Conclusion  
 
In this chapter, I discussed the epistemological and methodological approaches used in 
this study. I explored the implications of a post-structural perspective based on the idea 
that knowledge constitutes, rather than reflects, the social world. I then considered 
how a governmentality analytics approaches the issue of epistemology, showing how its 
explanatory power is based on the consistent use of a number of questions with regards 
to visibilities, techniques, episteme and the formation of identities. Issues of 
positionality were also explored, particularly in the context of ‘elite’ and oppositional 
research. I also questioned the radical potential of governmentality studies and showed 
that, though the critique they formulate may not have direct and practical applications, 
they nonetheless contribute to open debates, potentially leading to social change.  
 
The following section discussed these issues with reference to my own research. I 
explained how the emergence of a research topic was influenced both by my own 
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positionality and by currently valued theories within academia. I also showed how the 
scope of the research had to be reconsidered after a first ‘failed’ interview, and 
examined the reasons for this failure, analysing the role played by the relative 
positionalities of the researcher and participants, particularly in the context of ‘elite’ 
studies. I then discussed the reasons why this issue manifested itself differently in the 
context of my fieldwork in Malawi.  
 
In section 5.4., I provided more information on my research methods, describing the 
various phases of the study. I also reflected on the process of data analysis. Finally, I 
discussed the ways in which this research is grounded in ethical principles and explored 
how elite and oppositional research required some adjustments to the generally-agreed 
guidelines.  
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Chapter 6: 
Governing through freedom: 
educating desires, instilling values, inculcating habits 
 
 
6.1. Introduction 
 
‘To govern, in this sense, is to structure the possible field of action of others1.’ 
(Foucault, 2001: 1056) 
 
This quote, from Foucault’s 1982 essay entitled The Power and the Subject encapsulates 
the ideas developed in this chapter. Indeed, as seen in chapter 4, Foucault views 
governmental power relations as hinging on freedom, in the sense that ‘the “other” (the 
one over whom power is exercised) must be recognized and maintained to the very end 
as a subject who acts2’ (Foucault, 2001: 1055). This is what distinguishes them from 
relations of domination which are characterised by the threat of violence or its 
actualisation (although governmental power can also draw on violence, this does not 
constitute its central mode of operation).  
 
Drawing on these ideas, I explore how the new aid architecture can be viewed as 
deploying a series of technologies entrenching a shift in the nature of the relations 
between donors and poor countries. As chapter 2 explained, concepts such as 
ownership, governance, transparency and effectiveness have coalesced around the new 
millennium under the ‘Post-Washington Consensus’ (PWC) label. While some have 
seen this new country-led approach as ‘a façade, behind which donor influence 
intrudes further, or an excuse for donors to step back and issue a disclaimer’ (Collins, 
                                                 
1 ‘Gouverner, en ce sens, c’est structurer le champ d’action éventuel des autres’ – author’s translation. 
2 ‘”l’autre” (celui sur lequel elle s’exerce) soit bien reconnu et maintenu jusqu’au bout comme subject 
d’action’, Translated by Ivan A.Ramirez - published in Pli The Warwick Journal of Philosophy 
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2011: 3), I argue here that this new paradigm constitutes rather a significant change 
from a relationship based broadly on coercion (and resistance to it) to interactions 
drawing largely on the repertoire of neoliberal governmentality. While in the previous 
period, marked by Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs), donors can be seen as 
drawing on the grammar of domination, working through pressures and threats of 
funding withdrawal, or operating in parallel to and independently from the state (for 
example, through the funding of civil society organisations), the PWC has been 
characterised by a different set of strategies and techniques that seek to construct poor 
countries as agentic subjects3, behaving as responsible entrepreneurs of themselves.  
 
However, while analyses of the PWC as a new, governmental, expression of power 
relations have chiefly focused on Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) (for 
example, Collins 2011; Best, 2007), I contend here that the new aid architecture, as 
enshrined in the Paris Declaration, represents a much deeper entrenchment of the 
ethos, techniques and episteme (field of knowledge) that characterise government 
(Dean, 1992). Also, while critiques have often focused on economic policies, I argue 
here that concentrating on donors’ engagement in a social area such as Health and 
HIV/AIDS, reveals how the neo-liberal rationality underlying this new kind of power 
relations, is extended to all areas of government.  
  
In this chapter, I focus on how, under the new aid architecture, a number of 
‘technologies of subjectivity’ (Miller and Rose, 1990: 7) have been deployed by donors 
in an attempt to govern through ‘freedom’ (Rose, 1999). Using data from my fieldwork 
in Malawi in 2008, I show in section 6.2., how this involves eliciting the agentic 
qualities of the recipient country, by engaging with its desire for sovereignty and 
                                                 
3 This is not to deny that recipient countries had some degree of agency in the previous period, but that it 
was conceived as antagonistic or irrelevant to the goals of donors. 
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autonomy, in order to foster an entrepreneurial state. However, governing though 
freedom also entails shaping subjects, here the Government of Malawi (GoM), so they 
can make ‘proper’ use of the liberty through which power now operates. Section 6.3 
thus explores how the new aid architecture has created or reinforced spaces where 
dialogue as a technology of government can be deployed by donors in order to shape 
the GoM’s agency. I show how this relies on paradoxical discourses, drawing on the one 
hand on an ‘equalising rhetoric’ (Power, 2009) and, on the other, presenting the GoM as 
technically deficient, thus needing donors’ support to assume its new role. These 
discourses also have depoliticising qualities that allow the representation of policies as 
technical and legitimise donors’ role within policy making and implementation. 
Finally, section 6.4 examines the various ways donors use dialogue in order to foster the 
GoM as a ‘suitable’ subject, shaping its agency by promoting various norms of civility, 
encouraging policies that are consistent with specific regimes of truth, facilitating the 
acquisition of techniques and inculcating practices of self-improvement. These 
processes of subjectification can be seen as instilling an ethos of self-responsibility, 
consistent with neoliberal governmentality, allowing donors to govern through 
freedom.  
 
 
6.2. Constructing the entrepreneurial state: country ownership and donor coordination 
as agentic technologies  
 
While the principle of country ownership has been deployed by development actors for 
over a decade (for example, in relation to the rolling out of PRSPs), the new aid 
architecture has given the use of country systems and policies a new impetus by 
committing a greater number of donors to this principle. Indeed, the first of the five 
key concepts buttressing the Paris Declaration enjoins ‘partner countries’ (aid 
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recipients) to ‘exercise leadership in developing and implementing their national 
development strategies’ (para 14). Ownership has been seen as a tool to address the 
failures of ‘conditionality-based agenda setting’ (Collins, 2011: 3), or a smokescreen 
enabling the perpetuation of the status quo (see for example, Anders, 2005, for a 
detailed analysis of Malawi’s PRSP). While I don’t necessarily dispute these 
interpretations, I would like to suggest that ownership can also be seen as a technology 
of subjectification, a discursive tool enabling the activation of poor countries’ 
entrepreneurial agency, and a way of instituting a more governmentalised power 
relationship allowing donors to rule through freedom. 
 
Following Foucault, Dean states: ‘the notion of government as the “conduct of 
conducts” presupposes the primary freedom of those who are governed entailed in the 
capacities of acting and thinking’ (Dean, 1999: 24). However, as Rose (1999) argues, we 
should distinguish between freedom as a formula of power, which he develops in the 
quote below, and freedom as a formula of resistance (as in resistance movements). He 
explains:  
 
‘Modern individuals are not merely “free to choose”, but obliged to be free, to 
understand and enact their lives in terms of choice. They must interpret their 
past and dream their future as outcome of choices made or choices still to make. 
Their choices are, in their turn, seen as realizations of the attributes of the 
choosing person – expressions of personality – and reflect back upon the person 
who has made them’.  
(Rose, 1999: 87, emphasis original) 
 
As I show here, ruling through freedom is a strategy that also applies to aid-dependent 
states.  
 
In Malawi, the importance of the government’s agency was made clear, notably in the 
areas of Health and HIV/AIDS. At the Ministry of Health (MoH), the Sector-Wide 
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Approach (SWAp) has created a strong compulsion for the Government to make 
choices with regards to polices and their implementation. As this MoH representative 
explains, under the new aid architecture, there is an exhortation for the government to 
be ‘free’, to display its agentic quality by expressing its preferences and coming up with 
propositions with regards to policies:  
 
‘We are expected to show leadership in terms of what our priorities are and how 
we would want to go about implementing interventions for the priorities.’ 
(GoM interview 8)  
 
Similarly, this National AIDS Commission (NAC) representative explains, the onus is 
firmly on the NAC to develop policies and plans:  
 
‘First and foremost we’re responsible for the development of strategic plans for 
the national response.’ 
 (GoM interview 7) 
 
In addition, the Health SWAp and NAC pool-donor mechanism can be seen as further 
teasing out the governmental agentic qualities by requiring a series of detailed actions 
and choice-making processes pertaining to policy implementation to be undertaken by 
the recipient government: 
 
‘The [SWAp] Memorandum of Understanding defines an obligation under the 
Ministry of Health to write plans, to write strategies, to engage in planning 
processes like the procurement planning process by a certain point in time in 
the financial year and in readiness for the following financial year.’  
(Donor interview 3) 
 
As the above quote reflects well, the rhetoric of freedom and agency cannot be 
separated, here, from a language of compulsion: though the government is compelled to 
engage in processes and undertake actions such as drawing detailed work plans, the 
outcomes of these are, in theory at least, wide open. As Foucault (2001: 1055) puts it 
‘what defines a relationship of power is that it is a mode of action which does not act 
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directly and immediately on others. Instead, it acts upon their actions4’. As Best (2007: 
93) states, the focus on ownership reveals an ‘emerging governmental conception of 
responsibility’. Indeed, under the new aid architecture, the imperative for aid recipients 
to actively engage in processes relating to policy-making, to become self-reflective 
subjects and entrepreneurs of themselves has, to some extent, replaced the compulsion 
to implement donor-imposed policies.  
 
Moreover, the new aid architecture requires recipient governments to play a pro-active 
role by placing the responsibility for donor coordination in their hands. The Paris 
Declaration, for instance, commits ‘partner’ countries to ‘take the lead in co-ordinating 
aid at all levels’ (OECD, 2005: para. 14). This role can be seen as another medium 
through which the capacity of the government to ‘think and act’ is called for and 
bolstered, at various levels. In Malawi, the government has embraced this role and 
developed the Malawi Development Assistance Strategy (2006-2011), a document 
spelling out the various ways donors could contribute to the implementation of the 
Malawi Growth and Development Strategy:  
 
‘The Malawi government has a development system strategy which provides a 
context and framework for donor support to the Malawi government, almost a 
code of conduct on how donors would help and most effectively support this 
national development agenda.’  
(Donor interview 6) 
 
This role is clearly translated at the level of government bodies dealing with Health and 
AIDS. Interviews with personnel at the National AIDS Commission reveal the 
extensive responsibility that consulting with and coordinating all aid donors represents, 
especially as NAC needs to engage with non-aligned partners:  
 
                                                 
4 ‘Ce qui définit une relation de pouvoir, c’est un mode d’action qui n’agit pas directement et 
immédiatement sur les autres, mais qui agit sur leur action propre’ (translation from Foucault, 1982: 789). 
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‘Currently we have the National Action Framework which covers 2005 to 2009 
and then this translates into an Integrated Annual Workplan which involves 
input from all the key stakeholders in the National Response to HIV and AIDS 
[…] We are also seeking input from the other discrete donors that do not 
channel resources through the National AIDS Commission. […] By the end of 
the day we make sure that all the implementing agencies in the country are 
buying into the National Strategic Framework.’ 
(GoM interview 7) 
 
Although the aid effectiveness agenda aims to streamline and reduce the burden of 
interactions with donors, it appears to have led to a different, yet intense, kind of 
engagement based on the duty of aid recipients to coordinate all development actors, 
and negotiate with discrete donors to ensure that their funds are directed towards areas 
identified in the GoM’s national plans:  
 
‘NAC has worked out an Integrated Annual Workplan prior to the start of every 
financial year in which they clearly outline where their pool funding would go 
and where the discrete funds will go. So the discrete donors include UNDP and 
the US Government but it’s been worked out in such a way that there is more or 
less I think complete harmonisation in terms of who’s going to be responsible 
for what.’  
(Donor interview 3) 
 
 
This pro-active role is also firmly established as far as aligned donors are concerned. For 
example, the Health SWAp’s Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) (a document that 
specifies the guiding principles and roles and commitments of the various partners 
engaging with the approach) lists a number of undertakings that the Malawian 
government agreed to carry out, starting with two pledges putting it in charge of 
managing and coordinating the aid planning and delivery:  
 
‘The Government undertakes, within the limits of its laws, policies, rules and 
regulations, to do the following- 
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(1) facilitate the successful implementation of the POW [Programme of 
Work] in the health sector, where practically possible, and in line with the 
general Government policy; 
(2) provide overall leadership in planning, administration, implementation 
and monitoring of the POW, AIPs [Annual Implementation Plans] and budget;’  
(Republic of Malawi, 2004a: 5) 
 
 
Thus, through these processes, The GoM is compelled to display agentic qualities, 
mobilising organisational and leadership skills, negotiating and mediating their 
relations with donors. 
 
However, these requirements to take charge, to manage the coordination of other 
development actors and to make choices, work through, rather than against, the GoM’s 
aspirations and interests. As Cruickshank (1999: 82) puts it ‘to govern, then, means first 
to stir up the desire, the interest, and the will to participate or act politically’. It taps 
into hopes for greater sovereignty, mirrors the government’s desire for self-
determination, and stirs up ambitions of greater leadership, as these quotes indicate:  
 
‘There is a will of taking on this responsibility from the Government.’ 
 (Donor interviewee 6) 
 
‘I think government is leading, they are in the driving seat, I don’t think there is 
any question about that and Malawians are very strong in terms of political will 
and motivation.’  
(Donor interview 8) 
 
Interviews with government staff reveal a more nuanced picture however, displaying a 
clear willingness to seize the opportunity to assume the new responsibilities bestowed 
on them through the new aid architecture but showing that change might be more 
incremental than portrayed by donors:  
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 ‘E.M.:- Do you feel that government is more, as they say, in the driver’s seat 
now? 
GoM: - We are not yet there but we are making good progress [in this 
direction].’  
(GoM interview 2) 
 
This may reflect the fact that some donors (the Global Fund was often cited in that 
regard but others, such as the World Bank, were also mentioned) have not embraced 
the new aid architecture as readily as others and still seek to impose reforms, find it 
hard to let go of their ability to dictate conditions. The interviewee quoted below, for 
example, had been referring to donors’ requirements for reforming Malawi 
procurements, which explains her cautious statement:  
 
 ‘I would want to believe that we are in the driver’s seat.’  
(GoM interview 8) 
 
 
In contrast to the structural adjustment period however, many donors are now 
encouraging of the GoM’s display of agency, at least in areas pertaining to social 
spending:  
 
‘In Malawi through the Ministry of Finance and its Debt and Aid Division, there 
are at least several attempts underway to exercise national leadership which I 
think is very commendable’ 
 (Donor interview 6) 
 
‘The National AIDS Commission takes the lead, takes the responsibility […] now 
they’re chairing for instance, they’re chairing the pool funding partners which is 
a very good development. But they need the support.’ 
 (Donor interview 1) 
 
 
The aid effectiveness agenda thus works through the GoM’s desire for autonomy and 
sovereignty, creating compulsion to make choices as a free subject, enlisting it into a 
discourse of self-responsibility by granting it a central role in its policy-making and as 
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the chief aid-coordinator. Rather than seeking to impose policies through coercion, this 
governmentalised form of power operates by defining a number of areas where it 
becomes the GoM’s duty to make appropriate decisions. However, as this last quote 
shows, the use of freedom is conditional on the ability to make suitable use of it. The 
next section explores how donors use dialogue as a governmental technology enabling 
them to influence the GoM’s agency.  
 
 
6.3. The new aid relations: dialogue as a governmental technology  
 
As Burchell (1996, 24, in Huxley 2007) explains, liberal governmentality enables the 
governed to ‘freely conduct themselves in a certain rational way… that requires the 
proper use of liberty’. Here, I show how the new aid architecture has institutionalised 
dialogue as a governmental practice allowing donors to guide the GoM’s agency. I show 
that the deployment of dialogue as a governmental technology is both characterised and 
enabled by a paradox: a discourse presenting aid relations as a partnership based on 
horizontal, consensual and apolitical relations, while at the same time relying on the 
idea of the GoM as lacking the technical capacity to operate properly without donors’ 
assistance, thus de-problematising and legitimising their place at the heart of policy-
making, 
 
6.3.1. Creating governable spaces 
 
The new aid architecture has created or bolstered a number of institutional spaces 
where regular interactions between donors and government officials take place, thus 
redefining the sovereign contours of the government in Malawi, creating grey areas 
where various responsibilities and accountabilities overlap.  
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For example, the existence of the Health SWAp represents an institutional space which 
is entirely conditional on the participation of donors. Despite being located within the 
Ministry of Health, it does not represent exclusively the government. Even more 
strikingly, the National AIDS Commission is a semi-autonomous trust that was created 
in 2001 at the request of the World Bank. It replaced the original National AIDS 
Control Programme (NACP) set up in 1989, in the Ministry of Health. The autonomy of 
the new NAC from the Ministry of Health aims to reflect a stronger multisectoral 
approach to the pandemic, rather than focusing chiefly on biomedical issues (NAC, 
2012). But it also allows the bypassing of state structures and regulations, particularly in 
terms of budget, staff pay and conditions, organisational structure and authoritative 
decision-making. This was hailed as a way of promoting its ability to ‘respond quickly 
and decisively to issues’ (NAC, 2012) but, I would argue, also represents the creation of 
an institutional area that is more easily governed. As Rose (1999) explains, the 
delineation of specific spaces in a way that makes them more easily knowable, 
calculable and governable is key to enabling the deployment of governmental power. 
 
Indeed, donor agencies are accountable to their own governments or stakeholders. In 
the context of basket funding or budget support, the need to ensure that money is 
spent, not only for the purpose intended, but also, increasingly, in an effective manner, 
is higher than ever:  
 
‘If NAC didn’t exist, I don’t think donors would have the confidence to put in 
the levels of resources that they are currently putting.’ 
 (Donor interview 6) 
 
Budget support or pool funding mechanisms are thus based on a quid pro quo, where 
country ownership is matched by a greater surveillance by donors of the micro-
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processes linked to policy formulation and implementation, ensuring that liberty is used 
in a ‘proper way’. As this MoH staff explains:  
 
‘Once you’ve put your resources in the pool as a SWAp partner, two major 
things have to be understood. The government is in the driver’s seat, it will 
make the decisions. Of course, they will invite input from the partners; the 
partner will have lost its say in how the funds are used. But what the partner has 
done is it has gained a position at the discussion table.’ 
 (GoM interview 8) 
 
Thus these new institutional spaces enable the incursion of donors into the heart of 
policy-making, while simultaneously reiterating the importance of the freedom and 
sovereignty of the aid recipient.  
 
In addition, the new aid architecture has led to a formidable increase in regular 
interactions between donors and the GoM, already suggested in the previous section by 
the latter’s role as aid coordinator. The Health SWAp and the NAC pool-funding 
mechanisms are exemplary in that regard:  
 
‘There are a lot of interactions and dialogue that is going on. It’s not like donors 
are putting money and then going to the lake.’ 
 (GoM interview 9) 
 
However, even beyond these semi-autonomous spaces, the new aid architecture has 
also led to a proliferation of meetings seeking to improve the coordination of 
development assistance by providing increased opportunities for dialogue, as this donor 
representative explains:  
 
‘There’s a body called the Health Sector Review Group which includes the 
Health Services Commission, the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Finance… 
[…] Donors are represented in an efficient way so that the Secretary and the 
Chair of the Health donor group go but none of the other donors do. There are 
Technical Working Groups which address different technical issues such as the 
financial management or procurement reforms at the Ministry of Health. So 
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that’s essentially how the interaction takes place. Of course that’s not the only 
interaction. There are lots of other events and meetings taking place all the time 
in which we work together with the Ministry of Health.’ 
 (Donor interview 3) 
 
The new institutional landscape of aid cooperation thus enables the development of 
these new hybrid or liminal spaces where dialogue as a technology of power can be 
deployed.  
 
6.3.2. The equalizing rhetoric: the governmentalising power of partnership 
 
Dialogue as a governmental technology is underpinned by a dual and paradoxical 
rhetoric. One of these discourses constructs aid relations as a partnership, a 
collaboration between participants of equal worth, acting towards a common goal. The 
characterisation of interactions between rich and poor countries as partnership is not 
new (Noxolo, 2006) and has been used by the UK, for instance, to maintain a form of 
tutelage with its former colonies through their inclusion in the Commonwealth (see 
Power, 2009). As Dean (1999: 29), following Foucault, states, governmentality ‘retains 
and utilizes the techniques, rationalities and institutions characteristic of both 
sovereignty and discipline’ but seek to rework and ‘recode’ them.  
 
The rhetoric of partnership has been redeployed in recent years in the context of the 
PWC, replacing a language based on confrontation (Gould, 2005b). As Cornwall and 
Brock argue, ‘many of the familiar terms of recent years evoke a comforting mutuality, 
a warm reassuring consensus, ringing with the satisfaction of everyone pulling together 
to pursue a set of common goals for the well-being of all’ (Cornwall and Brock, 2005: 
1045). This rhetoric can indeed be seen as an attempt to deal with problems associated 
with conditionality-based assistance, where aid recipients were forced into accepting 
policies that they would subsequently fail to implement (Booth, 2003). Malawi is 
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characteristic in that regard. Since the advent of a multi-party system in 1994, aid 
relations have been marked by a low level of trust and mutual respect between donor 
staff and Malawians, with a recurrent ‘“on/off” pattern of programme aid/budget 
support, with conditionalities agreed under pressure and then ignored or subverted by 
government’ (Booth et al., 2006: 32).  
 
Thus, donors have tried to recast their relationship with aid recipients as more 
consensual. Indeed, in the words of the Paris Declaration, donors and aid recipients are 
all ‘development partners’ (in theory at least). Under the new aid architecture, the idea 
of partnership has become ever more crucial. As Collins (2011: 6) states: ‘The 
partnership of all stakeholders is possible, it is assumed, because of a common concern 
to improve the effectiveness of aid towards better development outcomes’. With donors 
now channelling funding through aid-recipients, they, in effect, bear a certain 
responsibility to their constituents (be they tax payers through the intermediation of 
the legislature for bilateral donors, or countries and charitable funds for multilaterals) 
for ensuring development results through this system. With ownership now a 
prominent operative concept of aid relations, it is believed that aid recipients too share 
an interest in developing and implementing effective development policies. The 
pooling of resources between aligned donors and the government has particularly 
reinforced these ideas of shared responsibility and mutual accountability. As this NAC 
representative explains:  
 
 ‘We are together, we have the same one annual review, one strategy, we have 
one set of reports, we interact, we are all accountable. Donors, they also need to 
be accountable to us, we are also accountable to them.’ 
 (GoM interview 9) 
 
Yet, the theme of joint responsibility has been embraced beyond the group of fully 
aligned donors, for example, through the creation of the Malawi Partnership Forum, ‘a 
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mutual accountability structure that serves as an advisory body to National AIDS 
Commission’ (UNAIDS, 2012b), as this interviewee explains:  
 
‘So we have in Malawi, a Malawian partnership forum which has government, 
bilateral donors or development partners, the UN and civil society sitting 
together at a policy level, reviewing on an annual basis what has been achieved 
in terms of the response in Malawi and being accountable for it, so it’s that level 
of shared responsibility.’ 
 (Donor interview 6) 
 
As Harrison (2001) explains, the discourse of joint responsibility participates in a 
blurring of boundaries between national sovereign government and donors, de-
problematising, legitimising and normalising the intrusion of donors at the heart of 
policy-making by the virtue of their shared concern for aid-recipients’ development. 
However, it is worth noting responsibilities are asymmetrical (Best, 2007), with donors’ 
role being to provide adequate funding, while the GoM is required to transform their 
policies and institutions to attain the desired results:  
 
‘That [reform] is led by the Ministry of Health but it’s done through the SWAp 
arrangement. So it’s not only the responsibility of the Ministry of Health, much 
as it is the lead institution that has to give us results, but donors are part of the 
process. If donors don’t give them the money they [the MoH] can’t achieve the 
indicator targets… so it’s the whole mechanism that is there to drive the 
achievement.’  
(Donor interview 7) 
 
Yet, the rhetoric of joint responsibility is reinforced by a discursive construction of aid 
relations as horizontal. Interviews with both donor and GoM representatives reveal a 
relationship based on what Power (2009: 16) calls an ‘equalizing rhetoric’ where power 
differences between donors and the GoM are played down, and all the actors involved 
in development assistance are presented as having the same worth:  
 
‘We’re all equal partners around the table, especially now that the Government 
has become a pool partner in the HIV pool.’ 
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 (Donor interview 3) 
 
Thus, the involvement of donors in sovereign policy-making is presented as a natural 
and desirable state of affairs, as a productive avenue for getting more voices around the 
table generating policy ideas, as this donor suggests: 
 
‘There are lots of situations where donors will present an idea to the Ministry, 
that the Ministry will say “okay, we’ll support that idea” and then the process 
gets moving. Sometimes it’s the other way around and the Ministry will say to 
donors: “here is what we want to do” and we’ll say “okay” and things are 
moving. I would say the latter is the more normal state of affairs.’ 
 (Donor interview 3) 
 
Indeed, the spirit invoked here is that of collegiality, fairness and neutrality. As 
Abrahamsen explains (2004: 1454), the power of partnerships lies in ‘techniques of 
cooperation and inclusion’. This equalizing rhetoric, with its inference that all actors 
have equal value, equal say and equal stake in policy work being carried out, can be 
seen as performing an important governmental function. By drawing on words and 
ideas that are ‘fulsomely positive’ (Cornwall and Brock, 2005), they support a 
conception of policies as politically neutral and ultimately technical.  
 
Dialogue as a governmental technology works towards the (rhetorical) erasing of power 
hierarchies, the elimination of the alterity of the GoM and the promotion of policy-
making as value-neutral and technical. Although this dialogue is underpinned by 
discourses that permeated the area of international development prior to the Paris 
Declaration, the new aid architecture, through its promotion of intensive, yet more 
consensual donor-GoM interactions based on country ownership, has redeployed them 
as governmental technologies: while all actors are presented as equal partners, the GoM 
is constructed as technically deficient, requiring donors’ expertise to make proper use of 
its new freedom.  
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6.3.3. Deficient agency and the power to care  
 
Contrasting with the ‘equalising rhetoric’ described above, another interwoven 
discourse presents the GoM as deficient and lacking the technical skills that would 
allow it to behave as a suitably agentic subject, by developing appropriate policies, 
carrying out necessary reforms and implementing suitable programmes:  
 
‘Capacity is the biggest challenge on the part of the government, because it lacks 
that capacity in terms of know-how…in terms of technical ability to lead.’  
(Donor interview 7)  
 
As this NGO staff member explains, dialogue between donors and the GoM is often 
used to underline the inadequacies of the aid recipient, while donors’ behaviour often 
remains unquestioned:  
 
‘I attended the meeting on “Making the Money Work” [a UNAIDS programme 
of technical support seeking to strengthen countries’ national AIDS 
programmes], how we can accelerate the implementation within the Ministry of 
Heath and all I got was what the ministry doesn’t do, the whole document.’  
(NGO/CSO interview 6) 
 
Interestingly, the more structural aspects of the GoM’s lack of capacity such as 
overworked and underpaid civil servants or lack of access to up-to-date ICT tend to be 
overlooked by donors, or treated as sovereign or intractable issues, as these donor 
representatives suggest:  
‘Donors are not supposed to do anything to help because one thing about the 
SWAp is you entrust the Government to take leadership, you have given 
finances and it’s up to the Government to take the leadership and say this is 
the way we are going to move. But at the same time, human resources, you 
need to have human resources who the Government can sustain it on. So that’s 
the balance that they have to make. If they need more people, it’s up to them 
to say “oh in this area we need more people”’.  
(Donor interview 4) 
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‘The whole issue of capacity development is a very big and very difficult 
subject. It’s something that’s very hard to achieve.’  
(Donor interview 3) 
 
 
In contrast, technical capacity is seen as an actionable item, an area where donors’ 
expertise can be deployed in order to enable the GoM to fulfil its role. While the 
scrutiny of the GoM’s activity can be understandable from the point of view of donors 
given their joint responsibility to achieve results and their accountability to their 
constituents, it justifies deeper involvement in shaping policy-making and 
implementation in a very detailed way. As this NGO staff member explains:  
 
‘There is a great deal of micro-management of processes within government 
from, if you want to call them donors, or development partners’.  
(NGO/CSO interview 6) 
 
Thus, donors have cast themselves as the ultimate judges of the validity and viability of 
the plans developed by the GoM, as this quote suggests:  
 
‘So that whole process defines a situation where you have the Ministry of Health 
saying to other partners ‘here is what we are going to do in the coming financial 
year’ and then other partners have the right to comment on that to influence it 
if they want. That’s the general state of affairs. The implementing partner says 
“here are our plans” and the other partners say “great, go for it” or “here’s what 
you need to change”.’  
(Donor interview 3) 
 
The de-politicising effect of the deployment of aid as technical was well-documented 
by James Ferguson in his seminal book The Anti-politics Machine (1990). He argued: 
‘betterment’, like ‘development, has provided an apparently technical point of entry for 
an intervention serving a variety of political uses’ (Ferguson, 1990: 263). The new aid 
architecture appears to reactivate development biases such as the primacy of technical 
solutions but its depoliticising effect is qualitatively different, in that it works through 
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the shaping of state institutions and the re-conceptualisation of national policies as a 
neutral, technical, optimal solution to a pre-defined and well-documented issue. It 
eschews a conception of policy as a political arbitration between different groups which 
are to benefit to various extent from a specific policy.  
 
Instead, it appears to be underpinned by a certain morality of care, a concern with ‘the 
health, wealth and well-being of the local population’ (Joseph: 2010: 46), characteristic 
of governmentality and compatible with a technocratic understanding of policy-
making, as this donor representative suggests:  
 
‘We don’t go to the table trying to influence but ensuring that the funds 
are […] actually filtered down to the people that it’s set out to reach.’  
(Donor interview 3) 
 
As Best has observed (2007: 88): ‘whereas [the IFIs5] once relied on their claims to 
neutrality and technical expertise to achieve legitimacy, IMF and World Bank leaders 
and staff are now drawing on an explicitly moral discourse to justify their proposals’. 
This is particularly evident in areas such as AIDS or Health, where donors often justify 
their funding to their constituents (in part) on the basis of the benefits it brings to 
vulnerable and suffering segments of the population. For example, the third paragraph 
of the Health SWAp MoU highlights this:  
 
‘[the Government and the Collaborating Partners] ARE AWARE that the 
provision of health services to the community constitutes an essential ingredient 
for the well-being of the people and that the provision of such services in 
Malawi contributes to physical, mental, social and economic development of 
Malawians;’  
(Republic of Malawi, 2004a: 1, original emphasis) 
 
                                                 
5 International Financial Institutions i.e. the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank 
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Thus, the inherent goodness of the goal of AIDS and Health policies places a strong 
moral duty on the GoM to accept donors’ technical expertise and assistance, promoted 
through their power to care.  
 
The new aid architecture appears to have strengthened or created spaces where regular 
interactions could take place between donors and the GoM. This has enabled the 
deployment of dialogue as a technology of government, whereby all development 
partners are presented as equal partners in theory, while at the same time, the GoM is 
portrayed as lacking the capacity to uphold its end of the partnership, justifying an in-
depth involvement of donors in policy-making. This rhetoric is also both reinforced by 
and buttresses a conception of policy as technical and apolitical, yet imbued with a 
sense of morality. The next section explores how dialogue as a technology of power is 
deployed in order to shape the GoM’s agency, by educating its desires, instilling values 
and inculcating habits.  
 
 
6.4. Shaping agency: governing the conduct of conducts  
 
This section explores how the agentic qualities of the GoM, while being applauded, are 
also being reworked and shaped through dialogue so as to result in behaviours and 
decision-making processes that are seen as adequate by donors. As Rose articulates, in 
liberal governmentality decisions about self-conduct are ‘surrounded by a web of 
vocabularies, injunctions, promises, dire warnings and threats of intervention, 
organized increasingly around a proliferation of norms and normativities’ (Rose, 1996: 
46). This section first examines how donors use dialogue in order to instil values 
pertaining to civility, seeking to shape the GoM as a reasonable subject. This, in turn, 
allows the deployment of a regime of truth concerning appropriate policy-making and 
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implementation. Dialogue is also instrumentalised to promote the inculcation of 
specific techniques of government as well as methods of self-assessment and self-
improvement that are congruent with the norms promoted by donors.  
 
6.4.1. Shaping reasonable subjects: instilling norms and values 
 
The more consensual turn to the relations between the GoM and donors (and amongst 
donors) hinges upon the upholding of a number of norms of conduct, which are both 
enforced by the new institutional landscape of SWAps and basket-funding, and allow 
their very functioning. Rose (1999) explains that values constituting what he calls 
civility have been instrumental to governing through freedom. He shows how the 
promotion and normalization of certain types of self-conduct seek to ensure that 
subjects use their freedom in a suitable manner:  
 
 ‘Civility was […] instituted through strategies which attempted to construct 
well-regulated liberty through creating practices of normality, rationality and 
sensibility. These practices governed through freedom, to the extent that they 
sought to invent the conditions in which subjects themselves would enact the 
responsibilities that composed their liberties.’ 
 (Rose, 1999: 72, original emphasis) 
 
 
The consensual imperative thus appears to rely heavily on the practice of values such as 
politeness, common sense, transparency, impartiality and plurality. These constitute the 
new norms of conduct that allow cooperation rather than conflict to develop, as this 
MoH staff member highlights:  
 
‘There are some times that probably the partners forget that we are supposed to 
be implementing the Paris Declaration Principles. So we remind one another 
politely: “but remember we are supposed to be in the driver’s seat and we think 
this is the best way to do business”. We are supposed to be partners and as 
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partners, we sit, you know, in a civil manner and discuss issues so that we are all 
happy in the long run.’ 
 (GoM interview 8) 
 
Transparency, which has been part of the normative lexicon of political liberalism 
deployed, inter alia by the World Bank, from as early as the 1990s (Harrison, 2010), is 
also crucial for donors in the context of budget support. As they cannot expect to know 
how their specific share of funding has been spent, they now require oversight of the 
entire sector or sub-sector to which their funds contribute (e.g. the SWAp’s Programme 
of Work or NAC’s Workplan). The SWAp MoU highlights: 
  
‘The Government and the Collaborating Partners will work in a spirit of 
openness, transparency and consultation, and will encourage effective flow of 
information and dialogue in order to build and sustain confidence and trust.’ 
. (Republic of Malawi, 2004a: art 12.1) 
 
The onus on transparency also draws on moral values such as fair-play and reciprocity, 
as this interviewee articulates:  
 
‘It is a partnership between the government and the donor community and in 
partnership, you lay your cards on the table and each partner is aware of what 
the other partner is doing.’ 
 (Donor interview 10) 
 
 
Values of civility are principally activated through the practice of dialogue which, as I 
explained above, has tremendously increased since the implementation of the new aid 
architecture. Dialogue both hinges on the principles described above and constitutes, 
through its practice, the main mechanism through which these norms are upheld, as 
this quote illustrates:  
 
‘[Before] every single donor would go in with their own agenda and quite 
bluntly try to drive that. And if they saw that NAC wasn’t delivering, there was 
immediately a black mark. But now that the harmonization agenda has been 
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pushed, it’s totally meant that it facilitates the discussion and a lot more trust 
around the development partners’ table.’ 
 (Donor interview 3) 
 
As this NAC representative argues, divergences and disagreements have not 
disappeared overnight with the implementation of the aid effectiveness agenda, but 
donors now seek to work through the GoM’s agency, by orienting its aspirations in line 
with the new consensual model of aid relations: 
 
‘If you take the World Bank, or you can take the Global Fund for example, or 
DFID say, they have all particular agendas at their headquarters which they 
want to see implemented and they will try to influence whatever you want […] 
We must make sure that we take [this] into account at country level […] so it’s a 
question of a dialogue at the end of the day.’ 
(GoM interview 9) 
 
Thus these norms of conducts can also be seen as mechanisms allowing donors to instil 
certain values, shape the GoM’s agency around specific qualities, educate its desires and 
model its subjectivity in a manner that is both consistent with the new modality 
governing aid relations and that makes it more amenable to being governed.  
 
Some donors appear to provide better role models than others. The Global Fund, which 
had recently joined the NAC basket-funding mechanism was often seen as failing to 
abide by this new interactive style. However, most other aligned donors displayed a 
more consistent and cohesive approach and were able to arbitrate disputes. The quote 
below is interesting in that respect in that it shows that recalcitrant donors are also 
disciplined into abiding by new norms of conduct through the mobilisation of the 
values it incarnates, here, neutrality and common sense:  
 
‘You have to be careful not to take sides but you also have to be practical. If you 
see that it’s the Global Fund being difficult, you have to rap them on the 
knuckles. Same thing with NAC, if they are being unreasonable then you have 
to communicate that effectively.’ 
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 (Donor interview 3) 
 
Indeed, the new consensual mentality of government has little tolerance for conflict; 
dialogue framed by the values of civility is seen as offering tools to pre-empt and 
resolve disputes, as the SWAp MoU specifies:  
 
‘In the event of a dispute or conflict regarding the provisions of this MOU or any 
matter not stipulated in this MOU that may arise during the duration of this 
MOU the signatories will as much as possible resort to dialogue and friendly 
consultations.’  
(Republic of Malawi, 2004a: art 12.2) 
 
The instrumentalisation of dialogue as a consensus-building technology appears, 
however, to be largely successful, as this donor explains:  
 
‘There’s a lot of interaction between the government and the donors so, to me, I 
would say yes it has tremendously improved the relationships.’  
(Donor interview 10)  
 
The new non-confrontational modes of interactions rely on norms of conduct revolving 
around neutrality, practicality and rationality. But they also represent media through 
which these qualities can be inculcated and rehearsed, modelling the aspirations and 
behaviours of participants. As Rose explains, values and norms coalesce into the 
production of a certain moral agency, ensuring that subjects’ actions are guided by 
principles coherent with the governing rationality. He states: ‘Individuals would have 
to be equipped with a moral agency that would shape their conduct within a space of 
action that was necessarily indeterminate’ (Rose, 1999: 72). In addition, eliciting a 
construction of the GoM as a reasonable subject makes it more susceptible to be open to 
the regime of truth supported by donors.  
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6.4.2. Episteme: structuring the field of action 
 
As Dean explains, liberal governmentality works by structuring the field of action 
through the establishment of a specific regime of truth, which is in turn underpinned 
by what he calls episteme. Episteme is characterised by the ‘forms of thought, 
knowledge, expertise, strategies, means of calculation, or rationality [that] are employed 
in practices of governing’ (Dean, 1999: 42). An interesting development concurrent to 
the rolling out of the new aid architecture has been the trend towards donors recasting 
themselves as knowledge-based agencies (McGrath, 2002). This new role relies largely 
on their alleged thorough appraisal of successful development policies in various other 
countries and other research-based findings. As this quote suggests, this is seen as 
highly compatible with the spirit of the Paris Declaration and the principle of 
ownership, presenting donors as neutral ‘knowledge banks’:  
 
‘We’re a minority funder of NAC and therefore it would be ridiculous for NAC 
policies to be set accordingly to what [our] HIV and AIDS policy says. But, since 
that brings us into the government structure we do have an opportunity to 
influence NAC policies, which of course we try to do in situations where we 
think that NAC policies might be err… go against what the evidence says a good 
national response to the HIV/AIDS epidemic should be.’  
(Donor interview 3) 
 
However, the role of donors as knowledge banks may not be as thorough as proclaimed. 
The move from project-based aid to policy dialogue had made aid staff’s jobs more 
complex. This has sometimes been heightened by ‘efficiency savings’ such as DFID’s 
policy of ‘doing more with less’, leaving staff little time to keep up with research 
evidence. A recent survey of aid staff involving 100 interviews and 500 survey 
questionnaires concluded that ‘under extreme time pressure, many staff feel unable to 
properly draw lessons from the evidence, relying instead on their experience’ (Jones, 
2012: 2).  
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In addition, Best (2007: 94) argues, ‘best practices’, while often presented as neutral and 
technical, actually involve ‘defining the norm in a given area – judging what is both 
good and normal’. In the area of AIDS, what is seen as feasible has undergone dramatic 
changes, with the rolling out of antiretrovirals (ARVs) in poor countries seen as 
unrealistic by many in the international community just over a decade ago. Much of 
what has been seen as achievable has been influenced by technological advances, but 
also by political will, and the subsequent ability to raise sufficient funding.  
 
While knowledge of (un)successful policies in other countries might be valuable, the 
representation of research-based knowledge as unbiased and universal reinforces the 
idea of policy as neutral, technical and optimal, independent of political arbitration. 
From a governmental perspective, the deployment of international best practice as a 
regime of truth can be seen as structuring the field of action, allowing the shaping of 
national policies by judging what is appropriate and what is not, setting standards as to 
what constitutes good practices and upholding norms of how these are defined as such. 
The quote below for example, shows that the GoM’s policies are seen to require donor 
scrutiny and adjustments, in order to reach internationally recognised standards:  
 
‘Sometimes, key information isn’t built into it like… going back to the topic of 
prevention, we’re not seeing enough interventions around men having sex with 
men for example, or prevention around young people… well, there’s quite a lot 
in there but again it boils down to analysis and research, what’s being done with 
the information that you’re receiving from partners? Especially since there is a 
global push for research to make up 5% of the budget and I think here it only 
makes 3% of the integrated annual work plan. So again, trying to get NAC to 
adhere to that.’  
(Donor interview 3) 
 
As Gaynor (2010: 347) notes, the dominant communication norm is argumentative, 
using statistics and facts to build up ‘reasonable’ arguments. These rhetorical devices are 
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particularly in tune with the kind of rational and dispassionate subjects described in the 
previous section. Indeed, the GoM appears to be receptive to some of these ideas. The 
role of donors as knowledge bank is viewed as helpful by many government officials, 
enabling them to make their policies more congruent with international norms: 
 
‘Of course, we consult the donors because, I think, they have an input in terms 
of international best practices.’  
(GoM interview 7) 
 
 
The appraisal of the government’s plans from the point of view of internationally 
recognised evidence is thus seen as empowering the GoM and the people it represents 
to make the best decisions with regards to policy. In Malawi, the institutionalisation of 
this regime of truth has been further entrenched by a programme promoting the use of 
‘evidence’ at all levels of policy making:  
 
‘In the wider Malawi public sector, there has just been agreed a programme 
which is called the Performance, Evidence and Accountability Programme and 
the idea of that is to try and increase the use of evidence in policy-making by 
the Government and increase the use of evidence in those institutions that hold 
the Government to account, like civil society and Parliament.’ 
 (Donor interview 3) 
 
In addition to structuring the field of action, the entrenchment of this regime of truth 
can be seen as a technology of responsibilisation, which Rose (1999) argues, has been 
crucial to the development of a liberal governmentality. As Tan explains ‘conformity 
with the status quo is assured by excluding those states which fail to play by the rules, 
not through force but through the evaluation of their willingness to be subjected to 
“universally” recognised policy objective’ (Tan, 2011: 1042). The deployment by donors 
of the episteme constituted by internationally good practices can be seen as seeking the 
self-regulation of the GoM through the internalisation of this regime of truth. As Miller 
and Rose (1990) argue, the deployment of ‘technologies of subjectivity’, such as 
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objectives, targets, methods and techniques, provide criteria through which aid 
recipients are enjoined to judge and evaluate themselves.  
 
Thus, through donors’ expertise, Malawi’s policy is (at least in part) constructed as a 
reflection of international norms. It might not therefore be surprising that the GoM’s 
policies bear many similarities with donors’ priorities, as this interviewee notes:  
 
‘The Malawi Health SWAp is a good example. I can’t think of anything in the 
[SWAp] programme of work that is inconsistent with what [our] Health 
Strategy says, of what we should be doing. I mean we work with Governments; 
we take a Health Systems approach…’  
(Donor interview 3) 
 
The normalising and self-regulating effects of the episteme are reinforced by the 
rhetoric of partnership described above. One consequence of this new cosmology of 
power – equalizing, consensual, apolitical - is the proliferation of steps involved in 
policy-making, where policy ideas can be checked against the norms and values 
promoted by the new partnership:  
 
‘With HIV, there’s management by consensus. And that’s one of the 
challenges that I see. You cannot move unless you have written that report, so 
err… when you want to introduce new ideas, new policies, you need to take it 
to the technical working group where this will be discussed, then it moves to 
the partnership forum, and sometimes you have to get the pool partners 
together to sit together, then they vote, at that level you take it to the board 
for approval.’ 
 (GoM interview 9) 
 
This consensus-building imperative thus appears to work effectively as a way of 
defusing ideas that may not fit in with international consensus on appropriate policies. 
Thus, innovative or context-specific ideas might be prevented from emerging:  
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‘Sometimes you lose even the idea in the process. So it’s good, but it’s, yes, a lot 
of challenges because sometimes you want to move but you are held back 
because you need to consult others.’ 
(GoM interview 9)  
 
Thus, through the technocratic processes of dialogue and consultation, international 
standards are maintained and reinforced, translated into Annual Implementation Plans 
at the level of NAC and guiding the criteria for rating funding applications for civil 
society organisations. The boundaries of what is seen as a funding-worthy project are 
tightly defined, possibly preventing the emergence of initiatives that may be at odds 
with the current prevailing ideas. As this donor representative explains, while donors’ 
financial participation with NAC is initially not earmarked towards specific activities, 
the funding criteria elaborated through the NAC for the release of these funds to NGOs 
and CSOs narrow the scope of potential activities:  
 
‘The pool money is very loose but then it becomes very directive. If you don’t fit 
into this proposal you don’t get money.’ 
(Donor interview 1) 
 
Indeed, interviews with government officials and some NGO staff members reveal a 
more complex picture, showing that the imposition of this episteme is not as 
uncontested and subliminal as donors might present it. For example, this interviewee 
was quite clear that health policies could not be seen as home-grown:  
 
‘And maybe you can talk to […] the director of planning at the Ministry of 
Health. He will tell you exactly how much donors have pushed him off track 
with their own priorities.’  
(GoM interview 4) 
 
This was echoed at the National AIDS Commission too. The more governmentalised 
way donors are operating – with the importance of dialogue highlighted in the quote 
below, for example, works through entangling aid-recipients in these discursive 
practices and these regimes of truth so as to make them share donors’ perspectives:  
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‘If you take the World Bank or you can take the Global Fund for example, or 
DFID say, they have all particular agendas at their headquarters which they 
want to see implemented and they will try to influence […] We must make sure 
that we take into account at country level […] so it’s a question of a dialogue at 
the end of the day. To us, what is important is that we are addressing our 
priority areas. I think I haven’t seen one diverting us completely, or something 
completely different.’  
(GoM interview 9) 
 
Working through neoliberal governmentality appears to be successful in some ways, 
with the GoM appearing keen in some respects to abide by international standards of 
good practices, for example by soliciting donors’ inputs. However, it is clear that this is 
also buttressed by their need for funding. Thus, neoliberal governmentality appears to 
be reliant on the threat of exclusion, the possible recourse to a relation of domination. 
The threat of funding withdrawal and its potentially dramatic consequences were 
evoked by several Malawian interviewees:  
 
‘We have more than 180,000 people who are starting on ARTs6. This is thanks 
to courtesy of the Global Fund. We need to find a way for local resource 
mobilisation to supplement that, in case something goes wrong with the grant. 
Suppose the Global Fund closes today which I hope it cannot close because 
they have already made an investment; for them to walk away now, it means 
they are putting millions of lives at stake. So I don’t expect them to walk away 
but at least we must find a way to match some of these resources. It’s not easy.’ 
(GoM interview 9) 
 
‘Of the public funds allocated to HIV-AIDS, it’s over 90% donor funded. So 
what happens lets say the government is not in good terms with IMF and if 
there’s no IMF programme in Malawi, that means whole CABS7 is out […] one 
by one they are pulling out…so what will happen to all the structures and the 
systems that they have put in place for the delivery of HIV-AIDS services?’  
(NGO/CSO interview 4) 
 
                                                 
6 Antiretroviral treatment. 
7 Common Approach to Budget Support. 
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However, the aid effectiveness agenda has added a layer of dialogue and civility to this 
overshadowing threat, a space through which the GoM is enticed to articulate itself in a 
way congruent with donors’ expectations. Yet, as the quote below reveals, this process 
of subjectification is not uncontested; some of the interviews with the GoM shows that 
its personnel can be critically aware of this process, but with little room for manoeuvre:  
  
‘The procedure of doing it requires you to do what donors say you should do. It 
says donors should endorse the national plan. They can only endorse if they 
thing you are doing what they think you are doing what they think you should 
be doing. So it’s a question of give and take to see how far away are they taking 
us from our priority areas. If we are not too far from it, I think we’ll just accept 
it. It’s the only way we can get money.’  
(GoM interview 4) 
 
The process of subjectification of the GoM can also be seen as perhaps more tentative, 
successful in some ways in shaping agency while also giving rise to negotiations. This 
was clearly visible in the field of AIDS, where several Malawian interviewees 
highlighted their awareness of, and resentment at the ways in which the agenda had 
been influenced by donors’ priorities. Above all, they felt that international best 
practices were not addressing the specificity of the Malawian epidemic. As this NGO 
representative argues:  
 
‘There are certain realities you cannot change because you have good rules, 
there are certain realities that must be addressed in context, and therefore 
there must be some determination of how resources are used and for what, 
that must be done at a local level, you cannot have blueprints from DC, 
imported directly.’ 
(NGO/CSO interview 6) 
 
One of the issues was that donors’ focus was not complementary and failed to provide a 
holistic approach, with prevention for example, currently neglected at the expense of 
treatment:  
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‘And what we’re also seeing is that because many governments think we have 
the Global Fund, they think that the solution is the Global Fund. Global Fund is 
not covering everything, Global Fund is interested in the HIV treatment, care 
and support for Malawi. The bulk of the Global Fund money is for treatment so 
there’s very little for prevention and you’d expect that you’d get prevention 
money from other funding partners, the World Bank and others but you have 
very little funding coming through these bilateral ones.’ 
(GoM interview 9) 
 
The link between AIDS and nutrition was seen as a distinctive characteristic that was 
overlooked as a result of the construction of AIDS policy as a reflection of international 
norms in this area:  
 
‘The Malawi pandemic is very unique in the sense that the malnutrition AIDS 
syndrome was very high, because of that we needed to set up in a way that 
when we are dealing with the HIV problem we deal with the nutrition 
problem as well. Seventy five percent of the HIV positive were malnourished 
in 2001 to 2005, 77% of the TB patients were malnourished, 54% of the 
children in the nutrition and rehabilitation units were HIV positive. So you 
can see that there is a big link.’  
(GoM interview 5) 
 
Thus, the link between AIDS and nutrition, while central in the Malawi Growth and 
Development Strategy, appears to have been marginalised in NAC’s work. For example, 
nutrition is not mentioned in any of the 10 focus areas outlined in the 2008-2009 
Integrated Annual Workplan, underlining the influence of donors’ priorities in the 
formulation of national strategies. As this government official explains:  
 
‘Nutrition does not get adequate resources. This is where the bottleneck is […] 
Donors are not paying attention to that […] There is a lot talked of poverty, 
hunger is superficially covered […] once we address the problem of nutrition, 
we will have addressed the problems that come because of hunger and the 
other vulnerability areas, so this area is a bottomless pit which has no money.’  
(GoM interview 5) 
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Thus the link between nutrition, or more largely poverty, also shows the selectivity of 
evidence-based knowledge. As Barnett and Whiteside (2002) have shown, donors have 
tended to focus on biomedical aspects of AIDS, at the expense of more structural issues 
pertaining to inequalities and poverty. Yet, this was an issue raised by Malawian 
interviewees, both from the government and from multilateral donors:  
 
‘If you want to improve the health of the people, you can start by providing 
them with adequate food.’ 
(GoM interview 3) 
 
‘I think beyond that we need to address the poverty issue. People argue that this 
is not about poverty but I’ll tell you […] This is a huge challenge’ 
(Donor interview 10) 
 
Yet the normalisation and entrenchment of a regime of truth based on donors’ priorities 
appear to have prevented these important issues from being reflected in policies. 
Instead, the GoM has been enjoined to present itself as a responsible subject by 
embracing internationally-based agendas.  
 
6.4.3. Techniques of self-rule : donors as educators  
 
Donors’ expertise also works through the institution of a grammar of policy-making, 
the implementation of a repertoire of practices involved in the exercise of aid 
recipients’ agency. Indeed, as outlined in section 2.2.3., the Paris Declaration enjoins 
donors to help aid recipients ‘strengthen their capacity to implement [their policies]’ 
(para. 15). The content of these practices, especially their programmatic qualities, will 
be explored in the next chapter. Here, I focus on the ways in which the GoM’s 
technical deficiencies have become a point of entry for donors to ‘educate’ staff at the 
GoM so as to, ultimately, enable self-rule according to the standards favoured by 
donors.  
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Technical assistance has often been perceived as problematic by aid-dependent 
governments: it is frequently ‘donor-driven’ rather than responsive to the country’s 
need and contributes to reducing the level of ‘real aid’ (ActionAid International, 
2006b). In addition, it has a tendency to substitute itself to government and thus lacks 
sustainability as problems resurface once assistance ceases (Booth et al., 2006). As 
DFID’s Drivers of Change study notes, these issues have been particularly acute in 
Malawi where ‘donor agencies have gone further than in most countries in substituting 
themselves for government in the policy-making function’ (Booth et al., 2006: 36). 
However, my fieldwork has found evidence that, although technical assistance still 
remains to some extent imposed and buttressed by a short-term vision, it is increasingly 
geared towards providing the tools and knowledge to enable the government to take 
over once the assistance ceases.  
 
The changing role of donors under the new aid architecture makes technical assistance 
more prominent as a tool to ensure that donors’ funding is used effectively as it is 
increasingly directed through government systems:  
 
‘Technical support has a lot to do with it; we have moved away from direct 
program implementation towards supporting Malawian structures […] to do the 
actual implementation, so a lot of it has to do with the upstream work.’  
(Donor interview 6) 
 
Thus, rather than temporarily replacing the state, technical assistance is increasingly 
viewed as a means of instituting a certain grammar of policy-making and 
implementation, by putting systems into place and educating government staff so that 
they conform to a range of practices, enabling them to self-perpetuate the structures 
designed by donors:  
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‘What has happened in the past is that there has been a lot of support given but 
most of this support has tended to be seconding people or even institutions that 
do a work for a period. […] So now what we are looking at is that we provide 
support and not just in doing the work, but we develop systems and ensure that 
the systems are working, and ensure that there are people, local people, [who] 
know how to operate those systems so that at the end of our contract, the 
systems should continue operating, the people will know how to operate those 
systems.’  
(Donor interview 13) 
 
Thus in the area of AIDS for example, a large part of technical assistance focused on 
administrative and organisational issues, rather than medical aspects:  
 
‘They [technical assistants] are not medical professionals, like in HIV/AIDS they 
are not medical professionals but they are mostly management advisors or social 
workers but they work with … they advise [on] the structures that they work 
with and how they manage their programmes or how they do programme 
implementation.’ 
(NGO/CSO interview 13) 
 
 
As Mosse (2005: 8) explains ‘technical assistance that accompanies aid packages does the 
political work of building compliance with external demands into the fabric of national 
administrative order’. By seeking to shape the conduct of civil servants rather than 
temporarily replacing them, technical assistance thus entrenches donors’ perspectives 
deeper than before, and more sustainably. Technical assistance can therefore be seen as 
a way of seeking to rule in the future, shaping the subjectivity of the GoM so that it 
internalises donors’ norms. As Rose (1999: 22) points out, in the context of 
governmentality: ‘…discipline seeks to reshape the ways in which each individual, at 
some future point, will conduct him-or herself in a space of regulated freedom’. 
 
A case in point is the use of a consultancy firm called the Financial Management 
Agency in order to assist with the grants facility handling funding applications by 
CSOs, set up within the NAC. As this NAC staff member explains:  
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‘They [the FMA] used to manage all the grants: they had officers here, within 
NAC. But their contracts were different then: they were managing the grants 
and what have you; of course in cooperation with NAC.’ 
(GoM interview 10) 
 
While the consultants initially set up and ran the facility, their assistance was phased 
out, in order to progressively allow staff from the NAC to take over, providing 
occasional support:  
 
‘Now we have a fully-fledged unit: the grants management unit which is […] 
getting technical assistance from the Financial Management Agency […] They 
have officers who come in now and then to see how the unit is performing.’ 
(GoM interview 10) 
 
But technical assistance is not the only way the technical ability of the GoM to self-
manage is fostered. For example, the European Commission, which has particularly 
demanding procedures, organises regular courses to try to ensure that Malawian civil 
servants are able to manage these:  
 
‘We have a deliberate policy of building capacities in the projects, whereby on 
an annual basis we always organize what we call EDF procedures courses…the 
European Commission has this consultancy firm called MDF […] They come to 
Malawi to conduct a 1 or 2 week-course, where we bring in all project 
managers, project accountants and TAs who work on our various projects, we 
bring them together, they are drilled on the in-depth procedures […] So there’s 
quite a good effort in terms of building the capacity of these project personnel.’  
(GoM interview 2) 
 
 
Within the pool funding mechanism or the SWAp, donors’ specialist technical expertise 
is also drawn on, in order to inform various processes:  
 
‘You can benefit from each other a lot, like we use the Bank a lot in some areas; 
we use the local fund agent for the Global Fund in some areas, we use DFID’s 
capacities in the pool which are very, very useful and helpful.’ 
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(Donor interview 1) 
 
Governing through freedom thus leads donors to tread a fine line between the need to 
foster suitable subjects and the intervention this requires, which is sometimes at odds 
with the requirement to abide by the new consensus. However as Rose notes (1999: 64) 
freedom as ‘a mode of organizing and regulation’ relies on subjects having the capacities 
to be free. Thus the GoM’s lack of capacity and donors’ technical expertise is seen as 
justifying a more intrusive approach:  
 
‘In general, it is driven by government. In general. But in certain specific areas 
where things are not working well, then it gets to be driven by donors. […] If 
things are not really moving well, then it tends to be overtaken by donors and it 
becomes driven by donors.’ 
(Donor interview 4) 
 
Yet, even in these cases, there seems to be a will to enable the GoM to learn, to improve 
in order to eventually be able to self-manage autonomously. For example, this donor 
representative explains that their role is akin to that of a teacher, checking that the 
GoM has successfully completed the task, and sending it back for corrections if that is 
not the case:  
 
‘None of the partners are supposed to lead anything, we all work as a group […] 
the only thing that we ask to lead in was on procurement oversight and a little 
bit again on fiduciary oversight. So all requests which are quite important for 
government in terms of procurement, they send them back for us to see if 
everything is ok and query it.’ 
(Donor interview 4) 
 
In a similar vein, other donors use their expertise to appraise the performance of the 
government and suggesting ways to improve:  
 
‘[The World Bank and DFID] have just finished an analysis of the grant system 
and they’re making recommendations to the National AIDS Commission, so it 
will be interesting to see what the results of that will be.’  
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(Donor interview 3) 
 
Thus, though donors’ technical expertise is still imposed in some areas (notably public 
finance management as explored in the next chapter), there appears to be a tendency to 
use the GoM’s lack of capacity as a way to engage with its staff, to work through them 
rather than in parallel or against them, pointing again to a more governmentalised 
quality of aid relations.  
 
6.4.4. The new conditionalities: shaping a self-regulating subject 
 
The more governmentalised relations presiding over aid can also be seen in the changes 
to conditionalities over the past decades. Best (2007) views conditionalities as a 
Gramscian exception to the new governmentalised aid regime, where promises of better 
sovereignty justify the exception to the rule of sovereignty. While it is true that macro-
economic conditions have remained unchanged, I argue that, in the areas of AIDS and 
Health, as well as budget support more generally, attempts from donors to orient the 
conduct of the GoM through the use of target setting and reviews operate as 
instruments of self-regulation and responsibilisation.  
 
The aid effectiveness agenda appears to have led to a multiplication, dispersion and 
overlapping of conditionalities, coming in various guises, under a range of labels, and 
carrying different degrees of consequences if not abided by. As this MoF staff member 
summarises:  
‘More conditionalities coming in different forms, in new forms.’  
(GoM interview 3) 
 
The regime of new conditionalities can be traced back to the introduction of PRSPs. As 
Gould (2005a) notes, they represent a major shift from a focus on macro-economic 
management to a regulation of new policy areas such as the state and social sectors. 
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Gould explains that the internalisation of the Washington Consensus policy package by 
aid-recipients has reduced the need for donors’ micro-management in the area of 
macro-economy. This has also been entrenched by the policy of lending selectivity 
adopted by the IFIs, which entails providing loans on the basis of already demonstrated 
good performance in terms of macro-economic neoliberal reforms (Best, 2007). As a 
consequence, Gould (2005a) argues, the IFIs have shifted their focus to new areas with 
a large potential for lending, namely the reform of state institutions and social sectors, 
explaining to some extent the increase of conditionalities in these areas.  
 
This trend has been consolidated by the greater use of budget support by bilateral 
donors. In Malawi, AIDS is funded by donors through several channels. I am leaving 
aside discrete donors here, as they are not representative of the trends characterising 
the aid effectiveness agenda. A main channel through which AIDS activities are funded 
is via general budget support financed by a group of donors referred to as Common 
Approach for Budget Support (CABS) donors. These donors rely on the regular 
assessment of a set of indictors set out in the Performance Assessment Framework 
(PAF). The PAF covers areas as diverse as governance, public financial management 
(PMF), and a variety of social sectors:  
 
‘GoM: - Social indicators look like the Ministry of Health, Education, and maybe 
[in the case of] gender indicators, so you will have the Ministry of Gender and 
Child Welfare or maybe, then we’re looking at governance indicators …so you 
are looking at the Ministry of Justice, maybe the Department of Prisons and so 
forth… 
E.M.: - So all the ministries are involved? 
GoM: - Yes. All the ministries’ 
(GoM interview 2) 
 
In effect, by seeking to regulate these multiple aspects of governmental activity, the 
new conditionalities are expanding the upwards accountability of the GoM to new 
domains:  
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‘In the past we received budget support which was from the IMF mostly. You 
just had to meet macro economic, the targets and whatever… money supply and 
all this. Well of course there was the Bank with policy lending in the 90s, that 
was linked to policy changing, but that business of direct budget support, there’s 
a list of 28 indicators!’ 
(GoM interview 4) 
 
Multi-donor agreements also tend to reinforce conditionalities as agreed frameworks 
are often based on the demands of the most reform-hungry donor (Tan, 2010: 114).  
 
Sectoral support has also contributed to an increase in conditionalities. In Malawi, these 
are channelled through the NAC’s pool funding and the Health SWAp, where 
conditions are spelled out in the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), which is 
agreed between SWAp members i.e. donors and the GoM. The new aid architecture has 
also led to some degree of overlapping between various sets of conditionalities. For 
example, the PFM indicators of the PAF are drawn from the Public Expenditure and 
Financial Accountability (PEFA) review, a separate international mechanism 
specifically focused on public finance management issues. AIDS is also one of the six 
priority areas of the Malawi Growth and Development Strategy, the second generation 
of PRSP which is reviewed regularly by the World Bank.  
 
Another significant change, contemporary to the new aid architecture, is the 
increasingly hybrid nature of conditionalities. While in some domains, they remain 
rigidly applied, Best notes that the IFIs increasingly also draw on a ‘non-juridical 
strategy of standards, a calculating logic of transparency and an individualizing ethic of 
responsibility to achieve their end’ (Best, 2007: 88). For example, ActionAid have noted 
the addition of benchmark’ conditions that the Bank claims are ‘non-binding’ to the 
World Bank development policy loans (ActionAid, 2006a: 15) (though it is worth 
noting that a Bank survey showed that 75% of developing country officials in the study 
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thought that all the conditions had to be met in order for the Bank to disburse). As this 
donor representative reflects, the distinction between what is simply expected of the 
GoM and what is considered a conditionality is increasingly blurred:  
 
‘For example if the reports are there, nobody will say, by the way, we had a 
condition here that the report is going to be ready. You know. So if it’s not 
there, then it becomes a condition now. So it becomes a problem.’ 
(Donor interview 4) 
 
In this context, the definition of what is a conditionality might be dependent on point 
of view, as this quote below suggests:  
 
‘At least now you can see that people [show] understanding. The government at 
first they didn’t understand: they do equal these to conditions, conditionalities. 
They were saying “ah no they have attached some conditions to these funds”. At 
least now there is at least a common understanding.’ 
(Donor interview 9) 
 
 
Thus conditionalities appear to act as regulating mechanisms, signalling to the GoM the 
expectations of donors. In addition, within aligned structures such as the SWAp, some 
of these new conditionalities are ‘softer’ than their predecessors, carrying fewer 
penalties for non-compliance or lateness: 
 
‘But sometimes, some of these actions are not done and you have to start 
thinking: ok, what do we do now and here? Do we keep just asking the 
government to do it and then we call life as normal? Which has usually been the 
case.’ 
(Donor interview 4) 
 
Donors appear to display a more flexible attitude towards the GoM. This is part of a 
wider trend with regards to conditionalities (see Bergamaschi, 2009 re. PRSPs), with 
conditionalities being more flexible and context-sensitive under the PWC (Best, 2007: 
100). The governmentalisation of conditionalities is also visible in the way in which 
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donors appeared to be keen to move away from the language of imposition, changing 
the labels used to refer to them, in order to make them seem more in tune with the 
principle of ownership:  
  
‘The EU has their own … they call them benchmarks but they are the 
conditionalities… DFID and NORAD have their own conditions they call them 
indicators…People used to call them benchmarks but then people got used to 
that one and said let’s call them indicators… ‘ 
(NGO/CSO interview 4) 
 
Thus, they can be seen as working as discursive mechanisms seeking to shape the 
GoM’s agency by highlighting donors’ standards.  
 
The growth, dispersion and hybridisation of conditionalities point to an 
instrumentalisation of conditionalities as tools for what Rosser and Simpson (2009: 3) 
call ‘metagovernance’. They argue that the move towards programme-based aid has 
induced a ‘shift in the role of donor agencies, particularly bilateral agencies, away form 
the direct management of aid to a “metagovernance” role entailing management via the 
setting of benchmarks and goals and the monitoring of broad outcomes’ (Rosser and 
Simpson, 2009: 3). Thus, conditionalities are used to regulate the conduct of conducts, 
by impressing on the GoM donors’ expectations and persuading the aid recipient to 
match them. As many commentators (Dijkstra, 2005; Gould, 2005a; Tan, 2010, 2011) 
have noted, while there has been a rise in target-setting, the PWC has also led to the 
emergence of new requirements with regards to policy processes, such as reforms to be 
undertaken or documents to be drafted. Under the new aid architecture, this trend has 
been extended in scope and depth, providing detailed lists of policy processes that the 
government should carry out, particularly in sectors where donor alignment and 
harmonisation is high. In Malawi, the Health SWAp was exemplary in that regard:  
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‘The SWAp tries to get the government to be in the leadership, the SWAp gives 
deadlines and actions that should be done.’ 
(Donor interview 4) 
 
The rise in process conditionalities can be seen as a way of shaping the GoM, through 
the reform of its systems, institutions and processes rather than by the imposition of 
policies. As Abrahamsen (2004: 1461) explains, ‘through partnership contracts, or 
Memorandums of Understanding as they are frequently called, recipients are enlisted as 
active agents of their own reform according to accepted and agreed standards.’  
 
However, new conditionalities also have another governmental function. As Droop et 
al. (2008: 12) note, there has also been a rapid growth of indices (such as the World 
Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessment - CPIA - or the PEFA) and more 
continue to be developed. New conditionalities often involve extensive and regular 
monitoring of data and performance in various areas:  
 
‘In the review we have agreed on what we call Joint Framework Agreement 
which we signed with the government. They are supposed to provide data and 
they do provide what we call progress on each indicator.’ 
(Donor interview 9) 
 
These mechanisms of scrutiny make the subject, the GoM more ‘knowable’ and 
governable. But these indices can also be seen as ‘technologies of performance’ 
(Fougner, 2008: 318) promoting self-regulation. Indicators operate through the 
production of normalising knowledge: information is usually standardised in a 
numerical form so as to be comparable across countries. As Porter (1996 in 
Bergamaschi, 2009) note, numbers are also easily transportable across continents. 
Alternatively, a letter system can be used as in the PEFA appraisal:  
 
‘You know when there are school assessments, they grade, they have As, Bs and 
Cs so they rank you according to how the assessors feel that you have performed 
as a country.’ 
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(GoM interview 2) 
 
The standardisation of aid-recipients’ performance thus enables the stimulation of self-
governance through comparison with others’ achievements. In addition, 
conditionalities make clear what attributes, reforms and performance matter to the 
international community, and provide strong incentives to conform to these. As 
Abrahamsen notes, assessments and audits ‘reshape in their own image’ (Abrahamsen, 
2004: 1463) the organisation that they monitor. This has been reinforced by the 
increased use of ex-post conditionalities, attributing funding on the basis of 
achievements, rather than promises of reform. As Tan (2010: 120) notes, ‘although 
coerciveness remains a substantial component of this new regime of conditionality, the 
mechanics of enforcement depends less on the threat of sanction or censure than on the 
incentive of reward for good behaviour’, pointing to a dynamic favouring self-
regulation.  
 
Under the new aid architecture, this shift towards conditionalities as instruments of 
self-governance is also perceptible in the rhetorical change deployed by donors, moving 
away from a representation of policies as forced on aid-recipients, drawing instead on 
the rhetoric of partnership and joint responsibility, and presenting them as tools of 
cooperation enabling donors to help the GoM to improve development results:  
 
‘We look at: what does the government wants to do to improve the system, 
that’s what we are asking from them. So we agree, this is common 
understanding… mutual understanding of a joint framework to say: what do 
they want to do? They want to improve this, this, this and this. Then we agree 
in the PAF: these are indicators we want to improve so we agree on them, on 
how to go from A to B.’ 
 (Donor interview 9) 
 
Indeed, conditionalities are increasingly based on the involvement of the aid recipient 
in a dialogue, and to some extent negotiations with donors:  
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‘We use what we call Performance Assessment Framework which we have 
agreed on with the government and there are certain indicators and targets 
which we agree on every year which the government signs… we propose, they 
also propose, then we come to a certain understanding whereby the government 
should improve its systems.’ 
(Donor interview 9) 
 
In a similar way, SWAp conditions are also negotiated at the beginning of the 
collaboration between donors and the GoM, thus allowing their internalisation:  
 
‘The conditions we agreed to when we were signing the Memorandum of 
Understanding, so we all know them.’ 
(GoM interview 8) 
 
The rise of ‘consensual conditionality’, as Morrow (2005: 5, in Tan, 2010: 123) calls it, 
enlists the GoM in the setting up of targets, working through rather than against its 
agency. Through this dialogue, the GoM is made responsible for its improvement, by 
the requirement that it suggests areas where its performance could be enhanced:  
‘It’s a consultative process … we do request government to come up with good 
measurable indicators which we can include in the PAF … what we do is we 
discuss with the government to say… give us indicators which we can review 
for the next 2 or 3 years, so they give us indicators based on each… in each 
category, so we engage government into discussions on those indicators, 
whether those indicators are good or they are not good […] it’s a consultative 
process.’  
(Donor interview 7) 
 
This negotiated process suggests that one of their effects is to enrol the GoM in a logic 
of self-improvement, requiring self-reflexivity in order to identify its deficiencies and 
propose some of the very targets it is then set up to meet: 
  
‘Actually there’s now been an improvement in terms of selected indicators 
because we have perceived that the government can do it and […] we think that 
the indicators should be down to … the government should tell us what they 
want to do.’ 
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(Donor interview 9) 
 
It is worth noting that this logic of self-improvement can be pursued infinitely: the 
workings of the GoM are always perfectible. For example, PAF targets change every 
few years, focusing on various sub-areas and covering increasingly greater territories. 
The centrality of the participation of the GoM in reviewing its achievement, for 
example here in PEFA appraisals, points to the ‘socialising’ element of the new 
conditionalities, where the goal is not to impose policies from outside but to enlist the 
aid-recipient into internalising donors’ expectations and ‘owning’ them: 
 
‘Oh yeah, you can’t do it without the government…they are assessing the 
government so the government… is fully involved…’ 
(Donor interview 7)  
 
The formulation of these conditionalities can therefore be seen to work as a dialogue-
based mechanism, enabling the rehearsing of practices of self-improvement such as goal 
setting and reviews. However, negotiations were clearly perceived by some as a co-
opting tool, seeking to make donors’ views more agreeable, rather than being opened to 
challenge. As this MoF official explains, the PEFA process, although dialogue-based, 
was not keen on integrating the GoM’s ideas8:  
 
‘It’s difficult, they are imposed, they try to negotiate with you, but in most cases 
we have given them our opinion, it doesn’t work so that’s why I was hesitant to 
tell you that they are negotiated […] So, when we came up with our proposals 
on some of those indicators, they didn’t want to take those in the main report, 
they put like annex and saying all that, but they kept their opinions as they 
were, so you wonder whether your opinion matters at all.’ 
(GoM interview 3) 
 
However, aid dependence limits the ability of the GoM to exit the system and it 
therefore has little choice but to take part in the negotiations. Thus, despite the GoM’s 
                                                 
8 It is worth noting that there seems to be more flexibility around social indicators than in areas such as 
PFM, where donors or international consultants in the case of PEFA, tend to be more intransigent. 
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perception of new conditionalities as imposed by donors to a large extent, these 
processes participate in blurring the distinctions between imposed reforms and self-
administered changes. Through its involvement in selecting targets, the GoM is made to 
become part and parcel of this process, entrenching the responsibility for meeting 
specified indicators deeper within the government. As Mosse (2005: 8) argues, the shift 
from SAPs to PRSPs is translated by a move from external controls to an internal 
discipline, which is further entrenched through budget support mechanisms promoted 
under the aid effectiveness agenda. Thus, the logic of the new conditionalities suggests 
a link between techniques of domination and techniques of the self working through 
the internalisation of practices of self-improvement. As Foucault (2008: 270) explains 
with regards to the subject of governmentality: ‘by following its own interest it also 
serves that of others’.  
 
These effects are reinforced by the increased integration of conditionalities into the 
fabric of aid relations. Assessments of the government’s performance are both more 
numerous and regular, as this interviewee explains:  
 
‘There are many reviews you’ll find; the SWAp review, the Global Fund, the 
Governance reviews, all those things. Another donor comes in with their own 
review. World Bank may have their own reviews…’ 
(Donor interview 9) 
 
As Best explains, ‘the process of measurement and judgement once limited to specific 
agreements have now become generalized and continuous’ (Best, 2007: 101). In 
addition, under the new aid architecture, donors are now involved in efforts to achieve 
targets, for example through CABS, SWAp or NAC pool funding mechanisms. The 
integration of donors allows a closer scrutiny of the GoM’s effort towards meeting the 
various specified targets:  
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‘That [the achievement of the PAF health indicator] is led by the Ministry of 
Health but it’s done through the SWAp arrangement. So it’s not only the 
responsibility of the Ministry of Health, much as it is the lead institution that 
has to give us results, but donors and so on are part of the process.’  
(Donor interview 7) 
 
As the quote below suggests, the involvement of donors might entail some micro-
management to ensure that conditionalities are integrated in the GoM’s functioning:  
 
‘But it’s unlikely that they will miss indicators or maybe one or two… […] the 
donors will provide assistance.’ 
(Donor interview 9) 
 
This can be seen as a mechanism through which donors are able to ensure that 
conditionalities are acted upon, a way of keeping up the pressure. But it also reinforces 
processes of subjectification, by providing a medium through which practices of self-
assessment become ‘subliminal and routine’ (Li, 2007: 7), built into the functioning of 
the GoM. Indeed, as this quote shows, conditionalities have led to the creation of 
systems within the government to ensure compliance with the set targets:  
 
‘In the health sector, the government is basically doing very well in achieving 
the targets, the reason is, there’s more organization … There is better 
arrangement of organization …Institutional (structures) are in place, that 
follows up the performance of these indicators from day one.’  
(Donor interview 7) 
 
Thus new conditionalities appear to constitute a process rather than an end in 
themselves. They seek to orient the action of the GoM by enforcing practices of self-
assessments and self-improvement, while also allowing greater scrutiny by donors.  
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6.5. Conclusion 
 
This chapter has explored the ways in which the new aid architecture and the aid 
effectiveness agenda are linked to changes in the relations between donors and the 
GoM. Here, I have argued that these changes can be analysed as the expression of a shift 
in the modality of power deployed by donors. While under the SAP era, development 
assistance either imposed reforms in aid recipients or worked in parallel to state 
structures via the financing of projects of NGOs and CSOs, the switch to the 
predominance of programme aid supported by the new aid architecture has led donors 
to work through aid-dependent recipients, drawing on a repertoire of ideas and 
practices which are consistent with Foucault’s analysis of neo-liberal governmentality 
(or the Chicago School-type of liberal governmentality as Foucault referred to it). This 
shift predates the Paris Declaration but I have shown that many features of the new aid 
architecture have considerably reinforced and entrenched this modality of power. For 
instance, in section 6.2., I explored how the principle of ownership is associated with 
the bolstering of the GoM’s agency, compelling the government to develop policies, 
strategies and engage in various reform processes. I also examined how its new role as 
aid coordinator has reinforced these agentic qualities, honing its negotiation and 
leadership skills. However, it is important to note that these changes work through the 
GoM’s desire for greater sovereignty and self-determination, rather than by seeking to 
suppress these aspirations. Yet, as Rose (1999) argues, this ‘freedom’ as compulsion to 
operate through choice-making requiring the activation of agency should be seen as a 
mode of subjectification. Indeed, I have shown that donors instrumentalise dialogue as 
a technology to govern through freedom, a medium through which they seek to re-
shape the GoM’s agency, aspirations, beliefs, mode of operating, in a manner that makes 
it consistent with their perspectives. 
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The deployment of dialogue has been both enhanced by the new aid architecture, with 
the creation or strengthening of institutional spaces where donors and the GoM 
interact on a regular basis. I have contended that dialogue as a governmental tool relies 
on a paradoxical rhetoric. On the one hand, donors and the GoM are presented as equal 
partners working towards the same goal: effective aid. This language erases discursive 
constructions of the GoM as ‘other’ and masks structural inequalities linked to aid 
dependence that mediate aid relations, enabling the emergence of more consensual 
relations. It also represents policy-making and implementation as apolitical and 
technical. On the other hand, the GoM is presented as lacking the capacity to make use 
of its ownership, thus legitimising donors’ role as ‘enabler’ of the state and their 
interference in sovereign affairs. The rationality of aid effectiveness, especially in areas 
such as AIDS and health, also draws on notions of morality derived from a duty to help 
those suffering: maximising the impact of development assistance thus becomes a moral 
duty for both donors and the GoM.  
 
Section 6.4. has considered a number of areas where dialogue has been deployed as a 
technology of government. It has showed that through these enhanced opportunities 
for dialogue, values of civility such as neutrality, practicality and common sense are 
mobilised. These norms of behaviour, which are instilled and rehearsed through 
interactions, can be seen as seeking to model the GoM as a reasonable subject, enabling 
donors to inflect its use of freedom through rational argumentation and sensible claims. 
Indeed, the next sub-section has explored how donors have recast themselves as 
knowledge banks, a role consistent with the spirit of country ownership, but which 
enables them to direct the GoM’s agency through the deployment of an episteme, a 
regime of truth, delineating what can be considered suitable policies. The establishment 
of this episteme was not uncontested, my research has shown. Interviews and 
document analysis have pointed to the critical awareness of government staff and the 
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loss of a number of ‘home-grown’ concerns in the formulation and implementation of 
ministry strategies. However, this exposed how governmental technologies also 
ultimately relied on dependence on donor funding to operate fully. Next, I have 
showed how donors’ technical expertise and the GoM’s lack of capacity is used as a 
point of entry to engage with government staff, to enrol them in learning processes in 
order to make reforms more sustainable. Finally, I have explored how conditionalities 
have, to some extent, evolved in a way that makes them operate as mechanisms 
enabling greater scrutiny from donors, while at the same time fostering self-regulation 
from the government.  
 
A number of features characteristic of neoliberal governmentality can thus be observed 
under the new aid architecture: the importance of the agentic subject, its shaping 
through norms, truths, knowledge, incentives, rather than in more coercive ways, the 
self-regulating, self-responsibilising effect of this new regime. This is not to say that 
these elements could not be identified prior to the aid effectiveness agenda. Indeed, as I 
explained in chapter 2, many of these ideas have emerged progressively over the past 
two decades and started to coalesce under the PWC. I have also noted in this chapter 
that some of these mechanisms have been deployed in the less recent past, for example 
under colonial rules. This is not a neat switch from one economy of power to another 
either. Many elements of the previous ‘rationality of government’ are still visible. Some 
non-discrete donors, for example the Global Fund and to some extent the World Bank, 
were seen as drawing largely on pre-PWC repertoire. And of course, one of the largest 
donors, the USA, has engaged minimally with the new aid architecture (though a 
change of attitude was noticeable at the 2011 Busan High-Level Forum of Aid 
Effectiveness). But as Foucault notes, changes in mentality of government cannot be 
viewed as transitions from one rationality to another. Instead, they should be viewed as 
‘a shift of emphasis and the appearance of new objectives, and so of new problems and 
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new techniques’ (Foucault, 2007a: 363). My analysis has shown that there is a distinct 
quality to new aid relations, which brings in new challenges and opportunities for 
donors and recipient countries. It reveals that the GoM is not ‘duped’ by this new 
power relation, but is compelled to engage in it due to its dependence on aid. Yet, 
interviews have also displayed a keenness from the government to assume 
characteristics of the ‘good subject’ in order to be treated as a ‘serious’ partner, and be 
able to negotiate more autonomy from donors. As outlined in the afterword, the 
increasing importance of ‘new donors’, particularly China, might provide the GoM with 
a stronger position to contest the rationality of aid effectiveness.  
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Chapter 7: 
Governing at a distance: 
programmatic technologies and neoliberal rationality 
 
 
7.1 Introduction  
 
In the previous chapter, I examined how under the new aid architecture, aid relations 
have been shifting from a regime where donors sought to impose reforms to more 
governmentalised interactions, promoting the agentic qualities of the government of 
Malawi (GoM) while allowing donors’ influence to shape the conduct of the GoM by 
supporting specific norms of behaviour and regimes of truth. I argued that these norms 
work towards encouraging the GoM to adopt an ethos of self-responsibility and 
entrepreneurialism.  
 
This chapter focuses on a different, though inter-related, aspect of changes that have 
been initiated by, or consolidated through, the aid effectiveness agenda: the ways in 
which donors have sought to institutionalise systems which affect how policy-making 
operates. This chapter thus examines the programmatic aspects of neoliberal 
governmentality by analysing a number of technologies allowing donors to conduct at a 
distance, through technologies instilling a specific rationality of government. As Dean 
(1999: 43) argues, the programmatic character of government can be detected in ‘the 
more or less explicit, purposive attempts to organize and reorganize institutional space, 
their routines, rituals and procedures, and the conduct of actors in specific ways’. I 
show how, by instituting a grammar of policy-making consistent with a certain 
neoliberal rationality, donors seek to make future intervention increasingly less 
necessary.  
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While the content of the (neoliberal) policies that donors, chiefly led by the 
International Financial Institutions (IFIs), seek to implement are rather similar to those 
supported in the SAP periods, in this chapter I argue that the means through which 
they are institutionalised have changed while their scope has widened. In particular, 
the technologies on which they rely point to the synergies between neoliberalism as 
governmentality and neoliberalism as policy (two of the three definitions of 
neoliberalism identified by Larner, 2000). This chapter shows that the current 
rationality deployed by donors bears many similarities with the conception of 
neoliberalism developed by the Chicago School (as analysed by Foucault in his 
governmentality lectures). In particular, I explore, here, the ways in which the new aid 
architecture has facilitated the extension of market rationality to areas such as AIDS 
and Health. In addition, I show that the reforms through which this is done aim to 
create self-sustaining systems, perpetuating this logic and eventually reducing the need 
for donors’ intervention. Indeed, as Foucault explains, the objective of liberal 
governmentality is ‘its own self-limitation insofar as it is pegged to the specificity of 
economic processes’ (Foucault, 2008: 297).  
 
In this chapter, I explore how development assistance, under the new aid architecture, 
has supported the deployment of a number of techniques of policy-making and 
implementation, promoting the expansion of a certain neoliberal rationality. In section 
7.2. I show that the new aid architecture has made funding for health and AIDS 
dependent on a series of reforms pertaining to public financial management (PFM), 
thus creating greater pressure to implement these changes and blurring boundaries 
between the social and financial spheres. In section 7.3., I investigate how these PFM 
reforms seek to reshape government in order to subordinate all its activities to 
macroeconomic and budgetary imperatives, by reigning in public spending, and using 
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calculative technologies recoding government activities and processes in economic 
terms. I show that the imposition of this technical grammar of policy-making and 
implementation constructs the state as a service-delivery mechanism, pointing to a 
depoliticisation also consistent with some forms of neoliberalism. Finally, in section 
7.4., I examine the possible avenues for resistance to neoliberal rationality, outlining 
how many respondents located it in the GoM, in spite of its dependence on donors’ 
funding. However, I also explore how the inconsistencies of this neoliberal rationality, 
which requires adequate capacity from the government to carry out complex and 
demanding reforms, while restricting its ability to invest in and develop sufficient state 
structures, may also offer an inadvertent form of resistance.  
 
 
7.2. Public Finance Management reforms as programmatic technologies 
 
Public Finance Management (PFM) is a rather technical and ‘relatively placid field of 
international development’ (Krause, 2012) which has received little critical scrutiny. As 
Simson et al. (2011: iv) note, ‘PFM underlies all government activity’, as it is related to 
all aspects of the budget including revenue, fund allocation to various activities, 
expenditure, accounting for spent funds and external oversight (by a Supreme Auditing 
Institution). PFM thus covers a wide range of highly specialized areas which also 
includes issues such as procurement for public works or payroll reforms (Simson et al., 
2011).  
 
The impetus for PFM reforms has its roots in the late 1990s. World Bank-led research 
into aid effectiveness showed that ‘sound policies are not enough to ensure sound and 
sustainable development outcomes’ (World Bank, 1998a). For example Burnside and 
Dollar (1997) argued that aid’s impact on growth was linked to fiscal, monetary and 
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trade policies consistent with those advocated by the Bank. The 1997 World 
Development Report (WDR) ‘The State in a Changing World’ signaled a new focus on 
state institutions (World Bank, 1997). The next year, the World Bank issued its ‘Public 
Expenditure Management Handbook’ which outlines a ‘framework for thinking about 
how governments can attain sound budget performance and gives guidance on the key 
elements of a well-performing public expenditure management (PEM) system’. Indeed, 
in the PWC era, with relatively unchanged macroeconomic conditions and Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) seeking to implement ‘a comprehensive “inclusive” 
neoliberal framework’ (Craig and Porter, 2006: 95), the missing link appeared to be the 
institutions able to translate these policies into reality and prevent aid-dependent 
governments from swaying away from their commitments. As Craig and Porter 
articulate:  
 
‘But governments remained the weak link in all this. Still missing were 
transparent budget and expenditure processes, budgetary and fiscal transfer 
devices to actually move the money down into places it might […] give strength 
to sanctions when behaviour was not PRSP-compliant.’  
(Craig and Porter, 2006: 95) 
 
As I explore in this section, the new aid architecture has both contributed to further 
emphasizing the need for PFM reforms and provided greater leverage to donors to 
enforce them. In addition, regulatory instruments such as the World Bank-initiated 
Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) assessment have been 
embedded in the new aid architecture framework in order to both reinforce the 
scrutiny of aid-recipients’ systems and promote deeper changes. I also show how the aid 
architecture has led to a greater interconnection of development assistance for social 
purposes with institutional reforms promoted by donors, by linking direct budget 
support and aligned mechanisms such as Sector-Wide Approach (SWAp) and pool 
funding, through which a large portion of AIDS and health interventions are financed 
in Malawi, to PFM reforms through a range of conditionalities (both ‘soft’ and ‘hard’). 
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The new aid architecture can therefore be seen as instilling ‘programmes of conduct’ 
defined as ‘the attempts to regulate, reform, organize and improve what occurs within 
regimes of practices ’ (Dean, 1999: 43).  
 
7.2.1. The new aid architecture and PFM: promoting a system(at)ic reform 
 
The shift in emphasis from project aid to programme aid, a prominent feature of the 
new aid architecture, has strengthened donors’ interest in improving financial 
accountability in poor countries (de Renzio, 2006). As Action Aid (2006b: 36) relates, 
donors’ support for PFM reforms is often motivated by concerns regarding the use of 
foreign aid in an accountable and transparent manner. Indeed, donors operating 
through state systems need to reassure their constituents (tax payers, contributing states 
of multilateral organisations and other financiers) that their funding will be used for 
the intended purpose. As Glennie et al. (2012) remark, a number of studies shows that 
the UK general public often perceives corruption to be one of the main causes of 
poverty (over half of respondents to DFID’s tracking survey in 2009 and 2010 gave this 
response, compared to 10% identifying debt as a main issue). Although anecdotal, this is 
consistent with the first reaction I encountered every time I talked about my research 
to people outside academia, who generally expressed fear (and indignation) that giving 
money directly to poor countries’ governments would only fuel corruption.  
 
These concerns are not necessarily unfounded. In Malawi, Bakili Muluzi, president 
from 1994 to 2004, was alleged to have appropriated $12 million of donor funds 
(Chuma, 2010). The President in charge at the time of my fieldwork, Bingu wa 
Mutharika, although seen in his first term as turning ‘the tide of de-industrialisation, 
macro-economic mismanagement and corruption with impunity’ (Cammack, 2011), is 
now suspected of having diverted large sums of money (Namwaza, 2012). This was 
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certainly seen as a concern by some of the civil society organisation representatives, as 
this interviewee articulates:  
 
‘Malawi has no budget framework, so the African governments, the ones that we 
have at the moment, need brakes. You cannot give them [funding] wholesale 
because they can abuse it, any one moment they can wake up and abuse it, so 
you must guard against that. So it is important that we have frameworks, 
mechanisms that safeguard potential abuse [...] So you must look into the future 
and make sure that you put safeguard mechanisms that protect the systems even 
in the long term, but because of that, you need certain conditionalities.’ 
(NGO/CSO interview 5) 
 
 
PFM reforms cover three broad aspects of policy-making and implementation, one of 
which relates to the credibility of the budget: 
 
‘The way they [the GoM] implement the budget: is it credible and so on? 
Expenditures: the way they are spending; are they over-spending, what are the 
problems?’  
(Donor interview 9) 
 
Another important area of focus comprises issues pertaining to budget implementation:  
 
‘How is the budget processed? […]. The PFM looks at the systems: do they have 
the systems, for example the Integrated Financial Management systems? It is a 
country system where the payment is done electronically? […] Doing the 
budget coding into the system so that it’s electronically managed and all those 
things.’ 
(Donor interview 9) 
 
A third major element of PFM addresses questions of reporting, auditing and scrutiny, 
ensuring external oversight over the budget cycle. For instance, the 2006 Performance 
Assessment Framework1 (PAF) which forms the basis for direct budget support 
disbursements by donors contained PFM indicators pertaining to the ‘timeliness of 
                                                 
1 The 2006 and 2007 Malawi PAF have been used for analysis here as they were the only ones freely 
available on the internet at the time of the research. Both PAF can be found in appendix L.  
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annual financial statements’ (indicator 9), the effectiveness of internal and external 
audits (indicators 8 and 10) and the scrutiny of external audit by Parliament (indicator 
11). As this interviewee explains, the focus is on: 
 
‘Whether they are reporting properly: their accounting systems. Then, we look 
at the audit: have they done the external audit on time? Submission of this or 
that data, scrutinised by the Parliament and so on … Institutional systems and 
all those…’ 
(Donor interview 9) 
 
Although PFM is supposed to deal with systems rather than economic policies, the 2007 
PAF included an indicator entitled ‘overall macroeconomic programme implemented’ 
(indicator 1) which is based on the IMF review of the Poverty Reduction and Growth 
Facility (PRGF) programme. PFM conditionalities are thus seen as a technical means of 
ensuring that public money is spent according to the budget and in a suitable manner, 
limiting mismanagement and corruption (de Renzio, 2006), as well as improving 
governance through the entrenchment of checks-and-balances mechanisms such as 
Parliamentary budgetary oversight. 
 
But PFM reforms are also seen as conducive to greater aid effectiveness by improving 
the prioritisation of development assistance towards reaching priorities such as the 
Malawi Growth Development Strategy (MGDS), Malawi’s the second-generation 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), for instance by ensuring that pro-poor 
expenditures are spent as budgeted. Indeed, in the 2005 Paris Declaration, PFM issues 
are prominent. For example, signatories commit to accelerate progress in:  
 
‘defining measures and standards of performance and accountability of partner 
country systems in public financial management, procurement, fiduciary 
safeguards and environmental assessments, in line with broadly accepted good 
practices and their quick and widespread application’.  
(OECD, 2005: article 3.vi) 
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PFM and procurements are also the subject of paragraphs 25 to 30 of the Paris 
Declaration, which are assessed by 3 of the 12 indicators of progress. Indicator 2 
measures the ‘number of partner countries [aid-recipients] that have procurement and 
public financial management systems that either (a) adhere to broadly accepted good 
practices or (b) have a reform programme in place to achieve these’. As Bissio (2007) 
notes, their suitability is assessed through the World Bank’s Country Policy and 
Institutional Assessment (CPIA) rating which also includes contentious issues such as 
property rights. In addition, the standards for procurement are based on processes 
developed by the joint OECD-DAC – World Bank Round Table on Strengthening 
Procurement Capacities in Developing Countries’ (2003). Indicators 5a and 5b measure 
donors’ use of country systems in PFM and procurements, providing that these systems 
abide by the requirements outlined in indicator 2. Thus, the Paris Declaration directly 
promotes PFM reforms that are aligned with mechanisms favoured by donors, 
particularly IFIs and the OECD.  
 
PFM reforms are particularly significant in the case of direct budget support, where 
donors’ money becomes part of the general budget and cannot be associated with 
particular activities. However, this extract from a paper on early SWAp experiments 
also presents forms of sectoral support as also subordinated to improvements of PFM 
systems:  
 
‘The degree of confidence in financial management systems is an important 
factor in determining how donors and Ministries of Finance disburse funds. In 
all countries where a SWAp is being pursued, the initial step has been to 
strengthen the structure of public budgets (including government and donor 
funds) to better monitor spending patterns.’  
(Peters and Chao, 1998: 184) 
 
The new aid architecture can therefore clearly be seen reinforcing the impetus for aid-
dependent countries to undertake reforms in areas pertaining to PFM. This trend has 
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been underpinned by the deployment of new instruments such as the Public 
Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) assessment.  
 
7.2.2. The Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) framework: ‘The 
devil is in the PEFA’ 
 
The PEFA Programme was created in 2001 as a multi-donor partnership between 7 
donors and the IFIs to ‘assess the condition of country public expenditure, procurement 
and financial accountability systems and develop a practical sequence for reform and 
capacity-building actions’ (PEFA, 2012b). Its Secretariat is located in the World Bank 
headquarter offices in Washington, DC (World Bank, 2012b), but unlike the CPIA 
which is led by the World Bank, the PEFA is usually ‘undertaken as a multi donor 
collaborative effort’ (PEFA Secretariat, 2007). The framework has been designed 
through a long consultative process (de Renzio, 2009) drawing on pre-existing 
instruments such as Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Assessments and a range 
of standards chiefly promoted by the IMF and the OECD. It focuses on three major 
areas relating to policy, including PFM (see appendix L for the list of PFM High-Level 
Performance Indicators Set):  
 
‘We look at three things: progress in PFM, we look at the macroeconomics and 
we look at the policies, availability of policies.’  
(Donor interview 9) 
 
The Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) assessment framework 
represents a means through which government systems are examined by donors. As 
this interviewee explains: 
 
‘PEFA is […] agreed by various donors internationally, it’s a framework for 
assessing the PFM; it is a snapshot of […] the systems in place. It looks at the 
budget, procurement issues, audit, all the issues on the PFM.’  
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(Donor interview 9) 
 
The PEFA framework thus represents the main international instrument assessing 
countries’ PFM systems in a consistent manner.  
 
Although its creation pre-dates the Paris Declaration, the PEFA reflects many of the 
principles buttressing the new aid architecture and is presented as a tool facilitating the 
implementation of the aid effectiveness agenda by providing an assessment which is 
country-led (PEFA, 2012b). As its dedicated website explains, the PEFA promotes ‘a 
government-led reform program for which analytical work, reform design, 
implementation and monitoring reflect country priorities and are integrated into 
governments' institutional structures’ (PEFA, 2012a). It also facilitates donor 
harmonization by creating a ‘coordinated program of support from donors and 
international finance institutions’ (PEFA, 2012a). As this Ministry of Finance (MoF) 
official explains:  
 
‘It [the PEFA] is linked on to the Paris Declaration because it tries to bring all 
donors together to agree on these indicators.’  
(GoM interview 3)  
 
In addition, some of the progress indicators of the Paris Declaration are linked to the 
PEFA framework: indicators 2a; 5 and 7 are closely aligned on PEFA indicators (PEFA 
Secretariat, 2007). Indeed, the Malawi’s PEFA assessment was used to judge progress 
made against the Paris Declaration indicators (OECD, 2008b). The PEFA can thus be 
seen as an instrument, interrelated with the new aid architecture, that reinforces the 
impetus for PFM reform. In addition, although aid-recipients are not obliged to 
undertake a PEFA assessment under the Paris Declaration, the new aid architecture 
considerably reinforces the impetus for doing so. Best (2007) has argued that new 
norms regarding economic policies and institutions enabling these are increasingly 
directed through a normative process rather than through coercion. She writes: ‘Instead 
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they are applied through a complex and largely voluntary bureaucratic process that 
involves the IMF’s and World Bank’s careful assessment of member states’ (Best, 2007: 
94). The PEFA can certainly be seen in this light2.  
 
In Malawi, the PEFA could be seen as part of the process of donors’ improved 
coordination. The assessment was spearheaded by the European Union (EU) and 
undertaken by the consultancy firm Crown Agents3 (Crown Agents, 2008). However, it 
involved most major donors:  
 
‘We do provide the support, employ the consultant who comes here but it’s 
done through all donors, common understanding… [They] come to agree and 
they assess the government’s performance within that period […] We did one in 
2005, another one in 2006 and now 2008 we had one.’  
(Donor interview 9) 
 
Although the PEFA is not formally linked to budget support, and disbursements, it is an 
indicator of the government’s performance in PFM issues, which is of prime interest to 
donors, particularly those involved in the Common Approach to Budget Support 
(CABS)4:  
‘[The PEFA] study will inform the donors whether the government of Malawi is 
doing well in terms of public finance management warranting them to give us 
budget support… So the results of the PEFA study are very, very useful because 
this inform the CABS group of donors whether the country is managing their 
finances properly.’ 
(GoM interview 2) 
 
                                                 
2 It is worth noting however that measures aimed at strengthening public expenditure management were 
part of the conditions of Malawi’s debt relief under the HIPC initiative (IMF, 2006: 2).  
3 Crown Agents (CA) was founded in 1833 in order to manage the procurement of goods and other 
services in British colonies. Since its privatization in 1997, this not-for-profit corporation has specialized 
in capacity-building and public sector reforms as well as in work in ‘difficult areas’ such as Iraq (for more 
information, see Power, 2009).  
4 CABS donors provide direct budget support. 
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However, while donors valued the process, the assessment was more controversial with 
interviewees from the GoM, particularly the Ministry of Finance, which is in charge of 
managing the PEFA:  
 
‘You know (laughs) it’s interesting because you will excuse my language, still the 
devil is not the IMF… right now we have PEFA.’  
(GoM interview 3) 
 
One of the causes for concern was the unprecedented level and scope of scrutiny of the 
PEFA. In addition, the standards expected were seen as being set particularly high: 
 
‘My headache is less with the IMF now than satisfying such sort of PEFA 
indicators […] because some of those PEFA indicators are even more stringent 
than anything IMF has ever done.’ 
(GoM interview 3) 
 
As hinted at in the previous chapter, despite claiming to be country-led, there appears 
to be little room for negotiations with regards to PFM indicators, contrasting with a 
more collaborative approach in other areas:  
 
‘The analysis and assessment [regarding] […] problems the national response 
has, regarding financing, programming, policing […] those assessments are done 
collectively or are commissioned by some donor, […] and the scrutiny is done 
collectively by all partners. When it comes to assessments to do with what’s not 
working regarding mechanisms, the money…and the culture around the money, 
the politics around the money, those are not done by all parties involved, [and] 
in this case […] they are clearly prescriptive: “we expect this, this, these are the 
standards and so on”’.  
(NGO/CSO interview 6) 
 
In addition, although PEFA is not directly linked to donors’ disbursements, many of its 
indicators are similar to those used by CABS donors in order to appraise their 
commitment to budget support and determine the amount of funding they are willing 
to disburse. Under the CABS arrangement, the Government’s performance is assessed 
against the targets attached to various indicators which form a Performance Assessment 
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Framework (PAF). Each PAF indicator is reviewed annually as well as indicators 
themselves if they are achieved or are deemed unsuitable. As this donor representative 
remarks: 
 
‘PFM indicators are rather similar in PAF and PEFA.’ 
(Donor interview 9) 
 
For example, the credibility of the budget (comparing what has actually been spent to 
what was budgeted) is flagged up in both the PEFA (indicators PI-1 and PI-2) and the 
2006 PAF (indicators 3-6). Effectiveness of payroll controls (PEFA indicator PI-18; 2006 
PAF indicator 7), ‘scope, nature and follow-up of external audit’ (PEFA indicator PI-26 
and 2006 PAF indicator 10) and ‘legislative scrutiny of external audit report’ (PEFA 
indicator PI-28 and PAF indicator 11) are also similar.  
 
It is difficult to ascertain a causal relation between PAF and PEFA indicators, as this 
interviewee explains:  
 
‘GoM: - It’s because CABS PAF has got PFM indicators and some of these 
indicators are linked to the PEFA assessment.[…] they are more or less the 
same…[we’re] trying to bring them on board, so you can assess from the CABS 
you know that, at least, there’s performance. [When the] next PEFA comes, 
maybe 2 years down the line, you have not neglected 1 or 2 areas. So it’s that 
one element. 
E.M.: - So does the PEFA have an influence on the PAF, in terms of what 
indicators it includes? 
GoM: - It does, it does …So I don’t know which one influences the other but 
there’s that linkage.’  
(Donor interview 7) 
 
However, these parallels show that the PEFA and the PAF overlap with the effect of 
reinforcing the impetus for PFM reform. As this interviewee outlines, PAF indicators 
also ensure that PEFA issues remain on the agenda between assessments. The PEFA and 
the PAF can thus be seen as complementing each other. The PEFA provides an in-
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depth and wide-ranging assessment, while the PAF contains a more selective list of 
indicators but is directly linked to donors’ contributions, as this MoF official articulates:  
 
‘It’s just one way of dismissing budget support that you’ll be told because these 
PEFA indicators which have been incorporated into the CABS assessment 
framework that have not been met, they are reluctant to disburse or will not, 
depending on who’s donating.’  
(GoM interview 4) 
 
‘GoM: - Budget support is preferred even though it is the most vulnerable.  
E.M.: - Because of that link? 
GoM: - Yes to the PEFA and to the PFM conditions.’  
(GoM interview 4) 
 
Thus the link between PEFA and the PAF can be seen as symptomatic of what Rose 
calls advanced liberalism, where power operates at a distance through the promotion of 
standards of conduct, promulgated by experts. He states:  
 
‘In this new dispensation, experts […] provide information […] that enables 
these quasi-autonomous entities to steer themselves. They tutor them in the 
techniques of self-government […] They provide the information that will allow 
[…] other parties – such as regulatory agencies – to assess the performance of 
these quasi-autonomous agencies, and hence to govern them […]. They identify 
those individuals unable to self-govern, and either attempt to re-attach them 
[…] or to manage their exclusion .  
 (Rose, 1999: 147)  
 
In this configuration, PAF indicators can be seen as seeking to ‘attempt to re-attach’ the 
GoM to PEFA standards, through the use of conditionalities. This does not seem to be 
unique to Malawi either. As Tan (2010) notes, there has been a progressive shift 
generally towards standardizing public financial management systems in developing 
countries through aid conditionalities. As Lemke states, liberal governmentality ‘aspires 
to construct prudent subjects whose moral quality is based on the fact that they 
rationally assess the costs and benefits of a certain sort as opposed to other alternative 
acts’  (Lemke 2001: 201). Here, the costs are made clear through their relation to aid 
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funding. I now turn to explore how PFM reforms are further entrenched in funding for 
socially-oriented sectors such as AIDS or Health.  
 
7.2.3. PFM and AIDS/Health: blurring boundaries, expanding donors’ reach 
 
As already outlined, direct budget support (DBS) makes it impossible to track what 
specific activities have been supported by donor funding. However, as it becomes part 
of the national budget, it is expected that some will go towards priority areas such as 
AIDS and Health sectors:  
 
‘EU, along various funding, we also provide DBS and this goes direct to the 
government […] in support of the budget, whereby the government uses its own 
systems such as accounting, auditing, procurements and the rest… […] So the 
assumption is that we feel that this programme will have something on health, 
HIV and others [other sectors].’ 
(Donor interview 9) 
 
Indeed, as this interviewee argues, donors anticipate direct budget support to provide 
results in social sectors:  
 
‘We consider our budget support programme as a poverty reduction programme 
[…] which should address the social elements of economic development. So in 
that area we expect to see increased resources in the areas of health, education 
and so on. The more we give the more we want to see improvements in these 
particular areas because that’s where our focus is.’ 
(Donor interview 7) 
 
This focus is translated by the inclusion of social indicators in the PAF. For example, 
the 2006 PAF comprises targets such as a 1:3,900 nurse population ratio or over 60,000 
people on ART5 by the end of 2006 (2007 PAF, indicators 17 and 18, in appendix L). 
The 2007 PAF specifies that 19% of health facilities should be delivering the minimum 
                                                 
5 Antiretroviral Treatment. 
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package of preventing mother-to-child transmission (PMTCT) services by the end of 
2007.  
 
However, these indicators appear to be less central to determining the level of aid 
received through DBS than those related to PFM. In order to understand this, it is 
necessary to explain some of the techniques used by donors in order to appraise their 
DBS funding. Indeed, some donors operate through two distinct mechanisms to assess 
the volume of their contribution to the GoM:  
 
‘The way we are doing it is that we have fixed tranche and variable tranche but 
this year we’ll only do the fixed tranche then the other two years we’ll spread 
into fixed and variable.’  
(Donor interview 9) 
 
Fixed tranche largely depends on the GoM meeting conditions pertaining to PFM, as 
the same interviewee continues:  
 
The fixed tranche […] we have certain conditions that we agree on with the 
government […] general conditions in terms of macro performance, PFM 
performance, availability of policies like the MGDS […] sound policies.’ 
(Donor interview 9) 
 
In this case, funding for AIDS and Health via direct budget support, relies entirely on 
the GoM meeting PFM targets, subordinating support for social areas to PFM reforms 
and macro-economic conditions and blurring the boundaries between the ‘economic’ 
and ‘social’ realms.  
 
Variable tranches involve attaching specific sums of money to reaching targets for PFM, 
social and governance indicators specified in the PAF (see the 2006 and 2007 PAF in 
appendix L for examples of both targets and indicators):  
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‘The funds are spread there [on the CABS indicators]: like [with] the 15 million 
[Euros], maybe 1.3 million [Euros] for each indicator. So where we are assessing, 
we say, maybe there’s progress, there’s no progress, there’s progress, there’s no 
progress: so from there we can see just how much we can give to the 
government, how much they haven’t achieved. If they have achieved 50% or 
more, we may give them half, if not then zero.’  
(Donor interview 9) 
 
However, in Malawi, PFM indicators were particularly well-represented in the PAF. 
For example the 2006 PAF includes 11 PFM indicators, while governance has 9 and 
social sectors focused largely on education, health and gender have 8. Similarly, the 
2007 PAF has 11 PFM indicators, with only 7 representing governance performance 
and 7 social sectors. In addition, funding attached to individual conditions does not 
necessarily reflects the amount of funding which, if obtained, will be attributed to the 
issue defined in the indicator. Hence, the balance appeared to be skewed in favour of 
PFM, giving these reforms disproportionate weight, at the expense of achievements in 
social sectors.  
 
In terms of sectoral support, although disbursements through the Health SWAp or 
NAC’s pool-funding mechanism were not directly linked to PFM performance, these 
issues were seen as influencing donors’ decision to enter such funding agreements:  
 
‘[In the area of] basket-funding for sector budget support, donors […] are very 
much interested to see that the reforms that are taking place in this particular 
sector and the finance … the public finance management systems are put in 
place: issues about transparency, accountability, you know good governance. So 
then, once they are satisfied, they come in with their basket funding.’ 
 (GoM interview 2) 
 
In addition, PFM issues were embedded in the SWAp framework, as this interviewee 
highlights:  
 
  
247 
 
‘You know when they developed the SWAP it was not only the programme of 
work but it was also […] the finance mechanism: it came with reporting 
procedures and structures etc. […] Procurement is something that comes to 
mind and as I said before, procurement was developed by the World Bank.’  
(NGO/CSO interview 6) 
 
Indeed, PFM appeared as ‘soft conditionalities’ in the form of expectations in the 
agreements between donors and the GoM. The Health SWAp’s MoU, for instance, 
contains detailed instructions with regard to the ways in which procurements are to be 
managed:  
 
‘[The Government and the Collaborating Partners] ensure that cost effective and 
transparent procedures are in place for the procurement of works, goods and 
consulting and non-consulting services. The Government will ensure that the 
new Procurement Act (no. 8, 2003) is implemented in the health sector and is 
operating fully and effectively. In the interim period, and in accordance of Part 
I.3(3) of the Public Procurement Act 2003, the Government will use, for all 
procurement above thresholds agreed with Pool Fund partners, International 
Competitive Bidding (ICB) as set forth in Section II of the Guidelines for 
Procurement under IBRD6 Loans and IDA7 Credits (“the Guidelines”) of May 
2004 and Selection and Employment of Consultants by World Bank Borrowers 
(the “Consultant Guidelines”) of May 2004, using IDA to review and provide 
required procurement ‘No-objections’. The Government will use Government of 
Malawi procurement systems for procurement of all goods, works, consulting 
and non-consulting services below the agreed thresholds, in accordance with 
procedures and thresholds outlined in the Public Procurement Act 2003 
Regulations and Desk Manuals issued by the Office of the Director of Public 
Procurement.’  
(Republic of Malawi, 2004b: 4-5) 
 
Significantly, the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) also implicitly specifies the 
need for wide-ranging PFM reforms:  
 
                                                 
6 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development: established in 1944 as the original institution 
of the World Bank Group, it provides loans and advice to credit-worthy countries.  
7 International Development Association: established in 1960, it provides loans and grants for 
programmes to poor countries.  
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‘[The Government and the Collaborating Partners] ACKNOWLEDGE that the 
SWAp requires institutional strengthening of the Ministry of Health in 
budgeting, procurement, financial management, management of human 
resources, information and communication systems.’  
(Republic of Malawi, 2004b: 2, original emphasis) 
 
The new aid architecture and the funding mechanisms it promotes thus create a 
reliance of funding for social sectors such as AIDS and Health, on PFM reforms, 
blurring the boundaries between financial and social sectors. While good PFM systems 
can be useful in ensuring checks-and-balances at the level of government and 
minimising risks of mismanagement, the subordination of socially-oriented funding to 
these institutional changes is problematic in that it makes funding vulnerable to cuts, 
regardless of performance in these sectors.  
 
In addition, the definition of what constitutes ‘good’ procurement systems is not a 
neutral one. Indeed, the Paris Declaration uses the Bank’s CPIA as the yardstick for 
‘broadly accepted good practices’ (OECD, 2005: indicator 5a) in PFM issues. In Malawi, 
the adoption of World Bank procurement procedures was also a conditionality for the 
Bank’s Multi-Country HIV/AIDS Program (MAP) funding. PFM issues, particularly 
those relating to procurement, have a particularly significant impact in areas such as the 
as the health sector, as this MoF official articulates: 
 
‘E.M.: - Are there any conditionalities in terms of Health or HIV and AIDS? 
GoM: - […] yes there are conditions there, most of the conditions are linked to 
PFM issues.  
E.M.: - So in terms of health, [PFM conditions] are an issue as well? 
GoM: - Yes, [with] procurements and so on.’  
(GoM interview 4) 
 
Procurement defines the various rules and processes guiding the acquisition of goods 
and services by the Government. Thus, PFM conditionalities pertaining to procurement 
reform entail an overhaul of the systems used by the government to acquire items and 
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services of prime importance such as medicines and medical equipment, transport 
vehicles, information and communication technologies, consultants etc. Procurement 
procedures can be extremely complex, making it difficult for under-resourced public 
administrations, as in the case of Malawi, to manage and creating delays in the 
acquisition of vital goods and services (this is addressed in greater length in section 
7.3.). In addition the design of the rules and regulations controlling public procurement 
can be seen as favouring specific companies or countries of origin by making procedures 
too cumbersome for others, including local firms. This is of particular significance to 
growth in poor countries as it is estimated that 12-29% of their GDP is spent annually 
through public procurement (Eurodad, 2008a). In the area of AIDS, drug procurement 
can be particularly contentious as it may restrict the use of generic treatments. As this 
interviewee explains, procurement procedures imposed as part of the PFM reforms 
could be seen as created biases, in favour, partly, of Western companies:  
 
‘Some of them [ARV drugs] [come from] India , others are coming from the US. 
Yeah… UNICEF does the procurement, the World Bank chooses which 
company….. so you can see what we are facing now!’ 
(NGO/CSO interview 4)   
 
 
In addition, the new aid architecture was seen as favouring more stringent PFM 
standards, as donors harmonised on the basis of the most demanding partners, which in 
Malawi were the World Bank and the Global Fund (though, according to ActionAid 
(2006a), this is in no way unique to Malawi). Moreover, new donors joining budget 
support mechanisms also adopted the conditionality framework already in place, such 
as the PAF, as this MoF official explains:  
 
‘Now unfortunately, even those donors who did not want such sort of 
conditionalities are brought into the picture.’ 
(GoM interview 3)  
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Hence, the Paris Declaration can be seen as reinforcing the ‘gatekeeping functions of 
the BWI8 to other sources of development financing’ (Tan 2011: 1042).  
 
The new aid architecture thus has programmatic effects, effectively promoting reforms 
that restructure the state apparatus. As Mosse (2005: 5) remarks:  
 
‘Indeed as its ends have narrowed to the achievement of quantified targets on 
poverty or ill-health, the means of international aid have expanded from the 
management of economic growth and technology of transfer to the reorganisation 
of state and society needed to deliver on targets’.  
(Mosse, 2005: 5, emphasis original) 
 
By making AIDS funding dependent on PFM reforms – either through coercive 
measures such as the formal conditionalities of the PAF, or through more broadly 
defined expectations in the Health SWAp – the new aid architecture has placed a range 
of neoliberal reforms at the centre of development assistance. As Rose explains, the 
programmatic nature of governmentality enables it to operate at a distance: 
  
‘These processes […] were not to be regulated by intervening directly upon 
organisational processes or by relying upon professional or bureaucratic expertise. 
Government was to act indirectly upon the actions of these autonomous entities, by 
focusing upon results: setting targets, promulgating standards, monitoring outputs, 
allocating budgets, undertaking audits.’  
(Rose, 1999: 146) 
 
As I explore in the next section, PFM reforms can be seen as doing exactly this: by 
instituting a certain grammar of policy-making and implementation, based on specific 
methodologies and techniques, it promotes a particular rationality of government 
which seeks to transform the state in line with neoliberal principles.  
 
 
                                                 
8 Bretton Woods Institutions i.e. the IMF, the World Bank and the World Trade Organisation.  
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7.3. PFM as governmental technology: neoliberalising the state 
 
As the previous section highlighted, the aid effectiveness agenda has contributed to 
embedding PFM reforms within all sectors of development assistance, including health 
and AIDS. The present section focuses on the neoliberal effects of this trend. It shows 
how these reforms involve the deployment a number of ‘apparently mundane practices 
[…] through which neoliberal spaces, states, and subjects are being constituted in 
particular forms’ (Larner 2003: 511). Here, I highlight how the implementation of a 
medium-term expenditure framework (MTEF) seeks to reign in expenditure, 
subordinating the implementation of national policies to IMF-agreed macro-economic 
policies. This, in turn, involves the prioritisation of public expenditures and their 
crystallization around the MGDS, at the expense of other policy areas. I show how the 
use of target-setting and performance-based budgeting, a practice implicit in the MTEF, 
attempts to extend market principles to all areas of government. This, I argue, 
represents an unprecedented expansion of a neoliberal rationale, as well as a 
problematic depoliticisation of the state.  
 
7.3.1. MTEF: fiscal discipline as over-arching rationality  
 
The implementation of medium-term expenditure frameworks (MTEF) is a central 
pillar of PFM reforms. MTEFs aim to ‘introduce strategic, medium-term budgeting, 
bringing together the policy-making, planning and budgeting roles of government into 
a rolling 3-year horizon’ (Shimwaka, 2004: 37). In other words, the MTEF enables a 
matching of projected resources with the anticipated cost of government policies 
(including recurrent expenditures such as staff and infrastructure maintenance), 
allowing the better predictability, planning, monitoring and controlling of public 
expenditures.  
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In effect however, MTEF can be seen as an instrument enforcing macroeconomic 
discipline, focused on maintaining low inflation through the reduction of budget 
deficits and subordinating expenses to revenue. As Gould (2005a: 3) explains: ‘recipient 
governments must, first, tie their budgets to a Medium-Term Expenditure Framework 
(MTEF) that conforms to criteria defined by the IMF’. It is worth noting however that 
the advisability of keeping inflation low at any cost is contested by internationally 
renowned economists, including Stiglitz (1998). McKinley (2008: 99) also argues that 
while there is little evidence that low inflation is good for growth, studies show that a 
moderate inflation situated between 5 and 15% can have a positive impact, principally 
when they are associated with investments. As McKinley (2008: 98) asserts, ‘many rich-
country advisers often argue against expansionary fiscal policies - except in their own 
countries’. 
 
In Malawi, an MTEF was introduced in 1995 following the 1990 Public Expenditure 
Review and the 1995 Budget Management Review conducted by the World Bank 
(Simwaka, 2004: 36). The implementation of a ‘new system for monitoring and 
controlling spending’ (IDA and IMF, 2000: 9) was then flagged up in the IMF 
completion point document, making it in effect a conditionality for debt relief. As the 
IDA9 and IMF (2000: 9) point out, such a system is ‘intended to prevent the re-
emergence of domestic arrears’. The enforcement of expenditure ceilings was also 
advocated in the recommendations from the 2000 Public Expenditure and MTEF 
reviews (Shimwaka, 2004). However, as the Malawi Growth and Development Strategy 
(Government of Malawi, 2006) notes, it failed to be followed-up successfully, leading to 
considerable variations between planned and actual expenditures. 
 
                                                 
9 International Development Association: the World Bank’s Fund for the poorest countries. 
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The new aid architecture can be seen as enabling donors to increase the pressure on the 
GoM to achieve better financial discipline. The implementation of the MTEF is, for 
instance, highlighted in the SWAp MoU, which states that the government and its 
partners should: 
 
‘adopt a medium term financial planning perspective for the health sector based 
on the Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF)’ 
(Republic of Malawi, 2004b: 5) 
 
As the quote above also highlights, the effects of the MTEF are translated at sectoral 
level, where policy implementation is made reliant on funding allocated centrally. 
Budget ceilings are then sent to districts allowing them to plan future activities around 
these. As a result, Bissio (2007: 15) notes, SWAps’ focus is firmly on the ‘supply-’ rather 
than the ‘demand-side’ of service delivery. As this donor representative articulates, 
reducing the budget deficit is also viewed as an underlying principle in the health 
sector:  
 
‘Maybe the NGOs worry “oh give it more than this, this is not adequate for the 
health sector”. But it’s a question of balance again so, so you don’t only have a 
budget or an account, an economy where you only eat, you only consume.’ 
 (Donor interview 4) 
 
In addition, as many have noted (see Woll, 2008; Hayman, 2009; Wallace 2009 for 
instance), one of the effects of the Paris agenda has been a differentiation within aid-
dependent countries’ governments. Direct budget support for example, is negotiated 
between donors and Ministries of Finance (in Malawi this is done through the MoF Aid 
and Debt division), while individual line ministries have lost all or part of their ability 
to approach donors directly about their needs. This reinforces the power of Ministries 
of Finance, which, as Harrison (2001: 664) explains tends to ‘speak the same language, 
of reducing inflation above all else’, at the expense of more socially-minded ones. This 
was confirmed in my fieldwork, as this MoF official articulates:  
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‘Let me come back to that issue about inflation targeting, whether it’s stringent 
on us. How we run our economy is no longer the issue now, it’s not the issue, 
we have to keep our inflation as low as possible, we have to keep our domestic 
borrowing as low as possible, not for the IMF, we do this for ourselves, right, 
because we understand the consequences if we don’t manage these very well, 
how it will be for the whole economy’ 
(GoM interview 3)  
 
Thus, IMF macro-economic policies have been internalised, at least at the level of the 
MoF. It reflects the Malawi Growth and Development Strategy which sets a target for 
inflation below 0.5% (Government of Malawi, 2006: 61). Fiscal discipline has thus 
become a central organising principle, on which all other policies hinge.  
 
These budgetary imperatives are furthered by the implementation of mechanisms 
facilitating the deployment of this rationale at all levels. In that regard, the introduction 
of an Integrated Financial Management Information System (IFMIS) in 2004-05 is key 
(Banda, 2007: 101). The IFMIS ‘has inherent controls to match expenditure to budget 
and flag where budget/commitments have been exceeded’ (Simwaka, 2004: 47) enabling 
the implementation of budget discipline at all levels of government. Again, the Health 
SWAp MoU can be seen as increasing pressure on the GoM to further the 
implementation of IFMIS. It enjoins the government and its partners to: 
 
‘strengthen mechanisms to ensure that each spending unit within the budget 
and that each institution participating in the SWAp adhere to applicable 
Government and Ministry of Health budget ceilings’. 
 (Republic of Malawi, 2004b: 5) 
 
In addition, the implementation of IFMIS improves the ability of ministries to provide 
up-to-date financial reports as expenditures are recorded electronically. This, in turn, 
allows greater scrutiny by the MoF and donors. For example, the SWAp MoU (art 8) 
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indicates that data from IFMIS will be used to inform reports from the Ministry of 
Health (MoH) to donors on progress on a set of indicators.  
 
The implementation of the MTEF can also be seen as shoring up a small government 
ideology by restricting the growth of the public sector. The IFIs are infamous for their 
wage bill cap, setting ceilings for public sector salaries expenditures, measured as 
percentage of the overall budget. This cap is often entrenched as part of HIPC 
conditionalities. Non-compliance can be costly. For instance, an Action Aid report 
(ActionAid International, 2006a) explains how in Honduras, the government’s policy to 
raise pay for teachers increased its wage bill above the specified ceiling and led to the 
suspension of US$ 194 million by the IMF. However, in Malawi, the wage bill cap had 
been lifted in the health sector, shortly before my fieldwork, thanks to the pressure 
from civil society organisations and NGOs: 
 
‘The Ministry of Health or the government had their hands tied when it came to 
recruitment because despite the crisis […] the IMF put a ceiling on how much 
they can spend on the pay roll, for paying salaries. So even though there were 
vacancies, the government could not recruit more because of that condition. So 
we lobbied […] the IMF together with other partners like Action Aid and 
fortunately for the health sector we have removed this.’  
(NGO/CSO interview 4) 
 
However, even in the absence of a wage bill cap, the MTEF enforces strict budget 
ceilings, putting fetters on a possible growth of the public sector workforce:  
 
‘The issue is whether we have enough money as Malawi government to mobilize 
all the social workers we need and the doctors we need and the answer is no.’ 
(GoM interview 3)  
 
Yet, the lack of human resource was seen as the greatest impediment to tackling AIDS 
in Malawi, as this Malawian donor representative explains:  
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‘Human resource is the biggest problem, no question about it. HR is the biggest 
problem because we don’t have enough human resource. The core medical staff 
as well as the supporting staff. […] I think that’s a real big problem.’ 
(Donor interview 7) 
 
Although human resource capacity in the Health sector was addressed, somewhat 
successfully, through the Emergency Human Resource Programme, with funding 
directed towards increasing the number of students in training institutions, boosting 
pay and providing special allowances for health professionals (Carlson et al., 2008: 8), 
administrative and management capacity have been lagging behind, both at district and 
central levels. In addition, this approach can be seen as indicative of a neoliberal 
governmentality in which, as Rose (1999: 123) argues, the social is no longer 
conceptualised in terms of capital and labour but instead segmented into ‘solvable’ and 
actionable issues.  
 
Although capacity is a complex and multi-faceted issue including not only the number 
of staff but also their level of training and efficiency (I will touch upon the issue of 
capacity again in section 7.4), macroeconomic limitations were seen as particularly 
detrimental in preventing the implementation of an effective AIDS response, as this 
GoM official explains:  
 
‘A country like Malawi is not a developed country, where I can sit and talk 
about HIV and people will sit around their radio and listen, or open their TV 
and listen or see me talk about the issues. We don’t have that luxury. But even if 
we had that luxury, if they have questions they cannot ask the TV, they cannot 
ask the radio. The majority of the population is illiterate; our transport network 
is not as developed as it should be. So as a country we need face-to-face 
interaction. So talking about increased wage bill in Malawi is unfortunate: we 
need the people at the community level to deliver a service. For example, we 
had a home craft worker who moved from house to house to teach people on 
nutrition using the home economics approach. We reduced malnutrition to a 
lower level. But when they said your wage bill is very high in 1992, all these 
people got removed […]. By 1998 stunting was 59%, it jumped from 47.8% to 
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59%, so you can imagine. And then, as we are talking now there is an outcry 
that the HIV/AIDS services are not reaching the community, it is because the 
community worker is not there, who can deliver the service home. So my only 
plea is to let them assess countries from their individual basis, not give a blanket 
recommendation, it does not make sense.’  
(GoM interview 5) 
 
The quality of staff that the Malawian public administration was able to attract and 
retain was also seen as an issue:  
 
‘Capacity needs to be built and it’s difficult to get good people in government to 
work for the salaries so if you don’t invest in the civil service structure, how do 
you get the technical expertise?’  
(Donor interview 8) 
 
Budget constraints due to macroeconomic imperatives have also been seen to hamper 
the scaling up of the national AIDS response: 
 
‘The national AIDS framework has been implemented effectively in certain 
components and not exactly in others, for the national programs that are 
biomedical being delivered in the Ministry of Health, there has been some 
remarkable progress we all know. But we also know that there is very little 
that’s been done to improve the capacity and speed at which these considerably 
successful initiatives are being implemented, because very little and delayed 
investment in human resource, infrastructure, a lot of policy, macro economic 
policy limitations around those two, have also been left to other players outside 
the sector to determine.’  
(NGO/CSO interview 6) 
 
In addition, the complex management processes imposed by donors through 
conditionalities were perceived as exacerbating the lack of capacity by draining 
precious human and material resources away from actual service delivery: 
 
‘Non-core [administrative] functions are now consuming a lot of money […] 
You’ll find that administration is getting a larger percent of the budget […] just 
because the framework within which they are implementing curative and 
preventive services is difficult.’  
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 (NGO/CSO interview 4) 
 
 
Thus, through the promotion of tools such as MTEF and IFMIS, the new aid 
architecture can be seen as embedding the IFIs’ economic tenets deep into the 
government, making anti-inflationary policies the central rationale and the basis for all 
governmental activities. As Bissio (2007) remarks, this neoliberal rationality runs 
against, and undermines the influence of, rights-based approaches, as promoted for 
instance the 1986 Declaration on the Right to Development. Indeed, the use of MTEF 
also deproblematises funding gaps, by making activities fit in with forecasted resources, 
rather than highlighting the need for increased funding from donors in order to match 
national and international policy commitments. In Malawi, this was particularly 
problematic in the area of AIDS, where the costing of the Universal Access10 strategy 
pointed to a large funding shortfall, as this interviewee explains:  
 
‘There’s a gap. You know there has been this global movement in order to 
provide universal access to HIV prevention, treatment, care and support. This 
was a global movement at the G8 and what have you… this hasn’t been matched 
with resources. A country like Malawi, we went ahead to develop a road map 
for universal access after 2011. We have the roadmap, but it’s not funded […] 
The NAF [National Action Framework] from 2005 to 2009 is costed at 620 
million [Malawi Kwatcha]; the UA [Universal Access] is almost 1.2 bn [MKw]. 
The commitments that we have up to 2009 … currently start at around 450 
million so really there’s a gap with the NAF, and certainly there is a gap with 
the UA. So as much as there was this global movement, this global movement 
has not been matched by funding.’  
(GoM interview 9) 
 
Ironically, aid predictability was left relatively unaddressed by PFM reforms, despite its 
crucial impact on a possible deficit. As this donor representative states:  
 
                                                 
10 In 2006 UN Member States committed to universal access to HIV prevention, treatment, care and 
support by 2010 (WHO, 2012) 
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‘What Government wants is consistent aid, people say this is the budget for this 
year, we would like it delivered on time according to our donors agreement. 
Donors are very bad about that. The predictability is a very, very big issue.’  
(Donor interview 1) 
 
This was strongly supported by the views from this MoF official:  
 
‘This the donors cannot explain, you know they tell us we will give you so 
much, and we make our economic programs and all that, based on those pledges 
and then in the end you see they never come and it messes us up completely, 
you know. And just to tell you last financial year, our financial year ends in 
June, on 30th June, we had in the programme 39 million US dollars from Global 
Fund promised and it never came.[…] We have to borrow from the central bank 
and our domestic borrowing swells, and that increases inflation, if you want, so, 
there’s more borrowing. Why? Because those who promised us don’t bring the 
money, so you have to get the money from somewhere, otherwise, you agree to 
let people die which we will not do.’ 
(GoM interview 3) 
 
 
The anti-inflationary rationale promoted by PFM reforms hence largely focuses on the 
GoM’s role and systems, at the expense of the role of donors. But it is also perversely 
enforced through the very mechanisms that then undermine its success: by attaching 
PFM conditionalities to funding, it makes it more likely that disbursements may be 
delayed, creating budget deficits.  
 
Hence, Public Finance Management can be seen as neoliberal in that it seeks to 
establish systems that will ensure that budget discipline will be observed in all areas of 
government. It is programmatic in that it sets in place processes that allow and promote 
the self-regulation of Ministries while increasing the scrutiny of the MoF and donors. 
As Rose (1999: 50) notes, ‘rule “at a distance” becomes possible when each can translate 
the values of others into its own terms, such that they provide norms and standards for 
their own ambitions, judgements and conduct’. In this case standards are made clear 
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through strict finance budgeting mechanisms which seek to ensure the primacy of the 
IMF-inspired macro-economic framework. Expectations are recalibrated to fit 
economic circumstances. 
 
7.3.2. Extending market rationality to the state: a new grammar of policy-making 
 
As Foucault (2008) explained the ‘Ordo’ liberals viewed state intervention in the social 
area as a means to sustain the existence of the market, for example by providing 
corrective measures through welfare provision. In contrast, the Chicago School strand 
of neoliberalism sought instead to:  
 
‘extend the rationality of the market, the schemas of analysis it offers and the 
decision-making criteria it suggests, to domains which are not exclusively or 
not primarily economic: the family and birth rate, for example, or delinquency 
and penal policy’ . 
(Foucault, 2008: 322) 
 
This section examines how the new aid architecture, combined with the 
implementation of PFM instruments such as the MTEF, converges towards the 
establishment of a certain grammar of policy-making that seeks to replace 
accountability based on professional expertise or democratic accountabilities with 
‘calculative practices’ (Miller and Rose, 1990: 11) inspired by market rationality.  
 
The implementation of MTEF implicitly requires a greater focus on ‘priority areas’ in 
order to ensure that public resources are allocated in a way that produces ‘value for 
money’ (Simwaka, 2004: 36). Under the PWC, this process gives centre stage to the 
implementation of PRSPs, at the expense of other policies. As Gould (2005a: 3) notes, 
‘the bulk of budget expenditures must be targeted to the over-riding goal of poverty 
reduction as defined by the World Bank’. This requirement has been reinforced by the 
demand from donors for demonstrable aid effectiveness. As Bowie and Mwase argue:  
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‘donors may be prepared to relinquish individual health projects and contribute 
to basket funding through a SWAp so long as the health sector plans for which 
the basket funding are used address health priorities in an efficient and effective 
way’.  
(Bowie and Mwase, 2011: 1) 
 
Prioritisation of resources towards clearly defined activities is seen as crucial in that 
regard. Peters and Chao (1998: 182), writing on early SWAp experiments show that this 
requirement has been part and parcel of the elaboration of the aid effectiveness agenda. 
They argue that ‘what the SWAp has demanded of new health policies is that they be 
far more explicit than their predecessors, and they be formulated to address real choices 
for the sector’ (Peters and Chao, 1998: 182).  
 
In Malawi, the need for better prioritisation was acknowledged by the GoM in its 
MGDS (Government of Malawi, 2006) where it recognised that its (limited) resources 
have been spread too thinly in the past, therefore making little impact. The Health 
SWAp demonstrates ‘tough and appropriate’ choices (Bowie and Mwase, 2011: 5). Its 
Programme of Work is largely based on the delivery of the Essential Health Package 
(EHP), a ‘prioritised but limited package of services that should be available to every 
individual in Malawi at all time’ (Republic of Malawi, 2004a: 1). The EHP is an 
instrument often used by SWAps in order to identify and focus on cost-effective 
interventions reflecting the burden of disease of the country (Bowie and Mwase, 2011). 
While this allows the Health sector to concentrate on the most severe health problems, 
this also provides ‘Value for Money’ for aid funding, a concept increasingly important 
to a number of donors (OECD, 2012a). Indeed, the content of EHP is often determined 
through the use of disability-adjusted life years (DALY) which mathematically 
establishes prioritisation. One DALY represent ‘one year of health life lost due to a 
disability or premature mortality’ (Sandusky, 2006: 11). The effectiveness of a treatment 
is calculated by dividing the number of DALYs averted by the cost of the treatment. In 
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Malawi though these choices were made through wide-ranging consultation, rather 
than mechanical quantification. Yet DALY are often used to assess the validity of this 
selection (Bowie and Mwase, 2011) and can thus be seen as an increasingly important 
tool for prioritisation. In addition, as Sandusky (2006: 11) notes EHP entrenches a 
specific rationality whereby ‘essential services are assigned based on resources 
availability rather than need’.  
 
Indicators measuring the achievement of outputs and objectives are included in an 
annual workplan and allow progress on the implementation of the EHP to be tracked . 
As the SWAp MoU indicates:  
 
‘The Government and the Collaborating Partners consent to a final set of SWAp 
indicators, including measurable indicators of input, output, and impact at both 
district and national level. Each indicator will have specified baseline and target 
values (annual, and end of program), and be disaggregated wherever possible by 
district, disadvantaged groups, and other relevant categories.’  
(Republic of Malawi, 2004b, art.8) 
 
Similarly, the NAC’s National HIV/AIDS Strategic Framework had identified eight 
areas of priorities and its Annual Integrated Workplan focused on key issues, 
disaggregated into activities with corresponding output targets. Monitoring and 
evaluation also provides information on progress made, as this NAC staff member 
explains:  
 
‘The M&E [Monitoring and Evaluation] framework has got a minimum set of 
indicators that we should collect information on. And this includes indicators 
that fall in 4 categories: it’s got impact indicators, outcome indicators, process 
indicators and as well as input indicators. So I think we have a set of about 56 
indicators if I remember correctly across the four areas. So we have key data 
sources where we get this information, largely it’s from the various 
implementing agencies and then we have line ministries which have their own 
existing information systems, so those are also data sources. Then we also have 
periodic surveys like the demographic and health survey, the welfare 
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monitoring survey and other related ones so those ones will usually get outcome 
as well as impact indicators.’ 
(GoM interview 7) 
 
There is also a multiplication of instruments improving the readability of policy 
implementation. During my fieldwork in Malawi, I represented Action Aid 
International Malawi at a meeting discussing the introduction of a tool called the 
National AIDS Spending Assessment (NASA). The NASA tracks resources devoted to 
AIDS and allows ‘a comprehensive analysis of actual expenditures’ (Kioko, 2008). The 
NASA includes information on financing (source of funding and agents), the provision 
of services and their use (beneficiaries and type of spending). National Health is another 
noteworthy tool enabling greater scrutiny of the resources affected to the Health sector.  
 
However, Malawi was seen by donors as still lacking suitable ‘calculative technologies’ 
(Miller and Rose, 1990: 11) allowing achievements to be measured against national 
policies: 
 
‘What has been missing in Malawi is a direct and uniformed tracking of 
financial accountability with programmatic outcomes.’  
(Donor interview 6) 
 
Improvement in this area was on donors’ agenda, as this donor representative explains:  
 
 ‘Another challenge is… pushing them as well to do more impact analysis. I 
think those are really critical in order to understand how the money flows, 
where it goes, who it is benefiting and if it’s really reaching […] the intended 
beneficiaries. These are the sort of data that we really would like to see and 
we’re not really starting to see very much yet, so…. It’s part of our influence, 
[…] it’s across the board… several partners would like to see a bit more evidence 
around that.’ 
 (Donor interview 3) 
 
A further step in the direction of this new grammar of policy implementation is to link 
these targets to funding. Indeed, a noteworthy change linked to the implementation of 
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PFM has been a shift towards ‘Public Expenditure Management’. As Box 4 below 
describes, this approach bases budget allocation on reaching specific targets, linked to 
government policies. It is often shored up by a decentralised responsibility for budget 
management and civil service reforms linking pay to performance. It is thought to 
improve accountability, transparency and efficiency by establishing clear links between 
targets met and allocation.  
 
Box 4: paradigm shift in budgeting (from ODI, 2004) 
 
Old paradigm  
‘conventional budgeting’ 
 
Budget process 
Rules 
Inputs 
Compliance 
Centralised control 
Bureaucratic opaqueness 
 
New Paradigm  
‘Public Expenditure Management’ 
 
Budget policies and institutions 
Incentives 
Outputs/outcomes 
Performance 
Decentralised responsibility 
Transparency and accountability  
 
 
The implementation of MTEF has often been concurrent to this type of paradigm shift. 
As Simwaka (2004: 37) explains: ‘the role of the budget under the MTEF was to change 
from a centralised inventory of inputs adjusted on an incremental basis11 to an output-
focused approach based on costings of priority activities and projections of available 
resources’. The MTEF thus entrenches radical changes in the ways in which the budget 
                                                 
11 This is a budget prepared using a previous period’s budget or actual performance as a basis with 
incremental amounts added for the new budget period. 
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is implemented, where allocations are based on performance, usually based on reaching 
a set of pre-defined targets (or outcomes and outputs12), rather than based on input i.e. 
reflecting past years’ fund allocation. However, performance budgeting covers a 
number of varied approaches from ‘the hard-edged contractualism of New Public 
Management to activity-based costing’ (IMF, 2008). As Tan (2010) notes, the approach 
to health planning is shifting increasingly from input-based to results-, or performance-
based planning and budgeting.  
 
In Malawi, output-based allocations in the Health sector were advocated after the 2007 
National Health Account (covering years between 2002-2003 to 2004-2005) showed 
that despite considerable increases in donor, government spending as well as household 
spending, ‘very little in terms of quality of care, access to and utilization of public 
health care services had improved’ (Health Systems 20/20, 2012). This triggered a 
review that sought to examine the strengthening of Level Agreement/Output Based 
Financing with mission facilities (which deliver a large proportion of health care in 
Malawi) and ‘investigate the feasibility and viability of alternative financing 
mechanisms for paying its providers such as performance-based financing or 
conditional cash transfers to beneficiaries for specific outputs’ (Ministry of Health, 
2007: 45). Thus performance-based budgeting was still nascent in the Health sector at 
the time of my fieldwork. However, as this quote from an MoH official insinuates, this 
constitutes the next step that the GoM is expected to take:  
 
‘Yeah, I’d want probably the Government as a bureaucratic institution, probably 
we should move to more performance-based disbursement.’ 
(GoM interview 8) 
 
These requests from donors for greater accountability for results can be seen as 
programmatic as they seek to institutionalise systems allowing greater coherence 
                                                 
12 Outcomes representing the desired results and outputs the intermediary steps to achieve it. 
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between policies and their implementation, through the use of targets-setting and 
monitoring. As Miller and Rose (2008: 29) state, governmentality is ‘characterized by an 
eternal optimism that a domain or a society could be administered better or more 
effectively, that reality is, in some way or other, programmable’.  
 
This new grammar of policy can be seen as allowing donors to conduct at a distance, by 
increasing their scrutiny over GoM’s operations as well as by making it easier to steer 
its policies in specific directions. According to Porter (1996) the status-conferring 
quality of numbers as objective and disinterested is key in situations where authority is 
not secure. Thus, the use of targets can be seen as providing donors with a tool allowing 
supervision of government activities. The need for enumeration is particularly acute in 
areas such as AIDS where desired outcomes are not immediate:  
 
‘And yes, it may be a while before we see a declining prevalence or a delay in 
sexual debut or a reduction in the number of sexual partners which are all either 
high level outcome or impact indicators. But if we can track in terms of teachers 
trained, children receiving life skills training, children receiving text books, 
orphans being supported, those are the intermediate indicators that can point 
towards some progress in the achievement of a high level outcome or impact 
indicators.’  
(Donor interview 6) 
 
Indeed, the need to demonstrate performance was echoed on the government’s side, 
exposing the requirement to demonstrate, not only progress with the national response 
to the AIDS epidemics, but also effectiveness: 
 
‘We need to be result-based, us as implementing partners, as a grant recipient, 
we should make sure that we focus on results […] Because at the end of the day, 
we are looking for impact: what has the money done at the end of the day? 
That’s just what we want to know. So the issue of monitoring implementation as 
impact is very critical in this particular case.’  
(GoM interview 9) 
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In addition, the homogenising quality of numbers creates avenues to implement ‘global’ 
priorities down to the district level. Indeed, this economy of enumeration, while 
appearing neutral is always political. As Alonso and Starr (1987, in Rose, 1999) political 
values and judgements guide the choice of what to measure, how to measure it and how 
to present and interpret the data. As this NAC staff member points out:  
 
‘The M&E [Monitoring and Evaluation] plan is also aligned on the regional as 
well as global reporting requirements like the SADC [Southern Africa 
Development Community], for example, as well as the UNGASS which is the 
UN. So after every two years we also produce an M&E report which informs 
reporting requirements for the UN.’ 
(GoM interview 7) 
 
Similarly the National AIDS Spending Assessment (NASA) was ‘compatible with upper-
level or aggregated systems’ (Kioko, 2008) allowing greater international scrutiny and 
comparison. As Miller and Rose (1990: 18) argue, conducting at a distance entails 
technologies which ‘appeared to enhance the autonomy of zones, persons, entities, but 
enwrapped them in new forms of regulation – audits, budgets, standards, risk 
management, targets, shadow of the law, etc.’ As this MoH official explains: 
 
‘So much is related to the targets we have agreed, to the indicators and things 
like that.’  
(GoM interview 8) 
 
In this respect, numbers are the principle vehicles of this governmentality, ‘structuring 
the field of action’ (Foucault, 1991a), creating hierarchies and order, zones of visibility 
where action and resources are to be channelled. 
 
This is particularly relevant with regards to decentralisation. As explained in chapter 3, 
decentralisation in Malawi, was in the process of devolving new power and 
responsibilities at district level, including for the management of the health sector and 
the AIDS response. However, lack of administrative and human resource capacity 
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constitutes a hindrance to a correct implementation of national policies, as this NAC 
staff member explains:  
 
‘I would say it [the greatest challenge] is mostly at district level, because that’s 
where the action takes place most. At central level it’s like the issue of policy-
development, strategy-development, issues of quality assurance, standard setting 
and stuff like that. But when it comes to implementation, whether through the 
public system or the civil society structure, I think that’s where we experience 
lots of challenges.’  
(GoM interview 7)  
 
Thus, donors have participated in the elaboration of instruments such as the district 
planning tool which were developed to help improve the measurement of performance 
against national targets at district level:  
 
‘What we are doing at this stage is ensuring that we have both the mechanisms 
to track the effective use of resources, - that’s the financial accountability - but 
tying this at the district level to programmatic indicators to ensure that there is 
also programmatic accountability. The financial indicators tell one about money 
in money out and who has been accountable for it, but what is important for us 
is what that money has achieved.’  
(Donor interview 6)  
 
 
While some of these methodologies of government have shown positive results, 
focusing limited resources where it was likely to make the biggest impact, both in terms 
of substance and geographically (see Bowie and Mwase, 2011), they have, at a deeper 
level, important de-politicizing effects. Indeed, these technologies of government can 
be seen as seeking to introduce a technical linearity between available funding, policy 
choice-making based on value-for-money and internationally-promoted ‘best practices’, 
target-setting facilitating implementation, reporting, evaluation and monitoring, 
auditing, etc. What these technologies reveal is an ‘instrumental conception of the state 
and politics’ (Peñafiel, 2008 in Bergamaschi, 2009), a vision of government as a service-
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delivery depoliticized machine, where the process of translating internationally 
recognized (and approved) policies such as those outlined in PRSPs into locally 
implemented activities is made as seamless as possible. Significantly, this was articulated 
by one of the participants at the NASA meeting I attended. The person argued that 
coupled with research-based evidence, this new tool would enable ‘optimum policy 
decisions’ to be taken. This is indicative of the increased inclination to use calculative 
techniques in order to reach policy decisions.  
 
This can be seen as having adverse effects on the development of political parties based 
on ideological orientation and contributes to reinforcing, instead, a patrimonial regime. 
Indeed, if governments have to commit to policy documents such as the MGDS for 
longer than their electoral mandate, then any alternative proposals might jeopardize 
donor funding. With MTEF translating PRSPs into implemented policies, democracy 
becomes an optional extra: 
 
‘This is all possible because politicians in this country have little influence over 
what’s going on. By politicians I mean Parliament. The executive manages the 
money, and democracy is still in its infancy. We are basically a toddler, in the 
sense that Parliament sometimes is seen as an interference in government 
business […] This has been encouraged because I think there is very little that 
the donors want to do with Parliament and that culture over years from the 
dictatorship to ten years of a very powerful government that had its way in 
Parliament, it’s still pretty much what goes on. So there is very little that takes 
place by way of interrogating what the executive has proposed, but more 
importantly what the executive has achieved. […] The whole due process of 
managed accountability, downward accountability, to the citizenry, 
accountability within the government systems is skewed. It’s about providing 
accountability to donors and that has a cost, that has its liabilities.’ 
(NGO/CSO interview 6) 
 
Interestingly, this may suit governments in power. In Malawi, as in many African 
countries, the political system is Presidential, with the executive branch of government 
concentrating power at the expense of Parliament. Thus, the role of Parliament in the 
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implementation of the MGDS is restricted to enhancing ‘Parliamentary oversight, 
transparency and accountability’ by ensuring that ‘budget is being used to provide 
resources for the prioritised activities in the MGDS’. (Government of Malawi, 2006: 72). 
 
But the technicalisation and depoliticisation of policy can also be read as the 
deployment of a certain neoliberal rationality. As Ong (2006: 3) states: ‘neoliberalism 
can also be conceptualized as a new relationship between government and knowledge 
through which governing activities are recast as nonpolitical and nonideological 
problems that need technical solutions.’ Indeed, the power of these calculative practices 
is to ‘shape the ways in which we frame the choices open to individuals, businesses and 
other organizations’ (Miller and Rose, 1990: 11). The deployment of these technical 
methodologies of government thus contributes to extend market rationality to new 
areas of government, through a shift from professional to financial accountability. As 
Miller and Rose (2008: 41) explain, under this rationality, personal and professional 
judgment is replaced by ‘the objectivity of economic-financial calculations’. They state: 
‘the enclosures of expertise are to be penetrated through a range of new techniques for 
exercising critical scrutiny over authority: budget disciplines, accountancy and audit 
being three of the most salient’. In this respect, this grammar of policy can be seen as a 
‘critique of previous governmental reason’ (Foucault, 2008: 284) seeking to displace 
bureaucratic and professionally based judgment by calculation based on market 
rationality allowing the ‘best’ allocation of funds.  
 
In addition, the governmental technologies outlined above can be seen as displacing 
issues pertaining to global inequalities and concentrating on the flaws on of the system 
as they appear at country or community level. Target-setting can be seen as discursively 
constituting ‘reality’, creating ‘internal homogeneity and an external boundary’ (Rose, 
1999: 212). By localising ill health at various levels of the state apparatus, it suggests 
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these areas are the source of these problems, conveniently bypassing international 
dynamics involved in creating these issues, from brain drain to trade policies. As Tan 
states:  
 
‘Reducing economic marginalisation and social inequality to the lowest 
territorial denominator not only distorts the magnitude of the problem, it 
localises the politics of poverty by suggesting that this is where the dislocations 
are most acute and where interventions should be targeted.’  
(Tan, 2011: 1048) 
 
The focus on government and community levels brought about by this repertoire of 
policy-related techniques can also be seen to divert attention from global dynamics of 
inequalities: 
 
‘Emphasis on country ownership also precludes discussion on international 
factors which contribute to the economic and social pressures faced by 
developing countries and forecloses possibilities of a wider international reform 
agenda on issues such as declining terms of trade, asymmetrical trade and 
investment rules and the absence of international regulation of finance capital 
which also impact adversely on countries’ capacities to generate and sustain 
revenue for such development’  
(Tan, 2010: 124)  
 
As this interviewee highlights, the effects of the Paris Declaration and its associated 
technologies contribute to excluding other ideas and values:  
 
‘I think that there should be a lot more room for alternative world views, I think 
that this business of international law being what a few selected countries 
preferred […] has serious consequences.’ 
(NGO/CSO interview 6) 
 
 
The new aid architecture thus appears to entrench a regime of practices, defined by 
Dean (1999: 31) as the ‘routinized and ritualized ways we do these things in certain 
places and at certain times’. Through the greater involvement of donors at government 
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level, involving prioritisation based on a repertoire including the establishment of 
priorities, target-setting, budgeting, planning, reviewing and auditing, are promoted as 
internationally recognised norms. The entrenchment of these techniques can be seen as 
a tool for leading at a distance, enabling greater scrutiny and influence from donors. But 
it also appears to have depoliticising effects through the inculcation of a specific 
neoliberal rationality, recoding activities in terms of ‘incomes, allocations, costs, savings 
and even profits’ (Rose, 1999: 152), extending market rationality and modes of 
calculations at the expense of bureaucratic and democratic accountabilities, localising 
problems while leaving global inequalities unquestioned and ‘locking in’ neoliberalism 
in a way that marginalises alternative worldviews. The next section examines potential 
avenues for resistance to this new rationality.  
 
 
7.4. Resistance to neoliberal governmentality? Politics and lack of capacity  
 
Foucault’s conceptualisation of governmentality has been seen as failing to 
acknowledge the possibility of resistance to this economy of power (McKee, 2009). 
Indeed, new modes of governmentality, for instance neoliberal governmentalities, 
which emerge as critique of previous rationalities, appear, if anything, as more 
totalizing, colonising an increasing array of behaviours and deploying ever more 
sophisticated and specific technologies targeted at shaping subjects. The agentic 
qualities of this mode of government that operates through freedom also makes the idea 
of resistance problematic (Rose et al., 2006), as freedom is seen as a construction 
through which power operates by creating incentives and disincentives influencing 
subjects’ choice-making. This section examines how the individuals I interviewed have 
articulated the possibility of resistance to the imposition of reforms by donors. 
Interestingly, this is not a question that I asked directly but discussions about relations 
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between donors and the GoM often led research participants (especially from the 
government and civil society) to elaborate on the ways in which the GoM had been 
trying to limit donors’ influence. Interestingly, given the agentic and programmatic 
nature of the mode of government, demonstration of political will and sovereignty from 
the government was seen as offering a possibility for resistance, pointing to the 
‘counter-conducts’ identified by McNay (1994). However, I argue that another form of 
opposition to the deployment of these technologies of power is embedded in their own 
contradictions, particularly in the lack of capacity of government that is both essential 
to and undermined by the implementation of the Paris Declaration.  
 
7.4.1. Political will as counter conduct? 
 
Collins (2011) states that relations between donors and aid-recipient governments are 
often understood either as subjugation with donors imposing their priorities, or 
conversely as still offering the possibility for the exercise of sovereignty by poor 
countries. The latter view affirms their agency building on examples where aid-
recipients have either frankly and publicly disagreed with donors or passively opposed 
the reforms they agreed to carry out. This second conceptualisation was volunteered 
frequently enough in the course of my fieldwork to deserve attention.  
 
The example of fertilizer subsidies in particular surfaced many times in interviews with 
Malawian citizens. The episode appeared to have acquired near-mythical qualities as an 
example of donor defiance, evoking the possibility of such insubordination reoccurring, 
and presenting the quid pro quo between donors and the GoM as a balance that could 
be unsettled, should donors become too domineering. The fertilizer subsidy programme 
was aimed at addressing the chronic food shortage by providing subsidised fertilizers to 
those most in need (for a detailed account, see Chissinga, 2007). It was fiercely opposed 
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by the IMF and USAID and received lukewarm reception from DFID, the EU and the 
World Bank (Chissinga, 2007). In the absence of donor funding to support it, the 
programme risked furthering the government deficit and jeopardizing prospects of 
reaching the HIPC completion point alleviating its US$ 113 million debt (Chissinga, 
2007). Thus, the implementation of the programme, against many donors’ judgement, 
was seen as a coup de force from the President, especially as it led to a bumper harvest 
(thanks in part to adequate rainfall that year). Though the overall success of the 
fertilizer programme is disputed (Booth et al., 2006), it has been hailed a triumph of 
political will and exercise of sovereignty over donors’ imposed prescriptions, especially 
as fertilizer subsidies were subsequently supported by donors in other poor countries 
(Dugger, 2007; Chissinga, 2007). This narrative was articulated by many interviewees as 
a sign of the GoM’s ability to defy donors:  
 
‘E.M.: - Isn’t there a risk that if the government goes against these IMF 
principles, that some donors will withdraw funds. Is it not a bit of a dilemma for 
the government? 
GoM: - I will give you an example, when a decision was made to provide 
agriculture subsidy, donors said you can’t manage, you don’t have money. The 
President said, donor or no donor, I’m going to provide agriculture subsidy, and 
that just changed our GDP [growth] from -2% to -3%, all of a sudden to 8.5%, 
which is a very big leap, and it also helped us to attain food security, and to have 
surplus in 2005/2006, 2006/2007, 2007/08 so that has helped us a lot. So it really 
requires highest political commitment.’  
(GoM interview 5) 
 
‘If you look for example at the agriculture input subsidy programme, you would 
get the feeling reading through the literature, the indications that we are getting 
is that the donors were against the input subsidies. But government still went 
ahead with some resistance from the donors. But if you look at the benefits it’s 
fine, the benefits are better.’  
(NGO/CSO interview 9) 
 
Other examples of the government taking a stand against donors, such as the 
privatisation of the Agricultural Development and Marketing Corporation (ADMARC), 
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which had a monopoly over the buying and selling of grain, or the signing of the 
European Partnership Agreement, were also seen as signs that donors’ influence could 
be circumscribed:  
 
‘ADMARC, there was a time where one international organisation – I think it 
was World Bank – was pushing for privatisation, forgetting I think the social 
function that ADMARC was playing, like making seeds and (fertilisers) available 
to the local farmers. I think Oxfam and the other partners took up that issue and 
lobbied the government not to privatise ADMARC. […] And then of course the 
whole debate around the Economic Partnership Agreement between the EU and 
the HIPC countries […] the government hasn’t signed. […] You saw how he 
[the President of Malawi] reacted to the EPAs13 [European Partnership 
Agreements], he said: “Malawi will not sign because it will not benefit us. But 
also if we are forced to sign, then this more of economic imperialism”’. 
(NGO/CSO interview 9) 
 
Interestingly, a consequence of this narrative was the perceived ability of the Malawian 
government to exercise its sovereignty in spite of donors’ influence and prescriptions, 
providing the government had the will to do so:  
 
‘Because government has decided against the wishes of the IMF, that it was 
going to implement the subsidy program, ok, that was purely against the IMF, 
but they went ahead and did it, and it was successful, so for me they can do 
anything […] If they are determined.’ 
 (NGO/CSO interview 5) 
 
Thus, this discourse puts the onus on the government to show strength and articulate a 
vision that can convince donors:  
 
I think there’s still limited leadership and ownership from the Government. 
Many things can be easily done if there’s more leadership and ownership in the 
sense of one directing. So yes donors… I think donors will go in the direction of 
the country if it is stronger. […] So, to me, it still boils down to the government.  
(NGO/CSO interview 7) 
                                                 
13 European Partnership Agreements: a scheme to create a free trade area between the European Union 
and the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP). 
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To some extent, these opinions chime with findings from Whitfield and Maipose 
(2008). In their studies of ownership looking in detail at eight African countries, they 
show that the degree of control by African governments over their policies is not 
necessarily defined by their reliance on aid (calculated as proportion of their gross 
national income). Other factors such as strong state institutions, geo-strategic 
importance, good macro-economic management in the 1980s and, indeed, national 
vision seem more crucial to influencing the context in which negotiations between 
donors and aid-recipient government take place.  
 
However, from a governmentality perspective, it is interesting to point out how this 
narrative constructs the GoM as an entrepreneur of itself, in charge of making 
appropriate choices (Hamann, 2009). It contributes to furthering the agentic qualities of 
the new aid architecture, the imperative for choice-making, while minimising external 
factors shaping these decisions. There is thus perhaps a meeting point between the 
perception of the government as ‘free’ to oppose donors and the deployment of a 
neoliberal governmentality through the new aid architecture. As this interviewee 
explains:  
 
‘I think in Malawi … and again there was a lot of talks about the kind of 
programme this country should be doing being donor-driven. But I think now 
even they [donors] have realised that it would help government not to be seen 
to be influenced by donors.’  
(NGO/CSO interview 9) 
 
Presenting the government as free to make its own choices thus appears to benefit both 
the GoM vis-à-vis its citizens, and donors as it embodies the central idea behind PRSPs 
and the new aid architecture, and the vector through which neoliberal governmentality 
operates. As Foucault (2001: 1055) argues, in governmental power relations, ‘the “other” 
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(the one over whom power is exercised) must be recognized and maintained to the very 
end as a subject who acts’14. 
 
 As Hamann (2009) highlights, the irony of neoliberal governmentality is that the ‘freer’ 
subjects become, the more trained they are to make calculative and rational choices 
based on incentives. And these incentives are made clear by conditionalities and the 
reliance on donors’ funding. Indeed, while the government has sometimes made 
choices going against donors’ interests, such acts of bravado can be costly. The 
possibility of funding being withdrawn, although in no way an immediate threat at the 
time of my fieldwork was evoked by a number of interviewees and appeared to be part 
of the context they were operating in, as this NAC official articulates:  
 
‘We have more than 180,000 people who are starting on ARTs15. This is thanks 
to the courtesy of the Global Fund… We need to find a way for local resource 
mobilisation to supplement that in case something goes wrong with the grant. 
Suppose the Global Fund closes today which I hope it cannot because they have 
already made an investment. For them to walk away now, it means they are 
putting millions of lives at stake. So I don’t expect them to walk away but at 
least we must find a way to match some of these resources. It’s not easy. We’re 
looking at competing requirements. Some of these investments they cannot be 
sustained but they are making a big difference. So I don’t expect big multilateral 
institutions to close overnight because even if the donor governments 
themselves would be … they would be accountable for these lives they have 
helped save.’ 
(GoM interview 9)  
 
Hence, the deployment of governmentality appears to rely in part on aid-dependency 
and fear of losing funding as a catalyser. Material inequalities between donors and the 
GoM are key to the ways in which governmental technologies are able to colonise the 
                                                 
14 ‘”l’autre” (celui sur lequel elle s’exerce) soit bien reconnu et maintenu jusqu’au bout comme subject 
d’action’, Translated by Ivan A.Ramirez - published in Pli The Warwick Journal of Philosophy 
14 This is not to deny that recipient countries had some degree of agency in the previous period, but that 
it was conceived as antagonistic or irrelevant to the goals of donors. 
15 Antiretroviral treatments. 
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state apparatus, imposing their logic, supporting norms of conduct and establishing 
‘regimes of truth’ that seek to subjectify the GoM. As this MoH official explains, the 
aid-dependency takes away the ability to resist conditionalities:  
 
‘The Global Fund came into the pool with additional conditionalities which are 
not part and parcel of the MoU […] I would have loved if we had said ‘no, just 
buy into the conditions that are already in the MoU’.  
(GoM interview 8) 
 
As this quote shows, aid-dependency makes it difficult for the GoM to resist demands 
from donors.  
 
Thus governmentality, although distinct in its operation from domination in which 
violence is central, does rest on the possibility of recourse to it – or in this case indirect 
‘violence’ through the suffering that massive funding withdrawal would cause. As Best 
(2007: 100) argues, ‘the promise of inclusion is always haunted by the threat of 
exclusion’. As a result, possibility for resistance or ‘counter conducts’ can seem 
restricted to the occasional salient disagreement or the very costly confrontation, 
leaving little room for the GoM to negotiate on its own terms on a regular basis. An 
instance of the latter scenario actually took place when in July 2011 the UK joined an 
already long list of donors including The World Bank, the EU, the African 
Development Bank, Germany and Norway that had suspended or ended general budget 
support to Malawi (Tran, 2011), following controversial decisions from the government 
to maintain an overvalued exchange rate as well the increasing autocratic measures 
taken by President Bingu Wa Mutharika to restrict signs of opposition to his rule, 
including repressing demonstrators and intimidating CSOs. While this is not the type of 
act of resistance against donors’ interest that can be seen as being of benefit to its 
citizens, it is indicative of the material power relations that support the elaboration of 
the more productive, consensus-seeking, technique-oriented form of power that 
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governmentality represents. But it also suggests the conceptual difficulties of extending 
the concept of governmentality to relations between donors and aid recipients (or 
inter-state relations in general): the potential lack of congruence between the interests 
of the government and those of the majority of its citizens. While aid-dependent 
governments may be able to find a way (particularly in light of the rise of Southern 
donors) not to be governed ‘at that cost’ (Foucault, 2007: 45), or to put it in another 
way, not to be ‘governed in ways that are limiting and intolerable’ (Hamann, 2009: 58), 
the benefits of these new power relations for their population is a different, though 
crucial issue. 
 
However, the increased importance of donors such as China may provide an alternative 
to traditional donors. As this interviewee articulates, this may lead to a less 
asymmetrical relation, giving the GoM the possibility to sidestep technologies of 
subjectification and create new subjectivities:  
 
‘I think when we have an alternative world view and a meeting point you are 
likely to be a lot more objective and solutions are likely to be a lot more, players 
are likely to be more receptive to what you consider unconventional and 
unorthodox solutions that might be really effective than what has currently 
being the case.’  
(NGO/CSO interview 6) 
 
In this context, the rise of ‘new’ donors is seen as threatening by some of the traditional 
donors, as this interviewee continues:  
 
‘I recall meetings that I’ve attended and where the Chinese have been said to be 
bad people, official meetings with donors.’  
(NGO/CSO interview 6) 
 
The rise of ‘trilateral development cooperation’ (McEwan and Mawdsley, 2012) 
involving traditional donors as well as Southern ones may alter the deployment of 
governmentality. In Malawi, the increasing importance of China as a donor (further 
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developed in the afterword) may provide the GoM leverage in order to negotiate its 
relations with traditional donors on a less unequal footing, making it possible what 
Foucault calls ‘the art of not being governed, or better, the art of not being governed 
like that and at that cost’ (Foucault, 2007b: 45).  
 
Yet, another avenue for a less straightforward, more muddled form of resistance can be 
envisaged: the lack of capacity of the GoM to perform its role under the Paris 
Declaration may offer an inadvertent challenge to the operationalization of neoliberal 
governmentality analysed in chapters 6 and 7.  
 
7.4.2. The capacity conundrum: resistance through dysfunction? 
 
A possibly more effective way through which this new governmentality is made to fail 
resides in its own inherent contradictions. As Miller and Rose (2008: 39) state, ‘“the 
real” always insists in the form of resistance to programming’. The new aid architecture, 
particularly through the intensification of the relations between donors and aid-
dependent governments that it involves, as well as the reforms it requires, hinges on an 
adequate capacity of the GoM to respond to these demands. However, as section 7.3 
exposed, these same reforms undermine the GoM’s ability to develop a suitable public 
sector workforce by restricting public spending and promoting a ‘small government’ 
ideology. As Clarke (2008: 144) notes with regard to neoliberal governmentalities: ‘as 
innovative strategies, they may generate new contradictions, antagonisms and 
dysfunctions (Clarke, 2008: 144).  
 
Indeed, while one of the rationales of the Paris Declaration was to reduce transaction 
costs, the new aid architecture appears instead to be extremely staff-intensive, at least 
on the GoM’s part. As Batley argues:  
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‘Transaction costs might be high under the Paris Declaration because of staff-
intensive PFM reforms and coordination costs as SWAps and other pool funding 
mechanisms require a lot of planning and coordinating. Also the more the 
government assumes ownership, the more it also acquires the costs of administering 
delivery’.  
(Batley, 2005: 421) 
This was echoed by this donor representative:  
 
‘Some people are talking about reducing the transaction costs. I haven’t seen … 
[…] I mean: somebody brings me evidence that this runs cheaper than before. 
[…] And the other thing is in parallel to it, like the Ministry of Finance 
department, of course, their cost in a way is increasing because of all the 
engagement, or if you look at institutional costs of the National AIDS 
Commission, mandated, from Governments at the moment. […] The thing is 
whether it is a reduction of costs or it’s a shifting of costs from one to another 
[…] it’s not based on evidence. It’s a feeling.’  
(Donor interview 1) 
 
This remark points to a validation of Unwin’s argument of the new aid architecture as a 
means of transferring transaction costs from donors to recipient countries (Unwin, 
2004).  
 
However, the GoM’s capacity is severely constrained. In that respect, the NAC which 
was operating as a semi-autonomous trust appeared to fare better than the Ministry of 
Health which suffered from severe human resource shortage:  
 
‘The big problem we have here is that the Paris Declaration talk very clearly 
about country ownership but in the Ministry of Health the vacancy rate is […] 
very, very high. Staff in the Ministry of Health are constantly… have too much 
work, much too much work… I mean they have a high vacancy rate but that’s 
within the context of a very poorly funded sector anyway so the number of 
people working on health issues in the Ministry of Health in Malawi is far less 
than the number working on it in a country like the UK for example so they’re 
already very, very stretched. The burden of disease, it’s different but arguably 
it’s higher than a place like the UK. So finding that leadership amongst staff who 
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have so much to do, have so little support in their day jobs, can be very difficult 
and that’s a real challenge.’ 
(Donor interview 3) 
 
‘You ask them for this report and that report, and they have to get that report to 
that organization, they […] tend to struggle with those things out there. Most of 
the time, it’s because they’re under too much pressure, too many things 
happening around the same people, so sometimes some of these things tend to 
be delayed.’ 
(Donor interview 4) 
 
Lack of human resources was also raised in other ministries such as the Ministry of 
Finance. Low salaries compared to those provided by donor agencies and non-
governmental agencies for example, made it difficult to retain staff, especially in 
positions requiring technical expertise. As this MoF staff member stated, this created an 
unstable work environment, prejudicial to effectiveness:  
 
‘Having the right numbers of people who can work on a particular project is also 
sometimes a problem because there is always a turnover of staff, who come in 
and go when they are given some greener pastures, somewhere they will tend to 
leave…and they are always creating gaps.’  
(GoM interview 2) 
 
The lack of investment at Ministry-level was also visible through the lack of 
equipment. While carrying out interviews at the MoH, the lack of basic office items 
such as filing cabinets was striking, with files being piled on the floor and against the 
walls. IT capabilities were also problematic, as this donor representative illustrates:  
 
‘How we define capacity-building, that’s another story but if we look at the HR 
as one of the issues, I would look at state of the art equipment and things … 
you’ve been to government obviously. They are still using Windows 98!’ 
(Donor interview 10) 
 
Thus, the lack of human and material capacity at ministerial level was seen as 
jeopardizing the GoM’s ability to carry out the operations necessary to the 
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implementation of the Paris Declaration, which required the management of extra 
funding channelled through the state system:  
 
‘One of the problems is that you know, the SWAp is usually huge, so most 
projects usually are for about 15 million, 20 million but when you’re talking 
about the SWAp, you’re talking about 100 million a year. Now that’s a lot of 
activities.’  
 (Donor interview 4)  
 
Indeed, in many ways, the aid effectiveness agenda is extremely demanding for the 
aid-recipient government. Not only does it have to manage an increased amount of 
donor funding, but, as we have seen in this chapter, it also has to undergo significant 
reforms of its systems. As this donor representative states:  
 
‘Donors can often be very hungry for reforms but also concerned to make sure 
that reform is pulled along by the Government of Malawi and its partners. And 
what happens is balancing the pace of reform and ownership by the 
Government here can be a very difficult balance to achieve.’  
(Donor interview 3) 
 
As Miller and Rose (2008: 38) explain, ‘programmes of government are idealized 
schemata for the ordering of social and economic life.’ However, in this case, these 
programmes are confronted by a reality they have helped to create. PFM reforms are 
very technical (ActionAid International, 2006b: 36). Procurement procedures in 
particular were seen as creating bottlenecks and hindering the implementation of the 
AIDS response. Indeed, some donors viewed government procedures as unsuitable and 
extensive reforms were thus requested:  
 
‘Another negative, well not so negative but still, we are meant to use 
procurement systems that are not of Government, to satisfy the partners […] 
They thought that the Government system was not yet robust enough so we 
agreed that at the beginning of the programme we would use the World Bank 
procurement guidelines and then we would move to the [reformed] 
Government’s procurement systems.’  
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 (GoM interview 8) 
 
As this MoF official notes, procurement is an area where alignment of donors on 
government’s procedures and even harmonisation amongst donors was problematic: 
 
‘Funny issue, procurement. Because each donor comes with how they can 
procure and how. Issues of tying it [funding] to procedures in some cases.’ 
(GoM interview 4) 
 
There were debates, even amongst the donor representatives I interviewed, as to the 
suitability of government procedures. Some, argued that they were ill suited to 
international procurements:  
 
‘As an example, national rules and regulations for procurement would require 
that your bids are in the national currency, Malawi currency but now Malawi 
currency is not exactly stable, if you are quoting from elsewhere, you don’t want 
to take that risk, the risk of an unstable currency, that’s one. Secondly, 
arbitration: according to national procurement regulations it is governed using 
the national laws, if you are bidding from outside Malawi, you may not find that 
necessarily very attractive, you might want some international arbitration.’ 
 (Donor interview 13) 
 
However, others were more doubtful about the need for a change:  
 
‘- some people are so stringent on their procurements. […] Everyone has to 
subscribe to the smallest common denominator.[…] The Malawi Government 
had a very adequate procurement system. Why people can’t accept that, why we 
have to use the World Bank system or the Global Fund system, I actually don’t 
know.’  
(Donor interview 1) 
 
 
In any case, donor-imposed procurement procedures appeared complex and work-
intensive, and somewhat ill-adapted to the GoM’s capacity:  
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‘…because it also involves changing the tender documents and things like that, 
that’s also a process, it’s not a straightforward thing’  
(Donor interview 13) 
 
‘In procurement we are saying EDF [European Development Fund] procedures 
are always very cumbersome, if they allowed us to use our national procedures, 
then it would be much better.’  
(GoM interview 2) 
 
These procedures were also subject to change, requiring staff to be retrained in order to 
operate within the new framework:  
 
‘The EDF procedures have always been changing…so they’re always changing 
their procedures that means you have to keep on building capacity, so that 
people are up to date with the procedures which are current.’  
(GoM interview 2) 
 
Indeed, Booth et al (2007: 5) for example have characterised donor-driven reforms as an 
‘unrealistic expectation of commitments based on ideals rather than on what is 
achievable’. The result of the imposition of these procedures in a sector such as Health 
can have dramatic effects as this MoH official explains:  
 
‘Those procurement systems are … it takes time before you procure something. 
So there has been times where we have not been able to procure a commodity in 
a timely manner for example, procurement of drugs, vaccines… those are things 
that you don’t want, you don’t expect any delays, you’ll want these things to be 
there right and then, but the processes are quite lengthy so … those are some of 
the problems.’  
(GoM interview 8) 
 
Local governments also struggle with time-consuming and technically demanding 
arrangements presiding over their new devolved responsibilities:  
 
‘The NAC rules and regulations are quite complex for the assemblies and they 
are labour intensive especially if they conduct every 3 months so … I experience 
that district assemblies find it difficult to adhere to NAC rules and regulations 
every 3 months and having that kind of labour burden on them, they often 
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delay to adhere to these rules and regulations on time and if they don’t write a 
financial report and put in a financial disbursement request on time then NAC 
cannot process the next disbursement and so yeah… I mean I’ve seen it every 
three months for some time, the scheme gets to a halt.’ 
(Donor interview 12) 
 
As Tan (2010) asserts, PFM reforms are often too complex and technical for poor 
countries to manage and are thus failing. Hence, the lack of capacity of government to 
manage the duties assigned to them through the Paris Declaration can be seen as an 
unintentional way in which the deployment of a neoliberal governmentality may be 
restrained. Miller and Rose (2008: 84) state that ‘whilst “governmentality” is eternally 
optimistic, “government” is a congenitally failing operation.’ In the context of aid 
relations in Malawi, this appears to be maybe too strong a statement. However, the 
failures of governmental technologies to operate successfully point to their limits as 
‘idealized schemata’ seeking to order a reality which often resists organisation through 
its own inadequacies, rather than by consciously opposing its rationality.  
 
The result of this ill fit between the complex technologies of government through 
which donors attempt to manage their relation with the GoM and the incapacity of the 
latter to respond to their demands has unfortunate consequences for those suffering 
from the AIDS pandemic however. The gap between donors’ expectations and the 
ability of the GoM to respond to them was seen as causing potential loss of funding:  
 
‘Look at the conditionalities, that is where we have issues. I have issues […] 
when you look at the EDF disbursements [EU], they are very hard, nobody has 
disbursed I think over 70%, above 70%, the reason is, because the procedures 
are cumbersome and very difficult.[…] When you hear that government has 
been given funding and they are failing to spend because of the procedures, 
those are the things we must try and remove the roadblocks, in terms of 
absorption, because they tend to blame us for failing to absorb when actually the 
problem is on their side.’ 
(NGO/CSO interview 5) 
 
  
287 
 
Lack of properly trained human resources was putting funding in jeopardy. As the 
GoM staff member in charge of coordinating Global Fund grant activities explained:  
 
‘There’s no one who has been working with me so that if I leave they would be 
able to follow up with it. Because their progress updates and reports are quite 
technical and quite time consuming and one has to have a lot of time and 
dedication and interest to do all those things. […] But there’s a lack of capacity. 
It’s not that the ministry doesn’t want but in the planning already we find that 
we are a little thin on the ground.’  
(GoM interview 11) 
 
Thus, the extremely important funding from the Global Fund which financed ARV 
treatment could be compromised by this mismatch brought about by implementing the 
new aid architecture in contexts of poor capacity. In addition, complex procedures 
create impediments to the implementation of a quick response:  
 
‘There are no special provisions to look at what challenges are being faced in the 
health sector for instance, and what provisions can we make to allow for 
expeditious or quick improvements, we know that in global fund there are a lot 
of cases, for instance the global fund to support the human resource for health, 
but they have very cumbersome processes that have taken time, they have been 
processes that are basically traditional bureaucratic, the IMF or World Bank sort 
of processes that are employed in a situation where you are looking at 
accelerating programs.’  
(NGO/CSO interview 6) 
 
Hence, the extensive reforms required by the new aid architecture appear to some 
extent to impede efforts to address the AIDS epidemic in a swift and timely manner:  
 
‘Sometimes we say HIV/AIDS is a crisis, it’s an emergency but when you look at 
the instruments we use to manage HIV and AIDS it’s like a development agenda. 
So it’s not like a tsunami. When you have a tsunami, everybody poured the 
money, we need to have this now, now, now. So the systems were not an issue 
at that time. People wanted to make sure that they addressed rescue, the victims 
and support them. SARS disease was a typical example. When you get to 
HIV/AIDS yes it’s a crisis, it’s an emergency but the way we manage it, you’re 
managing it as a development agenda. You have various points of condition 
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precedents and what have you, so a lot of requirements. […] But they are 
managing an emergency.’  
(GoM interview 9) 
 
 
Resistance to the neoliberal governmentality and its associated technologies thus 
appears either costly and improbable, or inadvertent and potentially damaging to those 
suffering from the consequences of the AIDS epidemic. However, as Foucault (2008) 
has shown, new governmentalities emerge as critiques of previous regimes. The 
dysfunctions highlighted here, combined with the increased importance of non-DAC 
donors such as China may open opportunities to formulate alternative rationalities of 
government.  
 
 
7.5. Conclusion  
 
This chapter has examined how the implementation of the aid effectiveness agenda has 
been concurrent to the deployment of programmatic technologies seeking to re-design 
state systems and institute a certain repertoire of policy-making practices. Indeed, the 
new aid architecture both relies on and promotes reforms of public finance 
management processes. Although donor-driven demands for changes in this area 
predate the Paris Declaration, donor harmonisation promoted by the new aid 
architecture has made aid for health and AIDS by aligned donors dependent on 
conformity with IFIs’ prescriptions concerning PFM. This both creates a greater 
pressure on the GoM to implement these reforms and contributes to blurring the 
distinction between social and the financial/economic sectors.  
 
This chapter has also highlighted how the imposition of this specific methodology of 
government pertaining to public finance management points to the synergies between 
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governmentality and neoliberalism. For example, the implementation of a Medium-
Term Expenditure Framework can be seen as an instrument allowing donors to 
‘conduct at a distance’ by instilling budget discipline in government spending at all 
levels of the state apparatus, and reinforcing a ‘small government’ ideology. In addition, 
the establishment of MTEF produces a certain grammar of policy-making based on the 
prioritisation of activities funded by the state, the setting up of targets creating new 
accountabilities and the move towards performance-based budgeting. This new 
repertoire of policy management can be seen as extending market rationalities to new 
areas of government, re-coding socially-oriented activities as determined through the 
medium of economy: funding towards AIDS and health are both subordinated to 
monetarist principles and managed through target-setting mechanisms rewarding 
performance, inspired by business practices. This technical grammar of policy also has 
depoliticising effects consistent with a certain version of neoliberalism. Numbers used 
in target-setting are used as vehicles to translate ‘global’ priorities down to the lowest 
echelons of government, enforcing hierarchies consistent with donors’ concerns and 
enabling greater scrutiny. By establishing a linearity between international 
prescriptions and policy implementation, these techniques of government also 
undermine democratic accountability and ideologically-oriented politics promoting 
alternatives. In addition, by providing greater scrutiny and homogenisation, these 
numerical instruments localise problems at the state and community level, while 
obscuring global dynamics perpetuating inequalities.  
 
The last section has examined forms of resistance to the deployment of this form of 
neoliberal governmentality. Interestingly, many Malawian interviewees viewed the 
government as potentially capable of refusing the imposition of these norms. However, 
this perception is mitigated by the government’s reliance on aid and the pervasive 
concern of losing funding. It also converges with discourses of freedom and agency 
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promoted by the aid effectiveness agenda, putting the onus for change on the 
government rather than on donors. Political will thus appears to offer limited or costly 
avenues for ‘counter-conducts’. A somewhat more indirect and unintentional mode of 
resistance to neoliberal governmentality can be seen to reside in the contradictions 
intrinsic to this rationality of power. Indeed, while it seeks to rein in state expansion, it 
requires demanding reforms and procedures. Thus the lack of capacity of the GoM to 
operate under this new rationality may prove to be a more powerful obstruction to the 
implementation of this form of governmentality. However, the GoM inability to 
manage these reforms may also have detrimental effects on those suffering from the 
plight of AIDS by reducing funding attached to target-reaching and creating delays in 
programme implementation.  
 
This chapter has thus shown how governmental technologies intersect with 
neoliberalism, by seeking to instil a new rationality of government, restructuring the 
state and its relation to society, through the use of instruments elaborated to manage 
economic entities. Governmental techniques, through their programmatic qualities, 
allow donors to govern at a distance through establishing a new ‘bottom line’ of politics 
around which most social actors (both progressive and conservative) now formulate 
their strategies (Peck, 2010: 25). This chapter has also analysed the specificity of the 
deployment of neoliberal governmentality in Malawi, highlighting how it is enabled by 
aid-dependency. However, I have also shown how the ‘real’ intersects with this 
programmatic governmentality, reconfiguring its impact, unravelling to some extent its 
neat, implacable logic. As Miller and Rose (2008: 35) assert: ‘the “will to govern” needs 
to be understood less in terms of its success than in terms of the difficulties and the 
variability of operationalizing it’.  
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Chapter 8 : Conclusion 
 
 
8.1. Introduction  
 
In this concluding chapter, I provide a summary of the thesis, outlining its key findings. 
I then highlight the contributions made by this thesis to scholarship on aid, 
governmentality and neoliberalism before discussing some of the limitations of this 
research and providing suggestions for future research.  
 
 
8.2. Summary of the thesis 
 
This thesis makes a contribution to the critique of international development by 
analysing the changes brought about by the new aid architecture to the power dynamic 
between donors and the government of Malawi (GoM). The research takes funding for 
AIDS (and Health to the extent that these sectors overlap) as its focus because the 
considerable increase of interest in and funding to tackle the pandemic from donors has 
magnified new trends in international development. In particular, largely externally 
funded AIDS programmes have been seen as causing important transformations of both 
state and society in Sub-Saharan countries. This research draws on 40 interviews 
conducted in Malawi in 2008 with representatives from the GoM, donor agencies and 
civil society organisations. The study also draws on analysis of official documents and 
limited ethnographic observations. The choice of Malawi, a poor country, burdened by 
a relatively high HIV prevalence, estimated at about 11%, was motivated by a number 
of factors. Funding for AIDS (and health) in Malawi has been largely channelled 
through the sort of mechanisms advocated by the Paris Declaration: at the time of the 
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research, it had a donor pool-funding arrangement which worked with the National 
AIDS Commission, a Health Sector-Wide Approach (SWAp) and a Common Approach 
for Budget Support (CABS). The country has also been the recipient of a relatively large 
amount of aid, despite its sometimes stormy relations with donors.  
 
While the Post-Washington Consensus (PWC) and its Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Papers (PRSPs) have generated a vast literature, the effects of the new aid architecture 
have not received the same attention. Yet, while the new aid architecture can be seen 
as crystallising and furthering some of the discourses deployed by the PWC (for 
example country ownership), other principles of the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid 
Effectiveness have important consequences. The alignment of donors on country 
development priorities and systems, better harmonisation amongst donors, mutual 
accountability and the principle of managing for results, which aims to improve 
decision-making, have encouraged a greater involvement of donors in aid-dependent 
countries’ policy decisions, notably through structures such as pool-funding or budget 
support mechanisms. The creation of these new spaces where donors and aid-
dependent governments interact on a regular basis has created much more intricate and 
routine relations and allowed donors to affect systems and practices pertaining to 
policy-making, including in social sectors.  
 
Like the PWC, the new aid architecture has been critiqued for maintaining a status quo 
between donors and poor countries while representing a continuation of neoliberal 
policies under a different guise. However, using a governmentality lens, I argue that 
this new configuration of aid relations is distinctive from the Structural Adjustment 
Programme (SAP) period in that it represents a shift away from domination, with 
donors attempting to impose policies, and towards more subtle interactions, through 
which donors have sought to transform the GoM into a self-disciplined, 
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entrepreneurial, neoliberal subject by shaping its aspirations and promoting specific 
norms of conduct, ‘truths’ and policy-related techniques. Governmentality, a term 
coined by Michel Foucault, is a form of productive power focused on the care of the 
population (redefined in the 18th century as the economy) which aims at governing the 
conduct of conducts. This modality of power and its rationalisation has evolved over 
time and it is particularly Foucault’s analysis of the type of (neo-)liberal 
governmentality that emerged from the work of the Chicago School which is 
illuminating here. According to Foucault, the partisans of the Chicago School advocated 
an organisation of the state by market-based principles. They also sought to extend this 
rationality to individuals, representing them as entrepreneurs of themselves. They 
viewed freedom as artificially arranged with individuals’ behaviour and their choice-
making responding to incentives and disincentives, which could be manipulated. As a 
result, the Chicago School thinking opens up new domains of intervention seeking to 
produce suitably responsible subjects. Governmentality scholars have extended this 
concept, analysing discourses and techniques involved in these processes of 
subjectification. Governmentality has also been used to make sense of international 
development; the depoliticising effects of the technicalisation of development have 
been associated with this form of power, providing particularly insightful perspective. 
In this thesis, following Joseph (2010), I have extended governmentality to relations 
between states (and with supra-national agencies) to explore the power dynamics 
between donors and the GoM.  
 
This research has taken an explicitly post-structural approach, which views knowledge 
as social construction. It has drawn on the governmentality analytics detailed by Dean 
(1999) which focuses on the fields of visibility of government (the objects, processes 
and actors made visible, and those obscured); the techniques used to rule and claim 
authority; the forms of knowledge, or ‘truths’ employed in the practice of governing; 
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and the formation of identities. The study focuses particularly on norms regarding the 
conduct of the GoM that have been promoted under the new aid architecture, 
including the new responsibilities the GoM has been assigned and the degree to which 
these participate in its construction as an entrepreneurial, ‘free’ subject. It has aimed to 
explore the discourses and regimes of truth through which donors’ new roles are 
legitimised and rationalised. Other research questions revolve around the practices that 
have been promoted by the aid effectiveness agenda, for example the increased 
coordination and dialogue between donors and the GoM, and their normative and 
productive effects on shaping particular subjectivities. In addition, the research has 
sought to explore the transformations pertaining to the domain of policy-making that 
have been spurred by the reorganisation of aid delivery, highlighting the new 
discursive constructions and rationalities underlying these changes and the role 
assigned to the government through these reforms.  
 
In this thesis, I have argued that under the new aid architecture, donors have been 
deploying ‘technologies of subjectivity’ in an attempt to govern through freedom. By 
encouraging the GoM to use its agency, through requirements to develop plans and 
policies and engage in planning processes, the new aid architecture can be seen as 
fostering the entrepreneurial qualities of the Malawian government. Yet, these 
expectations work through the GoM’s desire for autonomy and sovereignty. However, 
the rhetoric of freedom involved in country ownership is intertwined with a language 
of compulsion by creating an imperative for aid recipients to engage in choice-making. 
The new aid architecture had also created or reinforced institutional spaces requiring 
donors and the GoM to engage with one another. The increased involvement of donors 
in government policies has been legitimised by a discourse that, on the one hand, 
presents all partners, including the GoM as equals, relying on a horizontal, consensual 
and apolitical construction of aid relations, and on the other, casts the GoM as 
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technically deficient and requiring donors’ intervention. The intensification of practices 
of dialogue under the new aid architecture can be analysed as a technology through 
which donors seek to shape the agency of the GoM. This is done by promoting various 
norms of civility which allow relatively consensual relations, encouraging policies that 
are consistent with specific regimes of truth through the deployment of best practices, 
promoting the internalisation of techniques pertaining to policy-making through 
technical assistance, and instrumentalising conditionalities to inculcate an ethos of self-
regulation and self-improvement. I have argued that these practices can be seen as a 
way for donors to govern through freedom by seeking to shape the GoM’s agency in 
order to produce a self-responsible subject. I have also highlighted how this process of 
subjectification is in many ways consistent with the neoliberal rationality that Foucault 
identifies with the Chicago School.  
 
The implementation of the Paris principles also has a programmatic dimension, defined 
as the ways in which donors have sought to establish systems which ensure the 
(re)production of a certain neoliberal rationality of government, thus allowing them to 
eventually conduct the GoM’s conduct at a distance. Donors have put pressure on the 
GoM to adopt specific policy-related techniques, particularly in terms of public finance 
management. In the area of AIDS, the new aid architecture has created a certain 
reliance of funding to tackle the epidemic on compliance with these reforms. I have 
argued that the implementation of changes pertaining to public finance management 
systems has neoliberal effects. I have analysed how these reforms create and reinforce 
systems that act as relays to the macroeconomic policies promulgated by the 
International Financial Institutions (IFIs). For instance, I have outlined how the 
establishment of a Medium-Term Expenditure Framework seeks to rein in public 
spending by subordinating government activities to anti-inflationary imperatives. In 
addition, the concurrent deployment of a specific grammar of policy-making based on 
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the prioritisation of activities funded by the state, the setting up of targets creating new 
kinds of accountabilities and the move towards performance-based budgeting have 
contributed to re-coding the social in economic terms by extending market rationality 
to areas such as AIDS and health. Hence, the promotion of public financial 
management reforms under the new aid architecture can be seen as seeking to 
introduce a linearity between IFIs’ prescription and the smallest echelons of policy 
implementation, thus undermining democratic accountability. I have concluded that 
these changes have programmatic effects in that they attempt to transform the ways 
government systems operate so that they abide by a specific neoliberal rationality, thus 
allowing donors to operate at a distance.  
 
However, I have also examined avenues for resistance to this new rationality. I have 
explored how, while political will is often seen as a possibility, this puts the onus on the 
government, reinforcing the discourse of self-responsibility promoted by the new aid 
architecture and leaving the issue of aid dependence unaddressed. The contradictions 
intrinsic to the neoliberal rationality promoted under the new aid architecture may 
provide a more fertile ground for an inadvertent form of resistance. I have suggested 
that the inconsistencies between the small government ideology this rationality 
supports and the demanding systems it promotes in order to achieve this type of self-
regulated lean state may result in its failure. Thus the lack of capacity of the GoM to 
operate under this new rationality may prove to be a more powerful obstruction to the 
implementation of this form of neoliberal governmentality than political will. 
However, recent changes, particularly the increase of aid from Southern donors in 
Malawi, may provide the GoM with increased leverage to negotiate the terms of their 
relation with Western donors. The consequences of these new developments and the 
continuous relevance of these findings are analysed in greater detail in the afterword.  
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8.3. Contribution to knowledge: governmentality, aid and neoliberalism 
 
This thesis has made a number of significant contributions to the scholarship on aid, 
governmentality and neoliberalism and has provided valuable insights into the power 
dynamics that have unfolded under the new aid architecture. By doing so, it has also 
enabled us to think further about the critique of international development and the use 
of research methods in this area of research. These contributions are explored in more 
detail in this section.  
 
The thesis has demonstrated how the use of a governmentality perspective allows us to 
shed new light on the power relations between donors and aid-recipients. Although 
this research deals specifically with the relations between the Government of Malawi 
and some of its main donors around the time of my fieldwork in 2008, the analysis 
developed here is likely to be relevant in other contexts. In this respect, I have 
highlighted the importance of conceiving of power in a way that goes beyond the idea 
of domination, with donors forcing policies on poor countries, and considers the more 
subtle ways in which donors seek to influence the conduct of recipient countries. The 
research has established the significance of understanding how donors attempt to shape 
aid-recipients’ behaviour and decision-making processes through the promotion of 
norms, values, aspiration, ‘truths’ and techniques which work through, rather than 
against, recipients’ agency and desire for self-determination. It has shown that Joseph’s 
formulation of global governmentality as ‘a complex ensemble of institutions, 
procedures, analysis and tactics that has the state as its target, and a political economy 
of poor populations as its main form of knowledge’ (Joseph, 2010: 48) is borne out by 
qualitative data analysis and provides valuable insights into aid relations.  
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There has been little research into the ways in which subjects targeted by governmental 
technologies perceive and respond to this form of power. In this respect, the thesis has 
made a significant contribution by showing that, while the GoM is not unaware of the 
mechanisms through which donors attempt to guide its conduct, these technologies 
work by stirring its desire to comply with these norms in order to be seen as a ‘serious’ 
partner and increase its ability to negotiate more autonomy from donors. Thus, I have 
demonstrated that a governmentality perspective is crucial in understanding the 
processes through which policy ideas and techniques are adopted and implemented by 
aid recipients and how unequal power relations are reproduced and legitimised.  
 
The attention paid in this research to these processes of subjectification has also 
highlighted significant specificities of the aid effectiveness regime. The thesis has 
established that the new aid architecture is neither a continuation of the structural 
adjustment programmes - though some of the policies advocated by donors are similar - 
nor a paradigm shift that would enable aid-recipients to exercise self-determination. 
Instead, I have demonstrated that the new aid architecture has reconfigured relations 
between donors and the GoM in a way that enables a more governmental or consensual 
form of influence to develop. Although it can be argued that relations between donors 
and aid-recipients have been drawing on governmentality prior to the emergence of the 
new aid architecture (see Li, 2007 for example), this thesis has shown that many of the 
principles buttressing the new aid architecture have allowed this modality of power to 
gain increased importance in mediating aid relations.  
 
The research has also made a noteworthy contribution to scholarship on neoliberalism. 
It has shown that a governmentality perspective allows an analysis that goes beyond 
thinking of neoliberalism in terms of a set of policies, an ideology or a mode of 
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government and yet accounts for all these elements. I have analysed how various 
elements such as the promotion of specific norms, ethos, truths, and policy techniques 
work together to shape the GoM as a subject which self-regulate according to a specific 
neoliberal rationality. The focus on AIDS and the health sector, rather than on 
macroeconomics, has also enabled this research to analyse the ways in which neoliberal 
rationalisation extends to all areas of government, recoding all its activities in economic 
terms, at the expense of other values and democratic accountabilities. Thus, the thesis 
has shown that neoliberalism can be seen as a productive set of discourses and 
technologies that seek to create subjects that are self-disciplined and self-reliant 
entrepreneurs of themselves, and whose conduct is based on market principles. In this 
respect, this research has shed light on the links between a certain rationalisation of 
government, neoliberal policies and the deployment of specific technologies and argued 
that Ferguson (2010: 273) is mistaken to think that ‘neo-liberalism-as-rationality’ does 
not apply to Africa or to non-advanced liberal societies. Rather, the thesis has 
contended that this form of governmentality targets African governments and public 
administration.  
 
However, I have also exposed the incoherence of neoliberal rationality, revealing 
inconsistencies, for example between the techniques it calls for, the subjectivities it 
seeks to shape and the rationalities it attempts to impose. I have illustrated in this thesis 
the paradox between the formidable capacity required from the GoM by the techniques 
suggested or imposed by donors to achieve a responsible, self-regulatory state and the 
small government rationality guiding these changes. Although the perspectives on 
power offered by Foucault’s thinking have often been seen as over-emphasising ‘the 
coherence and effectiveness of political projects' (MacKinnon, 2000: 309; see also 
McKee, 2009), this research has demonstrated that this is not necessarily the case. 
While the analysis of the multiple ways through which specific governmentalities are 
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deployed – as a subjectivity, a rationality, a set of techniques and policies – can provide 
an impression of consistency, Foucault’s perspective, particularly when used in relation 
to qualitative data, also illuminates the incoherence and potential failures of this 
modality of power. 
 
The thesis has also helped us to evaluate the use of a governmentality perspective in the 
context of relations between donors and aid-recipients by identifying potential 
challenges. For instance, my findings have demonstrated that the GoM’s reliance on aid 
was also a factor motivating its engagement with the norms and discourses deployed by 
donors. Thus, I have highlighted how in this context, governmentality, though distinct 
in its operation from domination in which violence is central, does rely on the 
possibility of recourse to it – or in the case of aid, indirect violence through the 
suffering that massive funding withdrawal would be likely to cause. Hence, this 
research has enabled us to understand the importance of conceptualising the 
deployment of governmentality in the area of international development as a modality 
of power that works together with, though differently from, other productive and 
negative forms such as discipline and sovereignty.  
 
Another issue flagged up by this research concerns the extension of the concept of 
governmentality to power relations between organisations and/or states - rather than, 
in the case of Foucault’s analysis, between a government and its subjects. While 
viewing these entities as agents offer unique insights, it also masks the possibly 
conflicting interests existing between aid-dependent governments and their population, 
or even between various levels of the state apparatus. This difficulty is reflected in the 
limitations of this research. By focusing on relations between donors and the GoM, this 
thesis has struggled to highlight the distinctiveness of AIDS/health as an area of 
investigation. The research could have benefited from a greater emphasis on the ways 
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in which the technologies studied here (such as the use of indicators or public finance 
management procedures) affect the AIDS response on the ground. This would have 
provided a more comprehensive account by making clear the specific ways in which 
the deployment of a neoliberal rationality shapes the field of AIDS and its effect on the 
population. It might have also offered insights into other potential forms of resistance.  
However, this issue should not be seen as invalidating the insights provided by 
governmentality in the context of international development. Instead, it should be 
viewed as opening up new fields of investigation and encouraging the elaboration of 
analytical models able to illuminate the multiple scales at which governmental power 
operates.  
 
Finally, as many of its detractors have noted, governmentality offers neither a solution 
to the issues analysed through its critical lens, nor much optimism about the existence 
of such a solution. However, as Rose states, this kind of critique has the potential to:  
 
‘reshape and expand the terms of political debate, enabling different questions to 
be asked, enlarging spaces of legitimate contestation, modifying the relations of 
the different participants to the truths in the name of which they govern or are 
governed.’ 
(Rose, 1999: 277) 
 
Thinking about aid in terms of governmentality allows us to perceive the ‘agonism’ 
between power and freedom, this ‘relationship which is at the same time reciprocal 
incitation and struggle; […] a permanent provocation1’ (Foucault, 2001: 1057). 
‘Governing through freedom’ is a strategy that opens up spaces of debate, dissent and 
resistance; it is also prone to contradictions and failures, opening avenues for changes, 
or at least adjustments in the technologies it employs, the rationalities it promotes and 
the type of subjects it seeks to shape. Conceiving of aid in this light may help us think 
                                                 
1 ‘Un rapport qui est à la fois d’incitation réciproque et de lutte; moins d’une opposition terme à terme qui 
les bloque l’un en face de l’autre que d’une provocation permanente’. Translation from Foucault, 1982. 
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about international development in a way that is attentive to political rationalities and 
the subjectivities they promote and that seeks to imagine, propose, discuss and cultivate 
different ways in which these could be articulated. As Foucault explained, critique 
should not dictate changes but rather open up spaces for transformation by challenging 
‘what is’. Change will happen:  
 
‘when those who have a stake in that reality, all those people, have come into 
collision with each other and with themselves, run into dead ends, problems, 
and impossibilities, been through conflicts and confrontations – when critique 
has been played out in the real, not when reformers have realized their ideas.’ 
(Foucault, 2003a: 256-257) 
 
From a methodological point of view, the thesis has highlighted the value of using a 
post-structural perspective to study aid relations. It has stressed that recognising the 
situated and partial nature of knowledge can lead to rigorous research and shown how 
the consistent use of a set of specific questions can provide for a robust and intelligible 
analysis and contribute to a better understanding of an area of investigation. However, I 
have also demonstrated the importance of moving beyond discourse-based critiques of 
aid relations and neoliberalism, and investigating the material technologies, such as the 
increasing reliance of indicators and public finance management reforms, through 
which specific political rationalities are deployed. Here, I have analysed how the use of 
technical public finance management tools such as medium-term expenditure 
frameworks (MTEF), budgeting software and performance-based budgeting transforms 
the ways in which governmental action is rationalised by reshaping mundane and 
routine aspects of public administration. I have shown how these techniques both 
reflect and re-inscribe the idea of the state as a depoliticised service-delivery 
mechanism by establishing the primacy of macroeconomic stability, reproducing 
hierarchies amongst various areas of government and inscribing specific values in the 
fabric of social services. Thus, this thesis has highlighted how discursive mechanisms 
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and policy techniques overlap to created specific subjectivities and why it is important 
that critical analysis address both the discursive and technical elements of aid relations. 
 
I have also provided further insights into the challenges of research involving ‘elites’. 
More particularly, the thesis has illustrated both the importance of power relations in 
research and their fluidity. For instance, my research fieldwork has emphasised the 
significance of the researcher’s status in relation to respondents in gaining access. 
However, this thesis has also demonstrated that this status is not fixed and while access 
to donor representatives in the UK proved difficult, contacts were made more easily in 
Malawi, where my position as an international and Western researcher was more 
valued by respondents. I have also highlighted how the involvement of ‘elite’ 
participants largely relies on the relevance of the research to their own work. While 
this is in no way unique to this type of research, the often lower position of researchers 
in ‘elite’ interviews as well as the time-pressure these participants are often under 
exacerbate the necessity to make the project relevant to interviewees.  
 
I have also contributed to the emerging discussions on oppositional research. In 
particular, this research has attempted to resolve some of the contradictions between 
the necessity to establish ethical relations with respondents, based on respect and 
openness and the critical perspective guiding this work. The thesis has shown that 
research can be ethically grounded and based on open-mindedness and respect for 
individuals involved, while not necessarily abiding by principles such as full disclosure 
of research goals. Instead, in this case, a more neutral, technical and policy-relevant 
summary of the project was put forward in order to allow access to members of the 
‘elite’ and facilitate discussion. Though not incorrect, this description falls short of the 
full disclosure advocated by many ethical guidelines. The thesis has thus provided 
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pointers to revisiting ethical guidelines developed by institutions and organisations in 
order to make them relevant to elite and/or oppositional research.  
 
This study has also pointed to the need for further research in the area of international 
development, aid architecture and neoliberalism. The very rapid changes that have 
taken place since this fieldwork was conducted provide some fascinating new areas of 
investigation. The rise of (re)emerging donors such as China, India, Brazil and South 
Africa and the ways in which the economic downturn and political change has affected 
aid budgets in Western countries (both are explored in more detail in the afterword) 
have redrawn the landscape of international development. The Busan high-level forum 
in late 2011 has also shown signs of a shift in the aid architecture. These developments 
make the need for further research in the area of aid relations particularly pressing. The 
insights provided by the concept of governmentality may be particularly useful in this 
regard, as (re)emerging donors may provide leverage for poor countries to renegotiate 
their relations with Western donors. However, new forms of power relations with 
these Southern donors are also worthy of exploration.  
 
At country level, these new techniques of government promoted by donors are 
particularly deserving of further research. The thesis has exposed the role of these 
reforms in changing the values and rationale on which state action is based in a way 
that can be seen as neoliberal. Issues pertaining to public finance management reform 
in particular have received little critical attention despite their important effects both at 
theoretical and practical levels. The decentralisation agenda which has been rolled out 
in many African countries is also worthy of further exploration, especially in the ways 
that it acts as a conduit for these state-level changes. Indeed, while the Busan summit 
appears to have ushered in a new era in terms of aid architecture and aid relations, PMF 
reforms are still firmly on the agenda.
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Afterword 
 
 
The terrain of aid in Malawi has undergone some rapid changes since I conducted my 
fieldwork there in 2008. The increased importance of Southern donors, specifically 
China, is particularly noteworthy. While formal development cooperation between the 
two countries only started in 2007, by 2009, China was the third largest donor to 
Malawi (see table 1). China was not involved in AIDS or health cooperation at the time 
this research was carried out, and is still only marginally engaged with the Malawian 
health sector. As a result, its role in aid in Malawi was not covered in this thesis. 
However, it is likely that the increasing importance of China as a development partner 
has contributed to alter the relations between the government of Malawi (GoM) and 
traditional donors.  
 
Table 1. Aid to Malawi (2009/2010) – from Glennie (2011) 
 Aid (US$ million) 
European Union 155 
World Bank 139 
China 133 
UK 108 
US 99 
Norway 57 
Other  101 
TOTAL 792 
 
 
China’s aid to Malawi has largely focused on infrastructure development, including a 
new parliament building, a national conference centre, a five-star hotel, presidential 
villas, schools and university buildings, a 60-mile road and 600 boreholes for water 
(Smith, 2012b). In addition, in the past five years, it has provided concessionary loans, 
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grants and development support worth US$ 260 million (Ngozo, 2012). But China has 
also become a major economic partner for Malawi since the latter joined the Forum on 
China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in 2009. Trade volume between the two countries 
jumped by 400% between 2010 and 2011 (Ngozo, 2012). 
 
Though not currently on the same scale, Malawi’s relations with India have been 
recently strengthened too. In 2010, India provided a US$ 5 million grant to support 
Malawi’s development in the social sectors. Following a state visit by the then President 
Bingu wa Mutharika to India, the countries signed three agreements aiming at 
reinforcing bilateral cooperation. Bilateral trade between India and Malawi has also 
increased by almost 100 per cent between 2008/09 and 2009/2010 (High Commission of 
Malawi, New Delhi, 2012).  
 
Although it is difficult to ascertain, it is likely that China’s increasing contribution to 
Malawi through aid and trade and the potential alternative to traditional donors it 
represents may have contributed to the boldness displayed by the late President Bingu 
wa Mutharika during his second term. Since his re-election in 2009, Mutharika took a 
number of measures that put strains on its relationship with traditional DAC donors 
(Smith, 2012b) as described in this thesis (in chapter 3 and 7), He displayed an 
increasingly autocratic attitude, suppressing demonstrations, restricting freedom of 
expression, intimidating civil society organisations and intellectuals and giving police 
the right to search properties without warrants (Tran, 2012; Tran, 2011). An 
Injunctions Bill was also passed making it easier for the government to place 
restrictions on opponents without legal challenge (Tran, 2011). Economic management 
also concerned donors as Malawi maintained an overvalued exchange rate, negatively 
impacting the country’s private sector (DFID, 2011). As a result, by 2011, many of 
Malawi’s donors, including the World Bank, the European Union, the African 
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Development Bank, Germany, Norway and the UK had ended or suspended their 
contribution to direct budget support (Tran, 2011).  
 
In other African countries, there has been some evidence that the emergence of 
Southern donors could provide some degree of leverage to aid-dependent countries. For 
example, Henderson (2008) has shown that the Democratic Republic of Congo 
government was able to proceed to renegotiate its agreement with international actors 
due to its agreement with China Exim Bank on the financing of infrastructure. Gabas 
(2009) has also argued that African countries had greater power to renegotiate the 
Cotonou Agreement thanks to the presence of China. Power and Mohan (2010) have 
discussed how Angola turned to China in 2003 when its negotiations with the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) stalled (though it re-engaged with the IFIs in 2009 
when its oil revenue fell short of expectations). Thus, there are some signs that aid-
recipients may benefit from the increased plurality and fragmentation of aid, enabling 
them to ‘play donors and investors off against one another’ (Power and Mohan, 2010: 
480; see also Rosser and Simpson, 2009) and provide them with an opportunity to 
follow alternative models to the ones prescribed by the IFIs (Kragelund, 2011; Power 
and Mohan, 2010). According to Glennie (2011) the economic improvements that many 
aid-recipients have undergone in the past decade, together with the rise of non-DAC 
donors have led to a change in the attitude of developing countries’ officials towards 
the aid relationship: they appear more confident and have greater expectations about 
being in the driving seat.  
 
From a governmentality perspective, support from Southern donors may provide aid 
recipients with leverage to offer greater political resistance to the technologies of 
subjectification deployed by donors, allowing them to contest the ‘truths’ on which 
their policies are constructed, negotiate the techniques involved in the exercise of 
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government and challenge discourses constructing them as requiring donors’ expertise. 
However, it is worth noting that in the case of Mutharika, this increased confidence (he 
reportedly told donors to ‘go to hell’ after expelling the British High Commissioner 
(Cammack, 2012)) and policy independence has failed to benefit the majority of 
Malawians. His affirmation of Malawian sovereignty took place at the expense of 
democracy and weakened the country’s economy, with the overvalued kwacha, the 
national currency, generating a shortage of foreign exchange in the banking system and 
the reduction in ODA severely impacting the economy (Cammack, 2012). These 
developments highlight how the rise of Southern development partners is yet to offer a 
truly sustainable alternative to DAC donors, but also show how the interests of the 
government and its population may not necessarily be congruent. Indeed, in the West, 
Chinese aid in particular has been singled out for its deleterious effects on governance 
in Africa, as it has become an alternative to Western aid for authoritarian regimes (e.g. 
Collier, 2007, in Tan-Mullins et al., 2010). 
 
In addition, just like DAC donors, Southern actors instrumentalise their role as 
providers of development cooperation to increase their global status (Mawdsley, 2011). 
For example, China’s development cooperation has be seen as a way to secure votes to 
protect and promote its interests within the World Trade Organisation (WTO), of 
which it has been a member since in 2001 (Power and Mohan, 2010). Although China 
operates through ‘different types of political relationships’ (Tan-Mullins et al., 2010: 
868) and ‘employ different ideologies and practices of governance’ (Tan-Mullins et al., 
2010: 857), its involvement in development cooperation in Africa pursues the same self-
interested logic as older industrialised countries (see also Power and Mohan, 2010). 
Moreover, China’s aid practices are diverse and evolving. Like many other Southern 
donors, its development cooperation has been characterised by a stated respect for 
sovereignty and policy of non-interference in domestic affairs (Mawdsley, 2011) and a 
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preference for one-off projects and infrastructure delivery which are less prone to 
corruption and produce rapid and concrete results2 (Tan-Mullins et al., 2010: 860), 
while avoiding interference with aid-recipients’ policies. However, the Action Plan 
adopted at the fifth Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) summit in 2012 
pledged a deepening cooperation in the health sector (FOCAC, 2012), promising, inter 
alia, to ‘expand […] exchanges and cooperation in the prevention [and] treatment […] 
of HIV/AIDS, malaria, tuberculosis and other major communicable diseases, health 
personnel training, maternal and child health, health system building and public health 
policies’ (para 5.5.3.). As China expands its development assistance to new areas such as 
public health policies, more intricate and complex relations with aid recipients may 
develop, calling for different modalities of power.  
 
In Malawi, the sudden passing of Mutharika in April 2012 and the swearing in of the 
then vice-President, Joyce Banda, may provide yet another reconfiguration of power 
between Western and Southern donors and the GoM. Banda was quick to reverse some 
of her predecessor’s decisions that had led to the suspension of aid to the country and 
has been engaging with traditional donors in an effort to resume budget support (Tran, 
2012). In June 2012, DFID, Malawi’s largest bilateral donor pledged to spend £90 
million (approximately US$ 145 million) on aid for the country this year, and an 
average of £93 million (appr. US$ 150 million) a year until 2015 and the IMF and 
Malawi agreed a three-year, US$157 million aid package (Tran, 2012). Banda’s initial 
measure to devalue the kwacha had severe consequences on the poor, pushing up prices 
of many basic items by up to 50% (IRIN, 2012). So it yet remains to be seen whether 
the ‘competitive pressure’ (Woods, 2008: 1206) amongst donors generated by the rise of 
China and other Southern donors may ‘open up policy space for recipient countries to 
                                                 
2 Although Glennie (2012) argues that this is also a characteristic of Eastern donors belonging to DAC: for 
example, amongst western donors, only Germany spent more than 15% of its aid on infrastructure in 
2009-10, while South Korea and Japan both spent over 40%, and China 60%. 
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escape the strictures of neo-liberalism’ (Tan-Mullins et al., 2010: 859). As Power and 
Mohan (2010) state, the outcomes of this new configuration will largely depend on 
whether African elites are able to make use of it in a way that will be beneficial to 
ordinary citizens.  
 
However, despite the rise of Southern development actors, DAC donors still dominate 
the field of aid. It is true that the global economic downturn has reversed the increase 
in ODA from DAC donors in 2011 after over a decade of continuous growth: 
contributions fell by an estimated 2.7% in 2011 compared to 2010, a trend that is likely 
to continue in the near future (OECD, 2012b)3. A noteworthy consequence of aid 
budget cuts in many DAC countries has been the cancellation of the Global Fund’s next 
funding round (Commons Select Committee, 2012) as contributions fell short of 
expectations. However, estimates of ODA-like aid flows from non-DAC partners 
(including Southern actors, NGOs and foundations) stood at US$ 30bn a year in 2010, 
representing about a quarter of the US$ 125bn provided by DAC donors that same year 
(Prada et al, 2010 in Rogerson, 2011).  
 
The future of the aid effectiveness agenda is still unclear. There were some noticeable 
changes at the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness which took place in 
Busan, South Korea in 2011. The inclusion of Southern donors has altered some of the 
rhetoric (for example a change from ‘aid effectiveness’ to ‘development effectiveness’4) 
and the forum’s ensuing document, the Busan Partnership for Effective Development 
Co-operation (Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, 2011, in appendix J) 
reflects the increased plurality and fragmentation of development cooperation, 
                                                 
3 In 2011 aid from DAC donors to Sub-Saharan Africa was cut by 0.9% in real terms compared to 2010 
(OECD, 2012b).  
4 Many Southern donors prefer the term ‘development cooperation’ to ‘aid’, which is seen as having 
hierarchical connotations (Mawdsley, 2011) and use a broader variety of instruments to promote this. 
 311 
recognising the role of Southern donors, as well as the private sector (para. 10 and 32) 
and civil society (para. 1, 14 and 22). However, the Partnership outlines a two-tier 
system with DAC donors reiterating their commitments to follow the principles 
established at Paris and Accra, in addition to those established at Busan (para. 16) while 
‘the principles, commitments and actions agreed in the outcome document in Busan 
shall be the reference for South-South partners on a voluntary basis’ (para. 2). In 
addition, country ownership has remained central and the model on which this is 
measured is unchanged: the Partnership endorses the use of country-led result 
frameworks to allow ‘all concerned actors to assess performance based on a manageable 
number of output and outcome indicators’ (para. 18(b)), which suggests that the model 
of the Performance Assessment Framework will endure in some way. Public finance 
management reforms are still prominent with the Partnership declaration calling 
partners to ‘implement a Global Action Plan to […] ensure sound, result-focused public 
sector management, and highlight strategy issues for policy decisions’ (para 18(c)). The 
Partnership’s proposed indicators show that the World Bank CPIA is still presented as 
the yardstick according to which the appropriateness of country systems are measured 
(OECD-DAC Working Party on Aid Effectiveness, 2012).  
 
In addition, according to Hayman (2012: 9), the Busan Partnership recasts aid as ‘a 
catalyst’ to attract other ‘sources of finance to support sustainable and inclusive 
development, including taxation and domestic resource mobilisation, private 
investment, aid for trade, philanthropy, non-concessional public funding and climate 
change finance’ (para. 10, see also para. 9). She convincingly argues that the vision of 
development put forward in Busan is ‘essentially growth-driven, post-aid, aimed at 
country ownership, and – at its heart – neoliberal’ with ‘governance [defined as] 
creating effective states for effective resource mobilisation and service delivery’. This 
suggests that the neoliberal rationalisation of aid-dependent states analysed in chapter 7 
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is still at the centre of aid/development effectiveness. In this respect, Busan appears to 
further the discourse of aid-recipients’ self-responsibility, coupled with a neoliberal 
regime of truth identified in this thesis. Indeed, the Partnership document states:  
 
‘It is essential to examine the interdependence and coherence of all public 
policies - not just development policies – to enable countries to make full use of 
the opportunities presented by international investment and trade, and to 
expand their domestic capital markets.’  
(Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, 2011: para 9) 
 
The Busan summit can thus be seen as outlining the basis of a weaker but ‘broader and 
more inclusive’ partnership (para. 1) establishing a dual track system, with a number 
traditional donors confirming their interest in furthering the aid effectiveness agenda 
and a large, diverse group of ‘development partners’ agreeing on broader principles.  
 
It is thus likely that in spite of the changes highlighted above, the trends identified in 
this research will persist in this new context. The continuing emphasis on ownership 
suggests that the processes of subjectification highlighted in this thesis will remain 
relevant. The emphasis on public finance management in Busan Partnership’s proposed 
indicators also shows that its effect as a ‘programmatic technology’ is likely to endure. 
However, as explained in this section, the rise of Southern donors, particularly China, 
may alter the ability of aid-dependent governments to resist these processes to some 
extent. The interactions between the GoM and various groups of donors in the years to 
come will very probably be worthy of further research.  
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Appendix A. List of interviewees 
 
 
ORGANISATION 
 
 
TITLE OF THE PERSON INTERVIEWED 
NATIONAL AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND NATIONAL AIDS COMMISSION 
District Assembly (Lilongwe city) Acting District AIDS coordinator 
District Assembly (Lilongwe city) Chief Accountant 
Ministry of Economic Planning and 
Development  
Director, Social Protection 
Ministry of Finance Director of Economic Affairs 
Minister of Finance  Director Dept of Aid and Debt 
Ministry of Finance Deputy National Authorising Officer 
Ministry of Health Director SWAp Secretariat 
Ministry of Health Deputy Director, HIV/AIDS unit 
Ministry of Health Health Systems Strengthening Coordinator, Planning 
Dept 
NAC Executive Director 
NAC Head of Planning, M&E and Research 
NAC Research Officer 
Office of the President and Cabinet Secretary for Nutrition and HIV and AIDS 
DONORS 
Canadian High Commission Aid Liaison Consultant 
CIDA  HIV/AIDS Program Manager 
DFID HIV and AIDS Advisor 
Health and HIV and AIDS Advisor 
European Union Development Economist 
European Union Economist 
NORAD Health Adviser 
UNAIDS Country Coordinator 
UNFPA HIV Prevention Officer 
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UNICEF Chief, Social Policy 
UNICEF Reproductive Health & HIV&AIDS Manager 
UNICEF Procurement Specialist 
USAID HIV/AIDS Senior Technical Advisor 
WHO HIV/AIDS Country Officer 
World Bank  Health Specialist 
INGOs and CSOs 
Action Aid HIV/AIDS Theme Coordinator 
CARE Learning and Design Unit Manager 
Funders Collaborative for Children Programme Manager 
Lighthouse Trust Executive Director 
MACRO (Malawi AIDS Counselling 
and Resources Organisation)  
Executive Director 
MANELERA+ (Malawi Network of 
Religious Leaders Living with or 
personally affected by HIV and 
AIDS) 
Programme Officer 
MANET+ Executive Director 
MEJN (Malawi Economic Justice 
Network) 
Executive Director 
MHEN (Malawi Health Equity 
Network) 
Project Officer 
NAPHAM Executive Director 
National Organisation of Nurses and 
Midwives of Malawi  
Information & Advocacy Manager 
Project Manager 
OXFAM Advocacy Coordinator 
VSO Programme manager for HIV/AIDS 
Fieldwork UK 
ActionAid UK HIV/AIDS policy officer 
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B. Information leaflet provided to research participants 
 
Elodie Marandet, PhD candidate,  
Brunel University UK 
 
 
 
      
International AIDS policies in Malawi 
and the new aid architecture 
 
 
 
This doctoral research project seeks to analyse the effects, benefits and challenges of implementing 
international AIDS policies in the context of the new aid architecture and the country-led approach 
promoted by some donors.  
 
High levels of international donor funding have been available for HIV and AIDS-related work in the 
past few years. In this context, the management and efficiency of increased aid flow have become 
particularly crucial. The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005) seeks to address these issues 
and commits signatory donors to promoting their alignment on development strategies and policies of 
partner countries. However, donors’ spending remains guided to some extent by their own corporate 
policies and strategies. The project seeks to understand how donors balance these various 
commitments, and the outcomes of their efforts, focusing in particular on the role of UK funding of 
AIDS policies and interventions in Malawi.  
 
 
Main Objectives 
The study focuses on the following issues:  
 The extent to which international AIDS policies are tailored to the specific Malawian context and 
whether this has changed since the Paris Declaration. 
 The ways in which donors balance their corporate strategy with Malawi’s priorities.  
 The mechanisms used for aid harmonization with other donors 
 The ways in which country ownership has impacted relationships between donors and NGOs. 
 The impact of the new aid architecture on the types of interventions promoted  
 The degree to which monitoring and evaluation of donors’ Malawi-based HIV and AIDS activities 
are fed back to headquarters and into corporate strategies.  
 Good practices in promoting aid effectiveness, country ownership and policy alignment. 
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Methodology  
The research involves: 
 Analysis of DFID’s and Malawi’s AIDS policies 
 Interviews with DFID and INGOs staff in the UK  
 Interviews with staff from donor field offices in Malawi, including DFID, the Department of 
HIV and AIDS and Nutrition, the Ministry of Health, the National AIDS Commission,  INGOs 
and local NGOs (July-September 2008) 
 Participant observation with an NGO based in Lilongwe (July-September 2008) 
 
 
Ethics  
The project has received ethical approval from Brunel University and the National Health Sciences 
Research Committee in Malawi (TBC). Confidentiality and anonymity of all participants will be 
ensured. In addition, the study will be sensitive to the need not to harm any relationships between 
organizations.   
 
 
Dissemination of research findings 
A summary of the research findings will be sent to all research participants in February 2009.  
 
 
Researcher:  
 
Elodie Marandet 
PhD candidate 
Centre for Human Geography  
Brunel University  
Uxbridge, Middlesex, UB8 3PH, UK 
Elodie.Marandet@Brunel.ac.uk 
 
Supervisors:  
Dr Nicola Ansell  
Nicola.Ansell@Brunel.ac.uk 
and Prof. Susan Buckingham  
Susan.Buckingham@Brunel.ac.uk 
Centre for Human Geography  
Brunel University 
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C. Indicative interview schedule  
 
TOPIC GUIDE MALAWI 
 
 
Introductions and permission to record 
 
 
Introduce self and explain the purpose of the project and aim of interview i.e. to look at 
how the new aid architecture had affected the role of donors and their relationships 
with recipient government and NGOs in terms of HIV/AIDS intervention in Malawi. 
 
Ask interviewee how much time they have. 
 
Ask for permission to record (explain that the responses of those interviewed will be 
used in formulating the rest of the research and in writing the thesis).  
 
Ask if they are happy to be quoted in the final report and other publications that may 
be derived from the study. Ask if they agree that their name appear in the general 
acknowledgements in the final report. NOTE quotes will be used with the job title and 
organisation not their name. Get interviewees to sign the consent form.  
 
Ask interviewee to introduce themselves, give their job title and explain their role. 
 
 
The organisation  
 
 Could you start by telling me about what your organisation does in Malawi in 
terms of HIV and AIDS? PROBE for funding and number of staff working in the 
area. 
 
 For international organisations, PROBE for specificities in Malawi c/to other 
countries. 
 
 How has this work evolved in the past 5 years or so? PROBE for reasons for 
evolution and trend in terms of funding. 
 
 How have your current priorities been developed? For donors, PROBE for role 
of corporate strategy in formulating these priorities. 
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 What processes, if any, do you use in order to ensure that the needs of the 
people of Malawi are reflected in your priorities? 
 
 What are the main challenges you are facing in implementing your priorities?  
 
 For donors and NGOs/CSOs: where does your organisation see its niche in terms 
of HIV and AIDS work?  
 
 Who are the other main actors in terms of HIV and AIDS and how do you work 
with them?  
 
 Do you conduct Monitoring and Evaluation with regards to your work on HIV 
and AIDS?  
 
 For donors: to what extent monitoring and evaluation of your HIV and AIDS 
activities in Malawi are fed back to headquarters and into the corporate 
strategy/ies? 
 
 
HIV and AIDS in Malawi and the Government’s policy  
 
 In your opinion, what should be the current main priorities in terms of 
HIV/AIDS in Malawi? 
 
 How suitable is the current Malawi policy on HIV and AIDS? 
 
 Malawi’s got one HIV/AIDS strategy but other ministries have specific HIV 
and AIDS policies too? Are they consistent with the main strategy?  
 
 How effective has the implementation of the National Framework for Action 
been? PROBE for details and barriers? 
 
 What are the main gaps in the current provision? Are there any areas of 
HIV/AIDS intervention that are lagging behind?  
 
 What are the main barriers to addressing these?  
 
 Are there any funding gaps in terms of HIV and AIDS?  
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Funding and the Paris Declaration 
 
 Has the Paris Declaration affected the way you work? If yes, in which way? 
 
 What are the main challenges of implementing the Paris Declaration? How 
can they be overcome?  
 
 What are the positive and negative aspects of implementing the Paris 
Declaration in the area of HIV and AIDS? PROBE for alignment, ownership, 
harmonisation, mutual accountability, managing for results, M and E. 
 
 Do you feel the role of the donors have changed with the implementation of 
the Paris Declaration? If yes, in which ways? Are there any challenges linked 
to this new role?  
 
 Has this changed the relationship between donors and NGOs / CSOs? If yes, 
in which way?  
 
 What are issues you think may arise for donors as they try to balance their 
corporate strategy with their commitment to country ownership?  
 Can you think of any good practices in that respect?  
 
 Do you feel that channelling more money though the national and local 
governments might increase the politicisation of the way resources are 
distributed?  
 
 Do you feel donors still retain some influence in terms of policy formulation 
and implementation in the field of HIV AIDS?  
PROBE for whether this influence is a good or a bad thing.  
PROBE for differences between donors. 
 
 Do you feel the government is in the driver’s seat now? In which ways?  
 
 In your view what would contribute to improve relationships between 
donors and the Government of Malawi / amongst donors? 
 
 Can you think of any ways in which funding for HIV and AIDS could be 
made more effective?  
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Further information and contacts  
 
 Do you have any questions for me?  
 
 Are there any documents or studies related to what we have discussed that you 
think I should look at?  
 
 Is there anyone else that you think I should talk to at this stage or later?  
 
 
Thank and close 
 
 
 Ask if it would be possible to contact if any further questions. 
 
 Tell them we’ll send them a summary of the findings in February 2009. 
 
 Thank interviewee. 
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D. Ethical approval from the Malawi National Health Sciences Research Committee  
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E. Report sent to research participants in Malawi 
 
Elodie Marandet, PhD candidate   
  
Centre for Human Geography, School of Health Science and Social Care, Brunel 
University, UK 
In partnership with the Centre for Social Research, University of Malawi, Zomba, Malawi 
 
Supervisors: Dr Nicola Ansell and Prof. Susan Buckingham  
 
 
May 2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
International HIV and AIDS funding in Malawi and  
the new aid architecture 
 
Preliminary findings 
 
 
Report for research participants 
 
 
 
NHSRC Approval number: 537 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Acknowledgements 
348 
 
 
I would like to thank all those who I have interviewed for being generous with their time 
and knowledge. I am especially grateful to McBride Nkhalamba and the Action Aid team 
for welcoming me in their offices for the length of my stay in Lilongwe. I am also indebted 
to my supervisors for their continuous support.  
 
1. Introduction 
This report is based on preliminary findings emerging from the analysis of interviews 
conducted in Lilongwe from July to October 2008, as part of my PhD fieldwork.  
 
This report aims to provide feedback to all those who have taken part in the research as a 
way to thank them for their time and in the hope that they will find it useful. It seeks to 
summarise issues that were raised by participants with regards to the implementation of the 
so-called new aid architecture (as defined by the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda 
for Action) in the field of AIDS and AIDS-related funding. Thus, the report does not 
necessarily reflect my opinions but instead present the variety of the views of those 
interviewed. A more analytical and personal perspective on these data will be available 
upon request at a later date in the format of my doctoral thesis.  
 
 
2. Background  
This research project seeks to analyse the effects, benefits and challenges of implementing 
the principles of the new aid architecture (also called aid efficiency agenda) in the context 
of AIDS funding in Malawi.  
 
High levels of international donor funding have been available for AIDS-related work in 
the past few years. In this context, the management and efficiency of increased aid flow 
have become particularly crucial issues. The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005) 
seeks to address these and commits signatory development partners to promoting the 
following:  
♦ ‘Ownership - Developing countries set their own strategies for poverty reduction, 
improve their institutions and tackle corruption. 
♦ Alignment - Donor countries align behind these objectives and use local systems. 
♦ Harmonisation - Donor countries coordinate, simplify procedures and share 
information to avoid duplication. 
♦ Results - Developing countries and donors shift focus to development results and 
results get measured. 
♦ Mutual Accountability - Donors and partners are accountable for development 
results’. (OECD, 2010) 
 
Most interviews used here were conducted shortly before the Accra Agenda for Action 
(AAA) was made official. The AAA addresses issues such as funding predictability, the 
use of country systems and the use of conditionalities and tied aid (OECD, 2010), topics 
which as this report demonstrates were extensively discussed by research participants.  
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3. Research objectives 
The study focused on the following issues:  
 The extent to which international AIDS policies are tailored to the specific Malawian 
context and whether this has changed since the Paris Declaration. 
 The ways in which donors balance their corporate strategy with Malawi’s priorities.  
 The mechanisms used for aid harmonization with other donors. 
 The ways in which country ownership has impacted on relationships between the 
Government of Malawi, donors, INGOs and civil society organisations. 
 The impact of the new aid architecture on the Malawian AIDS response. 
 The advantages and disadvantages of the new aid architecture for the various partners 
involved.  
 Good practices in promoting aid effectiveness, country ownership and policy 
alignment. 
 
 
4. Methods 
The research is qualitative in nature and based on literature reviews, analysis of various 
strategic and policy documents, participant observation through an internship with Action 
Aid International Malawi in Lilongwe and 40 interviews with staff from donors’ field 
offices in Malawi, personnel from various ministries and institutions linked to the 
Government of Malawi (including the Office of the President and Cabinet – OPC - and the 
National AIDS Commission - NAC) and representatives from international and local NGOs 
and other civil society organisations.  
 
5. Ethics  
The project has received ethical approval from Brunel University and the National Health 
Sciences Research Committee in Malawi (approval number 537). Confidentiality and 
anonymity of participants has been ensured by anonymising the quotes that are used here. 
In order to give some sense of the dynamics at stake here, the following labels have been 
used instead: ‘Government of Malawi: Ministry of Health’ (thereafter GoM: MoH), 
‘Government of Malawi: Ministry of Finance’ (GoM: MoF), National AIDS Commission 
(NAC), ‘Bilateral Donor’, ‘Multilateral Donor’, ‘INGO’ and ‘CSO’.  
 
 
6. Structure of the report 
The findings are presented in a two-part structure, first examining the benefits of the new 
aid architecture as pertaining to the AIDS response in Malawi before exploring the 
challenges and possible limits linked to the implementation of the Paris principles. The 
conclusion highlights a few of the conceptual problems raised during this research and 
presents a few suggestions that were made by interviewees in order to enhance aid 
effectiveness.  
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7. Positive aspects of the new aid effectiveness agenda in the context of AIDS 
 
7.1. A more coordinated approach 
 
7.1.1. Better communication amongst development partners 
 
Many donor representatives explained how coordinating and funding mechanisms such as 
the Health Sector-Wide Approach (SWAp) or the pool donor group within the National 
AIDS Commission (NAC) provided fora where the various partners could engage with one 
another and thus enabled information to be shared more easily and freely both amongst 
donors and between donors and the Government.  
 
The variety of technical working groups informing AIDS-related programmes also enabled 
non-pool donors and other partners such as NGOs to inform plans and policies and learn 
about the work and perspectives of all those involved, as this discrete donor representative 
explained: 
 
We basically use this [the Health donor group] to get more information with regard 
to the policy direction, with regard to progress being made in the implementation of 
the SWAp, with regards to emerging issues from the SWAp, the problems that are 
coming out there and so on. (Multilateral Donor)  
 
The exchange of information was particularly important amongst pool partners as they each 
took a lead on specific issues and represented other pool member donors in technical 
working groups. As this donor representative explained:  
 
We make sure we go to it [technical working group], we make sure that we engage 
quite a lot with it, we make sure that we communicate with other partners before 
those meetings to find out if they have particular issues […] [What] they want to 
bring to the meetings, we communicate back to them after the meetings as to what 
has been agreed. (Bilateral Donor) 
 
The enhanced communication was also seen as enabling a more coordinated approach.  
 
 
7.1.2. Better coordination amongst development partners  
 
Many interviewees recognised that better communication combined with the use of 
documents such as the National Action Framework (NAF) and integrated annual work 
plans made it easier for donors to coordinate their action: 
 
The Malawi Government has a development system strategy which provides a context 
and framework for donor support to the Malawi Government, almost a code of 
conduct on how donors would help and most effectively support this national 
development agenda. In the AIDS area and to a certain extent to the Health sector, it 
is easier for the donor Governments to play by the rules. (Multilateral Donor) 
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Indeed under the new aid architecture, even discrete donors and NGOs found it easier to 
identify ‘specific things within the integrated annual work plan that they would want to 
support’ (Multilateral Donor) thus filling the gaps within a coherent framework and 
avoiding duplications.  
 
Some have also observed that the new aid mechanisms have encouraged better 
coordination amongst development partners, for example within the pool donor group and 
amongst UN agencies:  
 
I think also the UN is now coordinating better […] we are trying to deliver as one….. 
you know one plan, the UNDAF [the United Nations Development Assistance 
Framework], we meet frequently […] so we all know what we are doing […] we all 
support each other technically […] so I think that’s been very positive, better 
coordination… (Multilateral Donor) 
 
Some also found the Malawi Global Fund Coordinating Committee, or the Malawi 
Partnership Forum and their annual review process useful in enabling better coordination 
and utilization of resources.  
 
 
7.1.3. A more holistic response 
 
The increased level of coordination is also thought to have fostered a more holistic 
approach, going beyond medical aspects of AIDS and capturing ‘the full range of resources 
that nations, civil society, and Government can bring  to the response’ (Multilateral Donor).   
 
 
7.2. Improved relations between development partners  
 
7.2.1. Increased trust amongst partners 
 
Improved communication and transparency as well as the more intricate relationships 
between donors and Government departments fostered by the Paris agenda - for example 
through joint M&E reviews - has contributed to promote greater trust amongst all partners, 
as this pool donor representative explained:  
 
Now that the harmonization agenda has been pushed, we’re all equal partners 
around the table and especially now that the Government has become a pool partner 
in the HIV pool, it totally means that it facilitates the discussion and a lot more trust 
around the development partners’ table. (Bilateral Donor) 
 
As a ministry staff member explained, this increased confidence of donors in the 
Government also led to better and disbursement rates (as detailed in 7.3) 
 
 
7.2.2. Greater leadership from the Government of Malawi 
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This greater level of trust amongst development partners was seen as both helped by and 
enhancing the leadership of the Malawian Government, in line with the Paris principle of 
ownership. As one interviewee explained:  
 
I think Government is leading, they are in the driving seat, I don’t think there is any 
question about that and Malawians are very strong in terms of political will and 
motivation.  (Multilateral Donor) 
 
In particular, policy was seen as an area where the Government had taken the lead, with 
donors’ input being limited to ‘international best practices and things like that’ (NAC). It 
was believed that the relatively small number of donors in Malawi probably made it easier 
for the Government to demonstrate leadership in this area.  
 
 
7.2.3. A more equal relationship amongst development partners 
 
One of the perceived consequences of the new aid paradigm was also a more equal balance 
of power between donors and the Malawian Government. In particular, the leadership 
displayed by the Government in the policy area provided them with a stronger position 
during negotiations with discrete donors:  
 
We still have donors who have their separate funding sources and within this 
document [the Malawi Growth and Development strategy] we have six priority 
areas, so if indeed donors are serious, they need to align their funding to what we 
have already developed, not to come with new things to say “Oh! No! We want you to 
do this, we have this money”. (GoM) 
 
Moreover, the interdependence of donors, particularly members of pool funding 
mechanisms, appeared to have led to greater self-regulation and self-disciplining in terms 
of demands and prescriptions individual donors feel they can make on the recipient 
Government. 
 
 
7.2.4. A process that includes voices from the civil society 
 
According to many civil society organization representatives, the new aid architecture has 
enabled a greater involvement of NGOs for example by giving them a seat in one of the 
many technical working groups informing the policy process. Some CSOs also found 
membership of the Malawi Partnership Forum (a structure that serves as an advisory body 
to National AIDS commission) or the Malawi Global Fund Coordinating Committee useful 
in that regard. Working with parliamentary committees on health or budget and finance 
was yet another way to make their voice heard and be involved in processes shaping the 
AIDS response.  
 
The new aid architecture also made it easier to track expenses and carry out budget analysis 
to support advocacy activities as more funding was channeled through the Government’s 
systems.  
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7.3. Better funding 
 
7.3.1. More predictable funding: improved timeliness and disbursement rates 
 
Many interviewees felt that the greater coordination, trust and transparency brought about 
by the Paris principles helped funding from donors to be more predictable. In particular, the 
greater clarity linked to annual work plans and ‘peer pressure’ amongst donors from pool 
funding mechanisms allowed for greater disbursement rates and more timely 
disbursements.  
 
 
7.3.2. Greater funding mobilization 
 
Another advantage of the new aid architecture cited by interviewees was that it tended to 
boost the level of available resources:  
  
I think the major positive point is that it’s a modality of mobilizing resources in 
significant volume and targeting specific interventions: in this case HIV and AIDS.  
(NAC)  
 
 
7.3.3. More flexible funding 
 
Funding from pool donors was seen as particularly flexible as it could be used to fund any 
parts of the annual work plan, thus enabling a more holistic approach to spending where all 
priorities can be addressed adequately:  
 
Well the positive [of the SWAp] is that […] we are looking at the entire health 
delivery system to make sure that everything is in place. We are not only focusing on 
for example, one component, and leaving out others […] And then we are financing 
in all these areas to make sure that at least we have everything moving together. 
(GoM: MoH) 
 
 
7.3.4. Fairer distribution of resources  
 
One interviewee also highlighted that the channeling of resources through the districts via 
the Government could help spreading out funding more equitably amongst the different 
areas of the country, rather than relying on the highly variable concentration of NGOs.   
 
 
 
 
7.4. Greater effectiveness: making the money ‘work harder’ 
 
7.4.1 Reduced transactional costs 
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Interviewees reported that the streamlining of procedures linked to the alignment and 
harmonization principles of the Paris Declaration has reduced the bureaucratic burden 
placed on the Government:  
 
We have what we call the pool funding arrangement where we have common systems 
for reporting; this includes financial reporting, procurements, audit, progress 
reporting and what have you so it has substantially reduced the transactional cost, 
which was on us, which was demanded by each partner. (NAC) 
 
 
7.4.2 More effective interactions 
 
The new aid architecture was seen as facilitating direct contacts amongst donors and 
between ministries, NAC and donors thus providing opportunities to discuss and resolve 
issues swiftly and efficiently. The Emergency Human Resource Programme was cited as an 
example of an initiative that was developed particularly quickly and effectively despite 
involving a number of partners. This programme also benefited from a phenomenon 
encouraged by the new aid architecture whereby donors – particularly pool donors – 
specialize in policy areas and take the lead on initiatives where they have a particular 
interest or expertise. Indeed, mechanisms such as pool funding within NAC or the Ministry 
of Health (SWAp) have also contributed to increasing communication amongst donors and 
facilitated their work:  
 
Since working within this donor group, you’re getting information from other donors 
so you don’t have to all the time go to the Ministry of Health or to NAC to get your 
answers you need. (Bilateral Donor) 
 
 
7.4.3. Reduced waste and duplication (nationally and locally) 
 
Some interviewees highlighted how the improved coordination amongst donors had helped 
avoid duplication of efforts and activities. In addition it had led to greater transparency and 
contributed to limit unproductive practices such as the one described below:  
 
So the same organization would be getting funding from DFID, come and get funding 
from UNICEF, from USAID etc… and probably for the same activity. Because they 
would write a proposal, the same proposal just change name on the top and adapt it 
to suit the donor and then send it and then the same … they’ll have three fundings for 
the same kinds of activities, each one the reporting would be the same, they just 
change the title. And all donors are happy but things are not moving. Now with 
harmonization, these things cannot happen anymore because for each area there is 
only one channel of funding. (INGO) 
 
In addition, the decentralization movement that has been concomitant to the rolling out of 
the Paris principles has led to the creation of annual district plans for specific areas such as 
health and HIV and AIDS. These plans enable to capture a wide range of resources 
available at the local level as well as projects being carried out. They thus help to provide a 
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clearer picture of the local gaps and needs, and enable NGOs working in the area to 
complement each other’s efforts in a more integrated approach. 
 
The new aid architecture thus appears to have a number of positive characteristics and most 
interviewees were supportive of this approach. However, numerous issues with this new 
organization of aid were also highlighted and are detailed below.  
 
 
8. The challenges of the new aid architecture 
 
8.1. The difficulties of a coordinated approach: a slow moving bureaucracy 
 
8.1.1. Lengthy procedures and the necessity of consensus 
 
One drawback of the participatory nature of processes under the Paris principles is that they 
can take time:  
 
The SWAp themselves are not easy to formulate, they take too long. (GoM: MoF) 
 
Unfortunately in HIV//AIDS, there’s a lot of consensus, management by consensus. I 
think that’s one of the challenges. [If] you want to introduce new ideas, new policies, 
you need to take it to the technical working group where this will be discussed, then it 
moves to the partnership forum, and sometimes you have to get the pool partners 
together to sit together, then they vote, at that level you take it to the board for 
approval. (NAC) 
 
This can be perceived as particularly problematic and frustrating in crucial areas such as 
AIDS or Health where delayed implementation can have such dramatic consequences. In 
addition, the health SWAp was seen as lacking flexibility compared to the ‘vertical’ (or 
discrete) approach, as this discrete donor representative explains:  
 
The [SWAp] plan of work is only reviewed every year. Outside the pool donors can 
be much more accommodating to new priorities and gaps. (Bilateral Donor) 
 
Yet, despite the difficulties linked to creating consensus, one interviewee noted that 
donors’ engagement with Malawian democratic institutions was to a large extent limited to 
the executive arm of the state at the expense of the Parliament and its committees. This 
raises the question of whether the Paris Declaration, because of the already inherent 
complexity of working through consensus, might contribute to sidelining some democratic 
mechanisms ensuring the accountability of the Government to its electorate and 
representatives. The issue of accountability to Malawian citizens was also salient at the 
district level which had seen its role beefed up by decentralization and was becoming in 
charge of implementing national policies such as the National AIDS Strategy. At the time 
of the fieldwork however, the lack of recent elections at district assembly level meant that 
democratic overview at that level was restricted. Questions regarding the transparency and 
accountability of processes at district assembly level were brought up by many 
interviewees.  
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8.1.2. The limits of the Paris approach: the dilemma of double accountability 
 
Despite the enthusiasm of many research participants for the new aid architecture, some 
acknowledged the inherent tension in the position of donors, one the one hand, pressed to 
align and harmonize with the recipient country and on the other, accountable for pubic 
funds to the Government they are working for: 
 
Well, I guess Government, development partners and other donors have to account in 
some coherent fashion to national parliaments and with this comes the desire to seek 
attribution; this was achieved with say Swedish resources and this was achieved with 
British resources. This desire for individual attribution is often difficult to reconcile 
with the pro-Paris agenda and I guess it will be a learning experience as we go 
through. (Multilateral Donor)  
 
As a consequence, some donors were reluctant to stop earmarking money for specific 
programmes, even after signing up to pool funding mechanisms:  
 
So there are some partners who will want  to for example, earmark some funding 
when the fund is already in the pool; they’ll go ‘oh yeah, we have put our money but 
our money is to do this’. That’s not the spirit of the SWAp. (GoM: MoH) 
 
This was particularly problematic for multilateral donors who were themselves accountable 
to numerous donors. It was thus more difficult for them to be flexible as their standards 
were negotiated in advance with their own contributors and could not be altered as easily as 
those of bilateral donors. As a consequence, organizations such as those from the UN 
family opted to stay out of pool funding mechanisms. However, they were able to align on 
the priorities of the Government of Malawi by helping to fund specific aspects of the NAF 
for example. On the other hand, the Global Fund had decided to enter NAC’s pool donor 
group. The merits and pitfalls of this move were discussed by many interviewees and raised 
the question of the limits of the approach described under the Paris Declaration. .  
 
One of the main benefits of the Global Fund entering the pool was the substantial increased 
in available funding through the mechanism. However, the entry of this new member in 
existing structures such as the pool or the Health SWAp raised many questions, 
summarized by one interviewee as follows:  
 
Is the Global Fund in the current way it works, is it actually poolable? (Bilateral 
Donor) 
 
This uncertainty reflected issues raised by the late entry of the Global Fund into these 
mechanisms, and the ensuing tensions between the existing pool agreement and 
amendments required by the new partner. While it is understood that as a multilateral 
institutions, the Global Fund had to relay certain demands from its financers (for example a 
clause saying that the sub-recipient should not use its funding to finance terrorism), this 
multiple accountability did not sit well with the principle of alignment. This was seen as 
especially problematic as the Global Fund did not have a presence in Malawi and was 
represented by consultants, making the process of amending the agreement particularly 
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lengthy and frustrating for other development partners. Moreover, these delays had 
unfortunate consequences in terms of disbursement and implementation.  
 
 
8.1.3. The size vs. efficiency dilemma 
 
While new streams of funding were seen as positive, the inclusion of new and powerful 
members such as the Global Fund also created tensions. Interviewees reported that 
divergence of views amongst donors with regards to expected standards could lead to 
disagreements about what course of action to follow (e.g. suspend disbursement) should 
one of the conditions not be met on time. A few development partners highlighted that pool 
funding mechanisms were not necessarily a ‘pool of equals’ and that donors that ‘weighed’ 
in financial terms had a greater capacity to influence processes:  
 
A typical example is in the case of the Global Fund. I think everybody recognizes that 
they are a major contributor to the pool so by virtue of having that mass of… they 
have the potential of twisting other donors’ arms to maybe follow their own 
principles. In the process that disadvantages the grant recipient. (NAC) 
 
As one interviewee explained the AIDS pool fund had become ‘a victim of its own 
success’:  
 
It’s so big now and it’s so well subscribed that there has to be massive supervision 
and all these rigid structures in place because of the arsenal involved and if it was 
smaller, it probably could be a lot more flexible. (Bilateral Donor) 
 
These questions raised the issue of whether the new aid architecture is really the panacea 
described by some or has limits to when and how it can prove a useful tool. As this 
interviewee summarizes, this in part depends on the attitude of donors:  
 
It depends on the organization; if it’s an organization that is flexible, I’d say yes, the 
SWAp is the best way; if it’s an organization that is so rigid with a lot of regulations 
they might find the SWAp a little bit difficult. (Multilateral Donor) 
 
However, progress within the pool was also seen as highly dependent on a mixture of the 
institutional commitment of the various partners as well as the personal dedication of 
individuals involved in the mechanism. Thus the rotation of staff within agencies could 
seriously slow down processes spearheaded by the pool.  
 
 
 
 
 
8.1.4. Non-aligned donors  
 
Despite the popularity of the pool mechanisms with many bilateral donors and the efforts 
of many multilateral institutions to align with Government’s policies, there was still 
reluctance from some development partners to engage with the national institutions and 
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plans. This kind of attitude mad effective planning difficult and was seen as limiting some 
of the benefits of the new aid architecture approach: 
 
Unfortunately we still have partners who want to come and implement and then they 
don’t want to submit reports, they don’t want to share best practices, they don’t want 
to share what they’re doing and they don’t want to be open to other partners with 
them to strengthen their interventions. So there are a lot of pockets of unreported 
programmes which are making things a little bit difficult. (Bilateral Donor) 
 
 
8.1.5. A problematic implementation 
 
With more funding going through Government mechanisms, the funding of projects at the 
local level has become increasingly dependant on a chain of actors: from donors disbursing 
in a timely fashion, to CSOs following the proper reporting procedures and using the 
funding before the next cycle. Any ‘glitches’ in the system could thus destabilize a whole 
series of processes. This was especially crucial as many activities were seasonal or affected 
by the agricultural calendar:  
 
It’s difficult to implement some of the activities: for example, if they have asked for 
[funding for farming] so that they can care for the orphans and you find out that the 
funding is coming in February, where here we are suppose to cultivate from now 
[September] up to December so … Because you know here, we work according to 
seasons: let’s say if they bring some grant money for the CBOs in January. In 
January nobody can do activities because they are busy in their gardens. (District 
Assembly) 
 
 
8.2. A donor-driven aid architecture 
 
8.2.1. Donor-imposed institutional structures 
 
Interviewees, especially those from Malawian Governmental organizations and the civil 
society sector were prompt to highlight that while the Paris Declaration insisted that 
‘developing countries [should] set their own strategies for poverty reduction, improve their 
institutions and tackle corruption’ (OECD, 2010), the institutional architecture of aid was 
very much donor-driven.  
 
Thus, many interviewees highlighted that donors’ reluctance to align and use Government 
systems had led to the creation of ‘donor-driven’ institutional structures, such as the 
National AIDS Commission:  
 
I would argue in my case that the work of the NAC is a non-aligned institution. Of 
course now it appears aligned because it has been naturalized if you see what I 
mean. It has been here long enough so that people think it’s Malawian now but you 
know it was never Malawian. (GoM: MoF) 
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Interviewees from donors institutions argued that the setting up of parastatal organizations 
such as the NAC or the reformed central medical stores were necessary in order to avoid 
the bureaucracy involved in working through Government structures which were subject to 
annual funding allocations decided at Governmental and ministry level. The human 
resource policies that Governmental institutions had to follow were also seen as a 
hindrance. In particular, pool personnel who could be moved between departments at any 
time were seen as creating regular loss of knowledge specific to departments. Disciplinary 
procedures (and the presumed difficulty of removing inadequate members of staff) were 
also cited as a barrier to efficiency. However, rather than confronting human resource 
issues in the Government, donors promoted the setting up of these parastatal ‘trusts’. This 
can read as an avoidance strategy with regards to the supposed spirit of the Paris 
Declaration:  
 
The main reason [the NAC] is there, is … so that donors can control properly, they 
can monitor things more transparently, than they think they can’t do in a ministry. 
And then there, they prescribe all kinds of procurement, and management or 
disbursement procedures. (GoM: MoF) 
 
Thus for many interviewees especially those working in Malawian institutions, the new aid 
architecture has not necessarily produced a greater balance of power between donors and 
the Government.  
 
 
8.2.2. A structure reliant on donors 
 
The reliance on donors to finance the AIDS national response in Malawi was seen as a 
source of uneasiness, creating a situation where the Government has to tread carefully in 
order not to compromise programmes available to its citizen:  
 
We have more than 180,000 people who are starting on ARTs. This is thanks to 
courtesy of the Global Fund […]. Suppose the Global Fund closes today which I 
hope it cannot because they have already made an investment; for them to walk away 
now, it means putting millions of lives at stake. (NAC) 
 
The importance of Government decisions and policy decisions, such as the updating of the 
National AIDS Action Framework were key in influencing the funding environment and 
building up the trust and confidence of development partners. However, funding 
dependency could undermine the application of the Paris principles, especially with regards 
to ownership:  
 
 [I]f the development partners have another idea that they want the Government to 
choose then it might not necessarily be so easy to be taking bold leadership and say 
no we are going this way, we are not going that way. (Multilateral Donor) 
 
The persistent power imbalances between donors and recipient countries have not been 
significantly altered by the new aid architecture. Instead, a qualitative change where 
pressure has been in part replaced by influence was noticeable, although as the quote below 
illustrates, the boundaries between the two were sometimes blurred:  
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It [the Paris Declaration] says donors should endorse the national plan. They can 
only endorse if they think you are doing what they think you should be doing.  So it’s 
a question of give and take to see how far away they are taking us from our priority 
areas. If we are not too far from it, I think we’ll just accept it. It’s the only way we 
can get money. (GoM: MoF) 
 
Conversely, the Government was sometimes reluctant to take advice from donors in order 
to appear as a leader, despite potential benefits. This is was for example the case with the 
controversial issue of technical assistants.  
 
 
8.2.3. A Donor-led policy agenda 
 
Another area where donors’ influence was seen as sometimes overwhelming was in terms 
of policies. Despite many interviewees agreeing that the Government was now in the 
driving seat in terms of policies, further questions shed light on the limits of this 
sovereignty:  
 
I have to say the pool environment is definitely not a pool of equals and I think firstly 
the Government, I think it hasn’t … they’re probably not in the driving seat because 
donors still have their own agendas, ok. They’re happy to say they’re pooling but 
they will drive within the pool, they will drive their agenda through it within this pool 
environment. (Bilateral Donor) 
 
As this interviewee explains, the Government was free to demonstrate leadership as long as 
donors were happy with the results:  
 
- In general, it is driven by Government. In general. But in certain specific areas 
where things are not working well then it gets to be driven by donors.  
- Like the central medical store reform?  
- Yes, the central medical stores reforms, like general procurement issues err… yeah. 
If things are not really moving well, then it tends to be overtaken by donors and it 
becomes driven by donors. (Multilateral Donor) 
 
The issue of procurement procedures was especially divisive with contrasting views 
expressed by those interviewed. While it is too big and complex an issue to be addressed 
here, I wish to quickly highlight some of these perceptions. To some it was something 
needlessly imposed by the donor community which created delays:  
 
The Malawi Government had a very adequate procurement system. Why people can’t 
accept that, why we have to use the World Bank system or the Global Fund system, I 
actually don’t know. (Bilateral Donor) 
 
Others highlighted that changes were necessary at least in terms of international 
procurements:  
 
As an example, national rules and regulations for procurement would require that 
your bids are in the national currency, Malawi currency but now Malawi currency is 
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not exactly stable. If you are quoting from elsewhere, you don’t want to take that risk, 
the risk of an unstable currency, that’s one. Secondly, arbitration: according to 
national procurement regulations it is governed using the national laws, if you are 
bidding from outside Malawi, you may not find that necessarily very attractive, you 
might want some international arbitration.(Multilateral Donor) 
 
Although there was greater consensus on the need to reform central medical stores, one 
interviewee explains how there is a culture of blame focused on Governmental institutions 
while donors’ flaws often go unquestioned:  
 
I attended a meeting on making the money work: how we can accelerate the 
implementation within the ministry of heath and all I got was what the ministry 
doesn’t do, the whole document, nothing on any other [issues], and that’s the culture 
around here, there is absolutely no way you get anywhere by piling everything that 
needs to fixed on one end of the partnership, you don’t need a PhD to do that. (CSO) 
 
Generally, members of CSOs and Governmental institutions felt that donors were often intrusive 
and using the power linked to their financial contribution to ‘micro-manage’. This was also 
highlighted by some donors in relation to more powerful peers.  
 
 
8.3. The inadequate funding of the new system 
 
8.3.1. Lack of predictability 
 
The main issue identified through the interviews with regards to funding was its continuous 
lack of predictability. If predictability of funding was perceived as having improved within 
the pool funding mechanism (with the exception of the Global Fund), other non-
harmonized donors were more problematic.  
 
Yet the lack of predictability in the long-term was a hindrance to proper planning processes 
and created a ‘high risk environment’ in which the Government could be nervous about 
disbursing money.  As a member of staff at the Ministry of Health explained, the lack of 
predictability and low disbursement rates of some donors had created a catch-22 situation 
whereby factoring in these financial flow in the budget could have harmful macro-
economic implications should the money be retained by the donor, and not including them 
in the budget could make it difficult for the Government to spend it, once the budget 
approved: 
 
I’m already looking at the headlines: ‘ministry returns donor money because it can’t 
use it’ while on the ground the people are suffering. And it is because of the system. 
So I think we really need to sit and improve the system. (GoM: MoH) 
 
As a consequence, pool mechanisms were still perceived as being less reliable than discrete 
funding. For example, a member of a civil society organization explained that there were 
anxieties around the idea of getting ART funded through the pool where it could be delayed 
by disagreements amongst donors or between donors and the Government, which could 
jeopardize treatment availability and continuity.  
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8.3.2. More conditional funding 
 
In line with some recent literature (Gould, 2005) some felt that conditionalities had been 
creeping back in under the new aid architecture. While these conditions were often less 
rigid than in previous decades, it was seen as reducing the ability of the Government to 
exercise its sovereignty and going against the principle of alignment:  
 
In principle the policies are supposed to be developed by the Government and the 
others coming to support but, it’s not really the case in real life.[…] EU has their 
own they call them benchmarks but they are conditionalities, World Bank, they want 
privatization, for example they want ADMARC to be privatized, they want everything 
to be in private hands. DFID and NORAD have their own conditions they call them 
indicators. People used to call them benchmarks but then people got used to that one 
and said let’s call them indicators. (CSO)  
 
In addition, conditions can lead to delays when they are linked to major policy changes, 
especially if these reach beyond the mandate of institutions such as NAC or the Ministry of 
Health (for example a reform of human resource policies). This was also raised in the case 
of conditions that required an initial investment from the recipient Government, but which 
did not provide any financial support (see section 8.4.2.). Moreover, there were tensions 
between conditions set out in the Memorandum of Understanding presiding over pool 
mechanisms and pre-existing bilateral agreements that specific donors previously had with 
the Government of Malawi (this was notably mentioned in connection with the Global 
Fund).  
 
Overall some felt that the new aid architecture could lead to a situation where the highest 
common denominator prevailed in terms of conditions within pool funding mechanisms. 
These requirements were sometimes resented by other more flexible partners for the delays 
and disorganization they could create.  
 
 
8.3.3. Insufficient funding 
 
Asked whether they felt there was a funding gap in the area of HIV and AIDS, Government 
staff were quick to point out that the resources promised by donors, notably by the G8 
countries, had not all materialized:  ‘as much as there was this global movement, this global 
movement has not been matched by funding’. (NAC) 
 
The funding gap was highlighted even further by the thorough costing exercise of the 
National AIDS Framework (2005-2009) and the Universal Access roadmap (from 2011):  
 
The NAF from 2005 to 2009 is costed at 620 million; the UA is almost 1.2 bn. The 
commitments that we have up to 2009 … currently the commitments start at around 
450,000 so really there’s a gap with the NAF, and (certainly) there is a gap with the 
UA.  (NAC) 
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However despite recognizing the importance of financial resources to implement the AIDS 
response, some donors questioned the Government’s capacity to spend the amounts 
calculated and felt that the current funding levels were adequate.  
 
Yet, at the local level, some argued that capacity was curtailed by lack of funding rather 
than an inability to absorb additional money:  
 
When you go to the villages, you see the group that is at least doing a commendable 
job and at the end you are not giving them funds. (District Assembly) 
 
But the Malawian Government was also perceived as failing to dedicate adequate amounts 
to Health:  
 
In terms of finances we have been lobbying for the Government to fulfill the 
declaration that was signed in Abuja whereby the Government promised 15% of the 
national budget to be allocated to the health sector, that has been our campaign for 
some time now.. we’ve been making some progress but…every time we make one step 
forward, we take two backwards…it was nearly 15% last year, it was about 14.5% 
but this year its gone down to 10.3% (CSO) 
 
 
8.4. Lack of funding for civil society organizations: a difficult transition for Non-
Governmental actors 
 
8.4.1. A funding gap for INGOs 
 
The reorganization of funding along the Paris principles has made it difficult for NGOs, 
especially international NGOs to finance their activities. Although INGOs were used in the 
first phase of the decentralization in order to allow districts to build up their capacity, their 
role under the new aid architecture is unclear. The funding they used to get from 
international donors has at least in part been channeled through the recipient Government 
and as this INGO staff explains, there seems to be a catch-22 situation:  
 
We have tried to do that to go to them [the donors] but they will say ‘no that’s not the 
way we work we are giving this money to National AIDS Commission’ so we can give 
you the money but you have to go the National AIDS Commission. […] When you go 
to the National AIDS Commission they will say ‘you are an INGO an international 
organization, we can’t give you the money’. That presents a challenge for us: so 
where do we get the money? (INGO) 
  
This is seen as a missed opportunity as ‘there are some NGOs here that do fantastic work in 
health and for the Government to ignore these people because they’re international NGOs, 
it’s just short-sighted’ (Bilateral Donor). In addition, the lack of funding available to NGOs 
from donors makes it more difficult for them to identify and address possible gaps within 
the Government’s plans. Thus, the Paris Declaration might have contributed to the decline 
of effective ways of spending aid through INGOs and CSOs.  
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8.4.2. More prescriptive funding: ‘It’s so bureaucratic, so restricted, so directed’ (Bilateral 
Donor)  
 
According to some interviewees, activities that used to be financed directly from donors 
were now being picked up by the Governmental structures which were not always without 
problems:  
 
Before we used to get funding from other donors for our home-based care activities 
for example, but now it is going through the Government and NAC so you have to 
access it through the Ministry of Health at the local hospital so it never materializes. 
(CSO)  
 
In the same line, NGO staff also highlighted that available funding from the NAC or the 
Ministry of Health had become tied to heavy bureaucratic requirements:  
 
When you get it [funding] from the Commission, the Commission is basically 
panicking to report, panicking to comply, […] a lot of time is invested in 
accountability requirements as opposed to technical management support of what’s 
going on.  (INGO) 
 
We have been in discussions with NAC for maybe a year now. I mean their process is 
just ridiculous; it can go as far as three years before you get the funds (CSO) 
 
Direct funding from donors was generally perceived as easier and faster to obtain and more 
flexible as processes and outcomes could be negotiated directly with the organization.  
 
A further challenge seen by members of civil society organization was that some funding 
would not cover the actual running cost of an activity:  
 
The challenge is not whether we can raise money, but the challenge is whether we 
can raise money that is good enough, as in flexible enough to be used for our policy 
advocacy and our community initiative or interventions without overburdening or 
overstretching our organisational capacities, the capacity of our partners, and the 
public social service capacity, the ministry of health and the local assembly capacity, 
and all other partners that work with Government partners, all that we work with. 
(INGO) 
 
Other issues that arose include as the requirements for multiple quotes to procure goods, 
which was seen as time-consuming and costly and not always justified especially in remote 
areas.  
 
Moreover, some felt that the new organization of aid made it more difficult for civil society 
organizations to carry out lobbying and advocacy activities, as funding for this was not 
forthcoming. This could be a damaging aspect of the Paris principles whereby civil society 
could lose its ability to hold the Government and donors accountable.  
  
 
8.4. The issue of capacity 
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8.4.1. A structure which is still  staff-intensive  
 
Lack of adequate human resource capacity within ministries was identified as an issue by 
interviewees from both donor organizations and staff from various ministries as well as 
CSOs. The staffing gap was seen as having been made more crucial by the new aid 
architecture. Despite the streamlining of procedures, such as reporting and monitoring and 
evaluation, brought about by the Paris principles, staffing needs are still high. Indeed the 
leadership role played by the Government requires adequate and often increased human 
resources, especially as the process of consulting and agreeing with development partners 
can be time-consuming (see section 8.1.1.).  
 
The staffing gap is also felt at the local level, as the rolling out of decentralization has 
increased the burden of monitoring and evaluation and reporting procedures at the district 
assembly level:  
 
I experience that district assemblies find it difficult to adhere to NAC rules and 
regulations every three months and […]  if they don’t write a financial report and put 
in a financial disbursement request on time then NAC cannot process the next 
disbursement and so yeah… I mean I’ve seen it every three months for some times, 
the scheme gets to a halt. (Multilateral Donor) 
 
In this case, longer disbursement periods (six months) seemed to have helped lighten this 
burden.  
 
However, in addition to the staffing needs triggered by the new aid architecture and 
decentralization, it is worth noting that public health interventions such as the AIDS 
response are particularly reliant on front line workers in countries like Malawi: 
 
The majority of the population is illiterate; our transport network is not as developed 
as it should be. So as a country we need face to face interaction […] we need the 
people at the community level to deliver a service. (GoM) 
 
 
8.4.2. A structure undermined by lack of  capacity  
 
The lack of staff at both Ministry and local levels was seen as an impediment to the country 
ownership principle. Talking about the high vacancy rate at the Ministry of Health, a donor 
representative explained:  
 
Staff […] have too much work, much too much work… So finding that leadership 
amongst staff who have so much to do, have so little support in their day jobs, can be 
very difficult and that’s a real challenge. (Bilateral Donor) 
 
It is worth noting that this high vacancy rate is taking place in a context where the ministry 
is already under-resourced and under-staffed in proportion to the burden of the disease. 
Yet, large structures such as the NAC or the Ministry of Health are seen as absorbing a 
disproportionate amount of funding, leaving even more limited resources to local 
programmes and health facilities.  
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The capacity gap can also have negative effects in terms of securing funding from donors, 
for example by failing to comply with all their requirements. It was felt that donors whose 
requirements involved high levels of staffing without providing financial help to pay for 
these were very much stretching ministries’ capacity beyond their limits:  
 
If there is anything, any weaknesses that they see, those should be built into the 
programme as interventions, to strengthen the system, not to ask the Ministry to 
strengthen the system first before the money comes. […] So I believe that probably 
what needs to happen is that any weaknesses of the systems, those should be part and 
parcel of the interventions to be carried out with the funding, not that this should be 
done first before the funds come. (GoM: MoH) 
 
However, both under-staffing and the lack of training and skills in some areas could be 
problematic and both issues could often reinforce each other, as this Ministry of Health 
staff dealing with donors’ requirements explains:  
 
There’s no one who has been working with me to say that if I leave they would be 
able to follow up with it. Because [my work] is quite technical and quite time 
consuming and one has to have a lot of time and dedication and interest to do all 
those things.  (GoM: MoH) 
 
Thus the loss of this member of staff could be translated into important monetary loss with 
dramatic consequences for AIDS programmes.  
 
In addition, lack of adequate staffing could also cause low absorption capacity. At district 
level, capacity constraints could have dramatic consequences:  
 
They don’t have enough capacity in most districts to actually handle the funds, to 
actually channel the funds to the appropriate organisations so what is happening is 
that most of the funds get stuck at the district assembly’s office instead of going into 
the rural areas. (CSO) 
 
Although not the focus of this research it is worth mentioning that the lack of medical staff 
has been a serious impediment to the adequate implementation of the AIDS response. The 
capacity of the civil society as a mechanism to ensure checks and balances vis-à-vis the 
Government was also mentioned as inadequate and thus problematic.  
 
 
 
8.4.3. Barriers to adequate staffing  
 
While recognizing this problem, many donor representatives interviewed felt that increased 
staffing at ministry level was not necessarily a solution. One drawback was that the 
Government would not have the financial ability to sustain an increased workforce should 
donors’ support wane. In addition, there was a fear that more staff would be equated with 
an increased bureaucracy, rather than more efficiency. Some also felt that additional 
367 
 
staffing at ministry level was not the most pressing issue where for example medical 
personnel were particularly scarce.  
 
The effects of wage bill caps which until recently imposed a ceiling on how much the 
Government could spend on salaries as a share of its budget (see for example Action Aid, 
2005 and 2007) were discussed by a few interviewees: 
 
The ministry of Health or the Government had their hands tied when it came to 
recruitment despite the crisis; their hands were tied because IMF put a ceiling on 
how much they can spend on the pay roll… Even though there are vacancies the 
Government cannot recruit more because of that condition.  (CSO) 
 
This was seen as having created an environment where public health interventions were difficult to 
implement, particularly at the local level:  
 
For example, we had a home craft worker who moved from house to house to teach 
people on nutrition using the home economics approach. We reduced nutrition to a 
lower level, ok. But when they said your wage bill is very high in 1992, all these 
people got removed […] as we are talking now there is an outcry that the HIV/AIDS 
services are not reaching the community, it is because the community worker is not 
there. (GoM) 
 
Although wage bill caps had recently been lifted the Government was reluctant to increase 
the staffing cost for fear of boosting inflation.   
 
But Government HR policies, especially around the issue of continuous transfers were also 
criticized by interviewees from a variety of institutions:  
 
The ministry is sometimes also handicapped in terms of capacity because of the way 
the overall civil service system is working. We have what we call common service 
employees. Those are like support staff, then it is like HR people. So you might have 
you know HR management officer who comes and who will start knowing the system 
and then they get promoted, they are posted out of the ministry to another ministry. 
(GoM: MoH) 
 
The loss of skills and knowledge linked to these transfers was seen as problematic, 
especially in a context that did not allow the arriving personnel to overlap with her or his 
predecessor for a significant amount of time.   
 
Another issue raised was the limited ability of the Government of Malawi to offer 
competitive salaries compared to other development partners such as donors and NGOs. As 
one participant put it with regards to INGOs:  
 
They’re coming without adequate human resources and then they expect to source 
locally from the district local facilities and that’s created a massive strain on already 
weak health systems. (Bilateral Donor) 
 
 
8.5. A more effective system?  
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8.5.1. Reduced transactional costs or inflated bureaucracy? 
 
There were questions as to whether the Paris agenda had really reduced transactional costs. 
While it was recognized that the harmonization of reporting and monitoring and evaluation 
procedures was beneficial, some interviewees pointed out that the new aid architecture had 
contributed to creating more bureaucracy by shifting the implementation largely on state 
systems and creating new institutions such as NAC. There were doubts as to whether total 
costs were eventually lower than under the previous system:  
 
Just how effective is that money and how efficiently is it being used or how much is 
being absorbed by another layer of the system in that whole set up? (Bilateral Donor) 
 
One interviewee at the Ministry of Finance highlighted that the Government of Malawi 
found budget support easier to manage than pool funding mechanisms and ultimately 
preferable despite their vulnerability to cuts.  
 
 
8.5.2. A more effective allocation of funding? 
 
A number of interviewees highlighted that although the new aid architecture helped to 
avoid duplication and waste, they felt that spending was not always as effectively allocated 
as it could be. The lack of impact analysis was seen as a major barrier to improvements in 
this area and a number of donor representatives felt the lack of transparency regarding 
financial flows and their results was regrettable. This was also a salient critique from a 
number of civil society organizations as it hindered their ability to hold the Government 
accountable and lobby for change:  
 
It’s really difficult to find information on how the money is used on ARTs. It is being 
used but to find the information, we had to go to treasury, then to the Ministry of 
Health… but the actual information for example: how much was allocated for ARVs? 
We were not able to get that. And then we go on to the sites, to the cost centers, 
where they are using that amount of money, for example in hospitals, to find out how 
much they used for ARVs. In some we could get them, in others we couldn’t. (CSO) 
 
In addition it was felt that this lack of data was a major hindrance to effective reviews and 
(re)costing of AIDS-related policies.  
 
 
8.5.3. Effectiveness of other mechanisms  
 
Another point made by a number of interviewees was that the trend of the Paris principles 
should not over shadow the fact that some vertical programmes (albeit not all) have proven 
to be very successful. Thus some argued that they should not be dismissed altogether and 
the comparative advantages of using such an approach should be kept in mind:  
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It’s because the vision is discrete, the governance is discrete, the impetus is strong 
and it’s not being diluted by this ‘we have to share everything with everybody’. 
That’s why they’re successful. (Bilateral Donor) 
 
Again, this comment raises the question of whether the pool should be seen as the only 
solution or one mechanism used in tandem with other approaches.  This issue was also 
raised in relation to the waning role of INGOs in service delivery, or the lack of 
involvement of the private sector, as it was argued that their potential added value should 
be considered.  
 
 
9. Conclusion and recommendations  
 
Most of the individuals interviewed had a rather positive view of the new aid architecture 
although many issues with this approach were also raised. Both practically and 
conceptually, the two most salient issues appeared to be the Government’s lack of capacity 
and donors’ double accountability. 
 
Many interviewees –especially donors – felt that the idea of putting the Malawian 
Government in the driving seat should be interpreted more as an aspiration or a trend that 
could be furthered with time: 
 
This concept of donor coordination and Government sovereignty it is a new concept, 
a very new concept amongst donors … there’s no magic formula and everyone’s 
feeling their way a bit. (Bilateral Donor)  
 
There was a sense that in practice, the Paris Declaration involved a much messier business 
of negotiations and experiments than the text itself seemed to acknowledge. As one donor 
representative noted: ‘the Paris Declaration doesn’t tell us how to do it’. Thus the rolling 
out of the new aid architecture was highly reliant on inter-personal processes amongst those 
involved, especially as the pool of donors was relatively small in Malawi. Overall, many 
felt that the Paris principles were relatively recent and that the new system needed time to 
mature. Time will tell if this is simply a steep learning curve that will work itself out 
through improvements and new commitments (such as the Accra Agenda for Action) or if 
the rather technical approach of the new aid architecture and its silence on issues of power 
differences, accountability, sovereignty and capacity will lead to a new ‘development 
trend’ emerging in its place.  
 
 
 
Recommendations  
 
These were all suggested by research participants: 
 
- Donors should better support Government capacity at central and district levels  
- Greater leadership and ownership from the Government  
- Commitment from all partners is key to success 
- Increase predictability of funding  
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- Keep dialogue lines open  
- Rationalize the organization i.e. limit the number of task forces, working groups, 
steering committees etc.  
- Rationalize the use of resources using performance-based assessments  
- Enable alternative voices to be heard  
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F. List of OECD member countries (with the dates on which they deposited their 
instruments of ratification)  
 
From: http://www.oecd.org/general/listofoecdmembercountries-
ratificationoftheconventionontheoecd.htm 
 
Australia -  7 June 1971 
Austria - 29 September 1961 
Belgium - 13 September 1961 
Canada - 10 April 1961 
Chile - 7 May 2010 
Czech Republic - 21 December 1995 
Denmark - 30 May 1961 
Estonia - 9 December 2010 
Finland - 28 January 1969 
France - 7 August 1961 
Germany - 27 September 1961 
Greece - 27 September 1961 
Hungary- 7 May 1996 
Iceland - 5 June 1961 
Ireland - 17 August 1961 
Israel - 7 September 2010 
Italy - 29 March 1962 
Japan - 28 April 1964 
Korea - 12 December 1996 
Luxembourg - 7 December 1961 
Mexico - 18 May 1994 
Netherlands - 13 November 1961 
New Zealand - 29 May 1973 
Norway - 4 July 1961 
Poland - 22 November 1996 
Portugal - 4 August 1961 
Slovak Republic - 14 December 2000 
Slovenia - 21 July 2010 
Spain - 3 August 1961 
Sweden - 28 September 1961 
Switzerland - 28 September 1961 
Turkey - 2 August 1961 
United Kingdom - 2 May 1961 
United States - 12 April 1961 
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G. The 2003 Rome Declaration on Harmonisation (OECD, 2003) 
 
Rome Declaration on Harmonisation 
 
Ministers, Heads of Aid Agencies and other Senior Officials representing 
28 aid recipient countries and more than 40 multilateral and bilateral 
development institutions endorsed the Rome Declaration on Harmonisation 
in February 2003.  
We, the heads of multilateral and bilateral development institutions and 
representatives of the IMF, other multilateral financial institutions, and 
partner countries gathered in Rome, Italy, on February 24-25, 2003, 
reaffirm our commitment to eradicating poverty, achieving sustained 
economic growth, and promoting sustainable development as we advance to 
an inclusive and equitable global economic system. Our deliberations are an 
important international effort to harmonise the operational policies, 
procedures, and practices of our institutions with those of partner country 
systems to improve the effectiveness of development assistance, and thereby 
contribute to meeting the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). They 
directly support the broad agreement of the international development 
community on this issue as reflected in the Monterrey Consensus (Report of 
the International Conference on Financing for Development, March 2002, 
para. 43). We express our appreciation to the governments of Jamaica, 
Vietnam, and Ethiopia, and to the bilateral donors and international 
institutions that sponsored and coordinated regional workshops in 
Kingston, Hanoi, and Addis Ababa in January 2003, in preparation for the 
Rome Forum. The key principles, lessons, and messages synthesised in the 
reports of these workshops have provided valuable input to the Forum.  
Improvements in development effectiveness  
We in the donor community have been concerned with the growing 
evidence that, over time, the totality and wide variety of donor 
requirements and processes for preparing, delivering, and monitoring 
development assistance are generating unproductive transaction costs for, 
and drawing down the limited capacity of, partner countries. We are also 
aware of partner country concerns that donors’ practices do not always fit 
well with national development priorities and systems, including their 
budget, programme, and project planning cycles and public expenditure and 
financial management systems. We recognise that these issues require 
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urgent, coordinated, and sustained action to improve our effectiveness on 
the ground.  
We attach high importance to partner countries’ assuming a stronger 
leadership role in the coordination of development assistance, and to 
assisting in building their capacity to do so. Partner countries on their part 
will undertake necessary reforms to enable progressive reliance by donors 
on their systems as they adopt international principles or standards and 
apply good practices. The key element that will guide this work is a 
country-based approach that emphasizes country ownership and 
government leadership, includes capacity building, recognises diverse aid 
modalities (projects, sector approaches, and budget or balance of payments 
support), and engages civil society including the private sector.  
Good practice standards or principles  
We acknowledge that while our historical origins, institutional 
mandates, governance structures, and authorising environments vary, in 
many instances we can simplify and harmonise our requirements and 
reduce their associated costs, while improving fiduciary oversight and 
public accountability and enhancing the focus on concrete development 
results. We endorse the good practice work by the technical groups of the 
DAC-OECD Task Force and the multilateral development banks (MDBs), 
and look forward to the expected completion next year of the UN 
harmonisation work that is being coordinated by UNDG. We are ready to 
follow existing good practices while continuing to identify and disseminate 
new ones.  
Going forward  
We agree that, for both donors and partner countries, the progress we 
make on the ground in programmes and projects will be a concrete and 
important measure of the success of our efforts. We recognise that such 
progress can be facilitated and enhanced by harmonisation efforts at the 
international and regional levels. Building on the work of the DAC-OECD 
and MDB working groups and on country experience, including the recent 
country initiatives, we commit to the following activities to enhance 
harmonisation:  
❖ Ensuring that development assistance is delivered in accordance with 
partner country priorities, including poverty reduction strategies and 
similar approaches, and that harmonisation efforts are adapted to the 
country context.  
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❖ Reviewing and identifying ways to amend, as appropriate, our 
individual institutions’ and countries’ policies, procedures, and practices to 
facilitate harmonisation. In addition, we will work to reduce donor 
missions, reviews, and reporting, streamline conditionalities, and simplify 
and harmonise documentation.  
❖ Implementing progressively – building on experiences so far and the 
messages from the regional workshops – the good practice standards or 
principles in development assistance delivery and management, taking into 
account specific country circumstances. We will disseminate the good 
practices to our managers and staff at headquarters and in country offices 
and to other in-country development partners.  
❖ Intensifying donor efforts to work through delegated cooperation at 
the country level and increasing the flexibility of country-based staff to 
manage country programmes and projects more effectively and efficiently.  
❖Developing, at all levels within our organisations, incentives that 
foster management and staff recognition of the benefits of harmonisation in 
the interest of increased aid effectiveness.  
❖ Providing support for country analytic work in ways that will 
strengthen governments’ ability to assume a greater leadership role and take 
ownership of development results. In particular, we will work with partner 
governments to forge stronger partnerships and will collaborate to improve 
the policy relevance, quality, delivery, and efficiency of country analytic 
work.  
❖ Expanding or mainstreaming country-led efforts (whether begun in 
particular sectors, thematic areas, or individual projects) to streamline donor 
procedures and practices, including enhancing demand-driven technical 
cooperation. The list of countries presently involved includes Ethiopia, 
Jamaica, Vietnam, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Cambodia, Honduras, Kenya, 
Kyrgyz Republic, Morocco, Niger, Nicaragua, Pacific Islands, Philippines, 
Senegal, and Zambia.  
❖ Providing budget, sector, or balance of payments support where it is 
consistent with the mandate of the donor, and when appropriate policy and 
fiduciary arrangements are in place. Good practice principles or standards – 
including alignment with national budget cycles and national poverty 
reduction strategy reviews – should be used in delivering such assistance.  
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❖ Promoting harmonised approaches in global and regional programs.  
We wish to record that a positive by-product of our collaboration on 
harmonisation has been increased information sharing and improved 
understanding of commonalities and differences during the preparation or 
revision of our respective operational policies, procedures, and practices. 
We will deepen this collaboration in the future, and will explore how such 
collaboration could help to ensure that new or revised policies are 
appropriately harmonised or “harmonisable” with those of the partner 
countries and donor institutions.  
We recognise the global work on monitoring and assessing the 
contribution of donor support to the achievement of the MDGs. We will 
track and, as necessary, refine lead indicators of progress on harmonisation 
such as those described in the DAC-OECD Good Practice Papers.  
We acknowledge the potential contribution of modern information and 
communication technologies to promoting and facilitating harmonisation – 
already demonstrated by the use of audio and videoconferencing facilities in 
the staff work on harmonisation, the Development Gateway, the Country 
Analytic Work Website, and the early work on e-government, e-
procurement, and e-financial management. We commit to further efforts to 
exploit these technologies.  
Next steps  
Partner countries are encouraged to design country-based action plans 
for harmonisation, agreed with the donor community that will set out clear 
and monitorable proposals to harmonise development assistance using the 
proposals of the DAC-OECD Task Force and the MDB technical working 
groups as reference points. In turn, the bilateral and multilateral agencies 
will take actions to support harmonisation at the country level. As part of 
their self-evaluation processes, bilateral and multilateral agencies and 
partner countries will assess and report on progress in applying good 
practices, and on the impact of such practices. Whenever possible, we will 
use existing mechanisms to develop such plans and to assess and report on 
progress, and we will make these plans available to the public.  
We will utilise and strengthen, including through partner country 
participation, existing mechanisms to maintain peer pressure for 
implementing our agreements on harmonisation. In this regard and in the 
context of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development, we welcome 
regional initiatives, such as the work by the Economic Commission for 
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Africa, for a joint annual aid effectiveness review in a framework of mutual 
accountability that would also address harmonisation issues.  
Reflecting our experience over these last two days, we plan stocktaking 
meetings in early 2005 following the review already scheduled in DAC-
OECD in 2004. This follow-up would assess progress in and sustain the 
momentum for fundamental changes that enhance aid delivery, and would 
contribute to the review of the implementation of the Monterrey 
Consensus, the timing and modalities for which are expected to be 
determined by 2005.  
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H. The 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness 
 
 
Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness  
 
Ownership, Harmonisation, Alignment, Results and Mutual 
Accountability  
I. Statement of Resolve  
1. We, Ministers of developed and developing countries responsible for promoting 
development and Heads of multilateral and bilateral development institutions, meeting in 
Paris on 2 March 2005, resolve to take far-reaching and monitorable actions to reform 
the ways we deliver and manage aid as we look ahead to the UN five-year review of the  
Millennium Declaration and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) later this year. 
As in Monterrey, we recognise that while the volumes of aid and other development 
resources must increase to achieve these goals, aid effectiveness must increase 
significantly as well to support partner country efforts to strengthen governance and 
improve development performance. This will be all the more important if existing and 
new bilateral and multilateral initiatives lead to significant  
further increases in aid.  
2. At this High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, we followed up on the Declaration 
adopted at the High-Level Forum on Harmonisation in Rome (February 2003) and the 
core principles put forward at the Marrakech Roundtable on Managing for Development 
Results (February 2004) because we believe they will increase the impact aid has in 
reducing poverty and inequality, increasing growth, building capacity and accelerating 
achievement of the MDGs.  
Scale up for more effective aid  
3. We reaffirm the commitments made at Rome to harmonise and align aid delivery. We 
are encouraged that many donors and partner countries are making aid effectiveness a 
high priority, and we reaffirm our commitment to accelerate  
progress in implementation, especially in the following areas:  
i. Strengthening partner countries’ national development strategies and 
associated operational frameworks (e.g., planning, budget, and performance 
assessment frameworks).  
ii. Increasing alignment of aid with partner countries’ priorities, systems and 
procedures and helping to strengthen their capacities.  
iii. Enhancing donors’ and partner countries’ respective accountability to their 
citizens and parliaments for their development policies, strategies and 
performance.  
iv. Eliminating duplication of efforts and rationalising donor activities to make 
them as cost-effective as possible.  
v. Reforming and simplifying donor policies and procedures to encourage 
collaborative behaviour and progressive alignment with partner countries’ 
priorities, systems and procedures.  
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vi. Defining measures and standards of performance and accountability of 
partner country systems in public financial management, procurement, 
fiduciary safeguards and environmental assessments, in line with broadly 
accepted good practices and their quick and widespread application.  
 
4. We commit ourselves to taking concrete and effective action to address the remaining 
challenges, including:  
i. Weaknesses in partner countries’ institutional capacities to develop and 
implement results-driven national development strategies.  
ii. Failure to provide more predictable and multi-year commitments on aid flows 
to committed partner countries.  
iii. Insufficient delegation of authority to donors’ field staff, and inadequate 
attention to incentives for effective development partnerships between donors 
and partner countries.  
iv. Insufficient integration of global programmes and initiatives into partner 
countries’ broader development agendas, including in critical areas such as 
HIV/AIDS.  
v. Corruption and lack of transparency, which erode public support, impede 
effective resource mobilisation and allocation and divert resources away from 
activities that are vital for poverty reduction and sustainable economic 
development. Where corruption exists, it inhibits donors from relying on 
partner country systems.  
 
5. We acknowledge that enhancing the effectiveness of aid is feasible and necessary 
across all aid modalities. In determining the most effective modalities of aid delivery, we 
will be guided by development strategies and priorities established by partner countries. 
Individually and collectively, we will choose and design appropriate and complementary 
modalities so as to maximise their combined effectiveness.  
 
6. In following up the Declaration, we will intensify our efforts to provide and use 
development assistance, including the increased flows as promised at Monterrey, in 
ways that rationalise the often excessive fragmentation of donor activities at the country 
and sector levels.  
Adapt and apply to differing country situations  
7. Enhancing the effectiveness of aid is also necessary in challenging and complex 
situations, such as the tsunami disaster that struck countries of the Indian Ocean rim on 
26 December 2004. In such situations, worldwide humanitarian and development 
assistance must be harmonised within the growth and poverty reduction agendas of 
partner countries. In fragile states, as we support state-building and delivery of basic 
services, we will ensure that the principles of harmonisation, alignment and managing for 
results are adapted to environments of weak governance and capacity. Overall, we will 
give increased attention to such complex situations as we work toward greater aid 
effectiveness.  
Specify indicators, timetable and targets  
8. We accept that the reforms suggested in this Declaration will require continued high-
level political support, peer pressure and coordinated actions at the global, regional and 
country levels. We commit to accelerate the pace of change by implementing, in a spirit 
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of mutual accountability, the Partnership Commitments presented in Section II and to 
measure progress against 12 specific indicators that we have agreed today and that are 
set out in Section III of this Declaration.  
 
9. As a further spur to progress, we will set targets for the year 2010. These targets, 
which will involve action by both donors and partner countries, are designed to track and 
encourage progress at the global level among the countries and agencies that have 
agreed to this Declaration. They are not intended to prejudge or substitute for any 
targets that individual partner countries may wish to set. We have agreed today to set 
five preliminary targets against indicators as shown in Section III. We agree to review 
these preliminary targets and to adopt targets against the remaining indicators as shown 
in Section III before the UNGA Summit in September 2005; and we ask the partnership 
of donors and partner countries hosted by the DAC to prepare for this urgently1.
 
Meanwhile, we welcome initiatives by partner countries and donors to establish their own 
targets for improved aid effectiveness within the framework of the agreed Partnership 
Commitments and Indicators of Progress. For example, a number of partner countries 
have presented action plans, and a large number of donors have announced important 
new commitments. We invite all participants who wish to provide information on such 
initiatives to submit it by 4 April 2005 for subsequent publication.  
Monitor and evaluate implementation  
10. Because demonstrating real progress at country level is critical, under the leadership 
of the partner country we will periodically assess, qualitatively as well as quantitatively, 
our mutual progress at country level in implementing agreed commitments on aid 
effectiveness. In doing so, we will make use of appropriate country level mechanisms.  
 
11. At the international level, we call on the partnership of donors and partner countries 
hosted by the DAC to broaden partner country participation and, by the end of 2005, to 
propose arrangements for the medium term monitoring of the commitments in this 
Declaration. In the meantime, we ask the partnership to co-ordinate the international 
monitoring of the Indicators of Progress included in Section III; to refine targets as 
necessary; to provide appropriate guidance to establish baselines; and to enable 
consistent aggregation of information across a range of countries to be summed up in a 
periodic report. We will also use existing peer review mechanisms and regional reviews 
to support progress in this agenda. We will, in addition, explore independent cross-
country monitoring and evaluation processes – which should be applied without 
imposing additional burdens on partners – to provide a more comprehensive 
understanding of how increased aid effectiveness contributes to meeting development 
objectives.  
 
12. Consistent with the focus on implementation, we plan to meet again in 2008 in a 
developing country and conduct two rounds of monitoring before then to review progress 
                                                 
1 In accordance with paragraph 9 of the Declaration, the partnership of donors and partner countries hosted by the DAC 
(Working Party on Aid Effectiveness) comprising OECD/DAC members, partner countries and multilateral institutions, met 
twice, on _0-_1 May 2005 and on 7-8 July 2005 to adopt, and review where appropriate, the targets for the twelve 
Indicators of Progress. At these meetings an agreement was reached on the targets presented under Section III of the 
present Declaration. This agreement is subject to reservations by one donor on (a) the methodology for assessing the 
quality of locally-managed procurement systems (relating to targets 2b and 5b) and (b) the acceptable quality of public 
financial management reform programmes (relating to target 5a.ii). Further discussions are under way to address these 
issues. The targets, including the reservation, have been notified to the Chairs of the High-level Plenary Meeting of the 
59th General Assembly of the United Nations in a letter of 9 September 2005 by Mr. Richard Manning, Chair of the OECD 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC).  
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in implementing this Declaration.  
II. Partnership Commitments  
13. Developed in a spirit of mutual accountability, these Partnership Commitments are 
based on the lessons of experience. We recognise that commitments need to be 
interpreted in the light of the specific situation of each partner country.  
 
Ownership  
Partner countries exercise effective leadership over their development policies, and 
strategies and co-ordinate development actions.  
14.  Partner countries commit to:  
• Exercise leadership in developing and implementing their national development 
strategies2  through broad consultative processes.  
• Translate these national development strategies into prioritised results-oriented 
operational programmes as expressed in medium-term expenditure frameworks 
and annual budgets (Indicator 1).  
• Take the lead in co-ordinating aid at all levels in conjunction with other 
development resources in dialogue with donors and encouraging the participation 
of civil society and the private sector.  
 
15. Donors commit to:  
• Respect partner country leadership and help strengthen their capacity to exercise 
it.  
Alignment  
Donors base their overall support on partner countries’ national development strategies, 
institutions and procedures.  
Donors align with partners’ strategies  
16. Donors commit to:  
• Base their overall support — country strategies, policy dialogues and 
development co-operation programmes – on partners’ national development 
strategies and periodic reviews of progress in implementing these strategies3 
(Indicator 3).  
• Draw conditions, whenever possible, from a partner’s national development 
strategy or its annual review of progress in implementing this strategy. Other 
conditions would be included only when a sound justification exists and would be 
undertaken transparently and in close consultation with other donors and stake 
holders.  
                                                 
2 The term `national development strategies’ includes poverty reduction and similar over arching strategies as well as 
sector and thematic strategies. 
3 This includes for example the Annual Progress Review of the Poverty Reduction Strategies (APR).  
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• Link funding to a single framework of conditions and/or a manageable set of 
indicators derived from the national development strategy. This does not mean 
that all donors have identical conditions, but that each donor’s conditions should 
be derived from a common streamlined framework aimed at achieving lasting 
results.  
Donors use strengthened country systems  
17. Using a country’s own institutions and systems, where these provide assurance that 
aid will be used for agreed purposes, increases aid effectiveness by strengthening the 
partner country’s sustainable capacity to develop, implement and account for its policies 
to its citizens and parliament. Country systems and procedures typically include, but are 
not restricted to, national arrangements and procedures for public financial management, 
accounting, auditing, procurement, results frameworks and monitoring.  
 
18. Diagnostic reviews are an important – and growing – source of information to 
governments and donors on the state of country systems in partner countries. Partner 
countries and donors have a shared interest in being able to monitor progress over time 
in improving country systems. They are assisted by performance assessment 
frameworks, and an associated set of reform measures, that build on the information set 
out in diagnostic reviews and related analytical work.  
 
19. Partner countries and donors jointly commit to:  
• Work together to establish mutually agreed frameworks that provide reliable 
assessments of performance, transparency and accountability of country 
systems (Indicator 2).  
• Integrate diagnostic reviews and performance assessment frameworks within 
country-led strategies for capacity development.  
 
20. Partner countries commit to:  
• Carry out diagnostic reviews that provide reliable assessments of country 
systems and procedures.  
• On the basis of such diagnostic reviews, undertake reforms that may be 
necessary to ensure that national systems, institutions and procedures for 
managing aid and other development resources are effective, accountable and 
transparent.  
• Undertake reforms, such as public management reform, that may be necessary 
to launch and fuel sustainable capacity development processes.  
 
21. Donors commit to:  
• Use country systems and procedures to the maximum extent possible. Where 
use of country systems is not feasible, establish additional safeguards and 
measures in ways that strengthen rather than undermine country systems and 
procedures (Indicator 5).  
• Avoid, to the maximum extent possible, creating dedicated structures for day-to-
day management and implementation of aid-financed projects and programmes 
(Indicator 6).  
• Adopt harmonised performance assessment frameworks for country systems so 
 382 
as to avoid presenting partner countries with an excessive number of potentially 
conflicting targets.  
 
Partner countries strengthen development capacity with support from 
donors  
22. The capacity to plan, manage, implement, and account for results of policies and 
programmes, is critical for achieving development objectives – from analysis and 
dialogue through implementation, monitoring and evaluation. Capacity development is 
the responsibility of partner countries with donors playing a support role. It needs not 
only to be based on sound technical analysis, but also to be responsive to the broader 
social, political and economic environment, including the need to strengthen human 
resources.  
23. Partner countries commit to:  
• Integrate specific capacity strengthening objectives in national development 
strategies and pursue their implementation through country-led capacity 
development strategies where needed.  
_  
24. Donors commit to:  
• Align their analytic and financial support with partners’ capacity development 
objectives and strategies, make effective use of existing capacities and 
harmonise support for capacity development accordingly (Indicator 4).  
 
Strengthen public financial management capacity  
25. Partner countries commit to:  
• Intensify efforts to mobilise domestic resources, strengthen fiscal sustainability, 
and create an enabling environment for public and private investments.  
• Publish timely, transparent and reliable reporting on budget execution.  
• Take leadership of the public financial management reform process.  
 
26. Donors commit to:  
• Provide reliable indicative commitments of aid over a multi-year framework and 
disburse aid in a timely and predictable fashion according to agreed schedules 
(Indicator 7).  
• Rely to the maximum extent possible on transparent partner government budget 
and accounting mechanisms (Indicator 5).  
 
27. Partner countries and donors jointly commit to:  
• Implement harmonised diagnostic reviews and performance assessment 
frameworks in public financial management.  
 
Strengthen national procurement systems  
28. Partner countries and donors jointly commit to:  
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• Use mutually agreed standards and processes4
 
to carry out diagnostics, develop 
sustainable reforms and monitor implementation.  
• Commit sufficient resources to support and sustain medium and long-term 
procurement reforms and capacity development.  
• Share feedback at the country level on recommended approaches so they can be 
improved over time.  
 
29. Partner countries commit to take leadership and implement the procurement reform 
process.  
30. Donors commit to:  
• Progressively rely on partner country systems for procurement when the country 
has implemented mutually agreed standards and processes (Indicator 5).  
• Adopt harmonised approaches when national systems do not meet mutually 
agreed levels of performance or donors do not use them.  
 
Untie aid: getting better value for money  
31. Untying aid generally increases aid effectiveness by reducing transaction costs for 
partner countries and improving country ownership and alignment. DAC Donors will 
continue to make progress on untying as encouraged by the 2001 DAC 
Recommendation on Untying Official Development Assistance to the Least Developed 
Countries (Indicator 8).  
 
Harmonisation  
Donors’ actions are more harmonised, transparent and collectively effective.  
Donors implement common arrangements and simplify procedures  
32. Donors commit to:  
• Implement the donor action plans that they have developed as part of the follow-
up to the Rome High-Level Forum.  
• Implement, where feasible, common arrangements at country level for planning, 
funding (e.g. joint financial arrangements), disbursement, monitoring, evaluating 
and reporting to government on donor activities and aid flows. Increased use of 
programme-based aid modalities can contribute to this effort (Indicator 9).  
• Work together to reduce the number of separate, duplicative, missions to the field 
and diagnostic reviews (Indicator 10); and promote joint training to share lessons 
learnt and build a community of practice.  
 
Complementarity: more effective division of labour  
33. Excessive fragmentation of aid at global, country or sector level impairs aid 
effectiveness. A pragmatic approach to the division of labour and burden sharing 
increases complementarity and can reduce transaction costs.  
                                                 
4 Such as the processes developed by the joint OECD-DAC – World Bank Round Table on Strengthening Procurement Capacities in 
Developing Countries. 
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34. Partner countries commit to:  
• Provide clear views on donors’ comparative advantage and on how to achieve 
donor complementarity at country or sector level.  
35. Donors commit to:  
• Make full use of their respective comparative advantage at sector or country 
level by delegating, where appropriate, authority to lead donors for the 
execution of programmes, activities and tasks.  
• Work together to harmonise separate procedures.  
 
Incentives for collaborative behaviour  
36. Donors and partner countries jointly commit to:  
• Reform procedures and strengthen incentives – including for recruitment, 
appraisal and training – for management and staff to work towards 
harmonisation, alignment and results.  
Delivering effective aid in fragile states5
 
 
37. The long-term vision for international engagement in fragile states is to build 
legitimate, effective and resilient state and other country institutions. While the guiding 
principles of effective aid apply equally to fragile states, they need to be adapted to 
environments of weak ownership and capacity and to immediate needs for basic service 
delivery.  
38. Partner countries commit to:  
• Make progress towards building institutions and establishing governance 
structures that deliver effective governance, public safety, security, and 
equitable access to basic social services for their citizens.  
• Engage in dialogue with donors on developing simple planning tools, such as 
the transitional results matrix, where national development strategies are not 
yet in place.  
• Encourage broad participation of a range of national actors in setting 
development priorities.  
 
39. Donors commit to:  
• Harmonise their activities. Harmonisation is all the more crucial in the absence of 
strong government leadership. It should focus on upstream analysis, joint 
assessments, joint strategies, co-ordination of political engagement; and practical 
initiatives such as the establishment of joint donor offices.  
• Align to the maximum extent possible behind central government-led strategies 
or, if that is not possible, donors should make maximum use of country, regional, 
sector or non-government systems.  
• Avoid activities that undermine national institution building, such as bypassing 
                                                 
5 The following section draws on the draft Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States, which emerged from the 
Senior Level Forum on Development Effectiveness in Fragile States (London, January 2005). 
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national budget processes or setting high salaries for local staff.  
• Use an appropriate mix of aid instruments, including support for recurrent 
financing, particularly for countries in  
 
promising but high-risk transitions.  
 
Promoting a harmonised approach to environmental assessments  
40. Donors have achieved considerable progress in harmonisation around environmental 
impact assessment (EIA) including relevant health and social issues at the project level. 
This progress needs to be deepened, including on addressing implications of global 
environmental issues such as climate change, desertification and loss of biodiversity.  
 
41.Donors and partner countries jointly commit to:  
• Strengthen the application of EIAs and deepen common procedures for projects, 
including consultations with stake holders; and develop and apply common 
approaches for “strategic environmental assessment” at the sector and national 
levels.  
• Continue to develop the specialised technical and policy capacity necessary for 
environmental analysis and for enforcement of legislation.  
 
42.Similar harmonisation efforts are also needed on other cross-cutting issues, 
such as gender equality and other thematic issues including those financed by dedicated 
funds.  
 
 
Managing for Results  
Managing resources and improving decision-making for results  
43. Managing for results means managing and implementing aid in a way that focuses 
on the desired results and uses information to improve decision-making.  
44. Partner countries commit to:  
• Strengthen the linkages between national development strategies and annual 
and multi-annual budget processes.  
• Endeavour to establish results-oriented reporting and assessment frameworks 
that monitor progress against key dimensions of the national and sector 
development strategies; and that these frameworks should track a manageable 
number of indicators for which data are cost-effectively available (Indicator 11).  
 
45.Donors commit to:  
• Link country programming and resources to results and align them with effective 
partner country performance assessment frameworks, refraining from requesting 
the introduction of performance indicators that are not consistent with partners’ 
national development strategies.  
• Work with partner countries to rely, as far as possible, on partner countries’ 
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results-oriented reporting and monitoring frameworks.  
• Harmonise their monitoring and reporting requirements, and, until they can rely 
more extensively on partner countries’ statistical, monitoring and evaluation 
systems, with partner countries to the maximum extent possible on joint formats 
for periodic reporting.  
 
46. Partner countries and donors jointly commit to:  
• Work together in a participatory approach to strengthen country capacities and 
demand for results-based management.  
Mutual Accountability  
Donors and partners are accountable for development results  
47. A major priority for partner countries and donors is to enhance mutual accountability 
and transparency in the use of development resources. This also helps strengthen public 
support for national policies and development assistance.  
48. Partner countries commit to:  
• Strengthen as appropriate the parliamentary role in national development 
strategies and/or budgets.  
• Reinforce participatory approaches by systematically involving a broad range of 
development partners when formulating and assessing progress in implementing 
national development strategies.  
 
49. Donors commit to:  
• Provide timely, transparent and comprehensive information on aid flows so as to 
enable partner authorities to present comprehensive budget reports to their 
legislatures and citizens 
 
50. Partner countries and donors commit to:  
• Jointly assess through existing and increasingly objective country level 
mechanisms mutual progress in implementing agreed commitments on aid 
effectiveness, including the Partnership Commitments. (Indicator 12).  
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III. Indicators of Progress  
To be measured nationally and monitored internationally  
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Important note: In accordance with paragraph 9 of the Declaration, the partnership of donors and partner 
countries hosted by the DAC (Working Party on Aid Effectiveness) comprising OECD/DAC members, 
partner countries and multilateral institutions, met twice, on _0-_1 May 2005 and on 7-8 July 2005 to adopt, 
and review where appropriate, the targets for the twelve Indicators of Progress. At these meetings an 
agreement was reached on the targets presented under Section III of the present Declaration. This 
agreement is subject to reservations by one donor on (a) the methodology for assessing the quality of 
locally-managed procurement systems (relating to targets 2b and 5b) and (b) the acceptable quality of  
public financial management reform programmes (relating to target 5a.ii). Further discussions are underway 
to address these issues. The targets, including the reservation,have been notified to the Chairs of the High-
level Plenary Meeting of the 59th General Assembly of the United Nations in a letter  
of 9 September 2005 by Mr. Richard Manning, Chair of the OECD Development Assistance Committee 
(DAC).  
*note on Indicator 5: Scores for Indicator 5 are determined by the methodology used to measure quality of 
procurement and public financial management systems under Indicator 2 above.  
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*To be confirmed.     
 
 
More countries than listed here have endorsed the Paris Declaration. For a full 
and up to date list please consult 
www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/parisdeclaration/members.  
Participating Organisations 
African Development Bank  
Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa  
Asian Development Bank  
Commonwealth Secretariat  
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I. The 2008 Accra agenda for Action  
 
Accra Agenda for Action 
 
Ministers of developing and donor countries responsible for promoting 
development and Heads of multilateral and bilateral development institutions 
endorsed the following statement in Accra, Ghana, on 4 September 2008 to 
accelerate and deepen implementation of the Paris Declaration on Aid 
Effectiveness (2 March 2005).  
This is a moment of opportunity  
1. We are committed to eradicating poverty and promoting peace and prosperity by 
building stronger, more effective partnerships that enable developing countries to realise 
their development goals.  
 
2. There has been progress. Fifteen years ago, two out of five people lived in extreme 
poverty; today, that figure has been reduced to one in four. However, 1.4 billion people – 
most of them women and girls – still live in extreme poverty1
 
and access to safe drinking 
water and health care remains a major issue in many parts of the world. In addition, new 
global challenges – rising food and fuel prices and climate change – threaten the 
advances against poverty many countries have made.  
 
3. We need to achieve much more if all countries are to meet the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs). Aid is only one part of the development picture. 
Democracy, economic growth, social progress, and care for the environment are the 
prime engines of development in all countries. Addressing inequalities of income and 
opportunity within countries and between states is essential to global progress. Gender 
equality, respect for human rights, and environmental sustainability are cornerstones for 
achieving enduring impact on the lives and potential of poor women, men, and children. 
It is vital that all our policies address these issues in a more systematic and coherent 
way.  
4. In 2008, three international conferences will help us accelerate the pace of change: 
the Accra High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, the United Nations High Level Event 
on the MDGs in New York, and the Financing for Development follow-up meeting in 
Doha. Today at Accra, we are leading the way, united in a common objective: to unlock 
the full potential of aid in achieving lasting development results.  
We are making progress, but not enough  
5. Learning from our past successes and failures in development co-operation and 
building on the 200_ Rome Declaration on Harmonisation, in March 2005 we adopted an 
ambitious set of reforms: the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. In the Paris 
Declaration, we agreed to develop a genuine partnership, with developing countries 
clearly in charge of their own development processes. We also agreed to hold each 
other accountable for achieving concrete development results. Three and one-half years 
later, we are reconvening in Accra to review progress and address the challenges that 
now face us.  
                                                 
1 These figures are based on a recent World Bank study that found the poverty line to be $1.25 a day in 2005 prices. 
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6. Evidence shows we are making progress, but not enough. A recent evaluation shows 
that the Paris Declaration has created powerful momentum to change the way 
developing countries and donors work together on the ground. According to the 2008 
Monitoring Survey, a large number of developing countries have improved their 
management of public funds. Donors, in turn, are increasingly improving their co-
ordination at country level. Yet the pace of progress is too slow. Without further reform 
and faster action we will not meet our 2010 commitments and targets for improving the 
quality of aid.  
 
We will take action to accelerate progress  
7. Evidence shows that we will need to address three major challenges to accelerate 
progress on aid effectiveness:  
 
8. Country ownership is key. Developing country governments will take stronger 
leadership of their own development policies, and will engage with their parliaments and 
citizens in shaping those policies. Donors will support them by respecting countries’ 
priorities, investing in their human resources and institutions, making greater use of their 
systems to deliver aid, and increasing the predictability of aid flows.  
 
9. Building more effective and inclusive partnerships. In recent years, more development 
actors – middle-income countries, global funds, the private sector, civil society 
organisations – have been increasing their contributions and bringing valuable 
experience to the table. This also creates management and co-ordination challenges. 
Together, all development actors will work in more inclusive partnerships so that all our 
efforts have greater impact on reducing poverty.  
 
10. Achieving development results – and openly accounting for them – must be at the 
heart of all we do. More than ever, citizens and taxpayers of all countries expect to see 
the tangible results of development efforts. We will demonstrate that our actions 
translate into positive impacts on people’s lives. We will be accountable to each other 
and to our respective parliaments and governing bodies for these outcomes. 
  
11. Without addressing these obstacles to faster progress, we will fall short of our 
commitments and miss opportunities to improve the livelihoods of the most vulnerable 
people in the world. Therefore, we are reaffirming the commitments we made in the 
Paris Declaration and, in this Accra Agenda for Action, are agreeing on concrete and 
monitorable actions to accelerate progress to meet those commitments by 2010. We 
commit to continuing efforts in monitoring and evaluation that will assess whether we 
have achieved the commitments we agreed in the Paris Declaration and the Accra 
Agenda for Action, and to what extent aid effectiveness is improving and generating 
greater development impact.  
 
Strengthening Country Ownership over Development  
12. Developing countries determine and implement their development policies to 
achieve their own economic, social and environmental goals. We agreed in the 
Paris Declaration that this would be our first priority. Today, we are taking 
additional steps to turn this resolution into a reality.  
We will broaden country-level policy dialogue on development  
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13. We will engage in open and inclusive dialogue on development policies. We 
acknowledge the critical role and responsibility of parliaments in ensuring country 
ownership of development processes. To further this objective we will take the following 
actions:  
a) Developing country governments will work more closely with parliaments and local 
authorities in preparing, implementing and monitoring national development policies 
and plans. They will also engage with civil society organisations (CSOs).  
b) Donors will support efforts to increase the capacity of all development actors – 
parliaments, central and local governments, CSOs, research institutes, media and 
the private sector – to take an active role in dialogue on development policy and on 
the role of aid in contributing to countries’ development objectives.  
c) Developing countries and donors will ensure that their respective development 
policies and programmes are designed and implemented in ways consistent with 
their agreed international commitments on gender equality, human rights, disability 
and environmental sustainability.  
Developing countries will strengthen their capacity to lead and manage 
development  
14. Without robust capacity – strong institutions, systems, and local expertise – 
developing countries cannot fully own and manage their development processes. We 
agreed in the Paris Declaration that capacity development is the responsibility of 
developing countries, with donors playing a supportive role, and that technical co-
operation is one means among others to develop capacity. Together, developing 
countries and donors will take the following actions to strengthen capacity development:  
a) Developing countries will systematically identify areas where there is a need to 
strengthen the capacity to perform and deliver services at all levels – national, sub-
national, sectoral, and thematic – and design strategies to address them. Donors 
will strengthen their own capacity and skills to be more responsive to developing 
countries’ needs.  
b) Donors’ support for capacity development will be demand-driven and designed to 
support country ownership. To this end, developing countries and donors will i) 
jointly select and manage technical co-operation, and ii) promote the provision of 
technical co-operation by local and regional resources, including through South-
South co-operation.  
c) Developing countries and donors will work together at all levels to promote 
operational changes that make capacity development support more effective.  
We will strengthen and use developing country systems to the maximum 
extent possible  
15. Successful development depends to a large extent on a government’s capacity to 
implement its policies and manage public resources through its own institutions and 
systems. In the Paris Declaration, developing countries committed to strengthen their 
systems2 and donors committed to use those systems to the maximum extent possible. 
                                                 
2 These include, but are not limited to, systems for public financial management, procurement, audit, monitoring and 
evaluation, and social and environmental assessment.  
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Evidence shows, however, that developing countries and donors are not on track to 
meet these commitments. Progress in improving the quality of country systems varies 
considerably among countries; and even when there are good-quality country systems, 
donors often do not use them. Yet it is recognised that using country systems promotes 
their development. To strengthen and increase the use of country systems, we will take 
the following actions:  
a) Donors agree to use country systems as the first option for aid programmes in 
support of activities managed by the public sector.  
b) Should donors choose to use another option and rely on aid delivery mechanisms 
outside country systems (including parallel project implementation units), they will 
transparently state the rationale for this and will review their positions at regular 
intervals. Where use of country systems is not feasible, donors will establish 
additional safeguards and measures in ways that strengthen rather than undermine 
country systems and procedures.  
c) Developing countries and donors will jointly assess the quality of country systems 
in a country-led process using mutually agreed diagnostic tools. Where country 
systems require further strengthening, developing countries will lead in defining 
reform programmes and priorities. Donors will support these reforms and provide 
capacity development assistance.  
d) Donors will immediately start working on and sharing transparent plans for 
undertaking their Paris commitments on using country systems in all forms of 
development assistance; provide staff guidance on how these systems can be 
used; and ensure that internal incentives encourage their use. They will finalise 
these plans as a matter of urgency.  
e) Donors recollect and reaffirm their Paris Declaration commitment to provide 66% of 
aid as programme-based approaches. In addition, donors will aim to channel 50% 
or more of government-to-government assistance through country fiduciary 
systems, including by increasing the percentage of assistance provided through 
programme-based approaches.  
 
Building More Effective and Inclusive Partnerships for Development  
16. Aid is about building partnerships for development. Such partnerships are most 
effective when they fully harness the energy, skills and experience of all development 
actors—bilateral and multilateral donors, global funds, CSOs, and the private sector. To 
support developing countries’ efforts to build for the future, we resolve to create 
partnerships that will include all these actors.  
We will reduce costly fragmentation of aid  
17. The effectiveness of aid is reduced when there are too many duplicating initiatives, 
especially at country and sector levels. We will reduce the fragmentation of aid by 
improving the complementarity of donors’ efforts and the division of labour among 
donors, including through improved allocation of resources within sectors, within 
countries, and across countries. To this end:  
a) Developing countries will lead in determining the optimal roles of donors in 
supporting their development efforts at national, regional and sectoral levels. 
Donors will respect developing countries’ priorities, ensuring that new 
arrangements on the division of labour will not result in individual developing 
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countries receiving less aid.  
b) Donors and developing countries will work together with the Working Party on Aid 
Effectiveness to complete good practice principles on country-led division of labour. 
To that end, they will elaborate plans to ensure the maximum co-ordination of 
development co-operation. We will evaluate progress in implementation starting in 
2009.  
c) We will start dialogue on international division of labour across countries by June 
2009.  
d) We will work to address the issue of countries that receive insufficient aid.  
We will increase aid’s value for money  
18. Since the Paris Declaration was agreed in 2005, OECD-DAC donors have made 
progress in untying their aid. A number of donors have already fully untied their aid, and 
we encourage others to do so. We will pursue, and accelerate, these efforts by taking 
the following actions:  
a) OECD-DAC donors will extend coverage of the 2001 DAC Recommendation on 
Untying Aid to non-LDC HIPCs3
 
and will improve their reporting on the 2001 DAC 
Recommendation.  
b) Donors will elaborate individual plans to further untie their aid to the maximum 
extent.  
c) Donors will promote the use of local and regional procurement by ensuring that 
their procurement procedures are transparent and allow local and regional firms to 
compete. We will build on examples of good practice to help improve local firms’ 
capacity to compete successfully for aid-funded procurement.  
d) We will respect our international agreements on corporate social responsibility.  
 
We welcome and will work with all development actors  
19. The contributions of all development actors are more effective when developing 
countries are in a position to manage and co-ordinate them. We welcome the role of new 
contributors and will improve the way all development actors work together by taking the 
following actions:  
a) We encourage all development actors, including those engaged in South-South co-
operation, to use the Paris Declaration principles as a point of reference in 
providing development co-operation.  
b) We acknowledge the contributions made by all development actors, and in 
particular the role of middle-income countries as both providers and recipients of 
aid. We recognise the importance and particularities of South-South co-operation 
and acknowledge that we can learn from the experience of developing countries. 
We encourage further development of triangular co-operation.  
c) Global funds and programmes make an important contribution to development. The 
                                                 
3 The 2001 DAC recommendation on Untying ODA to the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) covers _1 so-called 
Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPCs). The OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) at its 2008 High 
Level Meeting agreed to extend the 2001 Recommendation to cover the remaining eight countries that are part of the 
HIPC initiative: Bolivia, Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Guyana, Honduras, Nicaragua and Republic of Congo. 
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programmes they fund are most effective in conjunction with complementary efforts 
to improve the policy environment and to strengthen the institutions in the sectors in 
which they operate. We call upon all global funds to support country ownership, to 
align and harmonise their assistance proactively, and to make good use of mutual 
accountability frameworks, while continuing their emphasis on achieving results. As 
new global challenges emerge, donors will ensure that existing channels for aid 
delivery are used and, if necessary, strengthened before creating separate new 
channels that risk further fragmentation and complicate co-ordination at country 
level.  
d) We encourage developing countries to mobilise, manage and evaluate their 
international co-operation initiatives for the benefit of other developing countries.  
e) South-South co-operation on development aims to observe the principle of non-
interference in internal affairs, equality among developing partners and respect for 
their independence, national sovereignty, cultural diversity and identity and local 
content. It plays an important role in international development co-operation and is 
a valuable complement to North-South co-operation.  
 
We will deepen our engagement with civil society organisations  
20. We will deepen our engagement with CSOs as independent development actors in 
their own right whose efforts complement those of governments and the private sector. 
We share an interest in ensuring that CSO contributions to development reach their full 
potential. To this end:  
a) We invite CSOs to reflect on how they can apply the Paris principles of aid 
effectiveness from a CSO perspective.  
b) We welcome the CSOs’ proposal to engage with them in a CSO-led 
multistakeholder process to promote CSO development effectiveness. As part of 
that process, we will seek to i) improve co-ordination of CSO efforts with 
government programmes, ii) enhance CSO accountability for results, and iii) 
improve information on CSO activities.  
c) We will work with CSOs to provide an enabling environment that maximises their 
contributions to development.  
 
We will adapt aid policies for countries in fragile situations  
21. In the Paris Declaration, we agreed that aid effectiveness principles apply equally to 
development co-operation in situations of fragility, including countries emerging from 
conflict, but that these principles need to be adapted to environments of weak ownership 
or capacity. Since then, Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States 
and Situations have been agreed. To further improve aid effectiveness in these 
environments, we will take the following actions:  
a) Donors will conduct joint assessments of governance and capacity and examine 
the causes of conflict, fragility and insecurity, engaging developing country 
authorities and other relevant stake holders to the maximum extent possible.  
b) At country level, donors and developing countries will work and agree on a set of 
realistic peace- and state-building objectives that address the root causes of 
conflict and fragility and help ensure the protection and participation of women. 
This process will be informed by international dialogue between partners and 
donors on these objectives as prerequisites for development.  
c) Donors will provide demand-driven, tailored and co-ordinated capacity-
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development support for core state functions and for early and sustained recovery. 
They will work with developing countries to design interim measures that are 
appropriately sequenced and that lead to sustainable local institutions.  
d) Donors will work on flexible, rapid and long-term funding modalities, on a pooled 
basis where appropriate, to i) bridge humanitarian, recovery and longer-term 
development phases, and ii) support stabilisation, inclusive peace building, and the 
building of capable, accountable and responsive states. In collaboration with 
developing countries, donors will foster partnerships with the UN System, 
international financial institutions and other donors.  
e) At country level and on a voluntary basis, donors and developing countries will 
monitor implementation of the Principles for Good International Engagement in 
Fragile States and Situations, and will share results as part of progress reports on 
implementing the Paris Declaration.  
 
Delivering and Accounting for Development Results  
22. We will be judged by the impacts that our collective efforts have on the lives of poor 
people. We recognise that greater transparency and accountability for the use of 
development resources—domestic as well as external—are powerful drivers of progress.  
We will focus on delivering results  
23. We will improve our management for results by taking the following actions:  
a) Developing countries will strengthen the quality of policy design, implementation 
and assessment by improving information systems, including, as appropriate, 
disaggregating data by sex, region and socioeconomic status.  
b) Developing countries and donors will work to develop cost-effective results 
management instruments to assess the impact of development policies and adjust 
them as necessary. We will better co-ordinate and link the various sources of 
information, including national statistical systems, budgeting, planning, monitoring 
and country-led evaluations of policy performance.  
c) Donors will align their monitoring with country information systems. They will 
support, and invest in strengthening, developing countries’ national statistical 
capacity and information systems, including those for managing aid.  
d) We will strengthen incentives to improve aid effectiveness. We will systematically 
review and address legal or administrative impediments to implementing 
international commitments on aid effectiveness. Donors will pay more attention to 
delegating sufficient authority to country offices and to changing organisational and 
staff incentives to promote behaviour in line with aid effectiveness principles.  
 
We will be more accountable and transparent to our publics for results  
24. Transparency and accountability are essential elements for development results. 
They lie at the heart of the Paris Declaration, in which we agreed that countries and 
donors would become more accountable to each other and to their citizens. We will 
pursue these efforts by taking the following actions:  
a) We will make aid more transparent. Developing countries will facilitate 
parliamentary oversight by implementing greater transparency in public 
 398 
financial management, including public disclosure of revenues, budgets, 
expenditures, procurement and audits. Donors will publicly disclose regular, 
detailed and timely information on volume, allocation and, when available, results 
of development expenditure to enable more accurate budget, accounting and audit 
by developing countries.  
b) We will step up our efforts to ensure that – as agreed in the Paris Declaration – 
mutual assessment reviews are in place by 2010 in all countries that have 
endorsed the Declaration. These reviews will be based on country results reporting 
and information systems complemented with available donor data and credible 
independent evidence. They will draw on emerging good practice with stronger 
parliamentary scrutiny and citizen engagement. With them we will hold each other 
accountable for mutually agreed results in keeping with country development and 
aid policies.  
c) To complement mutual assessment reviews at country level and drive better 
performance, developing countries and donors will jointly review and strengthen 
existing international accountability mechanisms, including peer review with 
participation of developing countries. We will review proposals for strengthening 
the mechanisms by end 2009.  
d) Effective and efficient use of development financing requires both donors and 
partner countries to do their utmost to fight corruption. Donors and developing 
countries will respect the principles to which they have agreed, including those 
under the UN Convention against Corruption. Developing countries will address 
corruption by improving systems of investigation, legal redress, accountability and 
transparency in the use of public funds. Donors will take steps in their own 
countries to combat corruption by individuals or corporations and to track, freeze, 
and recover illegally acquired assets.  
 
We will continue to change the nature of conditionality to support 
ownership  
25. To strengthen country ownership and improve the predictability of aid flows, donors 
agreed in the Paris Declaration that, whenever possible, they would draw their conditions 
from developing countries’ own development policies. We reaffirm our commitment to 
this principle and will continue to change the nature of conditionality by taking the 
following actions:  
a) Donors will work with developing countries to agree on a limited set of mutually 
agreed conditions based on national development strategies. We will jointly assess 
donor and developing country performance in meeting commitments.  
b) Beginning now, donors and developing countries will regularly make public all 
conditions linked to disbursements.  
c) Developing countries and donors will work together at the international level to 
review, document and disseminate good practices on conditionality with a view to 
reinforcing country ownership and other Paris Declaration Principles by increasing 
emphasis on harmonised, results-based conditionality. They will be receptive to 
contributions from civil society.  
 
We will increase the medium-term predictability of aid  
26. In the Paris Declaration, we agreed that greater predictability in the provision of aid 
flows is needed to enable developing countries to effectively plan and manage their 
development programmes over the short and medium term. As a matter of priority, we 
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will take the following actions to improve the predictability of aid:  
a) Developing countries will strengthen budget planning processes for managing 
domestic and external resources and will improve the linkages between 
expenditures and results over the medium term.  
b) Beginning now, donors will provide full and timely information on annual 
commitments and actual disbursements so that developing countries are in a 
position to accurately record all aid flows in their budget estimates and their 
accounting systems. 
c) Beginning now, donors will provide developing countries with regular and timely 
information on their rolling three-to five-year forward expenditure and/or 
implementation plans, with at least indicative resource allocations that developing 
countries can integrate in their medium-term planning and macroeconomic 
frameworks. Donors will address any constraints to providing such information.  
d) Developing countries and donors will work together at the international level on 
ways of further improving the medium-term predictability of aid, including by 
developing tools to measure it.  
 
Looking Forward  
27. The reforms we agree on today in Accra will require continued high level political 
support, peer pressure, and co-ordinated action at global, regional, and country levels. 
To achieve these reforms, we renew our commitment to the principles and targets 
established in the Paris Declaration, and will continue to assess progress in 
implementing them.  
 
28. The commitments we agree today will need to be adapted to different country 
circumstances – including in middle-income countries, small states and countries in 
situations of fragility. To this end, we encourage developing countries to design – with 
active support from donors – country-based action plans that set out time-bound and 
monitorable proposals to implement the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda for 
Action.  
 
29. We agree that, by 2010, each of us should meet the commitments we made on aid 
effectiveness in Paris and today in Accra, and to reach beyond these commitments 
where we can. We agree to reflect and draw upon the many valuable ideas and 
initiatives that have been presented at this High Level Forum. We agree that challenges 
such as climate change and rising food and fuel prices underline the importance of 
applying aid effectiveness principles. In response to the food  
crisis, we will develop and implement the global partnership on agriculture and food 
swiftly, efficiently and flexibly.  
30. We ask the Working Party on Aid Effectiveness to continue monitoring progress on 
implementing the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action and to report back 
to the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in 2011. We recognise that 
additional work will be required to improve the methodology and indicators of progress of 
aid effectiveness. In 2011, we will undertake the third round of monitoring that will tell us 
whether we have achieved the targets for 2010 agreed in Paris in 20054.
 
To carry 
                                                 
4 We will have that information available for the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in 2011, along with 
comprehensive second phase evaluations of the implementation of the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda for 
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forward this work, we will need to develop institutionalised processes for the joint and 
equal partnership of developing countries and the engagement of stakeholders.  
31. We recognise that aid effectiveness is an integral part of the broader financing for 
development agenda. To achieve development outcomes and the MDGs we need to 
meet our commitments on both aid quality and aid volumes. We ask the Secretary 
General of the United Nations to transmit the conclusions of the Third High Level Forum 
on Aid Effectiveness to the High Level Event on the MDGs in New York later this month 
and the Financing for Development Review meeting in Doha in November 2008. We 
welcome the contribution that the ECOSOC Development Co-operation Forum is making 
to the international dialogue and to mutual accountability on aid issues. We call upon the 
UN development system to further support the capacities of developing countries for 
effective management of development assistance.  
 
32. Today, more than ever, we resolve to work together to help countries across the 
world build the successful future all of us want to see – a future based on a shared 
commitment to overcome poverty, a future in which no countries will depend on aid.  
                                                                                                                                                 
Action as of 2010. Attention will also be paid to improving and developing communications on aid effectiveness for 
long-term development success and broad-based public support. 
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J. The 2011 Busan Partnership  (see overleaf) 
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BUSAN  PARTNERSHIP  FOR  EFFECTIVE  DEVELOPMENT  CO-­‐OPERATION    
FOURTH  HIGH  LEVEL  FORUM  ON  AID  EFFECTIVENESS,  BUSAN,  REPUBLIC  OF  KOREA,  
29  NOVEMBER-­‐1  DECEMBER  2011  
  
  
1.   We,  Heads  of  State,  Ministers  and  representatives  of  developing  and  developed  countries,  
heads   of   multilateral   and   bilateral   institutions,   representatives   of   different   types   of   public,   civil  
society,  private,  parliamentary,   local  and  regional  organisations  meeting  here  in  Busan,  Republic  of  
Korea,  recognise  that  we  are  united  by  a  new  partnership  that   is  broader  and  more   inclusive  than  
ever  before,  founded  on  shared  principles,  common  goals  and  differential  commitments  for  effective  
international  development.  
2.   The   nature,   modalities   and   responsibilities   that   apply   to   South-­‐South   co-­‐operation   differ  
from  those  that  apply  to  North-­‐South  co-­‐operation.  At  the  same  time,  we  recognise  that  we  are  all  
part  of   a  development   agenda   in  which  we  participate  on   the  basis  of   common  goals   and   shared  
principles.   In   this  context,  we  encourage   increased  efforts   to  support  effective  co-­‐operation  based  
on  our  specific  country  situations.  The  principles,  commitments  and  actions  agreed  in  the  outcome  
document  in  Busan  shall  be  the  reference  for  South-­‐South  partners  on  a  voluntary  basis.  
3.   The  world  stands  at  a  critical  juncture  in  global  development.  Poverty  and  inequality  remain  
the  central  challenge.  The  Millennium  Declaration  sets  out  our  universal  mandate  for  development  
and,   with   the   target   date   for   the  Millennium  Development   Goals   less   than   four   years   away,   the  
urgency  of  achieving  strong,  shared  and  sustainable  growth  and  decent  work  in  developing  countries  
is   paramount.  Moreover,   the  Declaration   identifies   that   promoting   human   rights,   democracy   and  
good  governance  are   an   integral   part  of  our  development  efforts.  Nowhere  are  our  development  
goals  more  urgent  than  in  fragile  and  conflict-­‐affected  states.  Political  will  is  vital  if  these  challenges  
are  to  be  addressed.  
4.   As   we   reaffirm   our   development   commitments,   we   realise   that   the   world   has   changed  
profoundly  since  development  co-­‐operation  began  over  60  years  ago.  Economic,  political,  social  and  
technological  developments  have  revolutionised  the  world  in  which  we  live.  Yet  poverty,  inequality  
and  hunger   persist.   Eradicating   poverty   and   tackling   the   global   and   regional   challenges   that   have  
adverse  effects  on  the  citizens  of  developing  countries  are  central   to  ensuring   the  achievement  of  
the  Millennium   Development   Goals   and   a  more   robust   and   resilient   global   economy   for   all.   Our  
success   depends   on   the   results   and   impact   of   our   joint   efforts   and   investments   as   we   address  
challenges   such   as   health   pandemics,   climate   change,   economic   downturns,   food   and   fuel   price  
crises,  conflict,  fragility  and  vulnerability  to  shocks  and  natural  disasters.  
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5.   We  also  have  a  more  complex  architecture  for  development  co-­‐operation,  characterised  by  
a  greater  number  of  state  and  non-­‐state  actors,  as  well  as  co-­‐operation  among  countries  at  different  
stages  in  their  development,  many  of  them  middle-­‐income  countries.  South-­‐South  and  triangular  co-­‐
operation,   new   forms   of   public-­‐private   partnership,   and   other   modalities   and   vehicles   for  
development  have  become  more  prominent,  complementing  North-­‐South  forms  of  co-­‐operation.    
6.   International  development  co-­‐operation  has  achieved  many  positive  results.  When  we  met  
in  Monterrey  a  decade  ago,  we  recognised  that  increases  in  volumes  of  financing  for  development  
must  be  coupled  with  more  effective  action  to  generate  sustainable  and  transparent  results  for  all  
citizens.  Our   dialogue   in   Busan  builds   on   the   foundations   laid   by   previous  High   Level   Fora,  which  
have  been  proven  to  remain  relevant,  and  which  have  helped  to  improve  the  quality  of  development  
co-­‐operation.   Yet   we   recognise   that   progress   has   been   uneven   and   neither   fast   nor   far-­‐reaching  
enough.  We   each   reaffirm   our   respective   commitments   and  will   implement   in   full   the   actions   to  
which  we  have  already  agreed.    
7.   We  can  and  must  improve  and  accelerate  our  efforts.  We  commit  to  modernise,  deepen  and  
broaden  our  co-­‐operation,   involving  state  and  non-­‐state  actors   that  wish  to  shape  an  agenda  that  
has  until  recently  been  dominated  by  a  narrower  group  of  development  actors.  In  Busan,  we  forge  a  
new  global  development  partnership  that  embraces  diversity  and  recognises  the  distinct  roles  that  
all  stakeholders  in  co-­‐operation  can  play  to  support  development.  
8.   Our   partnership   is   founded   on   a   common   set   of   principles   that   underpin   all   forms   of  
development  co-­‐operation.  At  the  same  time,  we  recognise  that  the  ways  in  which  these  principles  
are  applied  differ  across  countries  at  various  stages  of  development,  and  among  the  different  types  
of   public   and   private   stakeholders   involved.   Lessons   should   be   shared   by   all   who   participate   in  
development   co-­‐operation.   We   welcome   the   opportunities   presented   by   diverse   approaches   to  
development   co-­‐operation,   such   as   South-­‐South   co-­‐operation,   as  well   as   the   contribution   of   civil  
society   organisations   and   private   actors;   we  will   work   together   to   build   on   and   learn   from   their  
achievements  and  innovations,  recognising  their  unique  characteristics  and  respective  merits.  
9.   Sustainable   development   results   are   the   end   goal   of   our   commitments   to   effective   co-­‐
operation.   While   development   co-­‐operation   is   only   part   of   the   solution,   it   plays   a   catalytic   and  
indispensable   role   in   supporting   poverty   eradication,   social   protection,   economic   growth   and  
sustainable   development.  We   reaffirm   our   respective   commitments   to   scale   up   development   co-­‐
operation.  More  effective  co-­‐operation  should  not  lead  to  a  reduction  in  resources  for  development.  
Over   time,   we   will   aim   to   increase   independence   from   aid,   always   taking   into   account   the  
consequences   for   the  poorest  people  and  countries.   In   this  process,   it   is  essential   to  examine   the  
interdependence   and   coherence  of   all   public   policies  ʹ   not   just   development  policies  ʹ   to   enable  
countries  to  make  full  use  of  the  opportunities  presented  by  international  investment  and  trade,  and  
to  expand  their  domestic  capital  markets.    
10.   As   we   partner   to   increase   and   reinforce   development   results,   we   will   take   action   to  
facilitate,   leverage  and  strengthen  the   impact  of  diverse  sources  of   finance  to  support  sustainable  
and   inclusive   development,   including   taxation   and   domestic   resource   mobilisation,   private  
investment,  aid  for  trade,  philanthropy,  non-­‐concessional  public  funding  and  climate  change  finance.  
At   the   same   time,   new   financial   instruments,   investment   options,   technology   and   knowledge  
sharing,  and  public-­‐private  partnerships  are  called  for.  
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Shared  principles  to  achieve  common  goals  
11.   As   we   embrace   the   diversity   that   underpins   our   partnership   and   the   catalytic   role   of  
development   co-­‐operation,   we   share   common   principles   which   ʹ   consistent   with   our   agreed  
international   commitments   on   human   rights,   decent   work,   gender   equality,   environmental  
sustainability  and  disability  ʹ  form  the  foundation  of  our  co-­‐operation  for  effective  development:  
a) Ownership   of   development   priorities   by   developing   countries.   Partnerships   for  
development   can   only   succeed   if   they   are   led   by   developing   countries,   implementing  
approaches  that  are  tailored  to  country-­‐specific  situations  and  needs.    
b) Focus   on   results.  Our   investments   and  efforts  must  have   a   lasting   impact   on  eradicating  
poverty   and   reducing   inequality,   on   sustainable   development,   and   on   enhancing  
ĚĞǀĞůŽƉŝŶŐ ĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐ͛ ĐĂƉĂĐŝƚŝĞƐ͕ ĂůŝŐŶĞĚ ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞ ƉƌŝŽƌŝƚŝĞƐ ĂŶĚ ƉŽůŝĐŝĞƐ ƐĞƚ ŽƵƚ ďǇ
developing  countries  themselves.  
c) Inclusive  development  partnerships.  Openness,  trust,  and  mutual  respect  and  learning  lie  at  
the   core   of   effective   partnerships   in   support   of   development   goals,   recognising   the  
different  and  complementary  roles  of  all  actors.  
d) Transparency  and  accountability  to  each  other.  Mutual  accountability  and  accountability  to  
the   intended   beneficiaries   of   our   co-­‐operation,   as   well   as   to   our   respective   citizens,  
organisations,   constituents   and   shareholders,   is   critical   to   delivering   results.   Transparent  
practices  form  the  basis  for  enhanced  accountability.  
12.   These  shared  principles  will  guide  our  actions  to:    
a) Deepen,  extend  and  operationalise  the  democratic  ownership  of  development  policies  and  
processes.  
b) Strengthen   our   efforts   to   achieve   concrete   and   sustainable   results.   This   involves   better  
managing   for   results,   monitoring,   evaluating   and   communicating   progress;   as   well   as  
scaling  up  our  support,  strengthening  national  capacities  and  leveraging  diverse  resources  
and  initiatives  in  support  of  development  results.  
c) Broaden   support   for   South-­‐South   and   triangular   co-­‐operation,   helping   to   tailor   these  
horizontal  partnerships  to  a  greater  diversity  of  country  contexts  and  needs.  
d) Support   developing   countries   in   their   efforts   to   facilitate,   leverage   and   strengthen   the  
impact  of  diverse  forms  of  development  finance  and  activities,  ensuring  that  these  diverse  
forms  of  co-­‐operation  have  a  catalytic  effect  on  development.  
13.   We   recognise   the   urgency   with   which   these   actions   must   be   implemented.   Beginning  
implementation  now  ʹ  or  accelerating  efforts  where  they  are  ongoing  ʹ  is  essential  if  our  renewed  
approach   to   partnership   is   to   have   the   maximum   possible   impact   on   the   realisation   of   the  
Millennium  Development  Goals  by  2015,  as  well  as  on  development   results  over   the   longer   term.  
We   will   hold   each   other   accountable   for   implementing   our   respective   actions   in   developing  
countries   and   at   the   international   level.   As   we   focus   on   implementing   our   commitments   at   the  
country   level,   we   will   form   a   new,   inclusive   Global   Partnership   for   Effective   Development   Co-­‐
operation  to  support  implementation  at  the  political  level.  
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Realising  change:  Complementary  actions  to  reach  common  goals  
Inclusion  of  new  actors  on  the  basis  of  shared  principles  and  differential  commitments  
14.   dŽĚĂǇ͛Ɛ ĐŽŵƉůĞǆ ĂƌĐhitecture   for   development   co-­‐operation   has   evolved   from   the   North-­‐
South   paradigm.   Distinct   from   the   traditional   relationship   between   aid   providers   and   recipients,  
developing   nations   and   a   number   of   emerging   economies   have   become   important   providers   of  
South-­‐South  development  co-­‐operation.  They  remain  developing  countries  and  still  face  poverty  at  
home.  As  such,  they  remain  eligible  to  benefit  from  development  co-­‐operation  provided  by  others,  
yet   they   have   increasingly   taken  upon   themselves   the   responsibility   to   share  experiences   and   co-­‐
operate  with  other   developing   countries.   The   Paris  Declaration   did   not   address   the   complexity  of  
these  new  actors,  while  the  Accra  Agenda  for  Action  recognised  their   importance  and  specificities.  
While  North-­‐South  co-­‐operation  remains  the  main  form  of  development  co-­‐operation,  South-­‐South  
co-­‐operation   continues   to   evolve,   providing   additional   diversity   of   resources   for   development.   At  
Busan,  we  now  all  form  an  integral  part  of  a  new  and  more  inclusive  development  agenda,  in  which  
these   actors   participate   on   the   basis   of   common   goals,   shared   principles   and   differential  
commitments.  On  this  same  basis,  we  welcome  the  inclusion  of  civil  society,  the  private  sector  and  
other  actors.  
Improving  the  quality  and  effectiveness  of  development  co-­‐operation  
15.   Progress   has   been  made   in   advancing   the   aid   effectiveness   agenda,   yet  major   challenges  
persist.  Evidence  has  shown  that  ʹ  despite  the  challenges  encountered  in  the  implementation  of  our  
respective   commitments   ʹ   many   of   the   principles   underpinning   the   Paris   Declaration   on   Aid  
Effectiveness  and  Accra  Agenda  for  Action  have  contributed  to  higher  quality,  more  transparent  and  
effective  development  co-­‐operation.  
16.   We  will   sustain   our   high-­‐level   political   leadership   to   ensure   that   the   commitments  made  
here  in  Busan  are  implemented.  Within  this  context,  those  of  us  that  endorsed  the  mutually  agreed  
actions  set  out  in  Paris  and  Accra  will  intensify  our  efforts  to  implement  our  respective  commitments  
in  full.  A  growing  range  of  actors  ʹ  including  middle-­‐income  countries,  partners  of  South-­‐South  and  
triangular  co-­‐operation  and  civil  society  organisations  ʹ  have  joined  others  to  forge  a  broader,  more  
inclusive   agenda   since   Paris   and   Accra,   embracing   their   respective   and   different   commitments  
alongside  shared  principles.  
17.   Drawing   on   the   evidence   generated   through   periodic   monitoring   and   the   independent  
evaluation  of  the  Paris  Declaration,  we  will  be  guided  by  a  focus  on  sustainable  results  that  meet  the  
priority  needs  of  developing  countries,  and  will  make  the  urgently  needed  changes  to  improve  the  
effectiveness  of  our  partnerships  for  development.  
Ownership,  results  and  accountability  
18.   Together,  we  will  increase  our  focus  on  development  results.  To  this  end:  
a) ĞǀĞůŽƉŝŶŐĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐ͛ĞĨĨŽƌƚƐĂŶĚplans  to  strengthen  core  institutions  and  policies  will  be  
supported   through   approaches   that   aim   to  manage   ʹ   rather   than   avoid  ʹ   risk,   including  
through   the   development   of   joint   risk   management   frameworks   with   providers   of  
development  co-­‐operation.  
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b) Where   initiated   by   the   developing   country,   transparent,   country-­‐led   and   country-­‐level  
results  frameworks  and  platforms  will  be  adopted  as  a  common  tool  among  all  concerned  
actors   to   assess   performance   based   on   a   manageable   number   of   output   and   outcome  
indicators   drawn   from   the   development   priorities   and   goals   of   the   developing   country.  
Providers  of  development  co-­‐operation  will  minimise   their  use  of  additional   frameworks,  
refraining   from   requesting   the   introduction   of   performance   indicators   that   are   not  
consistent  ǁŝƚŚĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐ͛ŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĞƐ͘  
c) We  will   partner   to   implement   a   global   Action   Plan   to   enhance   capacity   for   statistics   to  
monitor   progress,   evaluate   impact,   ensure   sound,   results-­‐focused   public   sector  
management,  and  highlight  strategic  issues  for  policy  decisions.  
d) As   we   deepen   our   efforts   to   ensure   that  mutual   assessment   reviews   are   in   place   in   all  
developing   countries,   we   encourage   the   active   participation   of   all   development   co-­‐
operation  actors  in  these  processes.  
e) Pursuant   to   the  Accra  Agenda   for  Action,  we  will  accelerate  our  efforts   to  untie  aid.  We  
will,   in  2012,   review  our  plans  to  achieve  this.   In  addition  to   increasing  value   for  money,  
untying   can   present   opportunities   for   local   procurement,   business   development,  
employment  and  income  generation  in  developing  countries.  We  will  improve  the  quality,  
consistency  and  transparency  of  reporting  on  the  tying  status  of  aid.  
19.   dŚĞƵƐĞĂŶĚƐƚƌĞŶŐƚŚĞŶŝŶŐŽĨĚĞǀĞůŽƉŝŶŐĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐ͛ƐǇƐƚĞŵƐƌĞŵĂŝŶƐĐĞŶƚƌĂůƚŽŽƵƌĞĨĨŽƌƚƐƚŽ
build   effective   institutions.   We   will   build   on   our   respective   commitments   set   out   in   the   Paris  
Declaration  and  Accra  Agenda  for  Action  to:  
a) Use  country  systems  as  the  default  approach  for  development  co-­‐operation  in  support  of  
activities   managed   by   the   public   sector,   working   with   and   respecting   the   governance  
structures  of  both  the  provider  of  development  co-­‐operation  and  the  developing  country.  
b) Assess  jointly  country  systems  using  mutually  agreed  diagnostic  tools.  Based  on  the  results  
of  these  assessments,  providers  of  development  co-­‐operation  will  decide  on  the  extent  to  
which  they  can  use  country  systems.  Where  the  full  use  of  country  systems  is  not  possible,  
the   provider   of   development   co-­‐operation   will   state   the   reasons   for   non-­‐use,   and   will  
discuss  with  government  what  would  be  required  to  move  towards  full  use,  including  any  
necessary   assistance   or   changes   for   the   strengthening   of   systems.   The   use   and  
strengthening  of  country  systems  should  be  placed  within  the  overall  context  of  national  
capacity  development  for  sustainable  outcomes.  
20.   We  must  accelerate  our  efforts  to  achieve  gender  equality  and  the  empowerment  of  women  
through  development  programmes  grounded  in  country  priorities,  recognising  that  gender  equality  
ĂŶĚ ǁŽŵĞŶ͛Ɛ ĞŵƉŽǁĞƌŵĞŶƚ ĂƌĞ ĐƌŝƚŝĐĂů ƚŽ ĂĐŚŝĞǀŝŶŐ ĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞnt   results.   Reducing   gender  
inequality  is  both  an  end  in  its  own  right  and  a  prerequisite  for  sustainable  and  inclusive  growth.  As  
we  redouble  our  efforts  to  implement  existing  commitments  we  will:  
a) Accelerate  and  deepen  efforts  to  collect,  disseminate,  harmonise  and  make  full  use  of  data  
disaggregated   by   sex   to   inform   policy   decisions   and   guide   investments,   ensuring   in   turn  
that  public  expenditures  are  targeted  appropriately  to  benefit  both  women  and  men.  
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b) /ŶƚĞŐƌĂƚĞ ƚĂƌŐĞƚƐ ĨŽƌ ŐĞŶĚĞƌ ĞƋƵĂůŝƚǇ ĂŶĚ ǁŽŵĞŶ͛Ɛ empowerment   in   accountability  
mechanisms,  grounded  in  international  and  regional  commitments.  
c) ĚĚƌĞƐƐ ŐĞŶĚĞƌ ĞƋƵĂůŝƚǇ ĂŶĚǁŽŵĞŶ͛Ɛ ĞŵƉŽǁĞƌŵĞŶƚ ŝŶ Ăůů ĂƐƉĞĐƚƐ ŽĨ ŽƵƌ ĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ
efforts,  including  peacebuilding  and  statebuilding.  
21.   Parliaments  and  local  governments  play  critical  roles  in  linking  citizens  with  government,  and  
in  ensuring  broad-­‐ďĂƐĞĚĂŶĚĚĞŵŽĐƌĂƚŝĐŽǁŶĞƌƐŚŝƉŽĨĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐ͛ĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚĂŐĞŶĚĂƐ͘dŽĨĂĐŝůŝƚĂƚĞ
their  contribution,  we  will:  
a) Accelerate   and   deepen   the   implementation   of   existing   commitments   to   strengthen   the  
role   of   parliaments   in   the   oversight   of   development   processes,   including   by   supporting  
capacity  development  ʹ  backed  by  adequate  resources  and  clear  action  plans.  
b) Further  support  local  governments  to  enable  them  to  assume  more  fully  their  roles  above  
and  beyond  service  delivery,  enhancing  participation  and  accountability  at  the  sub-­‐national  
levels.  
22.   Civil  society  organisations  (CSOs)  play  a  vital  role  in  enabling  people  to  claim  their  rights,  in  
promoting   rights-­‐based   approaches,   in   shaping   development   policies   and   partnerships,   and   in  
overseeing   their   implementation.   They   also   provide   services   in   areas   that   are   complementary   to  
those  provided  by  states.  Recognising  this,  we  will:  
a) Implement   fully   our   respective   commitments   to   enable   CSOs   to   exercise   their   roles   as  
independent   development   actors,   with   a   particular   focus   on   an   enabling   environment,  
consistent  with   agreed   international   rights,   that  maximises   the   contributions   of   CSOs   to  
development.  
b) Encourage   CSOs   to   implement   practices   that   strengthen   their   accountability   and   their  
contribution   to   development   effectiveness,   guided   by   the   Istanbul   Principles   and   the  
International  Framework  for  CSO  Development  Effectiveness.  
Transparent  and  responsible  co-­‐operation  
23.   We   will   work   to   improve   the   availability   and   public   accessibility   of   information   on  
development   co-­‐operation   and   other   development   resources,   building   on   our   respective  
commitments  in  this  area.  To  this  end,  we  will:  
a) Make   the   full   range   of   information   on   publicly   funded   development   activities,   their  
financing,   terms   and   conditions,   and   contribution   to   development   results,   publicly  
available  subject  to  legitimate  concerns  about  commercially  sensitive  information.  
b) Focus,  at   the  country   level,  on  establishing  transparent  public   financial  management  and  
aid   information   management   systems,   and   strengthen   the   capacities   of   all   relevant  
stakeholders   to  make   better   use   of   this   information   in   decision-­‐making   and   to   promote  
accountability.  
c) Implement  a  common,  open  standard  for  electronic  publication  of  timely,  comprehensive  
and   forward-­‐looking   information   on   resources   provided   through   development   co-­‐
  7  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  www.busanhlf4.org   1  December  2011  
operation,   taking   into   account   the   statistical   reporting   of   the   OECD-­‐DAC   and   the  
complementary   efforts   of   the   International   Aid   Transparency   Initiative   and   others.   This  
standard  must  meet  the   information  needs  of  developing  countries  and  non-­‐state  actors,  
consistent   with   national   requirements.   We   will   agree   on   this   standard   and   publish   our  
respective  schedules  to  implement  it  by  December  2012,  with  the  aim  of  implementing  it  
fully  by  December  2015.  
24.   We  will  also  work  to  make  development  co-­‐operation  more  predictable  in  its  nature.  To  this  
end:  
a) Those  of  us  who   committed,   through   the  Accra  Agenda   for  Action,   to   improve  medium-­‐
term  predictability  will  implement  fully  our  commitments  in  this  area,  introducing  reforms  
where  needed.  By  2013,   they  will  provide  available,   regular,   timely   rolling   three-­‐   to   five-­‐
year  indicative  forward  expenditure  and/or  implementation  plans  as  agreed  in  Accra  to  all  
developing   countries   with   which   they   co-­‐operate.   Other   actors   will   aim   to   provide  
developing  countries  with  timely  and  relevant  information  on  their  intentions  with  regard  
to  future  co-­‐operation  over  the  medium  term.  
25.   We  welcome   the   diversity   of   development   co-­‐operation   actors.   Developing   countries   will  
lead   consultation   and   co-­‐ordination   efforts   to   manage   this   diversity   at   the   country   level,   while  
providers   of   development   assistance   have   a   responsibility   to   reduce   fragmentation   and   curb   the  
proliferation  of  aid  channels.  We  will  ensure  that  our  efforts  to  reduce  fragmentation  do  not  lead  to  
a  reduction  in  the  volume  and  quality  of  resources  available  to  support  development.  To  this  end:  
a) We  will,  by  2013,  make  greater  use  of  country-­‐led  co-­‐ordination  arrangements,   including  
division   of   labour,   as   well   as   programme-­‐based   approaches,   joint   programming   and  
delegated  co-­‐operation.  
b) We  will  improve  the  coherence  of  our  policies  on  multilateral  institutions,  global  funds  and  
programmes.   We   will   make   effective   use   of   existing   multilateral   channels,   focusing   on  
those  that  are  performing  well.  We  will  work  to  reduce  the  proliferation  of  these  channels  
and  will,  by  the  end  of  2012,  agree  on  principles  and  guidelines  to  guide  our  joint  efforts.  
As   they   continue   to   implement   their   respective   commitments   on   aid   effectiveness,  
multilateral  organisations,  global  funds  and  programmes  will  strengthen  their  participation  
in  co-­‐ordination  and  mutual  accountability  mechanisms  at  the  country,  regional  and  global  
levels.  
c) We   will   accelerate   efforts   to   address   the   issue   of   countries   that   receive   insufficient  
assistance,   agreeing   ʹ   by   the   end   of   2012   ʹ   on   principles   that  will   guide   our   actions   to  
address  this  challenge.  These  efforts  will  encompass  all  development  co-­‐operation  flows.    
d) Providers  of  development  co-­‐operation  will  deepen  and  accelerate  efforts  to  address  the  
problem   of   insufficient   delegation   of   authority   to   their   field   staff.   They   will   review   all  
aspects  of   their  operations,   including  delegation  of   financial  authority,   staffing,  and  roles  
and   responsibilities   in   the  design  and   implementation  of  development  programmes;   and  
they  will  implement  measures  that  address  the  remaining  bottlenecks.  
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Promoting  sustainable  development  in  situations  of  conflict  and  fragility  
26.   Fragile   states   are   for   the   large   part   off-­‐track   to  meet   the  Millennium  Development  Goals  
(MDGs).   Achieving   these   goals   will   depend   on   our   collective   ability   to   understand   the   unique  
challenges   facing   fragile   states,   overcome   these   challenges,   and   promote   foundations   for   lasting  
development.  We  welcome  the  New  Deal  developed  by  the  International  Dialogue  on  Peacebuilding  
and  Statebuilding,   including   the  g7+  group  of   fragile  and  conflict-­‐affected  states.  Those  of  us  who  
have  endorsed  the  New  Deal  will  pursue  actions  to  implement  it  and,  in  doing  so,  will  use:  
a) The   Peacebuilding   and   Statebuilding   Goals   (PSGs)   ʹ   which   prioritise   legitimate   politics,  
ƉĞŽƉůĞ͛Ɛ ƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ͕ ũƵƐƚŝĐĞ͕ ĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐ ĨŽƵŶĚĂƚŝŽŶƐ ĂŶĚ ƌĞǀĞŶƵĞƐ ĂŶĚ ĨĂŝƌ ƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƐ ʹ   as   an  
important   foundation   to  enable  progress   towards   the  MDGs   to  guide  our  work   in   fragile  
and  conflict-­‐affected  states.  
b) FOCUS  ʹ  a  new  country-­‐led  and  country-­‐owned  way  of  engaging  in  fragile  states.  
c) TRUST   ʹ   a   set   of   commitments   to   enhance   transparency;   manage   risk   to   use   country  
systems;   strengthen  national   capacities;   and   improve   the   timeliness   and  predictability  of  
aid  ʹ  to  achieve  better  results.  
Partnering  to  strengthen  resilience  and  reduce  vulnerability  in  the  face  of  adversity  
27.   We   must   ensure   that   development   strategies   and   programmes   prioritise   the   building   of  
resilience   among  people   and   societies   at   risk   from   shocks,   especially   in   highly   vulnerable   settings  
such  as  small  island  developing  states.  Investing  in  resilience  and  risk  reduction  increases  the  value  
and  sustainability  of  our  development  efforts.  To  this  end:  
a) Developing  countries  will  lead  in  integrating  resilience  to  shocks  and  measures  for  disaster  
management  within  their  own  policies  and  strategies.  
b) Responding   to   the   needs   articulated   by   developing   countries,   we   will   work   together   to  
invest   in   shock   resistant   infrastructure   and   social   protection   systems   for   at-­‐risk  
communities.   In   addition,  we  will   increase   the   resources,   planning   and   skills   for   disaster  
management  at  the  national  and  regional  levels.  
  9  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  www.busanhlf4.org   1  December  2011  
From  effective  aid  to  co-­‐operation  for  effective  development  
28.   Aid   is   only   part   of   the   solution   to   development.   It   is   now   time   to   broaden  our   focus   and  
attention   from   aid   effectiveness   to   the   challenges   of   effective   development.   This   calls   for   a  
framework  within  which:  
a) Development  is  driven  by  strong,  sustainable  and  inclusive  growth.  
b) 'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚƐ͛ŽǁŶƌĞǀĞŶƵĞƐƉůĂǇĂŐƌĞĂƚĞƌƌŽůĞ ŝŶĨŝŶĂŶĐŝŶŐƚŚĞŝƌĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚŶĞĞĚƐ͘ /Ŷ
turn,  governments  are  more  accountable  to  their  citizens  for  the  development  results  they  
achieve.  
c) Effective   state   and   non-­‐state   institutions   design   and   implement   their   own   reforms   and  
hold  each  other  to  account.  
d) Developing   countries   increasingly   integrate,   both   regionally   and   globally,   creating  
economies  of  scale  that  will  help  them  better  compete  in  the  global  economy.  
   To   this   effect,   we   will   rethink   what   aid   should   be   spent   on   and   how,   in   ways   that   are  
consistent  with  agreed  international  rights,  norms  and  standards,  so  that  aid  catalyses  development.  
29.   Effective   institutions   and   policies   are   essential   for   sustainable   development.   Institutions  
fulfilling   core   state   functions   should,   where   necessary,   be   further   strengthened,   alongside   the  
policies   and   practices   of   providers   of   development   co-­‐operation,   to   facilitate   the   leveraging   of  
resources   by   developing   countries.   Developing   countries   will   lead   in   efforts   to   strengthen   these  
institutions,  adapting  to  local  context  and  differing  stages  of  development.  To  this  end,  we  will:  
a) Support   the   implementation   of   institutional   and   policy   changes   led   by   developing  
countries,   resulting   in   effective   resource   mobilisation   and   service   delivery,   including  
national  and  sub-­‐national  institutions,  regional  organisations,  parliaments  and  civil  society.  
b) Assess   country   institutions,   systems   and   capacity   development   needs,   led   by   developing  
countries.  
c) Support   the   development   of   improved   evidence   on   institutional   performance   to   inform  
policy  formulation,  implementation  and  accountability,  led  by  developing  countries.  
d) Deepen  our   learning  on   the  determinants  of   success   for   institutional   reform,  exchanging  
knowledge  and  experience  at  the  regional  and  global  levels.  
South-­‐South  and  triangular  co-­‐operation  for  sustainable  development  
30.   The   inputs   to   sustainable   development   extend   well   beyond   financial   co-­‐operation   to   the  
knowledge  and  development  experience  of  all  actors  and  countries.  South-­‐South  and  triangular  co-­‐
ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶŚĂǀĞƚŚĞƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůƚŽƚƌĂŶƐĨŽƌŵĚĞǀĞůŽƉŝŶŐĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐ͛ƉŽůŝĐŝĞƐĂŶĚĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚĞƐƚŽƐĞƌǀŝĐĞ
delivery  by  bringing  effective,  locally  owned  solutions  that  are  appropriate  to  country  contexts.  
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31.   We  recognise  that  many  countries  engaged   in  South-­‐South  co-­‐operation  both  provide  and  
receive  diverse  resources  and  expertise  at  the  same  time,  and  that  this  should  enrich  co-­‐operation  
ǁŝƚŚŽƵƚ ĂĨĨĞĐƚŝŶŐ Ă ĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ͛Ɛ ĞůŝŐŝďŝůŝƚǇ ƚŽ ƌĞĐĞŝǀĞ ĂƐƐŝƐƚĂŶĐĞ ĨƌŽŵ ŽƚŚĞƌƐ͘tĞǁŝůů ƐƚƌĞŶŐƚŚĞŶ ƚŚĞ
sharing  of  knowledge  and  mutual  learning  by:  
a) Scaling   up   ʹ   where   appropriate   ʹ   the   use   of   triangular   approaches   to   development   co-­‐
operation.  
b) Making   fuller  use  of   South-­‐South  and   triangular   co-­‐operation,   recognising   the   success  of  
these  approaches  to  date  and  the  synergies  they  offer.  
c) Encouraging  the  development  of  networks  for  knowledge  exchange,  peer  learning  and  co-­‐
ordination   among   South-­‐South   co-­‐operation   actors   as   a   means   of   facilitating   access   to  
important  knowledge  pools  by  developing  countries.  
d) Supporting   efforts   to   strengthen   local   and   national   capacities   to   engage   effectively   in  
South-­‐South  and  triangular  co-­‐operation.  
Private  sector  and  development  
32.   We  recognise  the  central  role  of  the  private  sector  in  advancing  innovation,  creating  wealth,  
income  and   jobs,  mobilising  domestic   resources   and   in   turn   contributing   to  poverty   reduction.  To  
this  end,  we  will:  
a) Engage  with  representative  business  associations,  trade  unions  and  others  to  improve  the  
legal,   regulatory   and   administrative   environment   for   the   development   of   private  
investment;   and   also   to   ensure   a   sound   policy   and   regulatory   environment   for   private  
sector  development,   increased  foreign  direct   investment,  public-­‐private  partnerships,   the  
strengthening  of  value  chains  in  an  equitable  manner  and  giving  particular  consideration  to  
national  and  regional  dimensions,  and  the  scaling  up  of  efforts  in  support  of  development  
goals.  
b) Enable   the   participation   of   the   private   sector   in   the   design   and   implementation   of  
development  policies  and  strategies  to  foster  sustainable  growth  and  poverty  reduction.  
c) Further   develop   innovative   financial   mechanisms   to   mobilise   private   finance   for   shared  
development  goals.  
d) WƌŽŵŽƚĞ͞ĂŝĚ ĨŽƌ ƚƌĂĚĞ͟ĂƐĂŶĞŶŐŝŶĞŽĨƐƵƐƚĂŝŶĂďůĞĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ͕ ĨŽĐƵƐŝŶŐŽŶŽƵƚĐŽŵĞƐ
and  impact,  to  build  productive  capacities,  help  address  market  failures,  strengthen  access  
to   capital  markets   and   to  promote  approaches   that  mitigate   risk   faced  by  private   sector  
actors.  
e) Invite  representatives  of  the  public  and  private  sectors  and  related  organisations  to  play  an  
active  role  in  exploring  how  to  advance  both  development  and  business  outcomes  so  that  
they  are  mutually  reinforcing.  
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Combating  corruption  and  illicit  flows  
33.   Corruption  is  a  plague  that  seriously  undermines  development  globally,  diverting  resources  
that  could  be  harnessed  to   finance  development,  damaging  the  quality  of  governance   institutions,  
and  threatening  human  security.  It  often  fuels  crime  and  contributes  to  conflict  and  fragility.  We  will  
intensify   our   joint   efforts   to   fight   corruption   and   illicit   flows,   consistent  with   the   UN   Convention  
Against   Corruption   and   other   agreements   to   which  we   are   party,   such   as   the   OECD   Anti-­‐Bribery  
Convention.  To  this  end,  we  will:  
a) Implement   fully  our   respective  commitments   to  eradicate  corruption,  enforcing  our   laws  
and  promoting  a  culture  of  zero  tolerance  for  all  corrupt  practices.  This  includes  efforts  to  
improve   fiscal   transparency,   strengthen   independent   enforcement   mechanisms,   and  
extend  protection  for  whistleblowers.  
b) Accelerate   our   individual   efforts   to   combat   illicit   financial   flows   by   strengthening   anti  
money   laundering   measures,   addressing   tax   evasion,   and   strengthening   national   and  
international   policies,   legal   frameworks   and   institutional   arrangements   for   the   tracing,  
freezing   and   recovery   of   illegal   assets.   This   includes   ensuring   enactment   and  
implementation  of  laws  and  practices  that  facilitate  effective  international  co-­‐operation.  
Climate  change  finance  
34.   Global   climate   change   finance   is   expected   to   increase   substantially   in   the  medium   term.  
Recognising   that   this   resource   flow   brings   with   it   new   opportunities   and   challenges,   we   will  
endeavour   to   promote   coherence,   transparency   and   predictability   across   our   approaches   for  
effective  climate  finance  and  broader  development  co-­‐operation,  including  to:  
a) Continue   to   support   national   climate   change   policy   and   planning   as   an   integral   part   of  
ĚĞǀĞůŽƉŝŶŐ ĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐ͛ ŽǀĞƌĂůů ŶĂƚional   development   plans,   and   ensure   that   ʹ   where  
appropriate  ʹ   these  measures  are  financed,  delivered  and  monitored  through  developing  
ĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐ͛ƐǇƐƚĞŵƐŝŶĂƚƌĂŶƐƉĂƌĞŶƚŵĂŶŶĞƌ͘  
b) Continue   to   share   lessons   learned   in   development   effectiveness   with   those   entities  
engaged   in   climate   activities   and   ensure   that   broader   development   co-­‐operation   is   also  
informed  by  innovations  in  climate  finance.  
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The  road  ahead:  Partnering  for  progress  towards  and  beyond  the  MDGs  
35.   We   will   hold   each   other   accountable   for   making   progress   against   the   commitments   and  
actions  agreed   in  Busan,  alongside   those   set  out   in   the  Paris  Declaration  on  Aid  Effectiveness  and  
Accra  Agenda  for  Action.  To  this  end,  we  will:  
a) At   the   level   of   individual   developing   countries,   agree   on   frameworks   based   on   national  
needs  and  priorities   for  monitoring  progress  and  promoting  mutual  accountability   in  our  
efforts  to  improve  the  effectiveness  of  our  co-­‐operation  and,  in  turn,  development  results.  
Developing  countries  will  lead  in  the  elaboration  of  such  frameworks  which,  together  with  
any  indicators  and  targets  agreed,  will  respond  to  their  specific  needs  and  will  be  grounded  
in  their  aid  and  development  policies.  The  results  of  these  exercises  will  be  made  public.  
b) Agree,   by   June   2012,   on   a   selective   and   relevant   set   of   indicators   and   targets   through  
which  we  will  monitor   progress   on   a   rolling   basis,   supporting   international   and   regional  
accountability  for  the  implementation  of  our  commitments.  We  will  build  on  the  initiatives  
led   by   developing   countries   and   learn   from   existing   international   efforts   to  monitor   aid  
effectiveness.   We   will   review   these   arrangements   in   the   context   of   the   post-­‐MDG  
framework.  We  will  periodically  publish  the  results  of  these  exercises.  
c) Support   initiatives   at   the   national   and   regional   levels   led   by   developing   countries   that  
strengthen  capacities   to  monitor  progress  and  evaluate   the   impact  of  efforts   to   improve  
development  effectiveness.  
36.   We  accept  that  the  strengthening  of  our  co-­‐operation  and  the  adherence  to  both  common  
goals   and   differential   commitments   calls   for   continued   high-­‐level   political   support,   as   well   as   an  
inclusive   space   for   dialogue,   mutual   learning   and   accountability   at   the   global   level.   Regional  
organisations   can  and   should  play   an   important   role   in   supporting   implementation  at   the   country  
level,  and  in  linking  country  priorities  with  global  efforts.  The  UN  Development  Cooperation  Forum  is  
also   invited   to   play   a   role   in   consulting   on   the   implementation   of   agreements   reached   in   Busan.  
To  this  end,  we  will:  
a) Establish  a  new,  inclusive  and  representative  Global  Partnership  for  Effective  Development  
Co-­‐operation   to   support   and   ensure   accountability   for   the   implementation   of  
commitments   at   the   political   level.   This   Partnership   will   offer   an   open   platform   that  
embraces   diversity,   providing   a   forum   for   the   exchange   of   knowledge   and   the   regular  
review  of  progress.  
b) Agree,  by  June  2012,  on  light  working  arrangements  for  this  Global  Partnership,  including  
its   membership   and   opportunities   for   regular   ministerial-­‐level   engagement   that  
complements,  and  is  undertaken  in  conjunction  with,  other  fora.  
c) Call  on  the  Working  Party  on  Aid  Effectiveness  (WP-­‐EFF)  to  convene  representatives  of  all  
countries  and  stakeholders  endorsing  this  document  with  a  view  to  reaching  agreement  on  
the  working   arrangements   for   the  Global   Partnership   ʹ   and   the   indicators   and   channels  
through  which  global  monitoring  and  accountability  will  be  supported  ʹ  in  preparation  for  
the  phasing  out  of  the  WP-­‐EFF  and  its  associated  structures  in  June  2012.    
d) Invite   the   Organisation   for   Economic   Co-­‐operation   and   Development   and   the   United  
Nations   Development   Programme   to   support   the   effective   functioning   of   the   Global  
Partnership,   building   on   their   collaboration   to   date   and   their   respective   mandates   and  
areas  of  comparative  advantage. 
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K. PEFA Public Finance Management High-Level Performance Indicators Set 
 
The PFM High-Level Performance Indicator Set  
Overview of the indicator set 
(from PEFA Secretariat, 2005: 9) 
  
  A. PFM-OUT-TURNS:  Credibility of the budget  
PI-1  Aggregate expenditure out-turn compared to original approved budget  
PI-2  Composition of expenditure out-turn compared to original approved budget  
PI-3  Aggregate revenue out-turn compared to original approved budget  
PI-4  Stock and monitoring of expenditure payment arrears  
  B. KEY CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES: Comprehensiveness and Transparency  
PI-5  Classification of the budget  
PI-6  Comprehensiveness of information included in budget documentation  
PI-7  Extent of unreported government operations  
PI-8  Transparency of inter-governmental fiscal relations  
PI-9  Oversight of aggregate fiscal risk from other public sector entities.  
PI-10  Public access to key fiscal information  
  C. BUDGET CYCLE  
  C(i) Policy-Based Budgeting  
PI-11  Orderliness and participation in the annual budget process  
PI-12  Multi-year perspective in fiscal planning, expenditure policy and budgeting  
  C(ii) Predictability and Control in Budget Execution  
PI-13  Transparency of taxpayer obligations and liabilities   
PI-14  Effectiveness of measures for taxpayer registration and tax assessment  
PI-15  Effectiveness in collection of tax payments   
PI-16  Predictability in the availability of funds for commitment of expenditures  
PI-17  Recording and management of cash balances, debt and guarantees  
PI-18  Effectiveness of payroll controls  
PI-19  Competition, value for money and controls in procurement  
PI-20  Effectiveness of internal controls for non-salary expenditure  
PI-21  Effectiveness of internal audit  
  C(iii) Accounting, Recording  and Reporting  
PI-22  Timeliness and regularity of  accounts reconciliation  
PI-23  Availability of information on resources received by service delivery units  
PI-24  Quality and timeliness of in-year budget reports  
PI-25  Quality and timeliness of annual financial statements  
  C(iv) External Scrutiny and Audit  
PI-26  Scope, nature and follow-up of external audit  
PI-27  Legislative scrutiny of the annual budget law  
PI-28  Legislative scrutiny of external audit reports  
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  D. DONOR PRACTICES  
D-1  Predictability of Direct Budget Support  
D-2  Financial information provided by donors for budgeting and reporting on project and 
program aid  
D-3  Proportion of aid that is managed by use of national procedures  
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L. Malawi’s 2006 and 2007 Performance Assessment Frameworks 
 
Malawi’s 2006 Performance Assessment Framework indicators: achievements 
against 2006 targets 
(from European Commission, DFID, Norwegian Embassy, African Development 
Bank, 2007) 
 
Public Finance Management  
Indicator  Achievements against 2006 targets  
1 Macro  The target was achieved.  
PRGF is on track as of 3rd Review on 14/03/2007.  
2 Budget 
Comprehensiveness  
The target was achieved.  
All donors who provided data within deadline were recorded 
in budget documents.  
3 Budget Outturn  The target was achieved.  
Variance in expenditure composition exceeded overall 
deviation in primary expenditure by 2% - within the 10% limit.  
4 PPE Outturn  The target was achieved.   
Variance in actual PPE expenditure exceeded overall 
deviation by 0.5% - within the 5% limit.  
5 Health Outturn  The target was not achieved   
Actual ORT expenditure was 35.7% above budget while 
overall deviation was minus 16.4%.  
6 Education Outturn  The target was not achieved.  
Actual ORT expenditure was 33.2% above budget while 
overall deviation was minus 16.4%.  
7 Payroll  The target was achieved.  
The reconciliation of the payroll with the backlog of personnel 
data by December 2006 was completed.  
8 Internal Audit  The target was achieved.  
According to GoM internal audit units are functioning in all 
ministries and reports are issued regularly to the line 
ministries, the Ministry of Finance and the NAO.   
9 Public Accounts  The target was not achieved.  
Final accounts for FY 2005/06 have not been submitted 
within 6 months.  
10 External Audit  The target was partly achieved.  
For FY 2004/05 NAO will be able to audit more than 50 % of 
expenditure of ministries and departments. However, the 
audit report for 2004/05 was not submitted to Parliament by 
December 2006.  
11 External Scrutiny  The target was achieved.  
Scrutiny of the audit report for FY 2002/03 is completed.  
Social Sectors 
Indicator  Achievements against 2006 targets  
12 Pupil per 
teacher in rural 
area  
The target was not achieved.  
2006 ratio was 90:1 against a target of 75:1  
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13 Female Literacy 
rate  
The target was achieved.  
The indicator is at 56% against a target of 55%.  
14 Survival rate  The target was achieved.  
The survival rate for 2006 is at 53.3% for boys and 52.9% for 
girls against targets of 52% for boys and 48% for girls.  
15 Immunization  The target was not achieved.  
The indicator was reported at 82% in 2006 against a target of 
85%.   
16 Birth attended 
by skilled staff  
The target was achieved.  
Indicator reported at 40% in line with PAF target at 40%.  
17 Nurses per 
population ratio  
The target was achieved.  
The ratio for 2006 is at 1:3,653, exceeding the target of 
1:3,900  
18 People alive on 
ART  
The target was achieved.  
The indicator as of end of 2006 is above target of 60,000.   
19 Women in 
decision making 
positions  
The target was achieved.  
2006 figure was 18.4% against a target of 16%  
Governance 
Indicator  Achievement against 2006 PAF  
20 MGDS  The target was partly achieved.  
MGDS approved in Nov 2006. M&E Road Map not aligned with 
MGDS yet.  
21 Constitution and 
the Rule of Law  
a) The target was not achieved. 
Position on Local Government Elections was not regularized 
by February 2007.  
b) The target was not achieved 
Legislation not presented to Parliament.  
22 Elections  a) The target was partly achieved  
MEC strategic plan revised and partly implemented. 
Commissioners are not appointed. b) The target can not be 
assessed.  
No elections were held in 2006.  
23 Corruption  The target was achieved.  
The 15 cases completed during the designated period were 
concluded in an average of 8.3 months.  
24 Corruption  The target was achieved.  
73% of completed cases were concluded within 12 months.  
25 Corruption  The target was achieved.  
DPP did not refuse any ACB requests to prosecute and DPP 
consents were given within a reasonable time.  
26 Procurement  The target was achieved.  
All ministries, departments and agencies included in the target 
complied with the reporting requirement.  
27 GoM Funding  The target was partly achieved.  
Actual recurrent expenditure for governance institutions in 
05/06 was increased in real term from 04/05 but for the Malawi 
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Electoral Commission and Legal Aid Department.  
28 Prisons  a) The target was partly achieved.  
There was a 28% decline in the number of pre-trial detainees 
exceeding the maximum permitted remand period in 2006. 
Good progress was made. 
 b) The target was not achieved.  
The number of deaths in prison due to poor nutrition, HIV/AIDS 
etc. was at 19/10,000 in 2006 according to prisons figures.  
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Malawi’s 2007 Performance Assessment Framework (Mai 2007) 
 
 
No Indicator Baseline Target for 2008 review 
Public Financial Management Indicators 
1 Overall macroeconomic  
programme implemented 
PRGF programme signed in 
August  2005 
On track with IMF as of the latest 
IMF quarterly review. 
2 Predictability & 
comprehensiveness : 
Disbursement estimates 
are provided by donors 
and are reflected in 
budget documentation. 
Not all CABS donors provide 
estimates of budget support 
disbursements in the medium 
term in accordance with Joint 
Framework. 
Baseline : 
FY 06/07 for 2007 review. 
FY 07/08 for 2008 review. 
FY 08/09 for 2009 review. 
(i)For FY 2007/08: Same as for FY 
06/07 + UN-system, JICA and CIDA  
are included in budget documents. 
 
(ii) All CABS members disburse 
budget support for FY 2007/08 
according to estimates provided to 
GoM. 
 
(iii) All CABS members provide 
indicative information on the size 
and timing of budget support 
disbursement for FY 2008/09 and 
2009/10. 
 
3 
 
 
Composition of 
expenditure out-turn 
compared to original 
approved budget. 
FY 05/06 for 2007 review. 
FY 06/07 for 2008 review. 
FY 07/08 for 2009 review. 
For FY 06/07, variance in 
expenditure composition exceeded 
overall deviation in primary 
expenditure by no more than 10%. 
4 
 
Budgeted ORT 
appropriations  
FY 05/06 for 2008 review. For FY 07/08, budgeted ORT will be 
no lower as a proportion of primary 
expenditure than their FY 2005/06 
level 
5 Improved budget process IMF 2007 Review of Budget 
Process. 
Introduce budget calendar that 
incorporates all budget related 
activities by Dec. 2007. 
6 Improved payroll  
management  
Situation as of end December 
2006 for 2007 review. 
Situation as of end of 
December 2007 for 2008 
review. 
Situation as of end of Dec 2008 
for 2009 review. 
 Conduct review of the HRMIS and 
start implementation of  a time 
bound Action Plan by Dec 2007. 
7 
 
Timeliness of annual 
financial statements 
FY05/06 for 2007 review. 
FY 06/07 for 2008 review. 
FY 07/08 for 2009 review. 
Baseline : FY05/06 not 
submitted within 6 months. 
Consolidated GoM statement is 
submitted for external audit within 6 
months of the end of FY. 
8 Improved timeliness and 
follow up of external audit  
FY04/05 for 2007 review. 
FY 03/04 and FY05/06 for 2008 
review. 
FY 04/05 and FY 06/07 for 
2009 review. 
 
(i) Audit report on FY 05/06 
submitted to legislature by Dec. 
2007. 
 
(ii) Report on audit related 
recommendations by the Public 
Accounts Committee on the Audit 
Report for FY 03/04 is issued by 
OPC by Dec. 2007. 
9 Improved debt 
management 
Policy is in draft form. Cabinet approves Debt and Aid 
Management policy by Dec. 2007. 
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No Indicator Baseline Target for 2008 review 
10 Improved GoM 
procurement capacity. 
Only MoF and ACB complying 
with reporting in 2005  
 
Number of IPCs and SPUs at 
February 2007: 
IPCs – 170 (100%) 
SPUs – 29 (17%) 
(i) 30% increase in  number of SPUs 
by Dec 2007. 
 
(ii) SPUs are functional in the 10  
largest spending institutions1 by Dec 
2007. 
 
(iii) IPCs number is maintained as at 
Dec 2007. 
 
11 Proportion of  Required  
Routine and Periodic 
Road Maintenance 
Expenditure Financed 
Domestically 
35% 
(FY 2006/2007) 
By December 2007 Cabinet 
approves staged plan to achieve 
100% domestic funding of required 
routine and periodic road 
maintenance by FY 2010/11. 
Economic Growth and Social Protection Indicators 
12 Improved business 
environment  through 
improvements in the legal 
framework 
Average number of days to 
settle commercial disputes is 
337 days in 2006 
 
Average number of days to get 
a business license is 185 days 
in 2006 
(i) Average number of days to settle 
commercial disputes is 290 or less 
in 2007. 
 
(ii) Average number of days to get a 
business license is 135 days or less 
in 2007. 
13 Improved functioning of 
agricultural output markets 
As of 2006  
(i) three satellite auction floors 
are established  
(ii) strategic refocusing of 
ADMARC has started by 
winding down non-core 
business interests held through 
AIHC 
(i) MAWTCO established and 
operational in 2007. 
 
(ii) Substantial progress in ADMARC 
re-structuring as proposed in the 
agreed business plans in 2007. 
 
 
14 Improved functioning of 
agricultural input markets 
As of 2006,  
(i) Implemented a targeted 
fertilizer and seed subsidy 
program that included private 
sector participation in fertilizer 
distribution. 
(ii) Recruited and deployed 24 
District Land Officers and 55 
Land Clerks 
(i)Maintain at least FY06/07 levels of 
private sector participation in the 
supply and distribution of fertilizer 
under the subsidy programme. 
 
(ii)Start  performance assessment of 
private sector involvement in 
wholesale and retail trade based on 
agreed performance indicators by 
Dec. 2007. 
 
15 Improved coordination and 
coverage of social 
protection programs 
No coordination of Social 
Protection Programs. 
Cabinet approval of new Social 
Protection Policy with a clear 
implementation program of specific 
programs and begin its 
implementation by Dec. 2007. 
Social Sectors Indicators2 
16 Pupil per qualified teacher 
ratio in primary schools in 
rural areas 
2005 baseline for rural 74:1 2007 SY 84:1 or less  
                                                 
1 The 10 largest spending institutions are as follows: Min. of Education, Min. of Health, Min. of Agriculture and Food Security, 
Min. of Irrigation and Water Development, Min. of Transport, Lilongwe Water Board, Blantyre Water Board, Nothern Region 
Water Board, ESCOM , ADMARC. 
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No Indicator Baseline Target for 2008 review 
17 Survival rate in standard 5 
and Girl’s survival rate in 
Std 8 
(i) 51.8% in 2005 for Boys (std 
5) 
 
(ii) 47.6% in 2005 for Girls (std 
5) 
 
(iii) 22.9% in 2005 of girls (Std 
8)  
(i) 55% or above for 2007 SY for 
Boys 
 
(ii) 55% or above for 2007 SY for 
Girls 
 
(iii) 30% or above  in 2007 SY for 
Girls (std 8) 
18 Minimum increase in 
proportion of one year 
olds immunised against 
measles: 
 
i)  Districts below 80% 
level 3 
 
ii) National level 
As at June 2005: national level 
at 82%  
As at June 2007 
 
(i) 75% of the districts (9 out of 12) 
show a +2% or more increase on 
June 06 data and none declined. 
 
(ii) Maintain National level at least at 
the level of June 2006.  
19 
 
Proportion of birth 
attended by skilled health 
personnel. 
38% in 2005 42%  by June 2007 
 
 
20 Nurse  population ratio 1:4000 in 2005 1:3,500 by June 2007 
21 % of health facilities with 
at least the minimum 
package of PMTCT 
services   
Baseline 2005 is  
 7% 
 
33% 
  22 Women in Decision 
making positions 
 
15% in 2005 (i) 19% in 2007 
 
 
Governance Indicators 
 
 
 23 
 
Government compliance 
with the Constitution and 
rule of law. 
(i) Local elections not held in 
line with the Constitution. 
 
(ii) Ratio of tried criminal cases 
against registered criminal 
cases in the year for magistrate 
courts and for high courts. 
a. For Magistrate court :2005: 
63.6%, 2006:70% 
b. For High court : 2004:83%, 
2005 : 65.7%; 2006: not 
provided 
 
(iii) Weak compliance with 
constitutional provisions on 
declaration of assets 
 
(i) Bill to clarify the position on local 
elections presented to Parliament by 
July 2007. 
 
(ii) a. Magistrate Court: 73% in 
2007. 
 
(ii) b. High Court : 75% in 2007. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(iii) Legislation in accordance with 
international standards based upon 
the recommendations from the 
Special Law Commission tabled  in 
Parliament by December 2007 
 
 
24 
 
Elections judged free and 
fair by local civil society 
and international 
observers  
2004 elections judged free but 
not entirely fair because of 
abuse of incumbency by ruling 
party 
(a)  
(i) MEC Action Plan being 
implemented in accordance with the 
Project Support Document. 
                                                 
3 The 12 districts below 80% as at June 06 are: Chitipa (75%), Nkhatabay (70%), Dedza (74%), Lilongwe (66%), 
Nkhotakota (72%), Ntcheu (75%), Balaka (73%), Chiradzulu (67%), Mangochi (63%), Nsanje (78%), Phalombe (70%), 
Thyolo (74%).  
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No Indicator Baseline Target for 2008 review 
 
 (a)  MEC in need of reform to 
be more competent and 
impartial 
 
 
 
 
(b)  MEC weak in managing 
election environment. Freedom 
House assessed media as 
partly free in 2005. 
Score is 54 in 2005 and 55 in 
2006. 
 
 
 
 
(ii) Electoral Commissioners 
appointed in accordance with the 
Constitution and fulfilling their legal 
mandate 
 
 
 
 
(b) Communications Act modified to 
provide for independent Board for 
public media 
25 Corruption: 
Number of ACB 
investigations 
concluded. 
260 per year. 360 per year in 2007 
 
26 Total number of cases 
in the court system for 
over 2 years 
22 cases 15 cases in 2007 
27 Number of corruption 
risk assessments 
conducted and 
percentage share of 
prioritised 
recommendations 
implemented in selected 
public institutions  
Baseline is the Governance 
and Corruption Baseline 
Survey.  
 
No risk assessment have 
been conducted. 
  
a) 1 corruption risk assessments 
conducted per year in 2007 and 
 
b) 30% of prioritised 
recommendations implemented 
in 2007 
28 Prison conditions 
No of deaths in prison – 
as result of poor nutrition, 
HIV / AIDS, etc. 
14 deaths per month per 
10,000 prison population in 
2005 
17 death per month per 10,000 
29 Actual recurrent 
expenditure to 
Governance institutions 
FY 05/06 At a minimum actual recurrent 
expenditure  in FY 2006/07 is 
maintained at 2005/06 level in real 
terms 
 
 
